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The writing of this monograph has a long history. I began my career as lecturer 
in World History at the Faculty of History, Vietnam National University, Hanoi, 
with a special interest in the maritime history of Southeast Asia. Trading 
activities in the Straits of Melaka in the fifteenth century was the topic I 
intended to pursue when I applied to the Encompass (Encountering a Common 
Past in Asia) programme at the Faculty of History, Leiden University in the 
summer of 2006. In Leiden, I became fascinated with its distinguished tradition 
of Indonesian studies, and in next to no time I realized that I had better switch 
my attention to Indonesia. Under the supervision of Professor Leonard Blussé 
and Dr Alicia Schrikker, respectively director and co-ordinator of Encompass, I 
wrote my second BA thesis about the Dutch conquest of Makassar in 1666-
1669. Makassar was a trading town south of Sulawesi in the eastern part of 
Indonesian Archipelago. I had then the chance to explore the western part of the 
Archipelago when I conducted my MPhil research on Dutch imperialist 
expansion in Sumatra in the nineteenth and the early twentieth century. In 
addition to the continuing supervision of Professor Leonard Blussé, I received 
guidance from Dr Thomas Lindblad. 
Whether or not it was the intention of my supervisors, my studies at BA 
and MPhil levels were an excellent preparation for undertaking advanced 
research in Indonesian history. It provided me with the historical and 
geographical knowledge of Indonesia necessary to understand the country in 
more recent times. In my PhD project I have looked at Indonesia as a whole in 
the dramatic historical period which stretched from the late colonial era to 
immediate post-independence period. After having learned about the 
establishment of Dutch imperialism and colonialism in Indonesian Archipelago, 
in this new project I wanted to explore how decolonization took place and what 
alternative form of state the Indonesians sought to build after independence. 
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Comparison came to my mind only after I had discovered that the economic 
transition from colonialism to independence in Indonesia displayed many 
affinities with Vietnam. As we shall see, in comparison with other countries in 
Southeast Asia, the nationalist struggle for economic sovereignty in Indonesia 
and Vietnam culminated in very radical ends.   
This research forms part of a larger research project, ‘State and 
Economy in Modern Indonesia’s Changes of Regimes’, financed by the 
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (Nederlandse Organisatie voor 
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek-NWO). The tradition of Leiden University does 
not allow a PhD candidate to thank his supervisors in the acknowledgements. 
Yet I think I may be permitted to point out that it was Dr Thomas Lindblad who 
selected me for his research project and who guided me from the initial stage of 
writing a research proposal right up to the final stage of completing the 
manuscript. His extensive knowledge of the economic history of Indonesia has 
been of the greatest help whenever I had any difficulty in understanding a 
historical fact or the data I had collected. As his assistant in organizing history 
classes and as co-organizer of an international conference, I was able to gain 
precious teaching and work experience. Professor Leonard Blussé offered 
valuable comments and advice during my research and helped to correct the 
final drafts. I also would like to thank my project-partner, Farabi Fakih, who 
shared the same office and often travelled with me to various conferences. I 
have learnt a lot from him because of his wide knowledge about Indonesia, not 
to mention his enthusiasm in teaching me his mother tongue, Bahasa Indonesia. 
My gratitude goes to many other teachers, colleagues and staff at the 
Institute for History of Leiden University who have helped me in some way or 
another. The Academic Director of the Institute, Dr Leo Lucassen, and the 
Director of Research, Dr Peter Meel, have both been very helpful in providing 
administrative assistance and the support needed for my research. During my 
presentations at various seminars and conferences within the Institute, I 
received valuable comments and remarks from Professor Jos Gommans, 
Professor David Henley, Professor Marlou Schrover, Dr Jeroen Touwen, Dr 
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Alicia Schrikker, Dr Carolien Stolte and many others. I am grateful to all of 
them. Special thanks go to Ariel Lopez and Liesbeth Rosen Jacobson, PhD 
candidates at the Institute, for being my paranymphs at the defence ceremony. 
They have earned a place in my life for their moral support and cherished 
friendship. 
Many scholars and experts outside the Institute have also offered me 
valuable comments and advice. I would like to thank Professor Peer Vries 
(Vienna University), Professor Ann Booth (SOAS), the late Professor Thee 
Kian Wie (LIPI), Professor Bambang Purwanto (UGM), Professor John Kleinen 
(VU), Professor Oscar Salemink (Copenhagen University), Professor Adam 
Fforde (University of Melbourne), Professor Anthony Reid (ANU), Professor 
Robert Cribb (ANU), Professor Gerry van Klinken (KITLV), Professor Ewout 
Frankema (Utrecht University), Dr Remco Raben (Utrecht University) and Dr 
Philippe Peycam (IIAS). Parts of this dissertation have been presented at 
various conferences in Amsterdam (Netherlands), Vienna (Austria), Brussels 
(Belgium), Glasgow (Scotland), Stellenbosch (South Africa), Mumbai (India), 
Singapore and Hanoi (Vietnam). I am grateful to all the participants in these 
conferences for their remarks and criticisms.  
My research has required the use of many different languages. 
Therefore, I thank my language teachers, Ton Harmsen, Yolande Spaans and 
René Wezel, for teaching me Dutch. Their patience and the effort they put into 
the classes as well as into organizing social activities for me and other 
Encompass colleagues are memorable. My Indonesian was acquired from 
lessons with Suryadi and Aone van Engelenhoven at Leiden and teachers at the 
Indonesian Language Center, Alam Bahasa, in Yogyakarta, where I had a two-
month intensive course in summer 2010. All of them made it possible for me to 
read and use Dutch and Indonesian archives.   
My very special thanks to ‘tante’ Marijke van Wissen-van Staden, 
secretary of Encompass. She was always available when I needed help and she 
supported me without fail in all possible ways.  
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My seven-year stay in Leiden was made enjoyable thanks to the many 
friends and groups which became part of my life. It is not possible to name all 
of them here but some should be mentioned: Abdul Wahid, Andreas Weber, 
Anda Zara,Agus Suwignyo, Cynthia Viallé, Esther Zwinkels, F.X. Widiarso, 
Jajang Nurjaman, Johny Kusyairi, Julinta Hutagalung, Hying Jeenmai, Intan 
Ludwina, Li Wen, L()ng Minh Ng*c, Manjusha Kuruppath, Monique Erkelens, 
Murari Jha, Nadeera Seneviratne, Nadia Fauziah, Ngo T.T. Lam, Nguy+n B,o 
Trang, Prima Nurrahmi, Ravando Lie, Ratih Kamiso, Rennie Roos, Sanne 
Ravensbergen, Uji Nugroho, Widaratih Kamiso, Xu Xiaodong, Yedda Palemeq 
and Yudi Bachrioktora. I thank all of them and many others for their time and 
companionship. 
I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to Rosemary Robson for her 
help in correcting and improving my English. She offered many wonderful 
suggestions to improve the quality of this dissertation. I am indebted to Marek 
Avé and Abdul Wahid for translating my summary into Dutch and Bahasa 
Indonesia. 
I would like to acknowledge the assistance that I received from the 
authorities and staff of the archives and libraries I visited in the course of my 
research, including the National Archives and the Royal Library in The Hague, 
the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI), the archive and library of Bank 
Indonesia in Jakarta, the National Library and the Vietnam National University 
Library in Hanoi, the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 
(KITLV) and the University Library in Leiden. I owe a debt of gratitude to staff 
of these institutions for their promptness in providing the books and archives I 
requested for my research. 
My study in the Netherlands received generous support from Vietnam. I 
am grateful to Professor Nguy+n V%n Kim and Dr Hoàng Anh Tu-n who 
introduced me to the Encompass scholarship and subsequently encouraged and 
supported me to continue to pursue a PhD in the Netherlands. I especially thank 
the Dean of the Faculty of History of the University of Social Sciences and 
Humanities, Vietnam National University, Hanoi, the late Professor Nguy+n 
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H,i K#, who incessantly granted me permission to take a study leave for almost 
seven years. The then Dean of the Faculty, Professor V. V%n Quân, was also 
very kind in extending the permission. I am thankful to him and all other 
colleagues at the Faculty for their administrative and moral support during my 
study in the Netherlands. 
Lastly, I would like to express my love and gratitude to my family. I am 
grateful to my parents, brother and sister who have supported me in all my 
pursuits. To my beloved wife, Tr/n Th0 Nhung, I owe a huge debt of gratitude 
for her sacrifice, patience and all the work she shouldered during my long 
absence from home. I especially thank her for bringing me the wonderful gift, 
my little daughter, Ph$m Hà Ph()ng. Ever since they joined me in Leiden for 







‘Political independence, without economic 
independence, is but an illusion.’ -Kwame 
Nkrumah, President of Ghana 
 
 
1. The Subject 
Anyone surveying official documents relating to the historical connections 
between Indonesia and Vietnam comes across statements to the effect that 
Indonesia and Vietnam have shared a common historical background. 
References are repeatedly made to the fact that both countries suffered a similar 
form of colonial oppression and that their struggles for independence were 
analogous. On his visit to Indonesia in February and March 1959, for instance, 
the Vietnamese President H! Chí Minh called attention to the coincidental 
births of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Republic of 
Indonesia in their ‘August Revolutions’ of 1945. He compared the ongoing 
Indonesian struggle to liberate West Irian with the Vietnamese efforts to unify 
North and South Vietnam.1 Likewise, when the Indonesian President, Soekarno, 
paid a return visit to Vietnam four months later, he reiterated the theme of the 
common struggle of the Vietnamese and Indonesian people against colonialism 
and imperialism. Soekarno considered the Vietnamese and Indonesians 
‘comrades-in-arms’ (kawan-kawan seperjuangan) and stated that they would be 
found to be the same were one to remove their political skin.2 Similar 
statements can also be found in the speech by Prime Minister Ph$m V%n 1!ng 
when he received President Soekarno in June 19593 or the addresses by the 
                    
1 Nhân dân [The People], 28 February, 1-8 March 1959; Quân !"i nhân dân [the People’s Army] 
3, 10, 14 March 1959; Soekarno and H! Chí Minh, State visit to Indonesia of the President of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Dr. H# Chí Minh/ Speeches by President Soekarno and 
President H# Chí Minh (Jakarta: Ministry of Information, R.I. 1959) 26. 
2 Quân !"i nhân dân [the People’s Army] 23-27 June 1959; Soekarno, Presiden Repoeblik 
Indonesia di Vietnam, 24 Juni-29 Juni 1959 (Jakarta: Pemuda 1959).  
3 Soekarno, Presiden Repoeblik Indonesia di Vietnam, 27. 
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Vietnamese Minister of Defence, General V%n Ti#n D.ng, Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of Indonesia General Benny Moerdani and the 
Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, when they 
met in Hanoi in February 1984.4 
Leaving aside the rhetoric which diplomacy often requires, no one 
would argue that there are not certain congruities in the history of Indonesia and 
Vietnam. Despite this consensus, so far scholarly writing has paid remarkably 
little attention to comparisons between Indonesian and Vietnamese history. 
Only a few authors can be mentioned. David Henley has written an article 
analysing the contrast between the nationalist movements in the pre-war 
Netherlands Indies and French Indochina.5 Hans Antlöv and Stein Tønnesson 
have carried out a joint project comparing the immediate post-war years in 
Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia.6 The efforts of Burhan Magenda and Colbert 
Evelyn, who have adopted a comparative approach in discussing the revolutions 
and decolonization in Indonesia and Vietnam, are among them.7 While he 
bemoans the inadequate attention paid to comparative research on Indonesia and 
Vietnam, William Frederick offers a wide range of themes which can be applied 
in any comparison of the Indonesian and Vietnamese revolutions.8 Other 
scholars engaging in research on Indonesia and Vietnam have principally been 
                    
4 For the speech of Ph$m V%n 1!ng see: Soekarno, Presiden Repoeblik Indonesia di Vietnam, the 
meeting between V%n Ti#n D.ng, Moerdani and Mochtar in: Kompas; Harian pagi untuk 
umum, 18 February 1984. 
5 David E.F. Henley, ‘Ethnogeographical integration and exclusion in anticolonial nationalism; 
Indonesia and Indochina’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 37 (1995) 286-324. 
6 Stein Tønnesson, ‘Filling the power vacuum; 1945 in French Indochina, The Netherlands East 
Indies and British Malaya’ and Hans Antlöv, ‘Rulers in imperial policy; Sultan Ibrahim, 
Emperor B,o 1$i and Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX’ in Hans Antlöv and Stein Tønnesson (eds) 
Imperial policy and Southeast Asian nationalism (London: NIAS and Curzon Press, 1995) 110-
143 and 227-260, respectively. 
7 Burhan D. Magenda ‘The Indonesian and Vietnamese revolutions in comparison: An 
exploratory analysis, Prisma 9 (1978) 53-66; Colbert, Evelyn, ‘Reconsideration; The road not 
taken; Decolonization and independence in Indonesia and Indochina’, Foreign Affairs 51 (1973) 
608-628. 




concerned with the historical relations between the two countries, although 
comparisons do occasionally crop up as part of the analysis.9 
In short, ample opportunities remain for comparative studies on 
Indonesia and Vietnam, the two first colonies in Southeast Asia to declare their 
independence, but afterwards they chose to follow rather different paths of 
decolonization and nation-building.10 Previous comparisons have tended to 
focus on the nationalist movements and the political and military dimensions of 
the revolutions in both countries. This divergence of choice has narrowed the 
field of attention, tending to limit it to the nationalist struggles leading to the 
1945 Proclamation of Independence in both countries, the revolutionary wars 
against the re-establishment of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia (1945-1949) and 
French colonialism in Vietnam (1945-1954) and a comparison between the 
unification of Vietnam (1975) and the incorporation of West Irian into 
Indonesia (1962). To this date, the accompanying nationalist struggles of the 
two countries to transform their colonial economies into national economies, 
free of the imperialist control by foreigners, have never been treated in a 
comparative framework.11 
The absence of comparative research on the nationalist struggles to 
achieve economic independence in Indonesia and Vietnam can be attributed to 
                    
9 For discussions on Indonesia-Vietnam relations see the proceedings of the Second Indonesia-
Vietnam Seminar held in Jakarta in February 1985, published on Indonesian Quarterly XIII 
(1985) 153-236. Some notable article are: The opening remarks delivered by Soedjono 
Hoemardani, Cao Xuân Ph2’s Vietnam-Indonesia concurrences; Past and Present, and Hadi 
Soesastro’s Indonesia-Vietnam relations; Trade and beyond. See also: Arnold C. Brackman, 
‘Indonesia and North Vietnam’, Asian Affairs 1 (1973) 49-56; Leo Suryadinata, ‘Indonesia-
Vietnam relations under Soeharto’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12 (1991) 331-346, and 
Tr0nh Th0 Ng*c Di'p, Indonesia’s foreign policy toward Vietnam (PhD dissertation, University 
of Hawaii, Hawaii, 1995). 
10 Indonesia and Vietnam are actually important parts of T(3ng V.’s systematic comparison of 
four Asian countries: South Korea, Vietnam, China and Indonesia. However, his book looks at 
the political aspects of state formation and their impacts on development, rather than economic 
decolonization and transformation. See: T(3ng V., Paths to development in Asia; South Korea, 
Vietnam, China, and Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
11 There is one volume about the transition to national economies in Southeast Asia edited by 
Frank H. Golay, Ralph Anspach, M. Ruth Pfanner, and Eliezer B. Ayal. Nevertheless, the book 
discusses each country separately and only a brief section about South Vietnam is provided. 
See: Frank H. Golay, Ralph Anspach, M.Ruth Pfanner and Eliezer B. Ayal, Underdevelopment 
and economic nationalism in Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969). 
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the difficulties that any attempts to compare the two countries are bound to 
encounter.12 Nevertheless, a more direct cause of frustration is the visible 
contrast in the development of these movements, a discrepancy which cannot be 
easily explained without an understanding of both the political and economic 
situation in the two countries. Indonesia remained under the economic 
domination by Dutch and other foreign multinational corporations even after the 
Transfer of Sovereignty in December 1949. It was not until the late 1950s and 
the early 1960s that these foreign-owned companies were either nationalized or 
expropriated by the Indonesian government. The opposite occurred with French 
businesses in Vietnam which were completely ruined in the North following the 
withdrawal of French army in 1954-1955. The Ngô 1ình Di'm government of 
South Vietnam was also eager to eliminate the economic power of the French 
and the Chinese. Despite its efforts, South Vietnam allowed itself to become 
increasingly depend on economic aid and investment from the United States. 
The intention of this study is to compare and contrast the struggles to 
attain independent national economies in Indonesia and Vietnam. This process 
involved two intertwined aspects: (1) dismantling the economic structure 
inherited from colonialism and (2) establishing an alternative form of economy 
which would be able to bring the people prosperity. Particular attention is paid 
to political and institutional factors which determined the process of economic 
policy making in the two countries. Four major comparative themes played a 
leading role: the composition of the leading political forces, linkages with 
changing ideologies about the national economy, discriminatory government 
policies against foreigners and the actual transformation of the economy in the 
direction of strengthening the dominant role of the state. The struggles in the 
economic fields cannot be discussed while ignoring the wider context of 
                    
12 Writing of the revolutions in Indonesia and Vietnam, for instance, William H. Frederick points 
out four major difficulties which constrain scholars from making a comparison, namely: the 
different understanding of the concept of revolution in Indonesia and Vietnam, different kinds 
of revolution with different parties involved, the sort of questions to be asked and source 
materials requiring skills in several languages. See: William H. Frederick, Brothers of a kind; 
perspectives on comparing the Indonesian and Vietnamese revolutions’ in: Taufik Abdullah 





nationalist struggles for independence and unification in the two countries. This 
study covers the immediate post-war period, beginning with the 1945 
Proclamations of Independence in both Indonesia and Vietnam and continues 
until the collapse of Guided Democracy in Indonesia in 1965 and the outbreak 
of the escalated Vietnam War in the early 1960s. The policies pursued by the 
governments of both North and South Vietnam in their efforts to reconstruct the 
economy were rudely interrupted by these events and were subordinated to their 
military concerns.  
In my application of the comparative method, I shall deploy the ‘test 
hypothesis’ approach which has proved useful in cross-national historical 
research. This method has been designed to ‘test out other national and cultural 
settings a proposition already validated in one settings’13, or stated more 
elaborately ‘when a historian attributes the appearance of phenomenon “b” in a 
society to condition or cause “a”, he or she then can subsequently check this 
hypothesis by looking for societies, in which “b” appeared without “a”, or “a” 
existed without leading to “b”.’14 The ‘test hypothesis’ is strongly recommended 
for paired comparisons, particularly asymmetrical paired comparisons. As 
Jürgen Kocka and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt have put it, ‘[f]requently, one looks 
into another country, another society or another culture in order to better 
understand one’s own. One hopes to understand the peculiarities of one case by 
looking at others. Often the other case (cases) is (are) used for purposes of 
background only, while intensive investigation is reserved for the area or 
problem in the centre of attention.’15 Interpreted in this sense, ‘test hypothesis’ 
resembles the ‘counterpoint approach’ which the Dutch sociologist W.F. 
Wertheim used in his comparative analysis of Indonesia and China.16 
                    
13 Stein Rokkan, ‘Comparative cross-national research; the context of current efforts’, Richard L. 
Merritt and Rokkan (eds), Comparing nations; The use of quantitative date in cross-national 
research (New Haven: Yale University press, 1966), 19-20. 
14 Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, Comparative and transnational history; Central 
European approaches and new perspectives (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009) 4.  
15 Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, Comparative and transnational history,5. 
16 The Counterpoint Approach is actually a central part of Wertheim’s famous theory of 
emancipation, which argues for a two-way process, instead of a one-way process, from above 
only, in social evolution as is espoused by authors of modernization theories. However, he also 
used the Counterpoint Approach in his comparative research, for instance, in his analysis of the 
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Wertheim’s ‘counterpoint approach’ was successfully adopted by his student 
Loes Schenk-Sandbergen in her PhD dissertation, which compared street 
sweepers in India and China. Her dissertation is structured on a long and 
elaborate discussion of India with a brief section on China for contrast.17 Using 
Loes Schenk-Sandbergen’s research as a methodological source of inspiration, I 
have concentrated my main attention on Indonesia, and Vietnam serves as a 
background or a counterpoint to which Indonesia is compared.   
The central hypothesis of this thesis is that Indonesia adopted a new 
national economic system to replace the capitalist economic structure inherited 
from Dutch colonialism immediately after the Transfer of Sovereignty from the 
Netherlands in December 1949. This hypothesis is derived from a comparative 
observation of Vietnam, where the economic legacies of French colonialism 
were radically eliminated following the implementation of the Geneva 
Agreement on restoring peace in Indochina signed in July 1954. French and 
Chinese entrepreneurs immediately left North Vietnam, and it was not long 
before their productive assets in South Vietnam were taken over by Ngô 1ình 
Di'm’s government (1955-1963). A period of economic rehabilitation and 
transition to socialism followed in North Vietnam, characterized by radical land 
reform, the formation of massive agricultural and handicrafts co-operatives, 
growing state intervention in economic management and the extending state 
ownership, capped by mounting control of the means of production by the state 
and the Communist Party. Restructuring the economy in the South was carried 
out through the state procurement of French companies, institutionalized 
administrative restraints on the businesses of the Chinese, the establishment of 
new state-owned public enterprises and the encouragement of Vietnamese 
entrepreneurship. Elevating the position of the state to the commanding heights 
                                       
overpopulation problems in Java and China or the comparison of the Maoist revolution in China 
and the social revolutions in other Asian countries, mainly Indonesia and India. See: W.F. 
Wertheim, Emancipation in Asia; Positive and negative lesions from China (Rotterdam: 
Comparative Asian Studies Program, 1983) and W.F. Wertheim, Evolution and revolution; the 
rising wave of emancipation (Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1974). 
17 The dissertation is entitled ‘Vuil werk, schone toekomst? Het leven van straatvegers en 
vuilruimers; een onderzoek in Bulsar (India) en verkenningen in Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin en 




of the economy became the kernel in the economic policy of the new regimes in 
both North and South Vietnam, at least prior to the radically intensified 
intervention of the Unites States in the economic planning of South Vietnam in 
the early 1960s.  
By contrast, the Financial Economic Agreement (Finec) signed 
between the Netherlands and Indonesia at the Round Table Conference in The 
Hague in November 1949 entrenched the dominant position enjoyed by Dutch 
private capital in the Indonesian economy. It was estimated that before the 
Second World War, 52 per cent of the private capital in non-agricultural sectors 
was in the hands of the Dutch, with only 19 per cent held by indigenous 
Indonesians.18 After the Transfer of Sovereignty, the situation did not change 
significantly as Dutch firms still dominated the most important sectors of the 
economy. In 1952, for instance, 50 per cent of consumer imports in Indonesia 
were handled by four leading Dutch firms, and 80 per cent of technical imports 
by five firms. Eight firms controlled 60 per cent of all exports, excluding copra, 
tin and cinchona.19 The Dutch also had an important share in the higher levels of 
domestic wholesale trade. But it was the Chinese, the collectors of small-holder 
crops for sale and organizers of the distribution apparatus, who as peddlers and 
small shopkeepers provided the Indonesians with trade goods and credit.20 The 
central bank of issue was a largely Dutch-owned corporation, controlled by 
Dutch directors. The bulk of private banking was in the hands of seven foreign 
banks, of which three were Dutch, three Chinese and one British-owned.21 This 
                    
18 Nan G. Amstutz, Development of indigenous importers in Indonesia, 1950-1955, (PhD 
dissertation, Tufts University, Medford, 1958) 8; Hans O. Schmitt, ‘Foreign capital and social 
conflict in Indonesia, 1950-1958’, Economic development and cultural change, 3 (1962) 284-
285. 
19 John P. Meek, The government and economic development in Indonesia, 1950-1954 (PhD 
dissertation, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1956) 168; B. Higgins, All the difference; A 
development economist’s quest (Montreal: McGrill-Queen’s 1992) 168. 
20 Penempatan semua perusahaan asing di Indonesia yang tidak bersifat domestic di bawah 
penguasaan pemerintah Republik Indonesia (Penetapan Presiden Nomor 6 Tahun 1965 Tanggal 
24 April 1965)’, Pedoman Kabinet Ampera disusun oleh Sekretariat Presidium Kabinet Ampera 
Republik Indonesia, Vol. 1 (1967). Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1967, pp.86-89. 
21 De Javasche Bank, Laporan tahun pembukunan 1949-1950 (Jakarta: G. Kolff, 1950) 43-44, 
160; Meek, The government and economic development, 164; Bruce Glassburner, ‘Economic 
policy-making in Indonesia, 1950-1957’, in: Bruce Glassburner, The economy of Indonesia; 
Selected readings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971) 79. 
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situation was only subject to radical change in December 1957, when most 
Dutch-owned companies were taken over by the Indonesian trade unions and 
the army. They were nationalized two years later. This step was followed in the 
late 1950s and the early 1960s by take-overs of Chinese, British and American 
enterprises. On 24 April 1965, President Soekarno issued a decree ordering that 
all foreign enterprises, regardless of nationality, be put under government 
control.22 This Presidential Decree of 24 April 1965 marked the official climax 
of the Indonesian efforts since 1945. Later, during the early years of the New 
Order, a large number of British and American companies were returned to their 
former owners.  
As did the Communist and Nationalist leaders of North and South 
Vietnam, Indonesian Nationalist leaders tended to continue to be sceptical about 
individualism and capitalism. Nevertheless, whereas the Vietnamese leadership 
seemed to be consistent and rigid in applying its ideologies in economic 
administration, the Indonesian approaches to anti-imperialism and anti-
capitalism were more flexible and influenced by pragmatism. The Constitution 
adopted by the Republic of Indonesia in August 1945 laid strong emphasis on 
the importance of co-operatives and the controlling role of the state in the 
economy.23 However, with the return of the Dutch to the Archipelago and their 
frequent military threats to the territories of the Republic in Sumatra and Java, 
economic targets took the backseat and were subordinated to political 
aspirations and achieving independence. The strategy adopted by the Indonesian 
government was to accept foreign control over large segments of the economy 
in order to secure political independence.24 The Finec Agreement was signed at 
the expense of economic sovereignty of Indonesia. In the terms of the 
agreement, it was decided that Dutch firms could continue operations in 
Indonesia without hindrance. Any nationalization of Dutch firms would require 
                    
22 Willian A. Redfern, Soekarno’s Guided Democracy and the take-overs of foreign enterprises in 
Indonesia in the 1960s (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2010) 492. 
23 Department of Information RI, Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (Jakarta: JAPENPA, 
1945) see Article 33. 
24 J. Thomas Lindblad, Bridges to new business, the economic decolonization of Indonesia 




mutual agreement, with compensation to be determined on the basis of the real 
value of the nationalized firms. There was also an obligation for the Indonesian 
government to consult with the Netherlands on any monetary and financial 
measures likely to have an impact on Dutch interests.25 In addition, a substantial 
debt of 4.5 billion guilders of the Dutch colonial government, composed of 3 
billion guilders of the internal debt and 1.5 billion guilders of the external debt, 
was transferred to the Indonesian government.As long as this debt was not fully 
paid off, the Dutch government retained the right to intervene in Indonesian 
economic policy.26 
Undeniably, the period following the Transfer of Sovereignty was one 
in which the struggle for economic independence was given high priority. 
Unlike in Vietnam, where elements of the future national economies were 
intensively introduced immediately after the restoration of peace in late 1954, 
the transition to a national economy in Indonesia took place moderately and 
pragmatically. The provisions of the Finec Agreement were a factor restraining 
the process, but it was the pragmatic economic thinking of the Indonesian 
leadership which determined the course of Indonesian policy making in the 
early 1950s. Given the shortage of indigenous capital and trained personnel, 
leaders of the Indonesian government found they had no option but to retain the 
Dutch, who would provide training for Indonesian employees and supply the 
capital and technical expertise for government projects in the country. 
Consequently, the economic policies of the Indonesian government in the early 
1950s were geared just as much to utilizing the advantages offered by the Dutch 
and other foreign firms in promoting the economic position of the country as to 
sustaining economic development. Nevertheless, the voluntary nationalization 
of Dutch enterprises was pushed through as in the case of the central bank, the 
Java Bank, and a few other public enterprises, and discriminatory actions 
against foreign business firms were certainly not unheard of. Some state-owned 
                    
25 H.W Dick, Vincent Houben, J. Thomas Lindblad, and Thee Kian Wie.The emergence of a 
national economy; An economic history of Indonesia, 1800-2000 (Crows Nest, NSW: 
Allen&Unwin, 2002) 171. 
26 H. Meijer, Den Haag-Djakarta; De Nederlands-Indonesische betrekkingen 1950-1962 
(Utrecht: Het Spectrum 1994) 46-47,  356. 
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enterprises intended to provide competition for foreign corporations were also 
established.27 Despite such actions, in the mid-1950s, Dutch control of vital 
parts of the Indonesian economy was still largely intact. As often recalled in 
Parliament at the time, the Indonesian economy in the early 1950s was 
organized on the principle of a ‘half and half’ economy-half guided and half 
liberal.28 
Bruce Glassburner says that in the early 1950s, the Indonesian 
government was led by a group of ‘pragmatic conservatives’, whose plan was to 
live for the time being with the established economic structure while they set 
about designing a policy to improve its functioning. They were rivalled by a 
radically oriented group, who demanded for a ‘completion of the revolution’ in 
the economy and insisted on Indonesian control of economic institutions.29 
Although Glassburner does not label the latter, they have been referred to as 
‘history-minded’ group by Benjamin Higgins30 or the ‘solidarity makers’ by 
Herbert Feith.31 The opposition group steadily gained political power and 
eventually defeated the pragmatic-conservative intellectuals in late 1956 and 
1957.32 Their victory can be extrapolated from various factors, including the 
resignation of a leading figure of the pragmatic group, Vice-President Hatta, in 
                    
27 Anne Booth, The Indonesian economy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; A history of 
missed opportunities (London: Macmilllan 1998) 173. 
28 J.O. Sutter, Indonesianisasi: Politics in a changing economy 1940-1955 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 1959) 1124. 
29 Glassburner, ‘Economic policy-making in Indonesia’, 71, 73. 
30 Higgins has used the term ‘history-minded’ group to distinguish these from the ‘economic-
minded’ or development-minded people. While the former group was essentially Western-
oriented, the latter was a mixture of Communists and a larger number who were nationalist, 
conservative and isolationist. See: Benjamin Higgins, Indonesia’s economic stabilization and 
development (New York: Institute of pacific Relations, 1957) 102-103. 
31 ‘Solidarity makers’ were those who acted as skilled mediators between such functional groups 
as the leaders of regional army, guerrilla troops and religious organizations, as well as political 
propagandists. They were locked in conflict with the ‘administrator’ group, who had the 
administrative, technical, legal and foreign language skills. Most of the administrators were 
those who had acted as leaders in the revolution. Herbert Feith, The decline of constitutional 
democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962) 113-115. 
32 Herbert Feith and especially John Sutter state that the turning point in the shift in political 
leadership of Indonesia coincided with the fall of the Wilopo cabinet (April 1952-June 1953), 
marking the decline of ‘the Masjoemi period’ and the increasing ascendancy of ‘the PNI 
period’. This distinction between antagonistic groups on the basis of party labels has been 
proved pretty fruitless. See, for instance, Glassburner, ‘Economic policy-making in Indonesia’, 




December 1956, the introduction of Soekarno’s new konsepsi in February 1957 
and its immediate effect in the formation of the Djuanda’s Karya cabinet and 
the National Council (Dewan Nasional), in April and July 1957 respectively, 
and the radical take-over of the Dutch-owned enterprises in December 1957. In 
July 1959, Soekarno’s ideologies of Guided Democracy and Guided Economy 
were effectively implemented in conjunction with the restoration of the 1945 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. These measures were directly 
followed by the formation of a Presidential Cabinet placed directly under 
Soekarno’s leadership. It was under Soekarno’s authoritarian government that 
the Indonesian revolutionary struggle in the field of economy greatly 
accelerated. In April 1965, President Soekarno told the Provisional People’s 
Consultative Assembly that the national democratic phase of the Indonesian 
revolution was almost over. ‘We are now entering the next stage’, he said, ‘the 
stage of Indonesian socialism.’33 
‘Socialism à la Indonesia’, however, was not the ultimate goal of the 
Indonesian revolution, President Soekarno believed. Indonesia should strive 
beyond becoming simply ‘a just and prosperous society’; it must also be a self-
reliant country, able to stand on its own feet (berdiri diatas kaki sendiri).34 
Hence, although the nationalist struggle for economic sovereignty in Indonesia 
was protracted and highly divisive, it culminated in a very radical end, at least 
in comparison to what happened in South Vietnam. The leaders of South 
Vietnam were determined to dismantle the French economic and military 
presence, but only to the point at which they presented no significant threat to 
Vietnamese independence. As long as the viability of the new state remained 
economically dependent, they accepted the necessity of having been involved in 
the difficult aid relationship with the United States.35 Under Guided Democracy 
and Guided Economy in Indonesia, all economic institutions owned by 
foreigners had to be eradicated. The state would play a leading role in the 
                    
33 Quoted from L.Castles, ‘The fate of the private entrepreneur’, in: T.K. Tan (ed.), Soekarno’s 
Guided Indonesia (Melbourne: Jacaranda Press, 1976) 73. 
34 Soekarno, Berdiri diatas kaki sendiri (Berdikari); Amanat politik (Jakarta: B.P. Prapantja, 
1965) 
35 Golay, Anspach, Pfanner, and Ayal, Underdevelopment and economic nationalism,146. 
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economy, in terms of both ownership and guidance. Consequently, confiscated 
foreign firms were transformed into state-owned enterprises, placed under the 
direct control and management of the government and the armed forces.   
2. Key Concepts 
How can the transformation from a colonial to a national economy in Indonesia 
and Vietnam be explained? Frank Golay and his colleagues consider this 
process ‘an aspect of the extension of political nationalism-the extension of the 
nationalist revolution-to the organization of the economy’.36 Nevertheless, this 
argument, intended to apply to all Southeast Asian countries, does not seem to 
fit the case of Vietnam prior to 1954.37 From the beginning of the revolutionary 
war, H! Chí Minh and the DRV government had adopted the view that 
resistance against French colonial forces and the task of nation-building were 
inseparable. The goals of political independence and economic construction 
were therefore simply two sides of the same coin.38 During the escalation of the 
warfare, which commenced in December 1946, the economic task was generally 
interpreted in terms of economic resistance. Nationalist efforts to increase 
production to meet the needs of a war economy were undertaken alongside 
sabotage missions against both the economics of French rule and French 
businesses.39 This was partly the reason French businessmen made a radical 
withdrawal from North Vietnam in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. 
None the less, although the economic struggle in South Vietnam can 
still be regarded as an extension of political nationalism, but it was certainly not 
an offshoot of nationalist revolution. Although joining in the pursuit of 
independence for Vietnam, the leaders of South Vietnamese government did not 
participate in the revolutionary war. Their efforts to set the economy to rights in 
                    
36 Golay, Anspach, Pfanner, and Ayal, Underdevelopment and economic nationalism,439. 
37 It is probably because of the basis for their ideas that they excluded North Vietnam from their 
extensive and systematic analysis of economic nationalism in Southeast Asia. 
38 14ng Phong and Melanie Beresford, Authority relations and economic decision-making in 
Vietnam; An historical perspective (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1998) 16-
17 
39 14ng Phong, L$ch s% kinh t& Vi't Nam,1945-2000 [Economic History of Vietnam, 1945-2000] 




the late 1950s and the early 1960s have been explained largely in terms of 
indigenism. As in Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries, the term 
indigenism refers to the structure of policies and institutions created to 
transform the racial dimension of the economy inherited from colonial times. It 
also refers to the process by which the control of wealth and sources of income 
is transferred to members of the national society.40 In Indonesia, the pressures of 
indigenism were brought to bear on the Dutch, the British, the American and the 
Chinese, whereas in South Vietnam, the French and the Chinese were the 
principal targets of the discriminatory policies of the nationalist government. 
However, indigenism is only one aspect in this analysis, adopted to explain the 
transfer of economic power from foreign nationals to the indigenous people. 
The other side of the coin is the system of policies and institutions created to 
facilitate economic growth and welfare.  
The distinction between the political and economic aspects of the 
nationalist revolution is best seen in the case of Indonesia. In December 1949, at 
the time of the Transfer of Sovereignty, a leading figure in the Indonesian 
nationalist movement, HajiAgus Salim, stated that the Indonesian revolution 
had not yet entered its economic phase.41 This famous saying clearly 
distinguishes the economic process from the other aspects of the revolution, 
which Thomas Lindblad has condensed as political and economic 
decolonization.42 Nevertheless, economic decolonization is the term that 
Thomas Lindblad and several other authors use to describe Indonesian efforts to 
emancipate the country from Dutch economic domination. Although economic 
decolonization began in colonial times, they suggest, it only came to a 
                    
40 Golay, Anspach, Pfanner, and Ayal, Underdevelopment and economic nationalism,9. Similar 
terms to indigenism include indigenization and pribumisasi both used widely in the case of 
Indonesia. See, for instance, Jasper van de Kerkhof, ‘“Colonial” enterprise and the 
indigenization of management in independent Indonesia and Malaysia’, in: Thomas J. Lindblad 
and Peter Post (ed.), Indonesian economic decolonization in regional and international 
perspective (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009) 175-196 and Ralph Anspach, The problem of a plural 
economy and its effects on Indonesia’s economic structure; a study in economic policy (PhD 
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley 
41 Higgins, Indonesia’s stabilization and development, 102. 
42 Lindblad, Bridges to new business,2. 
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conclusion in 1959 when the Dutch enterprises were nationalized.43 Adopting 
the viewpoint that the businesses of the Chinese and Europeans in Indonesia 
were an integral part of the legacy of Dutch colonialism and that earlier efforts 
to curb their economic power were still actually being continued and intensified 
in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, this study will argue for the hypothesis of 
an extended economic decolonization of Indonesia. It was only after the eclipse 
of Soekarno’s government that the main features of Dutch colonial economy 
were discarded. 
A more popular and dynamic concept is Indonesianisasi (literally 
translated as Indonesianization), which was often featured in the political 
discourse of the economy in early independence period in Indonesia and has 
acquired a wide currency in the literature. The classic definition is given by an 
American political scientist John Sutter in his PhD dissertation defended at the 
University of Cornell in 1959. Sutter considers Indonesianisasi ‘a conscious 
effort to increase the participation and elevate the role of the Indonesian - and 
more particularly the “indigenous” Indonesian - in the more complex sectors of 
the economy’. He identifies nine forms of Indonesianisasi: 1) the transfer of 
state economic enterprises established by the colonial government to the 
government of Indonesia; 2) the establishment of new state enterprises by the 
government of Indonesia; 3) the transfer of private foreign enterprises to the 
government of Indonesia; 4) increased governmental control of foreign 
businesses; 5) the transfer of private foreign enterprises to Indonesians and their 
organizations; 6) establishment of new enterprises in fields of the economy 
virtually closed to them in the past by Indonesians and their organizations; 7) 
increased Indonesian stock-ownership in corporations established by foreigners; 
8) increased Indonesian participation in the executive and administrative staff of 
foreign companies; and 9) return of landholdings to the Indonesian community 
by foreign enterprises.44 
                    
43 Lindblad and Peter Post (ed.), Indonesian economic decolonization, 2. 




Sutter confined his research to the period between 1940 and 1955, when 
the economic transformation was taking place at a relatively slow pace. Most of 
the forms of Indonesianisasi identified by Sutter therefore tend to stress the 
voluntary nature of economic decolonization in Indonesia.45 Hence, they are a 
stark contrast to the hostile take-over and nationalization of the Dutch and other 
foreign enterprises in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Moreover, with the 
introduction of Guided Democracy and Guided Economy almost at the same 
time, it was obvious that the economic aim of the Indonesian revolution was not 
simply an elevation of the economic position of ethnic Indonesians, but more 
importantly according the state a guiding role in economic affairs. This 
development raises several questions which are addressed in this study: What 
did the Indonesian leaders actually think was the ideal system for national 
economy? What factors had a bearing on changing their ideas and economic 
policies? One step farther, in a comparative perspective with North Vietnam: 
Was it inevitable that as a newly independent state, Indonesia would end up 
with a socialist-type economy? If the answer to this is ‘no’, was the advent of 
Guided Economy the result of the failure of the democratic economic system 
pursued by successive governments in the late 1940s and the early 1950s to 
satisfy the Indonesian desire for economic nationalism?  
Economic nationalism is a concept which pervades this thesis. As do 
the other concepts of indigenism, economic decolonization and Indonesianisasi, 
economic nationalism likewise refers to the transfer of economic power from 
foreign hands to those of the nationals. Pertinently, it stresses the role of the 
state in controlling the external economic relations of a country, guiding 
national economic development and mobilizing internal resources.46 One 
famous definition of economic nationalism, often quoted in literature, is that 
made by Harry G. Johnson in his study of economic nationalism in new and 
developing states in which he defines economic nationalism as the national 
aspirations of ‘having property owned by nationals and having economic 
                    
45 Lindblad, Bridges to new business, 3. 
46 Golay, Anspach, Pfanner, and Ayal, Underdevelopment and economic nationalism, 2-6. 
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functions performed by nationals’.47 Three important methods which can be 
employed to attain the objectives of economic nationalism are: confiscation - 
that is, the forced transfer of property from foreign owners to nationals; 
investment of resources or purchase - that is, the use of wealth or savings to 
purchase material property or job opportunities for nationals and finally, the use 
of administrative measures - that is the tariffs, tax concessions, and special 
privileges to promote industries.48 
In the first two methods, nationalization is considered to be of 
paramount importance as that it provides more jobs for nationals. The gains or 
losses from nationalization, Harry Johnson argues, do not result from the mere 
fact of nationalization itself, but from the changes in management methods and 
policies introduced after nationalization.49 This statement will be especially 
valuable when we later examine the outcome of the Indonesian nationalization 
of Dutch-owned companies. At this point, it is important to note that the 
objectives of economic nationalism could potentially conflict with those of 
economic development. In attaining economic nationalism, increasing national 
income has to defer to gratifying the ‘taste for discrimination’, as Gary Becker 
puts it.50 In other words, economic development is concerned with the size of 
the economy and disregards its racial dimension. Conversely economic 
nationalism pays attention to the racial distribution of economic interests rather 
than the size of the economy. Another conceptual clarification might be 
necessary when the concept of economic nationalism is applied to North 
Vietnam where the Communists were in power. The argument of this study is 
that the international philosophy of Communism was only a minor cog in the 
wheel of the economic transformation in Vietnam prior to the land reforms in 
1953-1954. In fact, it was nationalism which helped the Communist Party to its 
                    
47 Harry G. Johnson, ‘The ideology of economic policy in the new state’, in: Harry G. Johnson 
(ed.), Economic nationalism in old and new states (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968) 
127. 
48 Harry G. Johnson, ‘A theoretical model of economic nationalism in new and developing states’, 
in: Johnson (ed.), Economic nationalism, 10-13. 
49 Johnson, ‘A theoretical model of economic nationalism’, 12. 





success in mobilizing the support of the wider community in the war of 
resistance against French colonialism.  
3. Sources and Structure 
Unlike its political counterpart, economic nationalism in Indonesia and Vietnam 
has attracted surprisingly little attention. In the case of Vietnam, where the 
political and economic aspects of the revolution were intertwined, economic 
resistance is usually integrated into discussions on the general war of resistance 
against French colonial forces. 14ng Phong’s two-volume monograph is 
perhaps the most extensive and carefully thought out work about the economic 
history of Vietnam and it provides plenty of fruitful information about 
economic resistance.51 There are a few publications about the economic 
situation in South Vietnam immediately after 1954, but economic facts, not 
economic transformation are the focus of discussions.52 As Thomas Lindblad 
has already pointed out, most studies of the decolonization of Indonesia tend to 
disregard economic ties, opting to concentrating on the political and military 
aspects of the process.53 Therefore, Thomas Lindblad has chosen to devote the 
majority of his publications to analyzing economic decolonization. Although 
Sutter’s Indonesianisasi is perhaps the most elaborate survey of the political 
economy in Indonesia during the 1940s and the early 1950s, the Achilles’ heel 
of this narrative is its lack of analysis and of an overview of the macroeconomic 
structure of Indonesia. Sutter consulted very few Dutch sources and 
consequently has largely ignored Dutch reactions to the economic policies of 
the Indonesian government. The final flaw in the dissertation is that it excludes 
the crucial episode of the take-over and nationalization of foreign firms and the 
                    
51 14ng Phong, L$ch s% kinh t& Vi't Nam,1945-2000 [Economic history of Vietnam, 1945-
2000]Vol. I-II (Hanoi: Khoa h*c Xã h5i Publishers, 2002) 
52 14ng Phong, L$ch s% kinh t& Vi't Nam,1945-2000 [Economic history of Vietnam, 1945-
2000]Vol. II (Hanoi: Khoa h*c Xã h5i Publishers, 2002); 14ng Phong, Kinh t# mi6n Nam th3i 
k7 1955-1975 [South Vietnam’s economy, 1955-1975] (Hanoi: Khoa h*c Xã h5i Publishers, 
2004). 
53 J. Thomas Lindblad, ‘Politieke economie en de dekolonisatie van Indonesië’, in: J. Thomas 
Lindblad and Willem van der Molen (eds), Macht en majesteit; Opstellen voor Cees Fasseur 
(Leiden: Opleiding Talen en Culturen van Zuidoost-Azië en Oceanië, 2002) 132-146. 
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growing involvement of the Indonesian state in the management of the economy 
in the late 1950s and the early 1960s.54 
As other studies about the post-independence period of Indonesia and 
Vietnam, this thesis is based on a variety of sources and materials. The most 
important sources are the official documents issued by the relevant governments 
and their agents, including letters, decrees, edicts, reports, political writings and 
so forth. Some of the documents have been published in booklets and 
newspapers, others are kept in the archives. Personal letters and appeals to 
governments and the programmes of the various political parties and 
organizations have also been consulted. Publications by foreign economic 
specialists who worked in Indonesia in the 1950s are particularly important. The 
main archival sources are Kabinet Presiden RI (KP) preserved in the National 
Archive of Indonesia (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, ANRI) in Jakarta, 
Ministerie van Economische Zaken; Directoraat-Generaal voor de 
Buitenlandse Economische Betrekkingen kept at the National Archive 
(Nationaal Archief, NA) of the Netherlands in The Hague and the private 
collection of the Oei Tiong Ham Concern kept in the Kong Koan Archive(Kong 
Koan-archief, KKA), University of Leiden. For the chapter on Vietnam, I have 
tended to consult secondary sources and Vietnamese newspapers.  
The following chapter is a discussion of the main features of the 
colonial economies of Indonesia and Vietnam up to 1945. It examines the extent 
to which Indonesia and Vietnam experienced a similar form of colonial 
exploitation and oppression. Special attention is paid to the disadvantageous 
economic position of indigenous Indonesians and Vietnamese compared to that 
of foreign nationals, especially the Chinese and metropolitan capitalists, namely 
the Dutch in Indonesia and the French in Vietnam. The different modes of 
colonial rule deployed by the Japanese army in Indonesia and Vietnam during 
the occupation and their impacts on the post-war period are also discussed. This 
chapter argues that it was within this short period of time that the Indonesians 
took the opportunity to acquire considerable knowledge and experience in 
                    




economic administration and practical business affairs, both of which were to be 
absolutely essential to them in the economic-planning of their country after 
independence.  
The second chapter of the thesis deals with the Vietnamese struggle to 
dismantle the economic system of French colonialism and to build up 
alternative forms of national economy in the two parts of the country. Besides 
looking into their technical experience in running an economy, it examines the 
personal and political background of the leaders of Vietnam. The organization 
of a war economy by the Vi't Minh government, characterized by a dual 
emphasis on the construction of and resistance against French businesses is 
treated in detail. The land reform of 1953-1956 is shown to have been a turning-
point in the orientation of economic policy towards Socialism in Vietnam. In 
North Vietnam this was strengthened forcefully after 1956. Special attention is 
paid to the growing withdrawal of French and Chinese entrepreneurs from 
North Vietnam which commenced in the early 1950s and to the policies of the 
Ngô 1ình Di'm government to seize their remaining assets. From the viewpoint 
of the problem of comparative methodology, this chapter serves as a mirror or a 
counterpoint in which discussions about Indonesia in the following chapters can 
be reflected. 
The third chapter discusses the initial attempts to establish economic 
nationalism made by the Republican government in Indonesia during the 
revolutionary period between 1945-1949. It describes the smooth 
transformation from the economic institutions of the Japanese administration to 
a national system immediately after independence. However, with the return of 
the Dutch colonial forces to the Archipelago, the Indonesian leadership showed 
ambivalence in its ideologies and approaches to the economic system it desired. 
This chapter also analyzes the changes in economic policy made by the 
Republican government in its efforts to bolster its diplomatic negotiations for 
political independence. Without downgrading the importance of the 
interventions by the United States, it will be argued that the economic 
concessions made by the Indonesian delegations at the Round Table Conference 
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were an important factor in making the Netherlands finally agree to a Transfer 
of Sovereignty to Indonesia in November 1949.  
The theme of the fourth chapter is the period in the Indonesian 
historiography between 1950 and 1957 labelled Parliamentary Democracy. It 
reveals the predominance of the pragmatic ideas about the running of the 
economy held by conservative political leaders over the increasingly powerful 
group advocating a more radical orientation. The moderate measures adopted by 
the Indonesian government to promote Indonesian entrepreneurship and 
strengthen the state control and supervision of the economic activities through 
the Sumitro Plan, the Benteng Programme and various fiscal policies are 
examined in some detail. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the failure 
of Indonesianisasi as a direct consequence of public tensions aroused by the 
economic domination by Dutch and other foreign capital in the mid-1950s. 
The last chapter of the thesis examines the final episode in the 
economic nationalism of the Old Order (Orde Lama) in Indonesia. If the 
moderate measures of Indonesianisasi failed to produce a satisfactory result in 
economic nationalism, what alternative measures were resorted to? The chapter 
describes the take-over and nationalization of Dutch companies in 1957-1959 
and the subsequent expropriation of the Chinese, British and American 
businesses. There is also a discussion of the dynamics of the Guided Economy 
in relationship to the initial aspirations held by the Indonesians to build up a 
national economy as set out in the 1945 Constitution. The strong involvement of 
the state in its support of the armed forces in the management of former foreign 
productive assets receives a special point of interest.  
The conclusion offers some final remarks about the process of 
transformation to an independent national economy in Indonesia and Vietnam, 
identifying their similarities and differences, as well as pointing out the 








INDONESIA AND VIETNAM: PRE-WAR ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
 
‘Within a sound colonial system, colonial 
production must be limited to suppling the mother 
country with raw materials or with non-
competitive products’. - Méline, the Director of the 




Comparisons between Indonesia and Vietnam invariably begin in the darkest 
period in the histories of the two countries when they were still subject to 
Western colonialism and later to the Japanese military occupation.1 A number 
of studies have pointed out the similarities and differences in the models of 
colonial rule and administration implemented by the Dutch in Indonesia, the 
French in Vietnam, and later by the Japanese in both countries. Social orders 
and political culture have sometimes been used in an attempt to explain the 
dynamics of nationalism and the process of decolonization in the two countries.2 
What I found important, and still missing in literature, is a comparative analysis 
                    
1 This does not include the article by Cao Xuân Ph2, who claims that the victories of Daiviet and 
Java against the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century were the first historical coincidence 
of the two nations. Cao Xuân Ph2, ‘Vietnam-Indonesia concurrences’, 154. 
2 See, for instance, Stein Tønnesson, ‘Filling the power vacuum’, 110-114; Magenda ‘The 
Indonesian and Vietnamese revolutions’, 53-66; William H. Frederick, ‘Brothers of a kind’, 
277-280. 
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of the economic systems implemented by the colonial and fascist powers in 
Indonesia and Vietnam. The ways in which the imperialist powers exploited 
their colonies certainly had a strong impact on the paths taken by the nationalist 
movements and on the process of economic decolonization. This chapter 
sketches the main features of the colonial economies of Indonesia and Vietnam 
and examines the impact of the Japanese rule on economic structure and future 
development of economic nationalism in the two countries. 
1. The Colonial Period 
The best description of the economy of colonial Indonesia is a ‘plural 
economy’. This concept was coined by the British colonial official J.S. 
Furnivall in his attempt to define the socio-economic structure of tropical and 
temperate regions, using the Netherlands Indies as an example. Furnivall argued 
that the term plural economy signified the economic aspects of a ‘plural 
society’, comprised of ‘two or more elements or social orders, which live side 
by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit.’ The mutual relationship 
between these social orders ‘tends to be governed solely by the economic 
process with the production of material goods as the prime end of social life.’3 
The consequences of the emphasis on production rather than social ends were a 
sectional division of labour and conflicts of economic interests between racial 
groups. The organization of economy of the Netherlands Indies is depicted as a 
pyramid with the top layer dominated by Western private enterprises, and the 
Indonesian indigenous people relegated to forming the basis. The Chinese and 
Arab minorities acted as intermediaries between the two.4 
Furnivall’s plural economy was developed from the famous theory of 
economic dualism, first expounded by J.H. Boeke in his 1910 Leiden University 
dissertation. Boeke believed that Western economic theories could not be 
applied validly in the tropical colonies. Therefore, he suggested ‘a double, or 
                    
3 J.S.Furnivall, Netherlands India; A study of plural economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1939) 446, 450-451. 
4 Lindblad, Bridges to new business, 15; Golay, Anspach, Pfanner, and Ayal, Underdevelopment 
and economic nationalism, 116-117. 
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even threefold theory: one theory for the Western part, one for the oriental part 
and one theory with a combined basis for the phenomena, which appear in the 
contact between the two parts.’ There was a radical division between the 
Western and the Eastern sectors. The former, governed by European law and by 
Europeans, was modern, dynamic and capitalistic, whereas the latter, 
administered under a mixture of modern and customary law through indirect 
rule, was traditional, backward and stagnant.5 After his examination of the 
active participation of the Chinese and Javanese in various businesses in the 
Netherlands Indies, Furnivall cast doubt on Boeke’s emphasis on an 
unbridgeable separation between the Western and Asian sectors and the 
economic passivity of the local community. Furnivall argued instead that in a 
plural society, any social elements were organized for economic purposes rather 
than social ends.6 
1.1. Racial Dimension 
In 1930, the population of the Netherlands Indies was 61 million, with 
indigenous Indonesians accounted for more than 97 per cent. The Chinese 
formed the largest non-indigenous ethnic minority, accounting for almost 1.2 
million (2 per cent), alongside only 240,000 Europeans (0.4 per cent) and 
115,000 other Foreign Asiatics (anderevreemde Oosterlingen) (0.2 per cent) 
(Table 1). The total registered labour force in 1930 was 20.8 million, of whom 
20.3 million were indigenous people and fewer than 100,000 were Europeans. 
More than 60 per cent of the indigenous workers were engaged in agriculture, 
whereas only 5 per cent took part in trade and scarcely more than 1 per cent in 
transport and professional services. This is in sharp contrast to the Chinese the 
majority of whom, 37 per cent, worked in the single most profitable sector, 
commerce and 30 per cent of Chinese workers were employed in the industrial 
                    
5 J.H. Boeke, ‘De economische theorie der dualistische samenleving’, De Economist 1 (1935) 
800-801; J. H.Boeke, The structure of Netherlands Indian economy (New York: Institute of 
Pacific Relations, 1949) 3-13. 
6 Furnivall, Netherlands India, 456-460. 
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sector and mining and only 12 per cent in agriculture.7 About 27 per cent of the 
Europeans in Java and 23 per cent in the Outer Islands were employed in the 
public sector.8 Despite being a tiny minority, the combined 1.5 million of non-
indigenous population dominated the economic and political life of colonial 
Indonesia. 










































Source: Patrica Tjiook-Liem, De rechtspositie der Chinezen in 
Nederlands-Indië 1848-1942 (PhD dissertation, Leiden University, 
Leiden, 2009) p. 19; Ong Eng Die, Chineezen in Nederlandsch-
Indië; Sociografie van een Indonesische bevolkingsgroep (Assen: 
Van Gorcum, 1943) pp. 14-15. 
The contrast was much greater in the distribution of national income. J.J. 
Polak says that in the interwar period (1921-1939) indigenous Indonesians 
received 70 per cent of total national income compared to 20 per cent for 
Europeans and 10 per cent for residents of Chinese or Arab origin. Taking into 
account the difference in the size of the population groups, this estimate 
translates into average per capita incomes where one European earned as much 
as eight Chinese or forty-five indigenous Indonesians.9 Angust Maddison gives 
                    
7 George L.Hicks (ed.), Overseas Chinese remittances from Southeast Asia 1910-1940 
(Singapore: Select Books, 1993) 135. 
8 Van der Eng, The ‘colonial drain’ from Indonesia, 15-17. 
9 J.J. Polak, ‘The national income of the Netherlands Indies 1921-1939’in: P.Creutzberg (ed.), 
Changing economy in Indonesia; Vol. V. National income (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1979) 27-101; 
Dick, Houben, Lindblad, and Thee, The emergence of a national economy, 141-142. 
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an even wider gap. In 1929, for instance, a European had a real income of 4,017 
guilders, 13 times higher than the 301 guilders of an Asiatic and 68 times the 
58.7 guilders of an Indonesian.10 A recent estimate prepared by Jan Luiten van 
Zanden, using data on the income of different ethnic groups of households, 
suggests a more moderate picture of the unequal distribution of income. In 
1925, the average income of 7,114,000 Indonesian households was 201 
guilders, while 129,000 Foreign Asiatics households averaged 1,179 guilders 
and each of 63,000 European households had 6,150 guilders. The Indonesian 
share in the national income declined from 88 per cent in 1880 to 72 per cent in 
1925, whereas the share of the Chinese and other Foreign Asiatics increased 
from 5 per cent to 8 per cent. The share of the tiny European community rose 
from 6 per cent in 1880 to 20 per cent in 1925. With five persons to a household 
on average a European had an income 5 times as high as an Asiatic and 29 times 
that of an Indonesian.11 
The situation in Indonesia leads to the question of to what extent can the 
concept of ‘plural society’ be applied in the case of colonial Vietnam? The 
population of Vietnam fluctuated between 16 and 23 million between 1921 and 
1945.12 Of this number, the Viet (the ethnic Kinh) made up about 87 per cent. 
The Europeans were a small minority, numbering 30,000 in 1930 and 35,000 in 
1937, accounting for about 0.7 per cent of the total population (Table 2). Half of 
the European community was in the age group 20-40 years, hence in the labour 
force group, with 53 per cent serving in army and navy and 19 per cent 
employed as government officials. The rest of the French community were 
employees of big French companies in Indochina, notably in trade (7.4 per 
                    
10 Angus Maddison, ‘Dutch income in and from Indonesia, 1700-1938’, in: Angus Maddison and 
Gé Prince, Economic growth in Indonesia, 1820-1940 (Dordrecht: Foris Publicans Holland, 
1989) 35. 
11 Jan Luiten van Zanden and Daan Marks, An economic history of Indonesia, 1800-2010 (New 
York: Routledge, 2012) 117-118. 
12 Nguy+n V%n Khánh, C( c)u kinh t& xã h"i Vi't Nam th*i thu"c !$a 1858-1945 [Socio-
economic structure of colonial Vietnam 1858-1945] (Hanoi: 1$i h*c Qu8c gia, 2004) 137, Lê 
M$nh Hùng, The impact of World War II on the economy of Vietnam, 1939-1945 (Singapore: 
Eastern Universities Press, 2004) 61. 
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cent), mining and industry (5.7 per cent) and transportation (2 per cent).13 The 
number of the Chinese in Vietnam was estimated at 195,000 in 1921 and 
267,000 in 1931.14 In 1937, there were 217,000 ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, 
accounting for 4.3 per cent of the total population, of whom three-thirds lived in 
Cochin China (South Vietnam) (Table 2)15, where they concentrated in large 
cities, such as Cholon, Saigon, Hanoi, H,i Phòng and Nam 10nh.16 Their major 
business was commerce (56 per cent), but some of them were employed in the 
French factories (28 per cent). Only a small number of the Chinese (16 per cent) 
was engaged in irrigating rice farms and fishing in the Mekong delta provinces, 
such as Trà Vinh, Sóc Tr%ng and Hà Tiên.17 In 1920, there were 289 Chinese 
employees in agricultural projects in the whole of Tonkin, and 3,779 in the 
mines there, against a total of 1,906 in commercial and industrial firms.18 The 
French were unable to recruit the Chinese for their plantations. The Vi't from 
the deltas of the North and Javanese coolies made up the majority of labour in 
European plantations in Tonkin and Central Vietnam.19 Apart from those who 
found employment on European plantations and in mining and construction, the 
majority of the Vietnamese community was engaged in the traditional sectors of 
agriculture and handicrafts.  
                    
13 Charles Robequain, Economic development of French Indo-China (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1944) 21, 27, 29. 
14 K7 L()ng Nh(, The Chinese in Vietnam; A study of Vietnamese-Chinese relations with special 
attention to the period 1862-1961 (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1963) 
42; Tr/n Khánh, The ethnic Chinese and economic development in Vietnam (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993) 25. 
15 Under the French politics of ‘divide and rule’, unified Vietnam was divided into three parts 
with different regimes. Tonkin (North Vietnam) and Annam (Central Vietnam) were French 
‘protectorates’, whereas Cochin China (South Vietnam) was a colony proper. These three 
regions were incorporated with Laos and Cambodia when the French Indochina Federation was 
formed 
16 In 1931, for instance, there were 100,000 Chinese residents in Saigon and Cholon, 19,000 in 
H,i Phòng, 5,000 in Hanoi. See: Victor Purcell, The position of the Chinese in Southeast Asia 
(New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950) 31; Tran, The ethnic Chinese, 25. 
17 Hicks (ed) Overseas Chinese remittances,135. 
18 Alain G. Marsot, The Chinese community in Vietnam under the French (Lewiston: The Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1993) 142. 
19 T$ Th0 Thúy, +#n !i,n c-a ng.*i Pháp / B0c K1 1884-1918 [French plantations in Tonkin 
1884-1918] (Hanoi: Th# gi9i Publishers, 1996) 233; T$ Th0 Thúy, Vi'c nh.2ng !)t kh3n hoang 
/ B0c K1 t4 1919 !&n 1945 [Land concessions in Tonkin from 1919 to 1945] (Hanoi: Th# gi9i 
Publishers, 2001) 233-234. 
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Table 2: Population of colonial Vietnam by nationality in 1937 

























Source: Charles Robequain, Economic development of French Indo-
China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1944) pp. 21,34 
(1) This includes both Europeans and ‘assimilés’, the latter were 
people who enjoyed the legal status of Europeans, although they 
were not necessarily of European origin, for instance, the Japanese. 
In 1937, the GDP of the whole of Indochina was estimated at 1,128 million 
piastres, equivalent to an income per capita of 48.6 piastres. Compared to the 
Netherlands Indies, the distribution of the income among the ethnic groups in 
Indochina was far more unequal. In 1931, at a time when the French population 
and the richer Chinese and Vietnamese enjoyed an income of about 5,000 to 
6,000 piastres per annum, the income of a manual worker was only 44 piastres 
per year in Tonkin, 47 piastres in Annam and 55 piastres in Cochin China. The 
peasants earned even less. The average budget of a poor peasant family of five 
persons in Cochin China in 1931 was 154 piastres, which corresponded to 30.8 
piastres per person.20 The peasants barely subsisted on their small plots of land 
and could hope to provide only for their most immediate needs. When hit by 
bad years or caught by an unpredictable expense such as illness or accidents, 
poor peasants were forced to borrow from richer landowners at an usurious rate 
                    
20 Lê M$nh Hùng, The impact of World War II, 41, 56. 
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of more than 100 per cent.21 Since many failed to redeem their debts, eventually 
they had to relinquish the ownership of their land to their rich creditors. They 
became tenants or sharecroppers on what once had been their own land. This 
discriminatory situation eventually fuelled the inherent class conflict between 
Vietnamese peasants and Vietnamese landlords, which simmered alongside the 
national conflict between the Vietnamese community and foreign powers. 
1.2. Economic Structure 
It was not ‘the lack of economic motive’, in the words of Boeke, but the policies 
of the colonial authorities which restrained the local community from 
participation in the modern sectors of economy. In French Indochina, the 
economic theories of the colonial government were dominated by the view that, 
‘within a sound colonial system, colonial production must be limited to 
supplying the mother country with raw materials or with non-competitive 
products’. Moreover, the metropolis deemed that the colonies needed to be 
reserved as ‘an exclusively French market’.22 As a result, the whole structure of 
the economy of French Indochina was geared towards primary production rather 
than manufacturing. The bulk of French private investment was poured into 
agriculture and mining, leaving the internal trade largely dominated by the 
Chinese. 
An investigation ordered by the French government in 1943 revealed 
that, from 1896 to 1940, total French private investment in Indochina was 38.5 
billion francs at 1940 value.23 Including the preceding period since 1859, total 
investment amounted to 52 billion francs, of which private capital accounted for 
73.9 per cent.24 Figure 1 presents the distribution of French investment in 
Indochina by sector from the first year of colonization until the arrival of the 
Japanese in 1940. Before the First World War, two-thirds of French investment 
                    
21 1oàn Tr*ng Truy6n and Ph$m Thành Vinh, L’édification d’une économie nationale 
indépendante au Vietnam (1945-1965) (Hanoi: Éditions en Langues Étrangeres, 1966) 34. 
22 Quoted from Robequain, Economic development, 129. 
23 Lê M$nh Hùng, The impact of World War II,46. 
24 V%n T$o, ‘Công cu5c khai thác thu5c :0a c&a th;c dân Pháp < Vi't Nam và s; phát tri=n c&a 
giai c-p công nhân Vi't nam’ [The French colonial exploitation in Vietnam and the 
development of the worker class in Vietnam], Nghiên c5u L$ch s% 11 (1955) 56. 
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went into mining and industry. After the war, the priorities of French companies 
shifted to agriculture, which then took up one-third of total investment. Between 
1924 and 1930, investment in agriculture was 1,272 million francs, 
corresponding to the combined capital of mining and industry, each about 600 
million francs.25 Although mining did continue to receive more investment, 
manufacturing remained largely static. Only a few projects in heavy and 
chemical industry launched by the colonial government in the late 1930s, 
including the construction of ammunitions factories in preparation for the 
impending war with Japan. The Japanese occupation frustrated any further 
French efforts to industrialize. By the end of 1940, the economy of Indochina 
was still largely based on primary production. In 1937, for instance, the 
traditional sectors, namely agriculture, forestry and handicrafts, made up 66.6 
per cent of GDP. Trade, transport and other services accounted for 13.5 per cent 
and mining and industry for 19.6 per cent.26 
Figure 1: Distribution of French capital in Indochina by sector, 
1858 -1939 (percentage) 
 
Source: Nguy+n V%n Khánh, C( c)u kinh t& xã h"i Vi't Nam th*i thu"c 
!$a 1858-1945 (Hanoi: 1$i h*c Qu8c gia, 2004) p. 80. 
                    
25 Martin J. Murray, The development of capitalism in colonial Indochina (1870-1940) (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980) 125. 
26 Nguy+n V%n Khánh, C( c)u kinh t& xã h"i Vi't Nam, 169; Jean Pierre Aumiphin, S6 hi'n di'n 
tài chính và kinh t& c-a Pháp / +ông D.(ng 1895-1939 [The financial and economic presence 
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French investment in agriculture was concentrated on plantation and 
export crops, particularly rice. In 1900, the area covered by French estate 
plantations had reached 322,000 hectares, 78,000 in South Vietnam and 98,000 
in North Vietnam. In 1907, North Vietnam alone had 476 French plantations, 
150 of them small-scale (fewer than 50 hectares) and 312 large, accounting for 
99.4 per cent of a total of 417,650 hectares.27 The area under plantations 
expanded greatly after the First World War, reaching more than one million 
hectares in 1930, half of these in South Vietnam.28 Although tea, coffee and 
corn were all cultivated on French plantations, rice and rubber were the leading 
export crops (Table 3). By 1941, the total area under rubber cultivation in 
Indochina had increased to 325,000 acres or 130,010 hectares (one-tenth 
compared to the area in the Netherlands Indies), producing 76,000 tons of 
rubber per year.29 The export of agricultural products accounted for two-thirds 
of export value of Indochina, with rice representing 65 per cent up to 1931. 
Each year Indochina exported around 1.5 million tons of rice and rice 
products.30 Corn accounted for 2.9 per cent of the total export value between 
1913-1917, but increased to 14 per cent between 1932 and 1936, whereas 
rubber amounted 8.4 per cent. Dried fish, pepper and raw untanned hides 
represented 8 per cent.31 
The majority of the investment in mining went into the extraction of 
coal, tin and zinc in the northeast regions of Tonkin (Cao B?ng, Thái Nguyên, 
B@c C$n, Qu,ng Ninh and Ninh Bình) and gold in southern Annam (Qu,ng 
Nam). Coal was the key mining product in Indochina, accounting for 89 per 
cent in 1932 and 63 per cent in 1937 of the total mining output.32 The 
production of coal rose from 500,000 tons in 1913 to 1,972,000 tons in 1929 
                    
27 T$ Th0 Thúy, +#n !i,n c-a ng.*i Pháp / B0c K1, 100-101; T$ Th0 Thúy, Vi'c nh.2ng !)t 
kh3n hoang / B0c K1, 84. 
28 André Touzet, L’économie Indochinoise et la grande crise universelle (Paris: Giard, 1934) 3. 
29 Andrew McFadyan (ed.) The history of rubber regulation 1934-1943 (London: George 
Allen&Unwin, 1944) 224. 
30 Nguy+n V%n LAi, L’économie commercial du riz en Indochine (Paris: Les éditions Domat-
Montchrestien, 1938) 27; Touzet, L’économie Indochinoise, 10. 
31 Robequain, Economic development, 308-309, Nguy+n V%n Khánh, C) c-u kinh t# xã h5i Vi't 
Nam,116. 
32 Robequain, Economic development, 252. 
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and 2,615,000 tons in the peak year of 1939.33 The bulk of the mining output 
was used for export, most going to France, China and Hong Kong. Between 
1930 and 1945, Indochina exported 28,154,000 tons of coal, 598,000 tons of 
iron ore, 760,000 tons of zinc and 533,000 tons of tin, lead and phosphate.34 The 
share of mining products in total exports increased from 1.3 per cent (1899-
1903) and 3.5 per cent (1913-1917) to 7 per cent in the total 1937 exports. Of 
this 7 per cent, coal alone represented 5.6 per cent.35 It is important to note that 
almost 50 per cent of the export products from Indochina were reserved for 
France.Other important destinations included Hong Kong, Singapore, China and 
the United States.36 
Table 3: Distribution of plantations in Indochina in 1930 
(in hectares) 
 Total Rice Tea Coffee Rubber 
Tonkin 134,400 30,300 200 4,150 - 
Annam 168,400 2,500 3,510 5,900 1,874 
Cochin China 606,500 253,400 - 650 97,804 
Cambodia 113,500 12,960 - - 26,729 
Laos 2,800 40 - 50 - 
Total 1,025,600 289,900 3,710 10,750 126,407 
Source: Nguy+n V%n Khánh, C( c)u kinh t& xã h"i Vi't Nam th*i 
thu"c !$a 1858-1945 (Hanoi: 1$i h*c Qu8c gia, 2004) p. 87. 
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, about 50 per cent 
of imports in Indochina originated from France and other French colonies. In 
1937, this proportion rose to 60 per cent.37 The principal imports consisted of 
                    
33 Cao V%n Bi6n, Công nghi'p than Vi't Nam th*i k1 1888-1945 [Coal mining in Vietnam, 1888-
1945] (Hanoi: Khoa h*c Xã h5i Publishers, 1998) 136-137; Murray, The development of 
capitalism,324. 
34 Vi'n Kinh t#, Kinh t& Vi't Nam t4 cách m7ng tháng Tám !&n kháng chi&n th0ng l2i, 1945-1954 
[Vietnam’s economy from the August Revolution to the end of the second Indochina War, 
1945-1954] (Hanoi: Khoa h*c Xã h5i Publishers, 1996) 15. 
35 Robequain, Economic development, 318; Murray, The development of capitalism, 329. 
36 Nguy+n V%n Khánh, C( c)u kinh t& Xã h"i, 106, 117-120. 
37 Nguy+n V%n Khánh, C( c)u kinh t& Xã h"i, 117-120; Touzet, L’économie Indochinoise,114-
115. 
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manufactured products, accounting for 62 per cent of the total in 1937.38 These 
commodities included cars, petrol, cotton fabrics, paper and various food 
products, including milk, canned fruits and beverages. Machinery and metal 
products made up only a small proportion, 1.5 per cent in 1915, and reached a 
peak in 1931 at 8.8 per cent.39 In 1938, the value of imported industrial 
equipment was 6.4 per cent of the total imports. Industrial raw materials 
amounted to 6.5 per cent of total imports qua value in 1938. The principal 
imported goods in that year were raw cotton representing 4 per cent and 
chemical products together 2.5 per cent of total imports. Cars, oil and kerosene 
took up another 9.8 per cent of total imports.40 Most import-export activities 
were controlled by the French, but the Chinese also had a hand in them, albeit a 
smaller one. The Vietnamese served as contractors or middlemen for foreign 
companies. In the years 1923-1927, there were 449 Vietnamese contractors in 
Tonkin with a combined capital of 4.4 million piastres. By comparison 155 
Western firms had assets worth 1.9 million piastres.41 
As it intended to keep the Indochina market exclusively for French 
manufactured goods, the French colonial government did not encourage the 
development of industry in Vietnam. In Cochin China, the dynamic economic 
centre of Indochina, for instance, in 1906 there were no more than thirty-six 
European industrial enterprises.42 The most important industry was mining, 
dominated by two French companies, Société des Charbonnage du Tonkin and 
the Société des Charbonnage du Dong Trieu, both specializing in coal 
extraction. The Société des Ciments Portland Artificiels de l’Indochine, founded 
in 1899 when a factory was opened in H,i Phòng, was the most important 
company in the field of manufacturing and processing industries. Textile 
manufacturing was controlled by the Société Cotonnière de l’Indochine, which 
                    
38 Robequain, Economic development, 319. 
39 Vi'n Kinh t#, Kinh t& Vi't Nam, 24. 
40 Lê M$nh Hùng, The impact of World War II, 37. 
41 T$ Th0 Thúy, S6 bi&n chuy8n c-a các giai c)p trong xã h"i Vi't Nam nh9ng n:m 20 c-a th& k; 
XX [The social classes’ transformation in Vietnam in the early 1920s (Hanoi: Advanced 
Political thesis, H! Chí Minh Academy, 2007) 45.  
42 Pierre Brocheux, Daniel Hémery (eds), Indochina; An ambiguous colonization, 1858-1954 
(Berkeley: Univesity of California Press, 2009) 118. 
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had mills in Hanoi, Nam 10nh, H,i Phòng and Saigon. The production and 
distribution of alcohol were monopolized by the Société Francaise de 
Distilleries de l’Indochine. There were a few small sugar refineries, rubber 
processing mills and tobacco processing factories. Only in the agricultural 
processing industries were there concerns not dominated by French interests. In 
1932, although the two largest were French owned, seventy-three of the 
seventy-five rice-processing mills in Cholon were Chinese owned.43 There were 
also numerous small rice-mills installed by the Vietnamese in the countryside. 
Modern industries such as power, transportation and chemicals were exclusively 
in the hands of French companies.       
The structure of the economy of colonial Indonesia was also highly 
traditional in which priority was placed on primary production. The colony was 
opened up to private capital investment in the 1870s, but it was only at the 
beginning of the twentieth century that foreign investment in Indonesia could be 
said to have reached a significant volume. In 1900, the total foreign investment 
in Indonesia was estimated at 750 million guilders. It increased to 1.7 billion 
guilders in 1914, culminating in 4 billion guilders in 1930 and subsequently 
hovered around 3 billion during the 1930s. About two-thirds of the foreign 
capital invested in colonial Indonesia was of Dutch origin, with British and 
American investors ranking second and third, respectively. As was French 
investment in Indochina, a large part of Dutch investment in the Netherlands 
Indies went into primary production. Nevertheless, unlike their counterparts in 
Indochina, Dutch investors concentrated more on agriculture than on mining, 
with a portion of the total investment of 45 and 20 per cent, respectively. The 
remainder went into services and manufacturing. The Dutch firms occupied a 
dominant position in sugar, tin and transport, but British and American firms 
were more firmly in the saddle in tobacco, rubber and oil. The bulk of the 
extraction and production of oil was in the hands of the Royal Dutch Shell, an 
alliance between Royal Dutch (Koninklijke) and British-owned Shell.44 By and 
                    
43 Murray, The development of capitalism, 451. 
44 Jean Bush Aden, Oil and politics in Indonesia, 1945 to 1980 (PhD dissertation, Cornell 
University, Ithaca, NY, 1988) 25-32; J. Thomas Lindblad, ‘The economic relationship between 
Beyond Political Skin 
 
34 
large, about 48 per cent of firms in the Netherlands Indies were engaged in 
estate agriculture, compared to 35 per cent in trade and 17 per cent in mining 
and industry. West and East Java were the most populous locations for the 
business operations of modern Western firms, whose main offices were often 
located in Batavia, Surabaya or Semarang.45 
The total number of foreign corporations operating in the Netherlands 
Indies was about 2,800 in 1914. This figure increased to 3700 in 1920, and then 
declined to 3,300 in 1925, 2,800 in 1930, and a bare 2,155 in 1940.46 These 
companies can be divided into four categories. The largest category was 
composed of Netherlands Indies firms, accounting for 51 per cent of the total 
number in 1914, 43 per cent in 1930 and 44 per cent in 1940. These companies 
were operated by permanent Dutch residents in the colony. The second group 
consisted of genuinely Dutch firms whose headquarters were in the 
Netherlands, with a share rising from 23 per cent in 1930 to 29 per cent in 1940. 
Truly foreign firms, run by investors from third countries, ranked third. The 
final category was made up of Asian but non-Indonesian firms, the largest 
number owned by ethnic Chinese. The Asian firms were generally small as 
were the many Netherlands Indies firms. In fact, the companies run from 
outside the colony were larger and hence less susceptible to short-run 
movements of business cycles. In 1930, for instance, genuinely Dutch 
companies claimed more than 70 per cent of the total registered equity against 
14 per cent for Netherlands Indies firms and only 4 per cent for Chinese firms, 
whereas British-owned enterprises alone occupied 10 per cent of the total 
equity. In the corporate network of the colony a small number of large firms 
managed from abroad operated alongside a large number of small firms with a 
strong local entrenchment.47 
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46 J. Thomas Lindblad, Foreign investment in Southeast Asia in the twentieth century (London: 
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One example of a large firm owned by an ethnic Chinese is the Oei 
Tiong Ham Concern (OTHC), a sugar-based conglomerate founded by a 
peranakan Chinese named Oei Tiong Ham.48 It was the parent company of 
numerous firms based in Semarang and Surabaya on the north coast of Java. 
The Handel-Maatschappij Kian Gwan (Kian Gwan Trading Company) was a 
sugar-centred international trading company, founded in 1863 by Oei Tiong 
Ham’s father, Oei Tjie Sien. It had agents in various parts of the world, 
including Calcutta, Bombay, Karachi, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Amoy, Singapore, 
London, New York, San Francisco, Rotterdam, Hamburg and Sydney. The 
General Development Company of Oei Tiong Ham Sugar Factories (Algemeene 
Maatschappij tot Exploitatie der Oei Tiong Ham Suikerfabrieken) focused on 
sugar manufacture, operating five plantations and mills in Java. Besides sugar, 
the company also owned a rubber estate and the Krebet Tapioca Factory in 
Malang in East Java. Other important companies under the control of the OTHC 
included the Heap Eng Moh Steamship Co. Ltd, the Bank Vereeniging Oei 
Tiong Ham, the Bouw-Maatschappij Randoesarie and the Midden-Java Veem.49 
As a consequence of its involvement in diversified businesses, OTHC became 
one of the largest commercial enterprises in the Netherlands Indies and was 
probably one of the largest privately owned companies in the world during the 
first decades of the twentieth century.  
In 1929 about 2 billion guilders were invested in the plantation industry, 
three-quarters of which were Dutch.50 Since tobacco was steadily losing ground, 
foreign investment diversified into other export crops, notably rubber, sugar, 
coffee and palm oil. The number of tobacco plantations in the East Coast of 
                    
48 All the information about the Oei Tiong Ham Concern (OTHC) in this study is based on the 
personal recollections of Oei Tjong Tjay, one of the heirs to OTHC. His recollections are kept 
at the library of the Sinological Institute at Leiden University. I am grateful to Professor 
Leonard Blussé for allowing me to use the recollections. 
49 KKA, The story of Krebet, published by Handel Maatschappij Kian Gwan in 1932.The Oei 
Tiong Ham-Concern; A short survey of its development and progress, published by Handel 
Maatschappij Kian Gwan in 1934. OTHC, inventory number 14. 
50  P. Creutzberg (ed.), Changing economy in Indonesia; A selection of statistical source material 
from the early 19th century up to 1940, Vol. III. Expenditure on fixed assets (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1977) 25. 
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Sumatra fell from 114 in 1904 to only forty-five in 1940.51 The total planted 
area of tobacco in 1940 was 195,000 hectares. As tobacco floundered, the 
rubber estates expanded enormously from 110,000 hectares in 1910 to 1.4 
million hectares in 1940, more than 1 million hectares of which were in 
Sumatra. In 1938, there were 207 rubber plantations in the East Coast of 
Sumatra. Sugar dominated Java when it covered an area of 149,000 hectares in 
1910, rising to 200,000 hectares in 1930. Thereafter it declined to about 
100,000 hectares in the late 1930s. The total number of sugar plantations in Java 
remained steady at about 180-190 between 1910 and 1930. The combined 
coffee and tea estates covered 400,000 hectares in 1910 and 500,000 hectares in 
1940. Other important perennial crops included palm oil (110,000 hectares) and 
coconuts (1.5 million hectares). Land reserved for such food crops as rice, 
maize and cassava amounted to 5 million hectares in 1910 or 7 million hectares 
in 1940. These calculations included both the large plantations owned by the 
Europeans and lands held by Indonesian smallholders.52 
Figure 2 shows the composition of export production in colonial 
Indonesia from the end of the nineteenth century to the late 1930s. Agricultural 
commodities accounted for more than 70 per cent of total export earnings. 
Sugar was the most profitable export crops, occupying almost 30 per cent in 
1900, reaching a peak at 47 per cent in 1920. Rubber had also commenced its 
steady climb by the second decade of the twentieth century and had even 
replaced sugar by the end of the 1930s. Tobacco, coffee and tea, which had 
been principal export crops in the Archipelago in the late nineteenth century, 
underwent a gradual decline in the total export earnings in the next century. 
Among the various other products, copra and cinchona shared about 10 per cent. 
Beside these agricultural products, the Netherlands Indies introduced new 
products that were generally termed industrial materials. Tin was mined on 
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Bangka and Billiton, coal was extracted from mines in West Sumatra (Ombilin), 
South Sumatra (Bukit Asam) and Kalimantan (Pulu Laut), and oil was found in 
North and South Sumatra and East Kalimantan. The share of mining in total 
export values rose enormously after 1910. Less than one-third of Indonesian 
exports went to the Netherlands, whereas Asia, including Singapore, received 
over 40 per cent. By 1925, these percentages were 15 and 50, respectively. The 
share of the United States in Indonesian exports increased remarkably, keeping 
pace with the expansion of rubber and oil production in Indonesia in the late 
1930s.53 
 
Source: G.H.A. Prince and H. Baudet, ‘Economie en beleid in  
vooroorlogs Nederlands-Indië’, in: H. Baudet, M. Fennema et al., 
Het Nederlands belang bij Indië (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1983) p. 33. 
Late colonial Indonesia was also becoming less dependent on imports 
from the Netherlands. In 1910, the proportion of imports from the Netherlands 
was 32 per cent. This figure declined sharply to 20 per cent in 1925, dropping to 
only 13 per cent in 1935. Most other imports were received either directly from 
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other European countries or through Singapore. The European share remained 
at about 50 per cent of all imports in the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, but declined dramatically to only 36 per cent by 1935. Japan ranked 
second after Singapore as the most important trading partner of colonial 
Indonesia in Asia, and by 1935, the Japanese share in Indonesian imports had 
surpassed Singapore, accounting for 32 per cent of total import value. Most 
Japanese exports to Indonesia consisted of cheap consumer goods, including 
cotton cloth, household utensils and bicycles.54 The American share rose 
remarkably after the First World War, touching 8 per cent in 1935. This was a 
partial reflection of the improved trans-Pacific shipping routes, but undeniably 
income growth and industrial development in Indonesia were also stimulating a 
growing demand for both capital and consumer goods produced by the United 
States.55 
The growth of trade, above all the economic expansion of colonial 
Indonesia, in the early twentieth century was attributed to the liberal economic 
policy pursued by the Netherlands Indies government from the 1870s. Free 
trade fostered a climate favourable to foreign investment, maximizing the scope 
for the expansion of export products. Initially, this liberalism was intended to 
safeguard market outlets for Dutch manufacturing at home, particularly the 
textile industry. Nevertheless, as the Archipelago was increasingly integrated 
into the world economy, the true beneficiaries of the colonial liberal trade 
policy were third-country exporters. Not the Netherlands, but Great Britain and 
Japan emerged as the leading suppliers of various manufactured products in 
Indonesia, particularly textiles. On the home front, free trade also exposed 
embryonic efforts at domestic manufacturing to international competition. 
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However, in the face of fierce competition, manufacturers, whether indigenous 
Indonesians, Chinese or Dutch, found themselves at a disadvantage.56 
As an export-led country, colonial Indonesia was among those hardest 
hit by the worldwide Depression in the 1930s as prices of primary products 
collapsed. As an instrument to deal with the offensive led by Japanese 
manufacturers of low-price products, liberalism was no longer an appropriate 
policy. In 1933, the Dutch colonial authorities introduced the Crisis Import 
Ordinance (Crisisinvoerordonnantie), a step which marked their switch to 
protectionism. Quotas were introduced as a regulatory instrument to curb 
foreign imports, especially from Japan.57 Protection against Japanese imports 
benefited not only the more expensive imports from the Netherlands but, 
unintentionally, also domestic production set up to promote import substitution. 
The restrictive trade policy coincided with unprecedented initiatives launched 
by the colonial government to promote manufacturing industries and 
agricultural production. Such small-scale industries as textile, sugar processing, 
confectionary, the manufacture of rubber sandals, coconut oil and margarine 
developed rapidly in Java, especially in West Java, in the late 1930s. The 
number of weaving mills rose from about twenty in 1930 to almost 2,000 in 
1938. The number of modern handlooms rose a thousand-fold during the 1930s, 
reaching 50,000 looms by the end of 1941, taking their place alongside with 
10,000 mechanical looms.58 In Kudus, Central Java, indigenous and Chinese 
producers competed with one another in the booming kretek cigarette industry. 
Nor were foreign firms left behind in this accelerating industrialization. Philips 
had a light bulb factory in Surabaya, General Motors opened an assembly line 
for motor cars in Batavia, Goodyear established Indonesia’s first tyre factory, 
Bata began producing shoes for the local market, and Unilever introduced 
locally produced margarine into Indonesian households.59 The best evidence of 
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emerging industrialization is that the manufacturing share of GDP jumped from 
8 per cent to 12 per cent between 1931 and 1939.60 By 1938 the Netherlands 
Indies was almost self-sufficient in cigarettes, frying pans, paint, toiletries, beer, 
shoes and confectionery and the local production of biscuits, margarine, 
batteries and bicycles was not insignificant.61 After 1936 the emphasis shifted 
from light industry and consumer goods to heavy industry and the production of 
industrial goods. In early 1940, the colonial government announced an 
industrialization programme which would favour heavy industry. By the time of 
the Japanese invasion in 1942, the Dutch authorities had already established 
some of these planned heavy industries, notably for the production of metals, 
machinery and chemicals.62 
1.3. Colonial Drain 
Post-independence discourses on the economic effects of colonialism have been 
dominated by the theory of colonial drain. This theory is based on the fact that 
many colonies generated a trade surplus. The extent to which the value of 
exports in merchandise exceeded that of imports is regarded as a loss to the 
colonies and a gain for colonizers.63 ‘Colonial drain’ is also the preferred 
argument by which to explain the poverty in and underdevelopment of post-
colonial economies.64 Historians in Indonesia have assumed that fabulous riches 
from the colony poured into the Dutch economy.65 In Vietnamese 
historiography, the process of French colonization is described in terms of two 
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phases of colonial exploitation: the first phase from 1897 to 1914 and the 
second from 1919-1929. Notwithstanding the essential fallacy which identifies 
colonial profits with trade surplus without deducting the services provided by 
foreign capital and labour66 and the profits reinvested in the colony,67 the ‘drain’ 
theory did substantiate the arguments for an immediate abolition of the colonial 
system of economy after independence. Fear of a continued ‘economic drain’ by 
Dutch colonialism was the main ideological basis behind the nationalist 
justifications for a radical nationalization of ‘alien giant capital’ in Indonesian 
in the early 1950s.68 
Although the balance of trade of colonial Indonesia did change over 
time, throughout the entire late colonial period, the Netherlands Indies 
experienced a trade surplus of 38 per cent,69 which rose as high as 75 per cent 
between 1913 and 1938.70 The surplus of exports over imports was converted 
into a substantial surplus on the current account of the balance of payments, and 
this in turn financed the outflow of profits, interest and dividends. In the 1920s, 
the surplus on the current account amounted to 5 per cent of the estimated 
national income of the Indonesian Archipelago.71 The bulk of the profits were 
remitted to the Netherlands, where they contributed about 9 per cent of the 
Dutch net domestic product (NDP),72 that is as high as 14 per cent of the 
national income of the Netherlands.73 
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In the reciprocal trade between colonial Indonesia and the Netherlands, 
the mother country always showed an important trade deficit and Indonesia a 
considerable surplus. The share of Indonesia in Dutch imports amounted to 14.5 
per cent by the end of the First World War but dropped to 5.5 per cent during 
the 1920s and the 1930s, whereas exports to the colony from the Netherlands 
constituted only 3.5 per cent in the first decade of the twentieth century, 
reaching a peak at 9.5 per cent in the second decade, but falling to 7 per cent in 
the third decade. The share of the Netherlands in the total of Indonesian exports 
ranged from 16.5 to 32 per cent between 1900 and 1939. Imports from the 
Netherlands to Indonesia accounted for about 26.5 per cent between 1900 and 
1930 and 17 per cent in the 1930s.74 By 1914 Dutch imports from colonial 
Indonesia approached 200 million guilders, while the reverse flow of trade 
amounted to 150 million. In the five-year period 1915-1919, over 150 million 
guilders worth of merchandise flowed to the Netherlands, but Dutch exports to 
Indonesia were valued at only 80 million guilders. Even during the short period 
of Dutch trade expansion in the early 1920s, the surplus of the westbound flow 
of capital over the eastbound exceeded 20 million guilders.75 
The commodity trade surplus of Indochina was much smaller. Between 
1913 and 1938, the surplus of exports over imports was 23 per cent compared to 
the 75 per cent of the Netherlands Indies. Until 1913, the trade balance of 
Indochina was often in deficit, or displayed only a small surplus. By the end of 
the first period of colonial exploitation, the surplus was 31 million francs. This 
was on account of the large inflows of capital to Indochina in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century on both government and private accounts for the 
purpose of developing infrastructure and supporting the growing French 
bureaucratic presence. During the First World War the surplus increased 
fourfold, amounting to 86 million francs.76 The most remarkable period of 
export expansion was between 1933 and 1937 when the surplus accumulated to 
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49 million piastres or 490 million francs (in the 1930s, the official rate was 1 
piastre to 10 francs).77 As noted above, about 50 per cent of exports from and 60 
per cent of imports into Indochina originated from France. However, exports 
from Indochina accounted for only 4.1 per cent of the total French imports in 
1938. In the same year, Indochina purchased 3.1 per cent of the total exports of 
the mother country.78 The dependence of Indochina on the mother country was 
far greater than in the case of the Netherlands Indies. 
The Chinese share in the ‘drain’ is difficult to calculate because of the 
long-standing Chinese settlement in Southeast Asia and hence a considerable 
part of the profits accruing from their businesses was ploughed back into them. 
Nevertheless, based on the remittances which the overseas Chinese sent to their 
families in China, a rough estimate can be made of the Chinese ‘drain’ on 
colonial Indonesia and French Indochina. By the Pacific War, the total 
investment of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies and Indochina was 
respectively 5,600 million yen and 1,800 million yen, out of a total of 14,500 
million yen for the whole of Southeast Asia.79 In 1930 the Chinese remittances 
from Indonesia were estimated to be about 25 million guilders or 5.8 per cent of 
foreign Asian income in Indonesia.80 In 1937, the overseas Fukienese in the 
Netherlands Indies and Annam (Central Vietnam) sent home remittances worth 
5.5 million Yuan and 1.1 million Yuan, respectively. The next year, the amount 
increased to 10.8 million Yuan and 687,000 Yuan. The amount of the Amoy 
Chinese remittances was similar, those from the Netherlands Indies amounting 
to 8.7 million Yuan in 1936, 5.3 million Yuan in 1937 and 8.5 million Yuan in 
1938. In contrast, the Amoy Chinese remittances from Annam were much 
smaller, reaching 331,000 Yuan in 1936, 133,000 Yuan in 1937 and 23,000 
Yuan in 1938. The Bank of China, which had branches and agencies in Saigon, 
Hanoi, Batavia and other major cities in Southeast Asia, showed the greatest 
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absorption of the overseas Fukienese remittances. In 1936, for instance, the 
Bank of China received 5 billion Yuan from the Netherlands Indies and 632 
million Yuan from Saigon.81, Jean-Pascal Bassino argues that outward-bound 
remittances from the Chinese were an important factor in producing a large 
current account surplus for Indochina in the years 1936-1944.82 The Chinese 
overseas remittances added to the massive amount of capital flows accruing to 
Europe creates the impression of a ‘double drain’, thwarting opportunities for 
economic growth in the colonies in the early twentieth century. Had more of 
these funds been retained in the colonies for investment in productive 
infrastructure and in education, the economic positions of Indonesia and 
Vietnam at independence might have been very different.83 
2. The Japanese Occupation 
Even before the Japanese attack on the Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, 
signalling the beginning of the Pacific War, the balance of imperial power in 
Southeast Asia had already changed. In September 1940, the Japanese army 
invaded the northern parts of Vietnam. This disruption was soon followed by an 
agreement with the French which allowed the Japanese to station troops in 
Indochina. The Japanese invasion of the Netherlands Indies took place in early 
1942, despite desperate sporadic efforts to resist them by the Dutch colonial 
army. The Japanese deployed different strategies to govern the occupied 
territories. The French colonial administration was retained under Japanese 
command until March 1945,84 whereas in the Netherlands Indies, Dutch 
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officials were replaced by Japanese administrators or by Indonesians in some 
posts. During the short period of occupation, the Indonesian entrepreneurs were 
given the chance to participate in the economy which had hitherto been almost 
exclusively dominated by foreign nationals. The situation was different but it 
does not mean that in comparison to Vietnam, Indonesia suffered less during the 
Japanese occupation. Under the Japanese war economy, the strategic natural 
resources of all colonies were exploited to meet military needs. The economic 
exploitation by the Japanese worsened economic conditions in Vietnam and 
Indonesia. Compounded by the severe damage wreaked by warfare, this placed 
both Indonesia and Vietnam in an appalling economic condition at the time of 
independence.  
2.1. Vietnam 
Japan had already established diplomatic and commercial relations with the 
feudal regimes of Vietnam long before the intrusion of French colonialism in 
the late nineteenth century. During the colonial period, relations between Japan 
and Vietnam were hampered by the protectionist policy of the French colonial 
authorities. The upshot was that the economic activities of the Japanese in 
Vietnam and the trade between the two countries were both fairly insignificant. 
In the 1930s, there were only about 300 Japanese in Indochina, most of them 
were engaged in trade and transportation.85 Coal, rubber, salt and occasionally 
rice were the principal Japanese imports from Vietnam, whereas only a small 
quantity of the Japanese industrial goods was exported to Vietnam. In 1939, 
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Indochina accounted for only 0.1 per cent of Japanese exports and 0.9 per cent 
of imports.86 
Vietnam became a country of strategic importance to Japan during the 
Second Sino-Japanese war, which broke out in 1937. Most war materials were 
supplied to China through Vietnam by two routes, the Haiphong-Yunnan 
railway and the Hanoi-1!ng 1%ng railway. Repeated demands by the Japanese 
to close the transit of military supplies to China were rejected by the French 
authorities. Fighting eventually broke out when the Japanese attacked the 
French garrisons in 1!ng 1%ng and L$ng S)n on 22 September 1940. Fighting 
lasted several days before the French Vichy government signed an agreement 
allowing Japanese troops to be stationed in northern Vietnam. The Japanese 
advance into southern Vietnam was carried out in mid-1941, resulting in 
another agreement, recognizing the occupation of Japanese troops of southern 
Vietnam. Finally, in December 1941, the French Vichy colonial government in 
Hanoi signed a new agreement with the Japanese on a common defence of 
Indochina. Accordingly, the Japanese forces were given the right to use all the 
facilities of the French forces throughout Indochina in their operations, 
maintenance and installations. The French forces would take all possible steps 
to co-operate with the Japanese forces for the defence of Indochina. 
Specifically, the French forces took charge of the defence of northern 
Indochina, while the defence of southern Indochina was the responsibility of the 
Japanese forces.87 The headquarters of the Southern Region Army, commanded 
by General Terauchi Hisaichi, was based in Saigon. Although the French 
maintained the sovereignty in Indochina, the agreement of December 1941 
guaranteed that the country was now under control of the Japanese army. 
Forthwith, the existing administrative system of French colonialism in 
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Indochina had to be tailored to satisfy all Japanese demands, whether military or 
economic.88 
Before its occupation of the northern parts of Vietnam, Japan had 
already drawn up a plan for the exploitation of Indochina resources. The 
‘Outline of Economic Counter-Plans for the Southern Region’, issued by the 
Japanese government on 6 August 1940, stressed the necessity of achieving a 
self-sufficient Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere led by Japan. Indochina 
was considered part of the ‘vital zone’, in which Japan endeavoured to use local 
capital and materials as far as possible to acquire goods and materials. By and 
large, the Japanese economic policy in Indochina was twofold. The principal 
aim of Japan was to obtain essential foodstuffs and such raw materials as 
rubber, coal and other strategic materials in exchange for the Japanese 
manufactured products with which it was then overstocked because of the trade 
embargo on it imposed by the United States and Great Britain. No less 
importantly, Japan also wanted to establish a strong economic foothold in 
Indochina in preparation for the realization of its dream: the autarkic Greater 
East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.89 The role of Indochina in the Greater East 
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was clarified in a document entitled ‘Policy 
Measures for Economic Expansion in French Indochina’, issued on 3 September 
1940. It called for a guarantee of Indochinese exports of rice, coal, apatite, 
manganese, industrial salt, tin rubber, zinc and silica, which would allow it to 
achieve independence in resources from the United States and Britain. To 
secure financing for the import of these goods, Japan persuaded the Bank of 
Indochina to offer credit on advantageous terms.90 
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One of the first things the Japanese did after entering Vietnam was to 
confiscate those Chinese businesses which had been trading with China.91 The 
Japanese pressured the French authorities to allocate a portion of local revenue 
to support the Japanese forces in Indochina, an extraction which had 
accumulated to 723 million piastres by March 1945.92 In May 1941, a series of 
documents was signed which gave Japan a most favoured nation status, both as 
a customer for Indochinese products and as a supplier of goods into Indochina.93 
The French agreed to export 700,000 tons of rice and 15,000 tons of rubber to 
Japan in 1941, the payment to be offset by exports from Japan to Indochina.94 A 
group of 150 Japanese technicians was sent to Vietnam charged with the 
mission of reorganizing agricultural, forestry, mining and hydroelectric power 
enterprises and investigating the possibility of the construction of a railway 
between Saigon and Rangoon.95 The outbreak of the Pacific war obliged Japan 
to modify its economic policy towards Vietnam. Self-reliance was emphasized 
with the exception of the trade with Japan. Measures were taken to restrict and 
control consumption, as well as to encourage import substitution to offset the 
consequences in the Allied embargo. All imports and products manufactured 
from imports were placed under tight government control. 
By May 1942, after the successive surrenders of the Americans in the 
Philippines, the British in Malaya and Burma, and the Dutch in the Netherlands 
Indies, the Japanese had essentially gained control of all of Southeast Asia. 
Many of the natural resources of Vietnam, including rubber, tin and zinc could 
now be obtained more easily and cheaply from Malaya and the Netherlands 
Indies. Rice continued to be the principal products Japan required from 
Vietnam, supplemented by a number of other products unavailable in other 
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colonies. Moreover, in preparation for the realization of an autarkic Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Japanese government tightened its control over 
the occupied territories. In December 1942, the Japanese signed a new 
agreement with the French authorities, which allowed the Japanese to become 
more directly involved in the exploitation of Vietnamese economic resources.96 
Japanese firms were encouraged to invest in Vietnam.   
Significant amounts of investment by the Japanese in Vietnam began in 
1941 with a total capital of 49 million piastres for the whole of Indochina 
compared to 12.5 million piastres in the previous year. This amount was 
reduced to 6.5 million piastres in 1942 as a consequence of the isolation of the 
country because of the escalation in hostilities, but rose again to 43 million 
piastres in 1943, which accounted for one-quarter of the total investment in 
Indochina in that year.97 The number of Japanese firms operating in Indochina 
increased from fourteen by 1940 to twenty-four in August 1941, and thirty-six 
at the beginning of 1942. The largest company was probably Mitsui Bussan 
Kaisha, strongly linked to the Japanese Navy, which was given the monopoly 
on rice imports to Japan and was engaged in various manufacturing activities, 
including timber, shipbuilding and foundry.98 
The purpose of the majority of the manufacturing activities launched by 
the Japanese in Vietnam was to supply the needs of the Japanese armed forces. 
Timber-getting was given the highest priority, as the Japanese needed wood to 
construct ships, bridges, buildings and railway links. In May 1941, six Japanese 
companies, including Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sanko, Ataka, Taitaku and Nakamura, 
formed a consortium to invest in the timber industry, bringing total timber 
production to 3 million cubic metres in 1941. Production increased to 3.5 
million cubic metres in 1942, but declined to around 1 million cubic metres in 
1943 and 1944, supplemented by about 4,000 tons of pine resin.99 Timber and 
pine resin were principally used in shipbuilding, an industry which the Japanese 
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government was trying to stimulate in order to replace the ships lost to enemy 
action. In 1943, the Japanese government drew up a shipbuilding programme 
for Vietnam, stating that ships were to be constructed as sailing vessels of 250 
tons with an auxiliary power. Another programme was implemented in early 
1944 and involved four companies, Ataka, Misubishi, Mitsui and Koan Docks. 
It planned to construct 165 ships with a total capacity of 27,200 tons. The sites 
chosen to build these ships were Haiphong, Vinh and Saigon. However, because 
of the shortage of capital investment only a small number of ships had been 
completed by the end of 1944.100 
Apart from the timber industry, Japanese companies invested in little 
else in the manufacturing sector in Vietnam. In April 1943, the Japanese 
government did draw up a programme for the expansion of the cotton industry 
in Indochina. It was designed to make the army and the people of Indochina 50 
per cent self-sufficient in clothing. Japan decided to supply Indochina with 
80,000 Japanese spinning machines and 3,000 looms. Apparently it languished 
as by the end of 1943 only one Japanese spinning-mill and one weaving-mill 
had been built in Saigon and Tonkin respectively. More Japanese investment 
went instead to the manufacture of the jute bags required for the transportation 
of rice. The rubber industry also attracted some attention from the Japanese. In 
May 1944, three Japanese companies, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Nomura, prepared 
plans to produce tyres. Other factories founded by the Japanese included a 
steelworks in Saigon established by Mitsui to produce parts for the Japanese 
Navy in 1943.101 In a few instances, the Japanese co-operated with the French 
and the Vietnamese in the setting up of small manufacturing concerns and retail 
shops to compete with the Chinese. 
Unsurprisingly, given their war machine, the Japanese were particularly 
interested in mining. Nevertheless, they only took over those enterprises in 
which production was still below par for their requirements, including the 
extraction of phosphate, manganese, chromite and apatite. The old-established 
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minerals, such as coal, zinc and tin were left in French hands.102 Generally, the 
Japanese were content to co-operate with the existing French mining 
companies. For instance, in 1941, the Compagnie Indochinoise de Commerce et 
d’Industrie co-operated with the French companies in establishing three joint 
ventures, namely the Compagnie de Chrome de l’Indochine (CHROMIC), the 
Compagnie Indochinoise d’industrie minière (CIM) and the Société 
d’exploitation des phosphates de l’Indochine (SIPI). These companies 
concentrated on exploiting such strategic minerals as chromium, manganese and 
iron ore, as well as some phosphate to export to Japan. Other Japanese 
enterprises active in the mining sector included the South Seas Fertilizer, Great 
Japan Phosphate and the Taiwan Fertilizer Companies.103 The production of 
iron ore rose from 53,300 tons in 1941 to 82,000 tons in 1943, and the mining 
of phosphate rock reached a high point of 98,8000 tons by the end of 1942.104 
Nevertheless, the prime source of interest for the Japanese in Vietnam 
was rice. The Mitsui Bussan Kaisha collected about 1 million tons of rice 
annually from Indochina. The grain was exported not only to Japan, but also to 
other parts of Greater East Asia. In fact, Vietnam was the largest supplier of rice 
to Japan, accounting for 37 per cent of Japanese rice imports in 1942 and 56 per 
cent in 1943.105 In 1942, the Japanese companies began to increase their 
investment in the cultivation of such fibre-yielding plants as cotton, jute and 
flax. The area under cultivation with cotton increased from 20,000 hectares in 
1942 to 52,000 hectares in 1944.106 To encourage the cultivation of jute, which 
was indispensable to the transportation of rice, a Japanese Jute Cultivation 
Association was established in early 1943 with twenty-two associated Japanese 
companies under the direction of the Japanese embassy in Hanoi. The 
Association was said to have cultivated about 10,000 hectares in 1943. This area 
was expanded to 15,000 hectares in 1944. The Japanese also forced Vietnamese 
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peasants to grow jute at the expense of their maize and rice crops, arousing 
resentment among the indigenous population. Turning to hemp and flax, 
Japanese production in 1943 was said to be about 6,000 tons from about 2,210 
hectares. The area was expected to expand to 3,300 hectares in 1944.107 To 
obtain vegetable oils, Japanese companies also invested in such oil-yielding 
plants as the castor beans, sesame plants and peanuts. The two largest 
companies cultivating oleaginous plants were the Taiwan Takushoku and 
Mitsubishi. The area under the cultivation with peanuts, castor beans and 
sesame plants grew rapidly from 33,000 hectares in 1940 to 65,000 hectares in 
1942, reaching 85,000 hectares by the end of 1944.108 The increasing cultivation 
of fibrous and oleaginous plants at the expense of rice and maize fields, rising 
demands for rice by the Japanese authorities, aggravated by bad weather, were 
the main reasons for the shortage of rice in Vietnam in 1944 and 1945. The 
terrible famine in North and Central Vietnam in early 1945 cost the lives of 
about 2 million people.109 
This summary leaves no doubt that Japan had become the foremost 
trading partner of Indochina. In 1942 and 1943, it bought about 95 per cent of 
all Indochinese exports and provided about 77 per cent of all imports into 
Indochina. The total value of exports to Japan jumped 25 per cent between 1941 
and 1943, from 160 million piastres to 200 million, while imports from Japan in 
the same period increased almost fourfold from 34 million piastres to 126 
million. From late 1943, Indochinese trade with Japan declined steeply, 
dropping to only 79 million piastres of export value and 34 million of import 
value in 1944.110 Apart from Japan, Indochina pursued only a little trade with 
Thailand and China. Trade with France had been completely halted since late 
1941 as the result of intensified embargo by the Allies.  
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Except for the take-overs of the Haiphong Cement Factory and two 
distilleries in Saigon-Cholon in early 1944, the Japanese did not try to control 
French businesses during the occupation. Nevertheless, because of the isolation 
of the country, the economic activities of the French in Indochina depended 
entirely on trade with Japan. Furthermore, the lack of imported materials and 
equipment forced the French companies to switch to the production of import 
substitutions, especially industrial alcohol as a replacement for petrol. Alcohol 
production jumped from 5,000 tons before the war to 15,500 tons in 1942.111 
Other products attracting the French investment included coal, charcoal, zinc, 
salt, gypsum, soda and other chemicals used in manufacturing soap and 
matches. Under such conditions the handicraft sector grew significantly and 
developed rapidly. Indigenous handicraft activities concentrated on textile 
fabrics and such small consumer objects as stationery, pens, and ink and oil 
lamps. The intensive Allied bombing of North and South Vietnam in 1944-1945 
caused not only a great loss of life, but also severe damage to economic 
establishments and a disruption of the communication system. By February 
1945, the Vietnamese economy was in a state of imminent collapse.112 
On 9 March 1945, the Japanese army staged a coup de force, 
overthrowing the French in Indochina. Two days later, on 11 March, the 
Japanese asked B,o 1$i, the Emperor of Annam, to declare the independence of 
Vietnam. By this action, Vietnam formally became independent, but in reality 
the Japanese retained the old French political structure essentially intact, simply 
replacing all of the top French officials with the Japanese. Middle-and lower-
ranking French officials, especially in technical services, were allowed to keep 
their positions until July 1945.113 Even after its formation in April 1945, the 
Tr/n Tr*ng Kim government initially controlled only Annam. North Vietnam 
was not returned to the Vietnamese government until May and South Vietnam 
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remained under direct Japanese rule until August 1945. Control of the economy 
remained in the hands of the Japanese, a fact clearly underlined when the Bank 
of Indochina was taken over by the Yokohama Specie Bank. All principal 
French industrial concerns were put under Japanese supervision with directives 
to convert all available equipment to satisfy the production of material of use to 
the Japanese forces.114 
2.2. Indonesia 
In contrast to the situation in French Indochina, Japan had enjoyed a close 
economic relationship with the Netherlands Indies during the colonial period. 
The evidence for this is the large share of Japan in the external trade of the 
Netherlands Indies cited above, as well as the important position of colonial 
Indonesia in the Japanese economy. By 1926, there were thirteen Japanese firms 
operating in the Archipelago with a total capital of 1.2 million yen or 1.4 
million guilders. Indonesia accounted for 10.7 per cent of the total export value 
of Japanese textiles, 9.8 per cent of ceramics and 7.2 per cent of knitted articles. 
Japanese imports of sugar and oil depended heavily on the supply from the 
Netherlands Indies. In 1926, 82.8 per cent of Japanese imports of sugar, 55.1 
per cent of petroleum and benzine and 23.4 per cent of kerosene came from 
Indonesia.115 Although the protectionist policy adopted by the Dutch colonial 
government in the 1930s did diminish the volume of imports from Japan,116 the 
Japanese economic activities in the Netherlands Indies appeared to be little 
affected. The total number of the Japanese spread over the Archipelago was 
6,800 in 1930 and 6,500 in 1939.117 Japanese exports to the Netherlands Indies 
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still exceeded 6 million guilders in 1939 and the reverse flow of trade amounted 
to 1.2 million guilders.118 
 Raw materials, especially oil, bauxite and rubber became increasingly 
vital for the Japanese war efforts. At the outbreak of the Pacific War, it was 
estimated that Japan would require 7.9 million tons of oil per year in order to 
wage a war with the Allied forces. However, by 1941, Japan had a reserve of 
only 9.4 million tons of oil, barely enough for one year.119 In preparation for a 
protracted war against the Allies, Japan wanted to raise the level of its oil 
reserves by demanding a bigger share in the oil export of the Netherlands 
Indies. Following the German occupation of the Netherlands in Europe, in 
September and again in December 1940, Japan sent missions to negotiate this 
matter in Batavia. Not only did the Dutch colonial government not acquiesce in 
the demands, it threatened sever trading ties with Japan. In July 1941, Japan 
decided to continue its expansion to the south. South Indochina immediately 
came under Japanese occupation, and the Japanese pressed on. The Netherlands 
Indies, rich in strategic materials, was the main target on which the Japanese 
military had set its sights.120 It should surprise nobody that the oil installations 
at Tarakan and Balikpapan in Kalimantan and Palembang in South Sumatra 
were the first locations in the Netherlands Indies captured by the Japanese in 
January and February 1941. The Japanese landings in Java took place on 1 
March 1942 after their triumph over the Allied Navy in the Battle of the Java 
Sea on 27 February 1942. The armed resistances by the Royal Netherlands 
Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger, KNIL) lasted ten days 
before the Dutch Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General H.ter Poorten 
surrendered to the Japanese army on 9 March 1942.121 With the exception of 
some sporadic guerrilla activities by soldiers of the Dutch colonial army, by the 
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end of 1942 the Japanese the Japanese had by and large completed their 
conquest of the Netherlands Indies.122 
The administration of the Netherlands Indies was entrusted to three 
Japanese military organizations, the 16th Army in Java and Madura, the 25th 
Army in Sumatra, and the Navy in Kalimantan and the Great East (Sulawesi, 
Maluku, the Lesser Sunda Islands and West New Guinea).123 Following the 
strategy set out in such official documents as the ‘Outline of Economic 
Counter-Plans for the Southern Region’ and the ‘Principles for the 
Administration of the Occupied Areas’, the general task facing these occupation 
forces was to facilitate the acquisition of resources vital to the prosecution of 
the war and to establish an autarkic Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.124 
Everything had been prepared for the administration of the economy in the 
newly occupied areas. An Instruction entitled ‘Principles of the Disposition of 
Military Administration in the Occupied Areas’ dated 14 March 1942, laid 
down that enemy property, namely that belonging to Americans, British and 
Dutch, was to be impounded and taken into custody. Enemy property was 
identified as businesses, services and investments owned by public bodies, 
nationals of the enemy states, including those of mixed blood, namely 
Eurasians, and legal bodies with head offices based in the enemy countries. The 
control of enemy property in Java and Sumatra was entrusted to an 
administrative organization, the Military Administrator’s Department or 
Gunseikanbu. This Department was organized along the lines of the sectors of 
the economy, including finance, industry, agriculture and transportation. In the 
Navy-controlled areas, the Navy co-operated with the zaibatsu (Japanese state-
led conglomerates) in its efforts to deal with matters impinging on production 
and trade.125 There were 333 zaibatsu out of the total of 726 companies 
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operating in the Navy areas, in comparison with 266 zaibatsu and another 263 
companies of various kinds in the Army areas.126 
The sector most immediately affected by the Japanese policy was oil. 
All oil installations in the Netherlands Indies were placed under the direct 
management of the armed forces. Attempts were made to resume oil production 
by summoning people who had been employed at the oil installations back to 
work. Some Dutch and other European engineers were even temporarily 
released from internment.127 In April 1942, the Japanese government sent 4,600 
technicians to the oil-fields in the Netherlands Indies to repair the damages 
caused by the Dutch scorched-earth tactics. Within a few weeks, the Japanese 
authorities were able to resume the operations at the oil installations in Tarakan, 
Balikpapan and Palembang. Oil production between April 1942 and March 
1943 amounted to 4 million tons, of which 40 per cent were exported to Japan. 
From April 1943 to March 1944, the Japanese produced 7 million tons of oil, 
almost reaching the pre-war level of 7.9 million tons. Over 30 per cent of this 
amount was shipped to Japan. The remaining oil, plus 5.5 million tons produced 
in the period April 1944-March 1945, failed to reach Japan on account of the 
intensification of the oil held back to supply the Japanese administration and 
armed forces in the Netherlands Indies, as well as in other occupied 
territories.128 
Although oil production was exclusively controlled by the Army and 
Navy, private Japanese companies were encouraged to invest in other mining 
industries. Mitsubishi ran the tin-mines on Bangka and Belitung, Mitsui was 
involved in coal and bauxite mining, and Sumitomo was assigned the nickel-
mines in Sulawesi. Diamond cutting in Martapura, South Kalimantan, was 
controlled by Nomura, which had been present in the region for several years.129 
Bauxite, the bulk of which was produced on the islands belonging to Riau and 
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Johor was vital to the Japanese aluminium industry. During the occupation, 
Mitsui produced 1.4 million tons of ore, most of which was shipped to Japan.130 
Both the Ombilin and Bukit Asam coal-mines were placed under control of 
Mitsui. Nevertheless, owing to the shortage of manpower, the output of these 
mines was very low. In 1942, the Ombilin mine produced 228,724 tons of coal, 
but its production dropped drastically to 92,878 tons in 1943, 72,780 tons in 
1944, and only 50,324 tons in 1945.131 A substantial quantity of the coal 
produced in Sumatra was exported to Java and Malaya, mainly for the use in 
gasworks and on the railways.132 As coal was vitally important to the war 
economy, the Japanese authorities made vigorous attempts to recruit engineers 
in Japan, as well as finding European internees and indigenous labourers to 
work in the coal-mines. Many machines in Bangka tin-mines were transferred to 
coal- mines.  
On 11 April 1942, the military administration closed all financial 
institutions owned by foreign nationals in Java. These included four Dutch 
banks (De Javasche Bank, Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank, Nederlandsch-
Indische Escomptobank and Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij), two British-
owned banks (the Chartered Bank and the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking 
Corporation) and three Chinese owned banks (Bank of China, Overseas Chinese 
Banking Corporation and Bank of Batavia. Their assets and activities were 
taken over by the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Taiwan Bank, Mitsui Bank and 
the Kanan Bank.133 The Algemeene Volkscredietbank (People’s Credit Bank) 
and the Post Office Savings Bank were allowed to do business, albeit under a 
Japanese name, the Syomin GinkB and Chokin GinkB, respectively. Both the 
Yokohama Specie Bank and the Taiwan Bank acted as agents for the Nanpo 
Kaihatsu Kinko (Southern Development Bank), which had been founded in 
March 1942 and served as the central bank in the Greater East Asia Co-
prosperity Sphere. In August 1943, the Yokohama Specie Bank was 
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commissioned as the bank of issue in Java and Sumatra, the Taiwan Bank 
provided the same service in the Navy-occupied areas.134 
The Japanese applied different strategies to manage agricultural estates. 
Because rubber industry had a vital military function, initially the military 
administration kept its direct management in its own hands. In July 1942, the 
management was handed over to the Agricultural Estates Management 
Corporation (Saibai Kigyô Kanri Kôdan, SKKK), an organization responsible 
for the supervision of all plantations, except sugar. Nevertheless, the army 
continued to exercise tight control over rubber production. The tapping of 
rubber trees was prohibited unless it had been ordered by the local military 
commanders.135 It was only in May 1944 that the army granted control of rubber 
and other agricultural estates under the supervision of the SKKK to private 
Japanese enterprises.136 The small number of Dutch managers, who had been 
retained to supervise day-to-day operations of rubber estates, were now 
completely replaced by the Japanese.137 The poor management of the Japanese 
military authorities and the professional ignorance of the Japanese about the 
rubber industry were the main reasons for a sharp decline in rubber production 
in Indonesia, falling from 99,000 tons in 1940 to only 24,000 ton in 1944.138 
Since sugar played a less direct role in the war economy, the Japanese 
army exercised less direct control over its production. Initially, sugar estates 
were managed by the Federation of the Sugar Industry Corporation (TBgyB 
RengBkai, TRK). In November 1942, the TRK transferred the control of all 
sixteen former Dutch sugar estates in Java to six Japanese corporations.139 
These six companies, in conjunction with the Oei Tiong Ham and two other 
Indonesian sugar estates, controlled the entire production of sugar in Java.140 As 
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on rubber estates, Dutch supervisors were ordered to remain and continue 
running the sugar estates until new managers arrived from Japan. As the transfer 
of management could be achieved very quickly, by August 1943, all Dutch 
employees on sugar estates had been interned.141 Under the management of the 
Japanese companies, sugar production declined dramatically, from 1.3 million 
tons in 1942 to 680,000 tons in 1943, 500,000 tons in 1944 and a paltry 30,000 
tons in 1945.142 Many sugar refineries were converted so that they could 
produce butyl alcohol from sugar-cane. This substance was mixed with petrol to 
power aeroplane engines. The Japanese also converted land previously used for 
growing sugar-cane to plant food crops and cotton. Tobacco fields were 
switched to the cultivation of hemp, needed to manufacture jute bags. These 
efforts corresponded with the general policy of the Japanese military authorities 
which was to encourage self-sufficiency at each level of administration.143 
Japanese investment in manufacturing served no purposes other than to 
achieve self-sufficiency and to meet the needs of the armed forces.144 The 
manufacture of textiles was especially important as the local production of cloth 
could reduce imports from Japan. After the pacification of Java, the 
Gunseikanbu took over all four textile factories and entrusted their management 
to Japanese companies. The Gunseikanbu also tried to expand these factories by 
introducing machines and experts from Japan, and to raise textile production by 
concentrating on plain manufactured textiles and by encouraging the cultivation 
of cotton. Military requirements had number one priority and what was left was 
used to meet civilian needs.145 As the import of materials from Japan gradually 
became impossible, the Japanese authorities were forced to release stockpiled 
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reserves. Since virtually none of the existing stock remained in the hands of 
indigenous people, the textile shortage reached a point at which the population 
had to utilize gunny sacks for clothes.146 As the economic situation was so bad, 
looting and robbery were not uncommon during the Japanese occupation. It was 
reported that in 1944, the factories in West Java were deprived of thousands of 
handlooms.147 The rice-mills and shops owned by the Chinese were also the 
frequent targets of Indonesian attacks.148 
The Japanese authorities desperately needed wooden ships both for the 
transportation of military supplies and raw materials to Japan and for carrying 
supplies within the Archipelago. The plan was to construct 700 ships in Java, 
130 ships in Sumatra and eighty ships in Northern Kalimantan whose total 
tonnage would add up to 138,000 by 1944. Factories to produce engines for the 
ships were also built in Java and 215 engineers from Japan were recruited to 
come to Java to work in them. However, because of the shortage of engines for 
the ships and the dearth of skilled labourers, by June 1944, only twenty-four 
ships had been completely finished, 282 launched and 106 were still under 
construction.149 Other Japanese investments in manufacturing in Indonesia 
included a small steel works in Kalimantan, a number of printing houses and 
beverage factories in Java and, importantly, enlarged investment in the cement 
factory in Padang, West Sumatra.150 
The war economic policy of the Japanese at war undoubtedly struck a 
fatal blow at the heart of the Netherlands Indies economy, which had hitherto 
depended heavily on the world market. The traditional export markets in Europe 
and North America were cut off and Japan could only absorb a small proportion 
of Indonesian output. The reverse trade suffered even more damage since Japan 
was in no position to provide machines and spare parts, or indeed any 
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intermediate materials, such as chemical products, to help develop 
manufacturing. Textiles and clothing were the main products imported from 
Japan to the Netherlands Indies with 57 per cent of total imports in 1942 and 40 
per cent in 1943. The second biggest group consisted of guns, vehicles and 
metal production, accounting for 19 per cent in 1942 and 26 per cent in 1943. 
Trade was far more intensive the other way around. Oil occupied 67 per cent of 
Japanese imports from the Netherlands Indies in 1942 and 47 per cent in 1943. 
Bauxite and metallic ores accounted for about 16 per cent of exports from the 
Netherlands Indies to Japan in 1943. In that year, Japan obtained 80 per cent of 
the trade surplus of the Netherlands Indies. Trade between the two countries 
became difficult in 1944 and had ground to a virtual halt by 1945.151 
The seeds of the destruction of the colonial economy were also present 
in the enforced crop conversion. As the market outlets for perennial crops dried 
up, many tea, coffee, rubber, sugar and other plantations in Java, Sumatra and 
Borneo were converted to cultivate food crops or to grow the ramie, hemp and 
castor beans required by the Japanese. The acreage of land used for cultivating 
tobacco shrank by three-quarters.152 By comparing with the years 1937-1941, 
Burger summarizes the collapse of production in the Netherlands Indies as a 
result of the Japanese occupation as follows: ‘Commercial agriculture came to a 
virtual halt. Tree crops were severely affected by years of neglect, although 
rubber was an exception because the trees benefited from not be tapped. Of all 
the cash crops grown by the local population, 75 per cent of the pepper was lost 
on South Sumatra and 99 per cent on Bangka. […] Of the kapok trees planted, 
30 per cent were felled and the rest deteriorated. On South Celebes half of the 
coffee was lost through neglect. The Western agricultural concerns were 
practically all closed down. The cultivation of annual crops, such as sugar, was 
almost entirely halted. […] Many commercial plantings of perennial crops were 
lost because they were cut down by the local people so that the land could be 
used for growing food. The worst affected were the tea and coffee plantings, of 
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which 30 per cent and 25 per cent were lost, respectively. In the case of oil palm 
and rubber plantings, 14 per cent and 10 per cent were felled respectively. 
Livestock decreased by about one half during the war years. The fishing fleet 
declined by 30 per cent.’153 
The living conditions of the Indonesian people during the Japanese 
occupation were extraordinarily bad. The policy of self-sufficiency did not help 
to increase food production, and textiles and clothing were already in very short 
supply. Indeed, during the Japanese occupation, rice production fell by one-
third, the output of cassava by more than one-half and that of maize by two-
thirds, whereas sweet potatoes production declined by one-quarter.154 Farmers 
were forced to surrender a substantial part of their rice production to the 
Japanese authorities. In Kediri, for instance, farmers cultivating land with an 
area of up to 2 hectares were assessed at 20 per cent, between 2 and 5 hectares 
at 50 per cent and over 5 hectares at 70 per cent of their production. In 1945, the 
quota for farmers operating in Bogor cultivating up to 1 hectares was 40 per 
cent, between 1 and 3 hectares 50 per cent, between 3 and 5 hectares 60 per cent 
and over 5 hectares 75 per cent. In some provinces, such as Semarang, the 
purchase of paddy was fixed according to the estimated yields per sub-
district.155 The Japanese authorities controlled both the supply and price of rice. 
All rice producers were obliged to sell part of their paddy to the Chinese brokers 
or deliver it to the government mills. The local distribution system of rice 
collapsed into a dysfunctional nightmare. The price of rice on the black market 
in the cities was often two or three time higher than the price in the black 
markets in rural areas.156 The food shortage caused the average daily intake of 
calories of Indonesians to fall from 2,000 kcal in 1940-1943 to 1,500 kcal in 
1944-1945. In early 1945, there were signs of impending famine. The 
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subsequent high inflation was reinforced by a steady, irresponsible expansion 
the money supply, during which the number of bank notes allegedly rose 
sevenfold between 1942 and 1945.157 
 
Conclusion 
During the colonial period, Indonesia and Vietnam experienced different types 
of colonial rule. The vast Archipelago was integrated into one unit, the 
Netherlands Indies, whereas unified Vietnam was divided into three separate 
parts, each with a different administrative system and these were incorporated 
with Laos and Cambodia in the creation of a French Indochina. In the wake of 
the liberal policy pursued by the Netherlands Indies government after 1870, 
colonial Indonesia developed into a typical plural society, with a multi-ethnic 
composition, in which each ethnic group occupied a different political and 
economic position. The tiny Dutch and other Western community were at the 
top of the pyramid, and the indigenous Indonesian people formed the base. The 
Chinese and Arab minorities served as intermediaries between the two. 
Although relations between the Netherlands and the colony were relatively 
strong, late colonial Indonesia gradually began to depend more heavily on the 
world market. This was the logical outcome of the Dutch colonial policy of 
expanding the capacity of the Archipelago to produce export commodities. 
Tobacco, sugar, rubber, tea, coffee and palm oil were the main agricultural 
export crops. The mining sector contributed such minerals as oil, tin and coal. 
Very little investment was made in manufacturing and imports were regulated 
by a free trade policy. The lack of government protection in the fray of fierce 
international competition led to the stagnation of indigenous manufacturing.  
The composition of the population of colonial Vietnam was less diverse 
than that of the Netherlands Indies. Nevertheless, the proportion of foreigners, 
namely the French and Chinese, and their economic superiority over the 
indigenous population were far higher. The unequal distribution of income 
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between the French and the rich Chinese and Vietnamese manual workers and 
peasants could be as high as 100 and 150 times, respectively. Just as the Dutch, 
French private investors were not interested in manufacturing, preserving the 
colony as an exclusive market for French industrial products. The primary 
French concerns were mining, including coal, tin and zinc. In the 1920s, the 
French companies began to invest in plantations and export crops, particularly 
rubber and rice. In comparison with the European plantations in the Netherlands 
Indies, French commercial plantations were much larger and there was a higher 
concentration of lands in the hands of a few companies.158 Another major 
difference had to do with the over-dependence of colonial Vietnam on the 
French economy. This led to the assumption that, whereas the Netherlands 
Indies benefited the world economy, Vietnam served France exclusively. 
The Japanese occupation brought fundamental changes in the economic 
systems of the Netherlands Indies and Indochina. First, there was a shift in 
economic power away from Western companies and the Chinese to the 
Japanese, albeit in different degrees. The French companies continued to 
operate in Vietnam under Japanese command after 1940. In contrast, the 
operation of Dutch enterprises in the Netherlands Indies was immediately taken 
over by the Japanese military authorities. Second, in pursuing their dream of an 
autarkic Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Japanese adopted different 
strategies in Indochina and the Netherlands Indies. Rice was the main product 
they required from Vietnam, although there was also quite an interest in textiles 
and vegetable oils. The products of overriding interest to the Japanese in the 
Archipelago were raw materials, notably oil, bauxite and rubber. Third, the 
embargo by the Allies and the Japanese self-sufficiency policy stimulated 
development of new industries and local handicrafts and the cultivation of new 
crops in Vietnam. Nevertheless, for an export-led country, as colonial Indonesia 
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was, the conversion to self-sufficiency entailed the almost complete disruption 
of the economic system.  
Irrevocably, the transformation towards a national economy in 
Indonesia, for better or worse, began during the Japanese period. The shift away 
from perennial export crops to the cultivation of cotton and food crops made the 
country less dependent on the world market. The economic role of the Chinese 
was significantly diminished, except for those enterprises such as the Oei Tiong 
Ham concern in Semarang, which enjoyed a good relationship with the Japanese 
authorities. Much more important was the elevation of indigenous Indonesians 
into higher positions in the economy. As the European managers were detained 
by the Japanese, many Indonesian senior staff were appointed to manage 
companies. This trend was also followed in the state administration. As will be 
discussed in the next chapters, a relatively large number of Indonesians were 
given responsibility in economic administration during the Japanese occupation. 
These officials, with the legacy of the practical experience they had built up, 
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 ‘Resistance and nation-building are two sides of 





Before B,o 1$i’s declaration of the independence of Vietnam and his 
subsequent appointment of Tr/n Tr*ng Kim to form the pro-Japanese 
government in March-April 1945, Vietnamese Nationalist and Communist 
organizations had made repeated attempts to attain national independence. The 
most influential was the Indochinese Communist Party (1,ng C5ng s,n 1ông 
D()ng), which had been founded by Nguy+n Ái Qu8c (later H! Chí Minh) in 
February 1930 and had taken the lead in the 1930-1931 Ngh' TCnh Soviet 
Uprising and in the 1936-1939 Democratic Movement. In 1941, the Indochinese 
Communist Party co-operated with a number of Vietnamese political 
organizations to form the League for the Independence of Vietnam (Vi't Nam 
15c LDp 1!ng Minh H5i, or Vi't Minh).1 The primary goal of the Vi't Minh 
was to unite all Vietnamese Communist and Nationalist forces in a common 
liberation front against the French and Japanese fascists.2 Seizing the 
opportunities created by the surrender of Japan to the Allies on 14 August 1945, 
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the Vi't Minh staged the ‘August Revolution’, which led to H! Chí Minh’s 
Proclamation of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on 2 
September 1945.  
A new, independent government was established in Vietnam on 16 
August 1945, soon followed by the voluntary dissolution of the Tr/n Tr*ng Kim 
government on 23 August but the DRV government was not recognized by the 
Allies. In September 1945, Allied troops, whose task was to disarm the 
Japanese army, were dispatched to Vietnam.3 Eager to re-establish their former 
colonial rule, the French returned backed up by Allied assistance. Their arrival 
initiated a protracted period of armed conflicts. The initial skirmishes were 
between returning French colonial forces and the Vi't Minh, but they gradually 
escalated into part of the globalized Cold War with the involvement of the 
United States, the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. The 
Geneva Agreement of 1954 restored peace in Vietnam, but divided the country 
into two parts, along the 17th parallel.4 In its wake, North Vietnam was 
gradually transformed into a socialist country under the leadership of H! Chí 
Minh, whereas an anti-Communist state was constructed in South Vietnam 
under Ngô 1ình Di'm. 
The withdrawal of French troops in 1954-1955 was followed by a rapid 
liquidation of French businesses in Vietnam, a process, which had begun in the 
late 1940s and the early 1950s. French entrepreneurs and a large number of the 
Chinese and Vietnamese Roman Catholics deserted North Vietnam for the 
South. Hence the Di'm government was actually taking measures to wrest the 
remaining assets of the French and the Chinese in South Vietnam. In a nutshell, 
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the economic reconstruction in both North and South Vietnam in the period 
immediately after the Geneva Agreement was marked by a concentration of 
economic power in the hands of the state. But the form it took was different. 
North Vietnam adopted a socialist economic model based on state ownership, 
whereas in South Vietnam, the Di'm government took control of public 
utilities, vital industries, mines and rice plantations. By the time of the fall of 
the Di'm regime in late 1963, almost all foreign companies associated with 
French colonialism had been placed under control of the Vietnamese 
authorities.    
Although the partition of the country after 1954 did cause a short delay, 
it did not put a stop to the transfer of the economic power of foreign nationals to 
Vietnamese hands. This chapter offers an examination of the struggle for 
economic independence in Vietnam from 1945 to the early 1960s. Its main 
points of focus will be those policies and practices of the Vietnamese 
governments which affected the French economic decolonization and the 
elimination of Chinese businesses from Vietnam. Unquestionably, the 
protracted war of resistance organized by the Vi't Minh was the main factor 
prompting the economic withdrawal of both French and Chinese businesses 
from Vietnam. The discussion of how the economic systems were established in 
North and South Vietnam to replace their colonial precursors will constitute an 
important part of this chapter, if only to identify the ultimate objectives in the 
economic policies of both the Vietnamese Nationalist and Communist leaders. 
Consequently, although the chapter contains an extensive account on economic 
policies of the DRV and transformation to socialism in North Vietnam, a brief 
section is devoted to the achievement of economic nationalism in South 
Vietnam. 
1. The DRV Government 
As economic nationalism deals specifically with policies and institutions, the 
structure and the composition of government, particularly of its economic 
management apparatus, is an absolute prerequisite as this what inevitably 
determines both the orientation and the effective operation of the economy. The 
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composition of the DRV government in the initial years after independence 
reflects its fairly democratic character, as its members were elected from 
different political parties and from among non-party members, although the 
Vi't Minh was unquestionably the leading forces. Half of the fourteen members 
of the Provisional Government established at Tân Trào in Thái Nguyên 
province on 16 August 1946 were neither Communist Party nor Vi't Minh 
members.5 In a reshuffle on 28 August, many members of the former Tr/n 
Tr*ng Kim government, including B,o 1$i, were invited to join the Provisional 
Government.6 In January 1946, the Provisional Government was reorganized 
into a Provisional Coalition Government. The Vi't Nam Qu8c Dân 1,ng (Vi't 
Qu8c) and the Vi't Nam Cách M'nh 1!ng Minh H5i (Vi't Cách), two major 
Vietnamese anti-Communist parties, were offered three ministerial posts and the 
vice-presidency, plus seventy seats in the future National Assembly (Qu8c h5i) 
without even having participated in the ongoing elections.7 The democratic 
composition of the DRV government was officially sanctioned by the First 
National Assembly at its initial session on 2 March 1946. Ten over eighteen 
members of a newly elected government did not belong to the Indochinese 
Communist Party. The name of the government was changed to the Government 
of Union and Resistance or the Coalition Government. H! Chí Minh was 
appointed President and its Vice President was Nguy+n H,i Th/n, leader of the 
Vi't Cách.8 
The National Assembly elected a Standing Committee (Ban Th(3ng 
Tr;c), to function as a liaising body operating between the government and the 
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Tr()ng 1ình Tri (Vi't Cách). Bernard B. Fall, The two Viet-Nams; A political and military 
analysis (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963) 10; Ph$m H!ng Tung, L$ch s% B" n"i v? [The history 
of the Ministry of the Interior] (Hanoi: Chính tr0 Qu8c gia Publisher, 2005) 44-45. 
8 Thông T-n Xã Vi't Nam, Chính ph- Vi't Nam, 1945-2000 [The Vietnamese government] 
(Hanoi: Chính tr0 Qu8c gia Publishers, 2000) 36-38. 
Vietnamese Nationalism and Socialism 
 
71 
National Assembly.9 The division of the country in three regions remained, and 
these all had Vietnamese names, B@c B5 (Tonkin), Trung B5 (Annam) and Nam 
B5 (Cochin China). Each ‘B5’ was divided into provinces, cities, prefectures, 
villages and hamlets. An Administrative Committee (Gy Ban Hành Chính) was 
established at all regional level, to be the executive branch of local government 
but also to carry out the orders issued by higher authorities. Members of the 
Administrative Committee were elected by the People’s Council (H5i 1!ng 
Nhân Dân), which represented the local population.10 When the war escalated in 
1947-1948 and many areas fell into French hands, a Committee for Resistance 
and Administration (Gy Ban Kháng Chi#n Hành Chính), which absorbed the 
Administrative Committees, was established at every levels.11 The DRV 
government also created a new system of administrative units which were to be 
integrated into the military commands. Adjoining provinces or towns were 
organized into ‘zones’ (khu) and a group of adjoining ‘zones’ constituted ‘inter-
zones’ (liên khu). The number of ‘zones’ and ‘inter-zones’ varied according to 
the fortunes of war, fluctuating between nine zones in 1945 to fourteen zones in 
1947 and six ‘inter-zones’ in 1948. As an administrative unit, the B" 
construction seems to have been abandoned in favour of ‘khu’ and ‘liên khu’.12 
The Coalition Government consisted of twelve ministries, four of which 
were directly responsible for the management of the economy, namely: the 
Ministry of the National Economy, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Communications and Public Works and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Irrigation. Parts of the Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Social Affairs also 
had a say in economic affairs. The most important of these bodies was the 
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Ministry of National Economy which maintained a network of bureaus at all 
regional, provincial, and district levels.13 In January 1946, H! Chí Minh 
established an Investigatory Committee for Constructing the Nation (Gy Ban 
Nghiên CEu K# Ho$ch Ki#n Thi#t). The Committee consisted of forty 
members, most of whom were either Vietnamese Nationalist intellectuals or had 
been senior officials under the French colonial authority or in Tr/n Tr*ng Kim’s 
government.14 Apart from changes in the leadership of the central government 
and among the heads of each regional level, the personnel apparatus of the 
former colonial authority remained by and large intact. A government decree on 
17 December 1945 laid down that ‘pending new orders, all staff in the 
government services over the whole Vietnam were to keep in their positions’.15 
The first Minister of National Economy in the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam was a non-party member, Nguy+n M$nh Hà, who had graduated from 
the Institut des Scciences Politiques in Paris and held a doctorate in law. After 
returning to Vietnam in 1937, Nguy+n M$nh Hà served in the labour office of 
the H,i Phòng Municipal Council and was promoted to Director of the Office of 
the Tonkinese Economy during the Japanese occupation. In the August 
Revolution, he was active in the Roman Catholic Youth movement and 
maintained close contacts with the Vi't Minh.16 In January 1946, Nguy+n M$nh 
Hà moved to become head of the Ministry of Social Assistance, but still kept a 
position in the Ministry of National Economy as Deputy Minister. The new 
Minister was Nguy+n T(3ng Long, a lawyer and writer, who had been jailed by 
the French authorities for his anti-French activities. Nguy+n T(3nng Long was 
a key member of the Vi't Qu8c, as was Chu Bá Ph(Ang, who replaced him in 
the Coalition Government. Both Nguy+n T(3ng Long and Chu Bá Ph(Ang had 
a wide knowledge of economics. In the colonial era, they had been the owners 
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and editors of a number of newspapers. More importantly, they had achieved 
great popularity and influence among Vietnamese intellectuals.17 
The Minister of Finance in the first two governments was a senior 
leader of the Communist Party and the Vi't Minh named Ph$m V%n 1!ng. As 
far as his professional experience in the pre-war era went, he had been best 
known as a history teacher. In 1926, at the age of nineteen, Ph$m V%n 1!ng 
joined the Vietnam Revolutionary Youth Association (Vi't Nam Thanh Niên 
Cách M$ng 1!ng Chí H5i), the predecessor of the Indochinese Communist 
Party. In 1929, he was arrested by the French colonial authorities and sentenced 
for ten years in prison. After being released in 1936, Ph$m V%n 1!ng continued 
to take part in the activities of the Communist Party led by H! Chí Minh. Ph$m 
V%n 1!ng was among the few members of the Vi't Minh who organized the 
People's National Congress at Tân Trào, which ultimately led to the 
establishment of the first government of Vietnam.18 In March 1946, Ph$m V%n 
1!ng relinquished his post to Lê V%n Hi#n, who had been Minister of Labour in 
the Provisional Government. Lê V%n Hi#n was also a member of the Vi't Minh 
and the Indochinese Communist Party and had various practical experiences to 
do with the economy. He had managed a publishing house and a factory 
producing wine and woodwork in 1à NHng. Lê V%n Hi#n kept his post until 
1958.19 
The portfolio of Ministry of Communications and Public Works was 
given to the engineer 1ào Tr*ng Kim, a former member of the Tr/n Tr*ng Kim 
government. In March 1946, 1ào Tr*ng Kim was replaced by Tr/n 1%ng Khoa, 
an irrigation engineer. Tr/n 1%ng Khoa had obtained his engineering degree at 
the Eyrolles École in Paris. During the colonial era, he served as a civil 
engineer, and had participated in the construction of many irrigation projects in 
the Central and South Vietnam. Tr/n 1%ng Khoa’s name is also known as one 
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of the founders of the Vietnam Democratic Party.20 The first head of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation was B! Xuân LuDt, a senior member of 
the Vi't Minh. In April 1946, B! Xuân LuDt relinquished his post to Hu7nh 
Thiên L5c, an irrigation engineer from the South.21 As Tr/n 1%ng Khoa had 
been, Hu7nh Thiên L5c was also educated in France. After returning to Vietnam 
he became a businessman, managing rice-milling factories in Saigon. During 
the Japanese occupation, he was appointed to the Committee of Economic and 
Financial Matters of Indochina, but returned to the South to join the 
revolutionary movement after a few months. The Ministry of Social Affairs and 
the Ministry of Health and Labour were both headed by Tr()ng 1ình Tri, who 
had served on the Administrative Committee of Tonkin during the Japanese 
occupation.22 
The strategy behind the formation of the Coalition Government was to 
create national solidarity in a common struggle for the independence in the best 
interests of the nation. Nevertheless, the unsolved conflicts between the 
Communist-led Vi't Minh and anti-Communist Vi't Qu8c and Vi't Cách led to 
a political purge in late 1946 and the subsequent departure to China of many 
members of the Vi't Qu8c and the Vi't Cách, who had held important positions 
in the government.23 In November 1946, this led to a major reshuffle in the 
government and in the aftermath the Vi't Minh took over most of the important 
positions. H! Chí Minh remained President ad interim Prime Minister and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.24 Ph$m V%n 1!ng, who also served as Deputy- 
                    
20 The Vietnam Democratic Party was found in Hanoi in June 1945 by patriotic intellectuals, 
students, and clerical workers in the colonial administration. Members of the party rapidly 
sought and gained affiliation with the Vi't Minh Front. 
21 B! Xuân LuDt continued to serve in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation as Deputy 
Minister. In November 1946, he was appointed Minister of State in the Coalition Government.  
22 Arthur, J. Dommen, The Indochinese experience of the French and the Americans, nationalism 
and communism in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2001) 185. 
23 Hoàng V%n 1ào, Vi't Nam QuAc Dân +>ng; L$ch s% !)u tranh cBn !7i, 1927-1954 [Vi't Nam 
Qu8c Dân 1,ng; A contemporary history of a national struggle, 1927-1954] (Saigon: Tân Dan 
Publishing House, 1970) 278-279; Võ Nguyên Giáp, Unforgettable days, (Hanoi: Ngo$i V%n 
Publishing House, 1975) 286-291. 
24 In April 1947, H! Chí Minh transferred the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs to Hoàng Minh 
Giám, the founder of the Vietnamese Socialist Party, who had helped H! Chí Minh in the 
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Minister of National Economy, was Deputy Prime Minister. The Minister of the 
National Economy was Ngô T-n Nh)n, who also held the portfolio of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. Ngô T-n Nh)n was an agronomist by 
training and for two years had been employed in the Indochinese Rice 
Management Office under the French colonial authority.25 Tr/n 1%ng Khoa 
continued to head the Ministry of Communications, while the Ministry of 
Labour was given to Nguy+n V%n T$o, a journalist and an active member of 
both the French Communist Party and of the Labour Union.  
The nineteenth of December 1946 was the official date of the outbreak 
of the war of independence. After two months of armed resistance in Hanoi, in 
February 1947 the Coalition Government withdrew to the Vi't B@c base in the 
northernmost part of Vietnam. Although there were a few changes in personnel 
rearrangements during the period when the government was in Vi't B@c, most 
of the existing governmental organs in the territories controlled by the DRV 
underwent few changes before 1954. One notable change was that Phan Anh 
moved from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of National Economy in 
May 1951, when this ministry was renamed the Ministry of Industry and Trade. 
Phan Anh was a lawyer, who had defended for several Vi't Minh prisioners in 
the colonial era. He had participated in Tr/n Tr*ng Kim’s government as 
Minister of Youth, but when the August Revolution broke out, he joined pro-
Vi't Minh youth movements against the Japanese.26 Ngô T-n Nh)n remained 
the post in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. In May 1951, the National 
Bank of Vietnam was established the direction of Nguy+n L()ng B?ng, who 
handed over the post to Lê Vi#t L(Ang a year later. Both Nguy+n L()ng B?ng 
and Lê Vi#t L(Ang were senior members of the Communist Party and the Vi't 
Minh.27 
                                       
former’s  negotiations with the French to set up the 6 March Accord of 1946. Hoàng Minh 
Giám held the post until April 1954.  
25 In 1940, Ngô T-n Nh)n was sentenced to five years in Côn 1,o Prison, inducted for his 
involvement in the anti-French movement. After his release from prison, he joined the 
Communist Party and was among the few leaders of the Vi't Minh who led the youth 
movement in its seizure of power in Saigon in the August Revolution of 1945. 
26 L.A.Patti, Why Vietnam?, 478. 
27 Thông T-n Xã Vi't Nam, Chính ph- Vi't Nam, 57. 
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The period immediately after the Geneva Agreement was one in which 
the transition to a one party-state in North Vietnam accelerated. The 
administration of the French-controlled areas was rapidly transferred to the 
Committees of Resistance and Administration, which had continued to work 
underground after the arrival of French occupying forces. In November 1954, 
the DRV Government returned to Hanoi. Vi't Minh officials and the regular 
troops in South Vietnam moved to the North honouring the terms of the Geneva 
Agreement, although parts of the army regulars (ch& l;c) and the Communist 
Party’s cadres (cán b5) remained behind.28 As the government found its feet it 
needed to expand by adding new ministries and department and there were 
several reshuffles between 1955 and 1960. In these five years, the Vietnam 
Workers’ Party (1,ng Lao 15ng), the successor to the Indochinese Communist 
Party since 1951, gradually took over the key positions in the government. The 
important reorganization of 20 September 1955 separated the prime ministerial 
post from the office of the President and Ph$m V%n 1!ng was appointed the 
first Prime Minister of the DRV. In answer to needs as they emerged, several 
ministries were split along functional lines. The Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce became the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Industry. Phan 
Anh remained in charge at the Ministry of Trade, and the Ministry of Industry 
was given to Lê Thanh Ngh0, a senior member of the Party who had worked as a 
technician in many French factories. The Ministry of Communications and 
Public Works was also split into two. Tr/n 1%ng Khoa continued in his post at 
the Ministry of Posts and Communications. The new department created from 
it, the Ministry of Water Resources and Architecture, was headed by Nguy+n 
V%n Tân, another member of the Vietnam Worker’s Party.  
The reshuffle in April 1958 was an even more important event, in which 
senior leaders of the Vietnam Worker’s Party seized top positions in the 
government. The former Secretary-General of the Party Tr(3ng Chinh and the 
Secretary of the Party’s Central Committee, Ph$m Hùng, were appointed to the 
                    
28 Bernard B. Fall, ‘Indochina Since Geneva’, Pacific Affairs, 28 (1955) 14; Lê MDu Hãn, Tr/n Bá 
1', and Nguy+n V%n Th(, +7i c.(ng l$ch s% Vi't Nam, 161. 
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new deputy-premierships. Important posts in the economic management 
apparatus were also handed out to members of the Central Committee of the 
Party. 1J M(3i held the portfolio of the Ministry of Home Trade, hived off 
from the Ministry of Trade. Bùi Quang T$o was Minister of Architecture, in the 
new ministry calved from the Ministry of Water Resources and Architecture. 
Hoàng Anh replaced Lê V%n Hi#n as Minister of Finance. The reorganizations 
continued in late 1958 and 1959 and only stopped when the second National 
Assembly elected a new government in July 1960.29 Although delegates from 
the Socialist and Democratic parties still survived in North Vietnam, in any 
attempts to modify the picture of total Communist control of the government 
their hands were tied. 
In summary nutshell, three important observations emerge from this 
survey of the structure and composition of the economic management apparatus 
of the DRV. In the first instance, it draws a sketch of all the basic economic 
institutions of DRV operating in the DRV between 1945 and 1960. In the 
process, the organization of the economic management apparatus was gradually 
transformed from a simplified structure of the war of resistance to a broadened 
and more specialized system after 1954. Second, the survey reflects the 
changing leadership in the DRV as the Party steadily gained more important 
positions in the economic machinery. In the early period after independence, H! 
Chí Minh appealed for the participation of all talented people and influential 
personalities in the government, regardless of their political backgrounds and 
affiliations. This was a considered political strategy gauged to win international 
recognition and alleviate the pressures being exerted by the Kuomintang 
authority.30 Members of the Tr/n Tr*ng Kim Government and such non-
Communist parties as the Vietnam Democratic Party, the Vi't Qu8c and the 
Vi't Cách, were invited join the Coalition Government. In November 1945, the 
Indochinese Communist Party even went as far to dissolve itself. Thereafter the 
                    
29 Thông T-n Xã Vi't Nam, 60 n:m chính ph- Vi't Nam, 1945-2005 [60 years of the Vietnamese 
government] (Hanoi: Thông T-n Xã Vi't Nam, 2005) 101-103. 
30 Hu7nh Kim Khánh, Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1945 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1982) 16; Fall, The Viet-minh regime, 6. 
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Communist influence was channelled through the Marxist Study Association, 
the Vi't Minh and a Communist group in the government. It was only in 1951 
when the Indochinese Communist Party was restored under the name of the 
Vietnam Workers’ Party, that the Communists attained more direct influence in 
the economic administrative system. Although a number of non-Communist 
Party members who returned from the South after 1954 had again been recruited 
to the government, by 1960 most of the important positions of the machine had 
fallen into the hands of senior leaders of the Communist Party. Thirdly, the 
DRV was suffering an acute shortage of capable, experienced economic experts. 
Only a few members of the government, among them Nguy+n M$nh Hà,31 Tr/n 
1%ng Khoa, Ngô T-n Nh)n and Lê V%n Hi#n had some technical and economic 
knowledge. Most of the others were revolutionary leaders and intellectuals who 
had no administrative experience because French policies had prevented the 
Vietnamese from acquiring any positions of real responsibility in the colonial 
administration.32 During his years in exile, H! Chí Minh had spent most of his 
time studying the organization of state machinery and national administration, 
but had no personal, practical experience of how these worked until the 
revolution.33 
2. From Nationalism to Communism  
In his Proclamation of Independence on 2 September 1945, H! Chí Minh 
accused the French of the economic exploitation of Vietnam in these words: 
‘For more than eighty years […] they have fleeced us to the backbone, 
impoverished our people and devastated our land. They have pillaged our rice-
fields, our mines, our forests and our raw materials. They have monopolized the 
issuing of banknotes and the export trade.’ Turning to the thorny issue of taxes, 
he alleged: ‘They have imposed numerous unjustifiable taxes and reduced our 
people, especially our peasantry and small businessman, to a state of extreme 
                    
31 Nguy+n M$nh Hà refused to evacuate to Vi't B@c in early 1947. He remained in Hanoi but 
continued to assist the DRV government. On account of his support of the Vi't Minh, in 1953 
Nguy+n M$nh Hà was exiled to France with his French wife.  
32 V. Ng( Chiêu, ‘The other side of the 1945 Vietnamese revolution’, 304. 
33 14ng Phong and Beresford, Authority relations, 17. 
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poverty. They have stood in the way of the prospering of our national 
bourgeoisie; they have mercilessly exploited our workers.’ With their 
capitulation to the Japanese in 1940 and again in March 1945, H! Chí Minh 
stated that the French had ‘twice sold our country to the Japanese’. Besides 
pointing out the fact that Vietnam ‘have wrested independence from the 
Japanese, not the French’, H! Chí Minh declared, ‘from now on, we, the 
members of the Provisional Government, shall break off all relations of a 
colonial nature with France. We repeal all the international obligations to which 
the French has so far subscribed on behalf of Vietnam and we abrogate all the 
special rights the French have unlawfully acquired in our fatherland.’34 
The form of the Vietnamese state, read the Proclamation of 
Independence, was to be a democratic republic. Its democratic nature was 
reaffirmed in the First Constitution of the DRV adopted by the National 
Assembly in November 1946. Article 1 of the Constitution stressed that all 
power in the country belonged to the people of Vietnam without distinction of 
race, class, creed, wealth or gender. As will be discussed in the following 
chapter, the First Constitution of Vietnam gives the impression of being much 
more liberal and democratic than the First Constitution of Indonesia adopted in 
August 1945. The 1946 Vietnam Constitution did not deal in economic theories 
and dispensed with the stereotypical Marxist phrases, such as state control, co-
operative or social welfare, which were liberally scattered throughout the 
Indonesian constitution. The 1946 Constitution of Vietnam contains only two 
passages which referred to the economy. Article 12 guaranteed the property 
rights of Vietnamese citizens, and Article 6 stipulated their equal rights in the 
fields of politics, culture and the economy.35 
                    
34 H! Chí Minh, Toàn tBp [Complete works by H! Chí Minh] Vol.3 (Hanoi: Chính tr0 Qu8c gia, 
2000), 9-12; H! Chí Minh, ‘Tuyên ngôn :5c lDp’ [Independence Proclaimation], in: 1,ng C5ng 
S,n Vi't Nam, V:n ki'n +>ng toàn tBp [Full collection of Party’s documents] Vol. 7 (Hanoi, 
Chinh tri Quoc gia, 2000) 434-440. 
35 ‘Hi#n pháp n(9c Vi't Nam dân ch& công hòa n%m 1946’ [the Constitution of 1946 of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam], in: Hoàng Trung Hi#u, Hoàng Hoa, Tìm hi8u hi&n pháp Vi't 
Nam [A study of the Vietnamese constitutions] (Dong Nai: Dong Nai Publishing House, 2000) 
196-210. 
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 As Stein Tønnesson has pointed out, the first Constitution did not actually 
reflect the political realities in the DRV. The most powerful organization in the 
DRV was the Vi't Minh, whose Central Committee (TDng B") was completely 
dominated by leading members of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, neither 
the Vi't Minh nor the Communist Party had a place in the Constitution.36 This 
‘weakness’ in the Constitution was conformed with the pragmatic thinking of 
President H! Chí Minh and other Vietnamese Nationalist Communist leaders. 
By November 1946, Vietnam was in the difficult situation, as it was being 
simultaneously challenged by three dangerous enemies: hunger, ignorance and 
foreign aggressors (giEc !ói, giEc dAt, giEc ngo7i xâm). French troops had 
landed in the North and the southern territory was still under foreign control. A 
coalition of all progressive and anti-colonial forces able to tackle the challenges 
facing the nation obviously had to take precedence over political prejudices and 
ideological conflicts. Under such circumstances, the Vi't Minh and the 
Communist Party should be treated as any other political forces, at least as far 
as the public was concerned. 
The chief concern of the political parties in Vietnam was the 
independence of the country. None of the parties, with the exception of the 
Indochinese Communist Party, had concrete plans for post-war economic 
reconstruction. The Vi't Qu8c and the Vi't Cách followed the political 
philosophy of the leader of the Chinese revolution Sun Yat-sen, known as the 
Three Principles of the People: Nationalism, Democracy and the People’s 
Livelihood.37 Although the People’s Livelihood had a heavily socialist oriented 
in its emphasis on the role of the government in the regulation of capital and 
distribution of land,38 these nationalist parties made no real effort to translate 
                    
36 Stein Tønnesson, ‘H! Chí Minh’s first constitution (1946)’, paper presented to the 
International Conference on Vietnamese Studies and the Enhancement of International Co-
operation (Hanoi, July 1998) 11. 
37 Hoàng V%n 1ào, Vi't Nam QuAc Dân +>ng, 9-10; Nguy+n V%n Khánh, Vi't Nam quAc dân 
+>ng trong l$ch s% các m7ng Vi't Nam [Vi't Nam Qu8c Dân 1,ng in the history of Vietnamese 
revolution] (Hanoi: Th# gi9i Publishers, 2012) 73-75. 
38 See an elaboration of Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles in: Sun Yat-sen & Chiang Kai-shek;The 
three principles of the People. Translated into English by Frank W. Price (Taipei: China 
Publishing Company, 1972). 
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this idea into specific programmes. There is no question that the Vietnam 
Democratic Party and the Socialist Party of Vietnam were under the influence 
of the Communist Party and that members of these two parties also associated 
with the Vi't Minh.39 The economic objectives of the Vi't Minh as laid down in 
its political programme announced in October 1941 consisted of seven points. It 
hoped to achieve a moderate and fair tax system to replace the excessive taxes 
imposed by the French and the Japanese authorities. It planned to confiscate 
French and Japanese banks by the establishment of national banks. Its idea was 
to develop a sound national economy by promoting industries and handicrafts. 
Agriculture was to burgeon overhauling and renewing the irrigation system, 
opening up new land and building new infrastructure.40 Apart in its plans 
banking sector, the Vi't Minh programme did not indicate any particular policy 
towards the position of foreign capital in a future Vietnamese economy.  
At this point in time, although the Vi't Minh was dominated by 
members of the Indochinese Communist Party, its programme did not 
necessarily reflect a Communist ideology. In fact, the Communist Party held far 
more extreme views about anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. In 1930, the 
first document published by the Party demanded the confiscation of all estates 
and plantations owned by the French and by Vietnamese counter-revolutionary 
landlords. The government would retain the landownership but redistribute the 
land to poor peasants. The colonial taxation would also be abolished and a new 
law of establishing eight-hour work day would be implemented. The ultimate 
aims of the Vietnamese revolution were to eradicate French colonialism, 
Vietnamese feudalism and counter-revolutionary capitalists and this would be 
achieved by creating a Socialist and Communist Vietnam.41 A resolution issued 
by the Central Committee of the Indochinese Communist Party in November 
                    
39 For the formation and ideological background of the Vietnam Democratic Party and the 
Vietnam Socialist Party see: Marr, Vietnam, 478-489. 
40 1,ng C5ng S,n Vi't Nam, V:n ki'n +>ng toàn tBp, Vol. 7, 148. 
41 These documents included the Party’s Summary Political Programme, the Appeal, and the 
Party’s Summary Strategies, which were all drafted by H! Chí Minh and were announced at the 
unity conference of the Vietnamese Communist Party on 3 February 1930. In October 1930, the 
Party adopted the Political Theses drafted by its first Secretary- General, Tr/n Phú, and changed 
its name to the Indochinese Communist Party.  
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1939 set out more specific economic objectives to be attained by the 
Indochinese revolution. It demanded the nationalization of banks, transportation 
and communication services, arsenals, land, water and other natural resources. 
Enterprises owned by foreign capital and French colonialists, as well as the 
estates of Vietnamese ‘traitors’, were to be seized and nationalized. Factories 
would be transferred to the working class. Land owned by French colonialists, 
Roman Catholic churches and Vietnamese ‘traitors’ was to be seized and 
redistributed to poor peasants although the the government would retain 
ownership of the land. Large plantations would be organized into Sovkhoze or 
state-run farms. Colonial taxation and loan contracts would be abolished. New 
regulations covering working conditions, wages, unemployment and pensions 
would be prescribed.42 
To what extent did the Communist Party influence the economic policy 
making of the DRV? As said above, the main post-Independence political force 
in the DRV was the Vi't Minh, whose predominant concern was directed 
towards Nationalist rather than Communist aims.43 Any aims it might have had 
were also hampered by the fact that, in November 1945, the Indochinese 
Communist Party had actually been dissolved, an act followed by a public 
declaration by H! Chí Minh that he was an adherent of only one party, the 
fictional Vietnam Party.44 At the time not Communism but Nationalism was the 
driving force behind the policy making of the DRV. Indeed, the economic 
policies of the DRV government prior to the restoration of the Party in 1951 
tended to ignore the principles of anti-feudalism and the class struggle, as these 
had initially been the catchwords of the Indochinese Communist Party. The 
primary concern of the government after independence was famine which was 
ravaging North and Central Vietnam. Measures to encourage production were 
taken along with the appeals for the voluntary contribution from the 
                    
42 1,ng C5ng S,n Vi't Nam, V:n ki'n +>ng toàn tBp, Vol. 6, 518-521. 
43 Adam Fforde and Suzanne H. Paine, The limits of national liberation; Problem of economic 
management in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with a Statistical Appendix (New York: 
Croom Helm, 1987) 36. 
44 H! Chí Minh, Toàn tBp, Vol.4, 268. 
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population.45 The DRV government also solicited investments from France, the 
United States, Russia and China.46 H! Chí Minh issued repeated declarations 
stating that the DRV would protect the property of French and other foreign 
nationals if they respected Vietnamese independence. If the foreign enterprises 
were essential to the national economy, H! Chí Minh asserted, the DRV 
government would purchase them offering a fair compensation.47 Chinese 
nationals were asked to co-operate with the Vietnamese revolutionary authority 
in a common struggle against the French colonialism.48 
As in the case of Indonesia discussed in the next chapter, ambivalence 
between the aspirations of economic nationalism and the demands for 
independence of the nation haunted the thinking of the Vietnamese leadership. 
In negotiations for independence with the French at the Dalat and Fontainebleau 
Conferences in April-May and July-September 1946 respectively, Vietnamese 
delegation, led by Tr0nh V%n Bình and later by Ph$m V%n 1!ng consistently 
rejected the French demand for an economic hegemony in Vietnam.49 
Nevertheless, they were eventually forced to make concessions and on 14 
September 1946, H! Chí Minh and the French Minister of Colonies, Marius 
Moutet, signed a Modus Vivendi, granting the French with tremendous 
                    
45 The contribution of the population was organized through the ‘Gold Week’ (Tu<n l@ vàng) 
Fund, ‘Sharing Rice and Cloths’ (nh.*ng c(m sF >o) Fund and ‘A Rice-saving Jar’ (h. g$o ti#t 
ki'm) Fund. During the ‘Gold Week’ (second week of September 1945), patriotic citizens and 
well-to-do families were asked to contribute gold to the government to purchase arms from 
abroad. To raise the ‘Sharing Rice and Cloths’ and ‘ A Rice-saving Jar’ funds, people were 
urged to deposit a spoonful of rice in a jar at each meal and to skip one meal every ten days. 
The rice saved would be distributed to poor people. Ho, Toan tap, Vol.4, 7-9, 39-40. 
46 H! Chí Minh, Toàn tBp, Vol.4, 81-82. 
47 H! Chí Minh, Toàn tBp, Vol.4, 53-54; 75-76; 81-82. 
48 C5u QuAc [National Salvation], 12 December 1945; H! Chí Minh, Toàn tBp, Vol.4, 13-14;  
49 At the Dalat Conference, the French delegation demanded that Vietnam circulate the same 
monetary units as the other countries in the Indochinese Federation, to be issued by Bank of 
Indochina. The French authorities continued to control taxation, hence the French commodities 
would not be considered imports, but domestic products within the French Union. French 
enterprises in Vietnam would enjoy special privileges in taxation, employment of labour and 
estates, imports and exports, as well as the consumption of French goods on the Vietnamese 
market. At the Fontainebleau Conference, the French demanded equal right of the French in 
Vietnam and Vietnam agreed to respect the property rights of the French and return all seized 
property, the Indochinese piastre was tied to the francs, and there was to be free trade between 
the countries in Indochinese Federation. France also demanded compensation for the damages 
incurred since Japanese coup in March 1945. Marr, Vietnam, 220, 230. 
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privileges in Vietnam in exchange for a general cease-fire. French nationals 
would enjoy the same rights and freedoms in business, education and work as 
Vietnamese nationals. All French property, which had been requisitioned by the 
Vietnamese government, would be returned to its owners. Whenever Vietnam 
needed the services of advisors, technicians or experts, French nationals would 
be given priority. The Modus Vivendi also recognized the French-controlled 
Indochinese piastre as the sole currency for all of Indochina. Since Vietnam had 
become part of the Indochinese Federation under the 6 March Accord of 1946,50 
in the Modus Vivendi it was agreed that co-ordinating committees would be 
established to run customs, foreign trade, currency and communications 
throughout the whole of Indochina.51 Stein Tønnesson says that these provisions 
reflect the degree to which H! Chí Minh was prepared to compromise on 
Vietnamese independence.52 However, despite H! Chí Minh’s concessions, in 
November 1946, French troops still occupied H,i Phòng. G. Chaffard thinks 
that this action was ‘an obvious sign that France had decided to employ a policy 
of violence’.53 
The DRV attitude towards the French changed radically after the 
outbreak of the First Indochina War in December 1946. The task of ‘nation-
building’ (ki&n quAc) under the slogan ‘resistance and nation-building’ (kháng 
chi#n, ki#n qu8c) launched by the Indochinese Communist Party in November 
1945, now conveyed connotations of both economic construction and the 
sabotaging of French economic potential. The principal aim of ‘sabotage was to 
thwart the enemy and construction was to combat the enemy’ (phá ho$i := ng%n 
:0ch, ki#n thi#t := :ánh :0ch), said H! Chí Minh.54 Besides the scorched-earth 
tactics implemented in the areas under the French occupation, the Vi't Minh 
                    
50 In the 6 March Accord, France recognized Vietnam as a free state within the Indochinese 
Federation with its own government, Parliament and Army. The Indochinese Federation would 
be a part of the French Union. In return, Vietnam agreed to the landing of 15,000 French troops 
in North Vietnam where they would take over from the Chinese army. These troops would be 
gradually withdrawn within five years. C5u quAc, 8 March 1946. 
51 Stein Tønnesson, Vietnam 1946; How the war began (Berkely: University of California Press, 
2010) 84. 
52 Tønnesson, Vietnam 1946, 84. 
53 George Chaffard, Les deux guerres au Vietnam (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1969) 36.  
54 H! Chí Minh, Toàn tBp, Vol. 4, 432-434. 
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government also called on the population to adopt the policy of non-co-
operation with the French. The most popular slogan during this time was: ‘Do 
not join the French army; do not pay tax to the French; do not sell provisions to 
the French; do not buy French goods.’55 In the large cities and towns, the 
principal targets for sabotages were munitions factories, mining companies, 
food warehouses, post offices, bridges and railways. The Vi't Minh even set up 
a committee to oversee the destruction French plantations. In fact, its main 
objective was to destroy the rubber plantations in the southern areas. The upshot 
of the Vi't Minh sabotage was that it forced the French authorities to maintain 
considerable number of troops simply to guard their factories, mines and 
plantations.56 
The agrarian policy of the government decreed that only lands and 
plantations owned by the French capitalists and Vietnamese ‘traitors’ and 
absentee landlords would be seized and redistributed to the poor peasants. 
Stepping up agricultural production was the chief priority, not severe disruption. 
The government threw its weight behind the peasants by building dykes, 
repairing irrigation works and reducing taxes in regions suffering difficulties or 
hit by natural calamities. In the private sector, the government encouraged 
Vietnamese small capitalists to invest in the production of such basic consumer 
goods as paper, ink, textiles, soap and cigarettes. The state only retained direct 
management of the defence industries and of a number of enterprises 
manufacturing basic necessities for the state apparatus, including paper, office 
equipment, machinery, soap, ink and garments.57 
By 1951, the Communist Party showed little inclination to interfere in 
economic policy making of the DRV. At the Second Congress of the 
Indochinese Communist Party, at which it was renamed the Vietnam Workers’ 
Party, in February 1951 the Party acknowledged that it did not have any explicit 
programme of economic policies. Party members had not paid serious attention 
                    
55 14ng Phong, Lich su Kinh te Viet Nam, Vol.I, 470. 
56 14ng Phong, Lich su Kinh te Viet Nam, Vol.I, 240, 471. 
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to economic matters and consequently economic management had been entirely 
entrusted to the government or ‘specialized’ personalities. The matter of anti-
feudalism had been put on a back-burner.58 Indeed, H! Chí Minh’s government 
hitherto maintained a neutral attitude towards peasants and landlords. In 
November 1945, the government issued a decree stipulating that land rent be 
reduced by 25 per cent, but prohibited any evasion of rent payment and 
protecting the property rights of landowners.59 The situation began to change in 
1950, following the diplomatic recognition of the DRV by the People’s 
Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Military aid and advisors from the 
Socialist bloc, particularly China, in the fields of party organization, economics 
and defence were sent to Vietnam.60 Their arrival coincided with the restoration 
of the Indochinese Communist Party and its decision henceforth to operate in 
the open. A far more important decision adopted at the 1951 Congress was that 
from then on the Party would take direct charge of the economy; every aspect of 
economic and financial policy would be determined by the Party. The Party 
would strengthen its control of economic institutions from central to local 
levels.61 A new political programme was adopted for the Vietnam Workers’ 
Party, which gave priority to state ownership and the development of co-
operatives, and the private sectors would be placed under the guidance of the 
Party.62 
The 1951 Congress provided the essential conditions for a 
‘partification’ of the state in terms of both leadership and ideology. Although 
this model developed fully in North Vietnam after 1960 and the whole Vietnam 
after 1975, a process of integration of the Party guidelines in state policies had 
actually been emerging since the early 1950s. Slowly but surely, the 
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government apparatus was deprived of its independence and discussions about 
government policies were held at the Party plenums. One of the essential 
components of the ‘partification’ of the state was the growing involvement of 
the state in the economic life. The National Bank of Vietnam was established in 
May 1951. It was granted full jurisdiction in issuing money, managing the 
treasury, mobilizing capital for production and controlling foreign currency.63 
Trade between the resistance and the French-occupied zones, hitherto 
forbidden, was now opened, but under the control of the state-run trade.64 The 
government assisted the population to produce export products and private 
traders were provided with money to import vital goods from the occupied- 
zones. In the resistance zones, the state-run trade controlled the principal 
commodities and provided goods wholesale to private traders. Retail trade was 
left to the private sector. Foreign trade, mostly with China, was completely 
monopolized by the state.65 In March 1951, the colonial taxation system was 
officially abolished and replaced by a new tax system which was much more 
lenient, consisting of only seven brackets.66 The state also took direct control of 
the French mines and factories, which had either been seized by the Vi't Minh 
troops during the military expansion in the early 1950s or abandoned by their 
owners after 1954. The efforts of the Party to orchestrate the socialist 
industrialization in North Vietnam in the late 1950s transformed former French-
owned industrial establishments into state enterprises.   
The most drastic policy of the Party, which had a far-reaching impact 
on the changing structure of the Vietnamese economy, was land reform. As 
discussed above, because the task of national liberation had been accorded the 
highest priority and a broad united front of all progressive and anti-colonial 
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forces was essential to the war of resistance, H! Chi Minh’s government had 
initially adopted a relatively moderate land policy. Its result can be found in the 
report made by Secretary-General Tr(3ng Chinh at the First National 
Conference of the Vietnam Workers’ Party in November 1953: over 70 per cent 
of all cultivated land in the country was still in the hands of the French, 
Vietnamese landlords or the Roman Catholic church, who made up less than 10 
per cent of the population. In contrast, the peasant, almost 90 per cent of the 
population, owned less than 30 per cent of land.67 It was only during the early 
1950s, when independence had become more or less assured, that the Party 
began to shift its attention to the socialist reform of agriculture. It was thought 
that radical land reform would enable the government to solve the internecine 
conflict in the countryside between the peasants and landlords and, more 
importantly, to mobilize a larger labour force recruited from the peasants for a 
decisive battle at 1i'n Biên Ph&. According to the tenets of the Marxist theory 
and the Chinese model, land reform would represent the effective confirmation 
of the commitment Vietnam to the Socialist bloc, in return for which it could 
continue to receive the military assistance and aid it needed in the ongoing 
resistance.68 In the eyes of Tr(3ng Chinh, and many other leaders, fulfilling the 
tasks of national independence and ‘land to the tillers’ were primary conditions 
if the advance to socialism were to be achieved.69 
At the First National Conference, the Vietnam Workers’ Party set up a 
platform of land reform. The platform was then transposed into the Land 
Reform Law, approved by the National Assembly and ratified by President H! 
Chí Minh on 19 December 1953. Among its other aims and its emphasis on the 
ideological significance of land reform, the Law stresses the need for the 
abolition of ownership of the land by French colonialists, imperialist aggressors 
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and Vietnamese feudal landowners to create a regime under which ownership of 
the land would be vested in the peasants. The Law distinguishes various 
categories of land which would be subject to confiscation, requisition or 
expropriation. First and foremost, all land and property belonging to the French 
colonialists and imperialist aggressors were liable to confiscate. On the other 
hand, Vietnamese ‘traitors’, reactionaries and recalcitrant bullies would be 
allowed to keep some of their land and livestock, but these non-confiscated 
properties would always be liable to requisition, for which compensation would 
be paid by the government. Democratic, resistance and non-reactionary 
landowners also had to surrender their land and farming implements to the 
government in which case they would receive payments based on local price of 
their property or in the form of government bonds. The government also 
confiscated some of the land belonging to religious and professional 
organizations, waste land and public land. All land and property seized would 
be redistributed to landless and poor peasants, refugees, and those who had 
contributed to the resistance. The state would retain the ownership of factories, 
perennial crops plantations, mines and public utilities. A Committee on Land 
Reform would be established in the central, ‘zone’ and at provincial levels to 
supervise the implementation of the reforms.70 Chairman of the Central 
Committee would be Tr(3ng Chinh, Secretary General of the Vietnam 
Workers’ Party.  
In the final analysis, land reform was never really designed to make an 
equitable distribution of land among the population. Instead it was an essential 
prerequisite for collectivization, which began in earnest in 1958. Directly after 
the reforms, the peasants were organized into the mutual aid teams, in which 
they were encouraged to assist each other during peak labour period. At this 
early stage, the peasants still retained ownership of their land and control of 
their crops. When the land reform was finally concluded in July 1956, the 
process of combining the mutual aid teams into agricultural production co-
operatives began. Peasants were obliged to perform collective labour, for which 
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they would receive work-points. Each work-point was worth a portion the net 
harvest of their co-operative. In the collectivized system, the state took direct 
control of the agricultural output of the co-operatives and its distribution. Land 
was also consolidated in the hands of the state. Each co-operative was allowed 
to reserve only 5 per cent of its arable land to be distributed to individual 
households. Notwithstanding its smallness, this plot became the main source of 
income of households.71 The land collectivization was accelerated in the early 
1960s when it was made the economic basis of socialist reform in future 
Vietnam. 
In short, by 1960 the tendency towards socialism in economic 
transformation had become established in North Vietnam. The ‘premature 
transition’ began in 1951 after a period of pragmatic nationalism, in which 
national independence was accorded the highest priority. In this early period, 
only a few of radical ideologies of the Communist Party had any effect on the 
economic policy making of the DRV. After its restoration in February 1951, the 
Communist Party was in a position in which it could gradually exert more 
influence and its growing power led directly the land reform in North Vietnam 
in 1953-1956. During the first years of economic rehabilitation after 1954, the 
Party still acknowledged private initiatives in the economy but after late 1958, 
the Party concentrated its efforts on either the transformation or the complete 
abolition of capitalist and private industry and trade and a free market. The 
economic model of the DRV gradually took shape in a transition to socialism. 
The overhaul of the whole state, ultimately transforming it into a socialist 
nation, was confirmed in the new Constitution adopted on 31 December 1959. 
Article 9 unequivocally states that economic aims of the DRV were gradually 
progressing from these of a regime of a people’s democracy towards those of 
socialism.72 
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3. Economic Transformation 
The seeds of the economic transformation in which the traditional structure of 
French colonialism would be irrefutably left behind, were sown in the period of 
the Japanese occupation. As the French unable to repatriate their capital to 
France, they concentrated their investments in a variety of businesses and 
manufacturing industries in Vietnam. By its introduction of new crops and 
industries and its encouragement of indigenous handicrafts the Japanese war 
efforts unintentionally diversified the primary sectors based economy of 
colonial Vietnam. A radical shift in economic power occurred in March 1945, 
when the Japanese seized the productive assets of the French and set up the 
puppet Tr/n Tr*ng Kim government. Between April and August 1945, while 
the Tr/n Tr*ng Kim government preoccupied itself with constitutional matters 
as well as trying to deal with attacks by opposition groups and tackling the 
famine, the Japanese intensified the capacity of the French concerns to satisfy 
their own needs.73 In the next stage, as the August Revolution made itself felt, 
economic administrative power was transferred from the Japanese to the new 
Vietnamese government. Since increasing production and achieving economic 
stability were the main priorities, the strategy adopted by the DRV was to allow 
foreign companies already established in the country to carry on their 
businesses. Strenuous efforts were thrown into rehabilitating the mines and 
reconstructing the factories and infrastructure, which had been destroyed by the 
war or being abandoned by Japanese and French owners. 
Foreign companies operating in Vietnam were told they had to comply 
with new regulations laid down by the DRV government74 and major French 
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companies carried on business as usual. The French controlled such important 
businesses as the water and electricity supplies in the cities, mines (Hòn Gai and 
CKm Ph,), textiles (Nam 10nh), cement (H,i Phòng), tiles (1áp C/u), and 
workshops in Hanoi and H,i Phòng.75 The Banque de L’Indochine began 
issuing banknotes for the independent government.76 The government took 
direct control of the mines and those factories, seized by the Japanese in March 
1935 or left behind by the French before the August Revolution. These included 
the 1áp C/u Paper Company, the Tr(3ng Thi Locomotive Repairing 
Workshop, the TCnh Túc Tin-mine, and several coal-mines in Tân Trào (Tuyên 
Quang), Làng CKm and Ph-n M+ (Thái Nguyên) and Quy#t Th@ng (Ninh Bình). 
In May 1946, the government opened new state-owned mines in 1ông Tri6u, 
Thái Nguyên, Trà My, Nông S)n, Nghê An and Hà TCnh. These mines fell 
under the aegis of the Bureau of Industry and Mining, a section of the Ministry 
of National Economy.77 The DRV government only confiscated those 
enterprises considered vital to the population and the functioning of the 
government, which included railway services, the post and radio-telegraphy. 
The Hanoi Water Company and the Hanoi Metal Company were also 
confiscated. At this juncture, a number of privately-owned Vietnamese 
enterprises were also actually established with government assistance. The 
majority had to do with banking and trade and included the Vi't Th()ng 
Company, the Vietnam Commercial Bank, the South Asia Banking Corporation, 
the Pacific Trading Company and the Vi't B@c Company.78 Although these 
companies had little capital and their operations were limited, their presence had 
one important implication. It affirmed the willingness of the new government to 
support Vietnamese private business thereby strengthening the trust of the 
Vietnamese Nationalist bourgeoisie in the new regime, and winning their 
supports in the war of resistance against the returning French colonial forces.   
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After the return of the French forces, the Vi't Minh government 
gradually lost control of large parts of the country. On 22 September 1945, 
French troops occupied Saigon. From there, in early 1946, the French gradually 
expanded the territories they occupied to the provinces in South Vietnam and 
the south central coast of Vietnam.  In late 1946, they extended their control to 
the highlands in Central Vietnam. By the summer of 1947, the French had 
control of almost entire South Vietnam and the southern parts of Central 
Vietnam, with the exception of some scattered resistance bases controlled by the 
Vi't Minh. In Central Vietnam, the French were in the saddle Hu# and the 
coastal areas. After these positions were consolidated, French troops landed in 
North Vietnam in November 1946. The terms of the Franco-Chinese treaty of 
February 1946 allowed the French forces take the place of the Kuomintang 
army in occupying North Vietnam.79 L$ng S)n, Lai Châu, Hòn Gai and H,i 
Phòng were the first areas to come under French occupation. In late November 
1946, French troops began to surround Hanoi, the seat of the DRV Government. 
On 19 December, H! Chí Minh made a radio appeal across the country, urging 
for a national war of resistance against the French colonialists. This is generally 
acknowledged to make the beginning of the First Indochina War. H! Chí Minh 
and his revolutionary government apparatus subsequently retreated to Vi't B@c 
and, between late 1947 and 1950, the French organized several military 
offensives against the Vi't Minh’s headquarters in Vi't B@c. Although French 
troops repeatedly failed to capture the leaders of the Vi't Minh Government, the 
area of the French-controlled territories expanded greatly, covering most of the 
plains, midlands and the north-western part of North Vietnam, as well as the 
border with China.80 
All the areas under French control were significant Vietnamese 
economic centres of Vietnam including the major cities, ports, industrial and 
mining areas, plantations and two largest plains in both the North and the South. 
As they carried on military operations in their efforts to wipe out the Vi't Minh 
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army, from early 1946 the French had been intensively prepared a plan for the 
economic reconstruction of post-war Vietnam. After two years of preparations, 
in January 1948 a massive plan was published under the name Plan de 
Modernisation et d’ Equipement de L’Indochine. This plan was drafted by a 
commission of economic specialists chaired by Jean Bourgoin, President of 
Indochina Sub-Commission, generally referred to as the Bourgoin Plan. The 
French government ratified the Bourgoin Plan on 18 September 1948.81 
The Bourgoin Plan was a ten-year plan designed to change the structure 
of the Indochinese economy. It was motivated by the fact that, up to that time, 
the economy of Indochina had been based purely on the exploitation of mining 
and the cultivation of agricultural products for export, a construction which 
meant that it continued to be backward and stagnant. To step up production and 
productivity as well as to reduce the dependence of the economy on the world 
markets, the plan stressed the need for the modernization and industrialization 
of Indochina. Bourgoin was convinced that the modernization process should 
begin in the agricultural sector. Although new land would be cleared, a fertilizer 
policy was essential if agricultural output was to be boosted. Bourgoin proposed 
building factories for the production of phosphates and nitrogenous fertilizers. 
Other chemical industries included those making sulphuric acid, soda, chlorine 
and glycerines, substances important to manufacturing. Heavy industries like 
iron, steel and aluminum would also need to be developed, because the 
production of metal goods was ‘indispensable to Indochina’s economic 
independence’. As the key to the development of industries was energy, the plan 
made provision for two main projects for energy production, the M$o Khê 
Thermoelectric Plant, using energy generated by fuel from the Hòn Gai Coal-
mine, would provide the main industrial centres in the North, including Hanoi, 
H,i Phòng, H,i D()ng and Nam 10nh with power. In the South, the Dàlat-1a 
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Nhim Hydro-electric Plant was intended to supply power to the port of Cam 
Ranh and the Saigon-Cho Lon areas.82 
 The total cost of the Bourgoin Plan was estimated to be 3,198 million 
piastres, of which 795 million would be allotted to agriculture, 140 million to 
mining, 175 million to energy, and 430 million to industry. The substantial 
amount of 1.4 million piastres was allocated to infrastructure. In its first five 
years (1949-1953), the plan would require an investment of 1,879 million 
piastres, a sum well beyond the means of Indochina.83 Although some of the 
expenditure was to be provided by investment funds in France, the major part 
would have to be self-financed by Indochina itself. The French contribution 
would pay for the initial setting up of industries, whose profits would be 
redirected by the state into further development by the state. Industrial 
production would be oriented towards the local market; the role of exports was 
not ruled out, but the driving force behind economic growth would be internal. 
It was expected that within ten years the output values in Indochina, as well as 
the average per capita income of the Indochinese people would be doubled.84 
Besides the looming financial difficulties, another serious threat to the 
implementation of the Bourgoin Plan was the determined efforts to sabotage it 
by the Vi't Minh forces. The upshot of this the Vi't Minh Government 
vandalism policy was that French businesses in Vietnam were badly damaged. 
Within a few months of the landing of French troops in the South in September 
1945, 138 French factories in Saigon-ChA L9n had been destroyed. Rubber 
plantations in the South and the southern part of Central Vietnam were also 
under serious attack. More than 5 million rubber trees were destroyed and only 
half of the French rubber plantations were still up and running. The area under 
rubber cultivation dropped sharply from 108,394 hectares in 1944 to 72,466 
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hectares in 1946.85 Rubber production was correspondingly reduced from 
52,000 tons 1942 to only 13,000 tons in 1946, and it remained at 27,000 tons in 
1947-1949. The H,i Phòng Cement Company used to produce 250-300,000 
tons annually, but in 1947 the production dropped to a meagre 40,000 tons. The 
Hòn Gai Coal-mine Company extracted 26,000 tons in 1947, whereas the 
annual average in the previous years had been around 145,000 tons.86 
 In the early 1950s, the Vi't Minh-controlled territories expanded greatly. 
This meant that a considerable number of economic installations previously 
controlled by the French fell into the Vi't Minh hands. The 1áp C/u Paper 
Factory, the TCnh Túc Tin-mine, the ChA Di6n Zinc-mine, the LCnh Nham Iron-
mine, the Lào Cai Apatite-mine and various coal-mines in Ninh Bình, Thái 
Nguyên and Tuyên Quang were gradually taken over by the Vi't Minh 
Government.87 The only cola-mine the French were able to keep under their 
control until 1954 was the Hòn Gai Coal-mine. Throughout this period, 
industrial installations in the cities and on plantations were under constant 
attack. Economic figures show a sharp decline in the economy of Vietnam in 
the early 1950s compared to pre-war levels. In 1939 Vietnam produced 2.6 
million tons of coal, whereas the coal output of 1953 was only 887,000 tons. 
Telling the same story, salt production reduced from 208,000 tons to 106,000 
tons, sugar from 54,000 tons to 3,300 tons and textile production from 16,300 
tons to 67,000 tons. Agricultural production experienced a similar decline with 
rice falling from 7 million tons to 2.5 million tons, corn from 214,000 tons to 
20,000 tons, coffee from 2,5 million tons to 1,176 million tons and tea from 11 
million tons to 2.1 million tons. The only sectors benefiting from the 
modernization programme run by the French authorities were rubber, cement 
and cigarettes. Despite the continuing reduction in the areas under rubber 
cultivation areas to about 62,000 hectares in the early 1950s, the rubber output 
of 1953 reached 53,3 million tons, 1 million tons higher than the 1942 level. 
The comparable figure of the cement output in the same period was between 
                    
85 Vi'n Kinh t#, Kinh t& Vi't Nam, 429. 
86 14ng Phong, L$ch s% kinh t& Vi't Nam, Vol.I, 240. 
87 Võ Nhân Trí, Croissance économique, 143-144. 
Vietnamese Nationalism and Socialism 
 
97 
270,000 tons and 291,000 tons, and cigarette production was between 5,000 
tons and 7,200 tons.88 The increase in rubber production and a number of 
manufacturing industries in the early 1950s had also been stimulated by 
growing United States investment in Vietnam. 
 The escalation in the warfare situation frustrated the French investment 
in Vietnam. Therefore, instead of investing more in Vietnam as they had been 
asked to do under the Bourgoin Plan, after 1948 French companies began to 
withdraw their capital from the country. The Á-1ông Phosphate Company, the 
Indochina Paper Company, and theBanque de L'Indochinewere the first to take 
the lead in shifting their operations away from Vietnam.89In 1948,theBanque de 
L'Indochine established new branches in the Arab countries, San Fransisco, 
Africa and Vanuatu, a French colony in the South Pacific Ocean. By September 
1950, only one-eighth of the value of the dealings of Banque de L’Indochine 
was still being transacted in China, Indochina, and Southeast Asia, a sharp 
contrast to before the Second World War, when the ratio was 40 to 47 per cent. 
The process of the French economic decolonization in Vietnam was hastened in 
the early 1950s when the prospects for the French forces during the war in 
Vietnam turned bleaker. In 1951, the Indochina Civil Engineering Enterprise 
began transferring its capital to Senegal. The Indochina Forest et des Allumettes 
Company transferred 30 million francs to buy stock in a similar forestry and 
match company in Africa.In 1951, the Banque France-Chinoise pour le 
Commerce et L’Industrie (BFCCI) established branches in Madagascar. After 
the French defeat in 1954, the BFCCI closed its offices in North Vietnam once 
and for all.90 
A more typical example of the attitudes prevailing in French businesses 
in Vietnam in the 1950s was the French Colonial and Finance Company 
(Société Financière Française et Coloniale-SFFC). Founded in 1920, the SFFC 
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soon developed into a powerful finance house participating in more than thirty 
colonial enterprises. In 1931, nineteen of these were in Indochina. The SFFC 
was in the forefront of the Indochina rubber boom in the late 1920s, and it had 
interests in the production of tea, sugar, paper and textiles, as well as in property 
and banking. During the Japanese occupation, the SFFC suffered considerably. 
Some of its subsidiaries, such as the Société Nouvelle des Phosphates du 
Tonkin, Société Indochinoise des Cultures Tropicales, and the Société des 
Caoutchoucs d’Extrême Orient were almost paralysed after the Japanese coup 
d’état. The majority of SFFC companies were located in Hanoi and H,i Phòng, 
but after 1945, especially in the 1950s, their operations were gradually shifted 
southwards to Saigon, before being removed from Vietnam altogether. By 1953, 
only 23 per cent of the value of the SFFC dealings was still in Indochina, 42.5 
per cent in Africa and 34.5 per cent in France.91 
The decline in manufacturing meant that French consumption in 
Vietnam was heavily dependent on goods imported under the American aid and 
on subsidies from the French government.92 The value of American aid to the 
French authorities in Indochina in 1952 was 280 billion francs. The sum was 
increased to 292 billion francs in 1953 and reached a peak of 475 billion francs 
in 1954.93 In an attempt to promote production, the French government made 
desperate pleas for the private investment. In Many 1953, besides reducing the 
tax on foreign investment the French government devalued the piastre from 17 
to 10 francs.94 A forlorn hope because after 1950, French entrepreneurs were no 
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expenditure. Chaffard, Les deux guerres du Vietnam,184. 
94 Although the exchange rate of the piastre was fixed at the high level of 17 francs, on the black 
market, the piastre was devalued to 7 or 8.5 francs. The upshot was twofold: the repatriation of 
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longer interested in the manufacturing sector. Most of the French companies 
remaining in Vietnam at that time were import firms. Following the withdrawal 
of the French army after the fall of 1i'n Biên Ph& in May 1954 and the 
subsequent conclusion of the Geneva Agreement, the remaining French firms in 
the North moved to South Vietnam.95 
As the French withdrew from Vietnam, the Americans set about 
strengthening their presence there. While military aid and official technical and 
economic commissions were sent to Vietnam, from 1951, American private 
companies began infiltrating local businesses. The Americans had an undefined 
share in Vietnam Air, a joint venture founded in June 1951 by the Republic of 
Vietnam and Air France. In 1952, they bought 65 per cent of the equity in the 
Société des Plantations et Pneumatiques Michelin, a French tyre company 
which owned the largest rubber plantation in Vietnam. In the same year, the US 
Rubber Company bought two-thirds of the shares of the Compagnie des 
Plantations aux Hauts Plateau Indochinois, which owned a large rubber 
plantation at Buôn Mê ThuDt, in south-central Vietnam. Goodrich provided the 
Hòn Gai Coal-mine with $ 3.8 million in capital goods and simultaneously 
made a deal with the De Rivaud to buy rubber plantations in Cambodia and 
Lao. In 1953, the Pan American Airways established an air route connecting the 
United States-Saigon-Hanoi, and Civil Air Transport installed an office in 
Saigon. The Laza Brothers bought 10 per cent of the Banque de L'Indochine.96 
Vietnam markets began to be flooded with American products and at the same 
time almost all the rubber and 70 per cent of coal produced in Vietnam were 
being exported to the United States.97 From the early 1950s, the Americans 
gradually replaced the French in Vietnam in both military and economic 
spheres.  
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The economic position of the Chinese and other foreign groups in 
Vietnam during the First Indochinese War did not change very much from what 
it had been in the colonial times. Initially, by virtue of Allied agreement the 
Chinese benefited enormously from their occupation of North Vietnam. The 
Kuomintang Army took over the stocks and supplies left behind by Japanese 
firms, seized local resources and facilities and dominated the trade between 
North Vietnam and China.98 Under the terms of the Franco-Chinese Treaty, the 
Kuomintang authorities had control of the Yunnan-Hanoi railway and a free 
zone in the port of Hai Phong, in which goods destined for China were 
exempted from import duty. The French also promised to improve the status of 
the local Chinese in Vietnam.99 It could not last. After the evacuation of the 
Kuomintang troops in June 1946, the economic interests of the Chinese in 
Vietnam were seriously threatened by both the Vietnamese government and the 
returning French authorities. The DRV Government quickly abolished the 
former privileges the Chinese enjoyed in foreign trade. In November 1946, the 
French attacked the Chinese quarter in Hai Phong, an action which resulted in 
the deaths of more than 500 Chinese and left several hundred wounded. The 
extensive loss of property was estimated at 40 million piastres.100 
The position of the Chinese in Vietnam grew even more precarious 
after the outbreak of the full-scale war in December 1946. Chinese property in 
Hanoi and H,i Phòng was again destroyed. Many Chinese became refugees; 
some even fled to China. This situation is certainly one explanation of the rapid 
diminishment in the number of Chinese residents in North Vietnam, which fell 
from 59,000 in 1951 to 52,000 in 1953.101 Initially, the Chinese sought 
protection from the French, but as time went by, after the Communists won the 
war in China and the coherent relationship was established between the newly 
founded People’s Republic of China and the Viêt Minh Government, more and 
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more Chinese in Vietnam sided with the Vi't Minh.102 Worries about Chinese 
supports for the Vi't Minh might have been the reason behind the French policy 
of concentrating the Chinese and other foreign nationals in a few cities, where 
they were easier to control. The Chinese in North Vietnam were given aid to 
help them move to the South and Saigon-Cholon was rapidly overcrowded with 
Chinese residents. In 1951, the Chinese population of Saigon-Cholon reached 
583,000, several times more than the figure in the colonial era (Chapter One).103 
In 1952, the Chinese population in Saigon-Cholon constituted about 34 per cent 
of the total population of the city, whereas their proportion in Hanoi and H, 
Phòng was 4 and 15 per cent, respectively.104 When the partition of the country 
became a fact in 1954, a few thousand Chinese followed in the steps of a large 
number of Roman Catholics and the French deserted North for South 
Vietnam.105 Subsequently, the number of the Chinese in South Vietnam swelled 
from 657,000 in 1951 to about 800,000 in 1956.106 
Besides the obvious political and religious reasons, the large-scale 
evacuation of the Chinese and Vietnamese Roman Catholics to South Vietnam 
in the early 1950s was closely related to the nature of their professional 
activities. The major business of the Chinese community in Vietnam was in the 
field of commerce and the operations associated to it, including such jobs as 
moneylenders, bankers, contractors and middlemen between the Europeans and 
the local Vietnamese. By and large, the Chinese was much wealthier than the 
ordinary Vietnamese. Their prosperity was often believed by the indigenous 
people to have been the fruit of their collaboration with the French colonial 
authorities and their exploitation of the local resources. This misconception 
stirred up latent hostilities towards the Chinese among the indigenous 
population. It would not have taken any great stretch of the imagination for 
sensible Chinese traders to envisage that given time the Vietnamese authorities 
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would only pile more pressure on them once the war was over. Moving to the 
South, where there was a stronger French protection and a larger Chinese 
community, seemed to some Chinese to present the most realistic solution, 
although eventually they did not escape discrimination by the Southern 
Vietnamese authorities either. A more direct impetus for the Chinese 
immigration to the South was the rapid growth of the Communism in North 
Vietnam in the early 1950s. The entrepreneurial Chinese, who formed a highly 
commercial and capitalistic community in Vietnam, were by nature hostile to 
the Communist regime and vice-versa. The anxiety about putative Communist 
repression especially applied to the Vietnamese Roman Catholics, many of 
whom had been civil servants of the French colonial administration. 
Undoubtedly, religious and psychological incentives played the central role in 
their flight to South Vietnam after 1954.107 
Economically, the land reform was a success. It broke the ties of 
feudalism and colonialism in the Vietnamese countryside. Between 1953 and 
1956, six waves of land reform were carried out, covering 3,314 villages in 
seventeen provinces in North Vietnam. Besides these land reforms, there were 
eight waves of rent reduction in the overlapping regions, covering 1,875 
villages with a population of about 7.8 million. By the end of the land reforms 
in July 1956, over 700,000 hectares of land, 1.8 million farm implements and 
107,000 draft animals had been distributed to 1.5 million peasant families. Over 
50 per cent of the cultivated area in villages had been involved in the land 
reform.108 The dramatic change in the landownership in the countryside in 
North Vietnam before and after the land reform can be seen in Table 4. The 
consolidation of land in state hands was strengthened after 1955. By August 
1955, 31,657 mutual aid teams, representing some 10 per cent of peasant 
families, had been formed in 447 villages. This number had risen to 153,000 at 
the beginning of 1956, 195,000 in September 1957, accounting 50 per cent of 
peasant families.109 The number of co-operatives rapidly increased from 4,722 
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in 1958, 28,775 at the end of 1959 to 41,401 at the end of 1960, embracing 86 
per cent of all farming families. By the end of 1961, 99 per cent of the total 
value of agricultural production came from the co-operatives.110 
Table 4: Land ownership before and after land reforms, 1945-1957 
(square metres per capita) 
 1945 1953 1957 
Landlords 10,093 6,393 738 
Rich peasants  3,975 3,345 1,547 
Middle peasants 1,372 1,257 1,610 
Poor peasants 431 490 1,437 
Landless Peasants 124 262 1,413 
Source: Andrew Vickerman, The fate of the Peasantry; Premature 
‘Transition to Socialism’ in the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 
1986) p. 107. 
The reorganization of trade and industry after 1954 followed a rather 
different path. The DRV found it had suddenly inherited the vast industrial 
establishments abandoned by the French in North Vietnam. The most notable 
businesses were the textile mills in Nam 10nh, the cement factories in H,i 
Phòng, the Hòn Gai and 1ông Tri6u Coal-mines and power stations in big 
cities. However, the picture was slightly less rosy as many factories had either 
been destroyed by the war or paralysed because their erstwhile French owners 
had removed vital equipment when they moved to the South.111 As a result, the 
first priority in the economic reconstruction plans of the DRV was to ensure that 
former French factories were made operational again as quickly as possible, for 
which technical assistance and financial aid from the Socialist Bloc were 
essential.112 Since there was an extreme shortage of Vietnamese engineers, in 
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some production plants, such as the Hòn Gai Coal-mine and the power stations 
in Hanoi, the supervising French engineers were asked to stay on for two 
years.113 Former French companies were grouped into the state enterprises. The 
number of state-owned enterprises grew from forty-one in 1954 to fifty-six in 
1955, 11 in 1956 and 151 in 1957. By the end of 1957, the plans for the 
reconstruction of trade and industry had been completed and production in 
much of the industrial sector had again reached the pre-war level of 1939.114 
Initially, the DRV Government encouraged Vietnamese private capital 
to invest in industry and commerce. In 1955, the number of privately-owned 
enterprises was 3,065, of which 957 in industry, 1,794 in commerce and 
services and 314 in transportation.115 In late 1957, the government changed its 
tack and concentrated its efforts on developing state enterprises, allocating 42 
per cent of total investment to them. Private enterprises were encouraged to co-
operate with state enterprises in the formation of joint enterprises with 
government or industrial co-operatives. By the end of 1957, 60 per cent of 
private enterprises had signed contracts with state trading companies.116 In 
1958, the government established an Office for the Conversion of Privately-
Owned Enterprises chaired by 1J M(3i. Between 1958 and 1960, there were no 
fewer than five waves of conversion of commerce, five in industry and 
handicrafts, and three in transportation. The result was extraordinary. In total 
729 private enterprises were reorganized into 661 joint enterprises and sixty-
eight into industrial co-operatives. In Hanoi, no fewer than 499 private 
industrial installations were converted into joint enterprises, and forty-nine other 
installations became industrial co-operatives, accounting for 77 per cent of total 
privately-owned enterprises in the city.117 The number of state enterprises 
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increased from forty-one in 1954 to 281 in 1958 and 1,012 in 1960. The share 
of state enterprises in the total industrial output correspondently increased from 
34.4 per cent in 1958 to 57 per cent in 1960. The share of the state-run trade in 
the wholesale trade increased from 28 per cent in 1955 to 53 per cent in 1957 
and 94 per cent in 1960, and their share in retail trade corresponded 10 per cent 
in 1954, 40 per cent in 1957 and 91 per cent in 1960.118 The only area in which 
socialist-inspired transformation was still an issue was that composed of the 
artisanal and small-scale sectors. By 1960, only 80 per cent of registered 
artisans had joint collectives.119 
By 1960, the Socialist transformation in North Vietnam had largely 
drawn to a close with the state taking control of the means of production. 
French factories, mines and public utilities which had once operated in the areas 
North of the 17th parallel were rapidly taken over by the DRV government and 
subsequently developed into state enterprises. Privately-owned Vietnamese 
firms were reorganized into either industrial co-operatives or joint state-private 
enterprises. French and Chinese trading firms sold their businesses to their 
Vietnamese counterparts before moving to the South during the late 1940s and 
the early 1950s. A more radical transformation changed the face of agriculture. 
The colonial system of landownership was completely dismantled and 
reorganized in the form of collectives. Collectivization was also introduced into 
the handicrafts and individual sectors, though there were still a small number of 
artisans who had not joint in co-operatives. Economic reorganization in the part 
south of the 17th parallel helped accomplish the economic decolonization of the 
French in Vietnam and consolidate the economic strength in the government of 
South Vietnam, albeit to a lesser degree than this had been achieved in North 
Vietnam.  
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4. Di!m’s Nationalism 
While the Geneva Conference was underway in the wake of the collapse of 
1i'n Biên Ph&120 on 4 June 1954, the French signed treaties with B,o 1$i, 
recognizing the ‘full independence’ of Vietnam.121 B,o 1$i then appointed the 
Roman Catholic Ngô 1ình Di'm to form a new government for the State of 
Vietnam.122 On 7 July 1954, Di'm’s first cabinet with himself as Prime Minister 
was announced.123 The Geneva Agreement, concluded on 21 July 1954, 
stipulated that the control of Vietnam south of the 17th parallel would be in the 
hands of the French forces. However, the French, already in earnest about 
withdrawing from Vietnam had transferred various parts of their administrative 
tasks to the B,o 1$i Government in the early 1950s.124Di'm’s government took 
over control of financial, customs and monetary institutions as of 1 January 
1955, the same date that the United States began dispatching direct aid to South 
Vietnam, bypassing the French.125 At long last the French control of economic 
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affairs in South Vietnam was replaced by that of the Di'm Government and of 
the Americans. 
The Geneva Agreement required general elections throughout all of 
Vietnam in order to establish a unified country. However, since Di'm had not 
signed the agreement, he later declared that South Vietnam was not bounded by 
the Geneva Agreement and would not take part in the elections.126 Instead, in 
October 1955 Di'm organized a plebiscite, dethroning B,o 1$i and establishing 
a Republican regime in South Vietnam.127 On 29 October, the first government 
of the Republic of Vietnam was announced with Ngô 1ình Di'm as President. 
Ministers in charge of the economy included Minister of Finance Tr/n H"u 
Ph()ng, Minister of Economic Affairs, Transportation and Public Works Tr/n 
V%n MLo, Minister of Land and Land Reform Nguy+n V%n Tho$i, Minister 
Agriculture Nguy+n Công Vi'n and Minister of Labour Affairs Hu7nh V%n 
NghCa.128 As were other members of the cabinet, these ministers were French-
educated intellectuals, many of whom had served in the French colonial 
administration. Under Di'm’s despotic regime, they had little chance to 
participate in the decision making in the country. Most powers were vested in 
the hands of members of Di'm’s family and his close personnel friends.129 Di'm 
himself retained the ‘full civilian and military powers’ formerly granted by B,o 
1$i. His power was reaffirmed in the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam 
promulgated on 26 October 1956.130Although Di'm’s presidential term was set 
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for a period of five years, it was repeatedly renewed until he was assassinated 
on 2 November 1963.    
During the first nine years of its existence, South Vietnam was under 
Di'm’s authoritarian regime, with sporadic American interventions through 
their aid policy. The structure of the economic goals and policies of South 
Vietnam were therefore marked by Di'm’s political philosophy. First, he was a 
mandarin, strongly influenced by Confucianism, who believed in the 
paternalistic leadership of the society by an intellectual elite. Second, he 
adopted personalism (nhân v0) as the official philosophy of his regime. Di'm’s 
personalism emphasizes the value of humanism in society, which was in stark 
contrast to the conceptualization of the human being under Communism as a 
sub-component of the masses. Nevertheless, his ideology was not like Western 
democracy, with its stress on capitalist individualism. Di'm agreed that every 
citizen was entitled to own basic amount of property, such as a house and a 
piece of land, but this was as far as it went. Citizens were expected to contribute 
their remaining assets to the government so that it could build up national 
industries, co-operatives and social welfare programmes.131 Consequently, 
while maintaining a skeptical attitude towards Western individualism and 
capitalist institutions, Di'm did not reject the ideas of land reform, state 
industries and the maintenance of administrative restraints on the economic 
activities. Many American observers thought the economic philosophy of South 
Vietnam was akin to the socialist ideology of Communist North Vietnam, the 
exception being its attitude toward the ownership of rubber plantations.132 
The most decisive factor affecting the policy of the South Vietnam 
government on foreign investment was Di'm’s nationalist outlook. He enjoyed 
a tried and tested reputation as a fervent nationalist, who had several times 
refused to accept a position in either pro-Japanese government of Tr/n Tr*ng 
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Kim or in the B,o 1$i puppet government, objecting to their limited authority. 
He was single-minded in determination to protect independence and autonomy 
of the Republic of Vietnam. Di'm recognized that economic independence was 
an essential component of sovereignty, and he was articulate in his insistence on 
the need to oppose foreign economic influence in both government and in 
private business.133 Moreover, just as the Vi't Minh preached anti-Westernism, 
Di'm’s government was also periodically engaged in anti-Western, including 
anti-American, campaigns.134 
As other newly independent regimes, the first attempts made by Di'm’s 
government to establish economic nationalism were to seize control of financial 
affairs. Within a few months in power, on 31 December 1954, Di'm abolished 
the right of issue of the Bank of Indochina. The government-owned National 
Bank of Vietnam (not to be confused with the National Bank of Vietnam of the 
DRV established by in 1951 and renamed the State Bank of Vietnam in 1960) 
was established to take over this task. The banknotes in circulation were 
replaced by new Vietnamese banknotes.135 The National Bank had supervisory 
power over private banks, eleven in all, eight of them branches of foreign banks, 
concentrated mostly in the area of Saigon-Cho Lon. Every month private banks 
were requested to send the National Bank all useful documents relating to their 
activities so that these could be checked and follow-up processes set in motion 
if this was deemed necessary. If such an occasion arose, the National Bank 
would send its agent to make an audit and give advice. The bulk of the activities 
of the National Bank were almost entirely devoted to financing foreign trade 
and managing reserves obtained through foreign aid. It also had the jurisdiction 
to approve of and award import licences (Table 5). Besides the Central Bank, 
Di'm’s government created a number of loan funds, including the National 
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Investment Fund and the Commercial Credit, whose aims were to provide 
Vietnamese businessmen with loans and assistance.136 
Table 5: Number and value of import licences approved and settled by the 
National Bank of South Vietnam, 1955-1960 
 Number of licences Value in thousand US dollars 
1955 17,251 139,252 
1956 22,390 230,595 
1957 23,194 243,231 
1958 18,061 159,547 
1959 27,363 175,954 
1960 22,025 150,967 
Source: Republic of Vietnam, 7 years of the Ngô +ình Di'm 
administration 1954-1961 (published on the 6th anniversary of the 
Republic of Vietnam (Saigon: 1961) p. 313. 
Under the French colonial policy, economic functions of Vietnam had 
been geographically divided: extractive industries and manufacturing were 
concentrated in the North and the economy of South Vietnam was largely based 
on agriculture, with rice and rubber taking pride of place as the principal export 
crops (Table 6). Manufacturing consisted mostly of processing plants and 
factories producing consumer goods under the control of the French and 
Chinese.137 The efforts to gain control of industrial sector were set in motion by 
bringing restrained administrative pressures to bear on foreign enterprises, 
typically by raising fees and taxes and placing restrictions on the transfer of 
profits to abroad. What happened was only to be expected. Major French firms 
were progressively sold off to Vietnamese. In 1956, the major French-owned 
urban transportation company in Saigon sold out to the government for 5 
million piastres after having asked for 100 million piastres the year before. In 
the meantime, however, the government presented the company with a 20 
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million piastres bill for overdue taxes, traffic fines and for the refunding of 
excessive fares. The same year, the French electric utility company serving 
Saigon proposed various schemes for selling itself out as it found itself 
squeezed between rising costs and the persistent refusal of the government to 
approve rate increases.138 
In another move, the government established new state-owned 
companies to buy out existing foreign enterprises. In 1957, for instance, the 
government established the Sugar Company of Vietnam to take the Hi'p Hoà 
Sugar Mill over from French interests, and a year later, the Tân Mai Saw-mill 
administration was established to purchase the French-owned Bien Hoa Saw-
mill. The move made by the government in 1959 to increase its share in the 
joint ownership of Air Vietnam with Air France to 75 per cent was another such 
action.139 By the end of 1959, 110 in the total of 229 French industrial firms, in 
addition to 102 trading firms in South Vietnam had been closed down or sold to 
the Vietnamese authorities. The remaining enterprises operated half-heartedly 
with limited production.140 
The foreign investment policy of the Di'm government was based on 
the principle that the state would hold over 51 per cent of the stock in certain 
enterprises of vital importance to the welfare and security of the country.141 
Wary of Di'm’s bias towards state ownership, very few foreign companies 
invested in South Vietnam, apart from some limited investments in the form of 
joint enterprises with the local government. Foreign companies started investing 
in South Vietnam since 1957 and by 1964, the total foreign investment was 
estimated at $ 4.6 million.142 By 1960, only two paper-mills and a glass factory 
had been established with the minority participation of Italian, French and 
American private capital. The 1!ng Nai Paper and Chemical Products 
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Company was capitalized at 150 million piastres with 30 per cent coming from 
Sindicato Cellulosa Pomilio of Italy. The Paper Industry Company of Vietnam 
was capitalized at 180 million piastres with 19 per cent provided by the Parsons 
and Whittemore of the United States. The Glass Works Company of Vietnam 
was capitalized at 100 million piastres with 44.5 per cent coming from the 
French beverage firm Brasseries des Glacieres de l’Indochine and 4.5 per cent 
from the Société Indochinoise de Pyrotechnie.143 The largest joint enterprise in 
South Vietnam was the 16 million dollar oil refinery established in April 1962. 
Two Western oil companies, Esso and Shell, held 50 per cent of the shares, and 
the South Vietnam Government owned 40 per cent, with another 10 per cent 
belonging to Vietnamese private investors.144 
The major French rice plantations were transferred to Vietnamese 
ownership in the Land Reform Bill promulgated in October 1956. The Law on 
Land Reform stipulated that no landlord could own more than 100 hectares 
applied equally to rice- fields. Land in excess of 100 hectares would be 
purchased by the government for resale to the peasants in plots equivalent to 
between 2.5 and 5 hectares. The government would pay the expropriated 
landlords 10 per cent of the value of the land in cash and the remainder in non-
transferable government bonds, yielding 3 per cent interest.145 If they so wished, 
bond-holders could use them as shares in industrial and agricultural firms 
established by the government.146 All in all, the land reform in South Vietnam 
involved 2,033 Vietnamese landlords and 430 landlords with French 
citizenship. The total amount of land subject to transfer was 733,800 hectares, 
of which 245,000 were French owned. Approximately, one-third of all the 
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tenanted land in South Vietnam was affected by the land reform programme of 
the Di'm Government.147 
The land reforms in South Vietnam were financed by foreign aid. The 
French government agreed to allocate the South’s Vietnamese government 
1,490 million francs ($ 2.9 million US$) for the purchase of all the French rice-
fields, plus an additional 473 million francs to buy agricultural equipment and 
to improve the irrigation system in the Mekong Delta. Most of the 
administrative costs incurred by the land transfer programme, $ 2.2 million in 
total, were covered by the US aid funds.148 The transfer of the land from its 
French owners to the South Vietnamese Government was commenced in early 
1960. By September, approximately 200,000 out of a total of 245,000 hectares 
had been formally transferred to the South Vietnamese Government. The 
remainder was to follow suit by the end of the year.149 By the end of 1962, when 
President Di'm declared the land reform programme completed, 246,000 
hectares had been distributed to 115,381 farmers. Subsequently, about 364,000 
hectares were allocated, but over 400,000 hectares remained government 
owned.150 
Peasants were encouraged to participate in co-operatives. In February 
1959, the Commissariat General for Co-operatives and Agricultural Credit was 
established. This organization was assigned the task of promoting the co-
operative movement by the expedient of providing finance, technical assistance, 
personnel and training. In June 1960, the Commissariat was supervising 266 co-
operatives, consisting of 120 in agricultural production, three in forestry, two in 
animal husbandry, seventy-six in fishery, fifty-seven in handicrafts, six in the 
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manufacture of consumer and two others.151 By the end of 1961, the number of 
co-operatives had increased to 348, scattered throughout all the provinces with 
79,000 members and a capital of $ 10 million.152 Unlike the collectivization in 
Communist North Vietnam, the co-operative movement in South Vietnam was 
carried out on a more voluntary basis. The role of the government was limited 
to providing assistance and guidance. It refrained from any strong intervention 
in the internal affairs of co-operatives.   
The large plantations in the upland areas, which covered about 75,000 
hectares in 1956, remained undisturbed under the land reform programme of the 
Republic of Vietnam.153 Initially, the Di'm regime did take steps to eliminate 
foreign investment and technical skills from rubber production. Nevertheless, 
owing to the growing importance of rubber to the value of Vietnamese exports 
(Table 6) and the shortage of funds from which to compensate their owners, the 
government was forced to retain rubber plantations in the hands of foreigners, 
most of them French nationals.154 Showing some foresight, the government did 
establish funds to provide loans to Vietnamese owners of rubber plantations in 
an attempt to expand the output of their plantations. A Rubber Office was set up 
to complete with a Technical Guidance Committee to provide rubber planters 
with guidance and assistance. The results were satisfactory as rubber plantation 
areas increased to 100,000 hectares in 1960 and 150,000 hectares by the end of 
1963.155 The subsequent military operations against the Communist insurgents 
by the US and South Vietnamese forces seriously damaged the rubber 
plantations and some were forced to close down.156 
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Table 6: The share of rubber and rice in the value of South 
Vietnamese exports (in percentages) 
 1939 1956 1957 1958 1960 1961 1962 1964 
Rubber 27.4 87.1 60.9 64.0 58.6 62.5 87.6 67.9 
Rice 36.0 0.0 24.8 25.5 31.4 20.3 3.6 11.5 
Total 63.4 87.1 85.7 89.5 90 82.7 91.2 89.4 
Source: Bernard B. Fall, The two Viet-Nams; A political and military 
analysis (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963) p. 297 
The unrelenting pressures being exerted on the French business interests 
caused a steady contraction in the size of the French minority. By the end of 
1956, the number of French in South Vietnam was estimated to be only 20,000. 
The official estimate of the population of South Vietnam in December 1959 
showed that the number of Westerners in Vietnam was 13,663, of whom 11,762 
were French and 1,028 Americans.157 By mid-1962, the number of the French 
had fallen to 10,000.158 Although the pressures on the French economic interests 
began to moderate after the fall of Di'm regime, the French had permanently 
lost the position as they had enjoyed during the colonial times.    
The drive to curb the economic influence of the Chinese was launched 
with Government Ordinance 21 August 1956. The Ordinance decreed the 
granting of Vietnamese citizenship to all Chinese born in Vietnam. Chinese 
born in Vietnam could either accept Vietnamese citizenship or seek repatriation 
to Taiwan. Less than a month later, on 6 September 1956, the Department of 
National Economy promulgated another ordinance barring foreign nationals 
from eleven professions known to be largely in Chinese hands. The Chinese 
were given six months to a year to liquidate their businesses.159 As will be 
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shown later in Chapter 5, these policies were analogous to the anti-Chinese 
measures implemented by the Indonesian government in the late 1950s and the 
early 1960s.   
When push came to shove, the number of Chinese eligible for 
Vietnamese citizenship chose to move to Taiwan was small; most of the 
Chinese complied with the registration regulations. By 9 May 1957, the 
deadline set for the newly designated citizens to pick up their identification 
cards, about 3,000 out of an estimated 600,000 Chinese born in Vietnam had 
complied with the stipulations laid down in the citizenship law.160 As a result of 
police intervention, from late 1957 more and more the Chinese decided to 
comply with the new law. By July 1959, about 230,000 had decided in favour of 
Vietnamese citizenship, against some 3,000 who went to Taiwan, and fewer 
than 5,000, who registered as foreigners.161 In the official estimate of December 
1959, only 17,299 Chinese remained in South Vietnam.162 Since many Chinese 
had Vietnamese wives, the former procedure they preferred was to transfer 
ownership of parts of their businesses to their wives and children born in 
Vietnam.163 
The transfer of the control of foreign trade from the Chinese to 
Vietnamese hands was heightened by the discriminatory government policy on 
the issuing import licences in favour of Vietnamese participants, a similar 
measure to the benteng policy of the Indonesian government to be discussed in 
Chapter 4. Between December 1954 and mid-1956, the number of importers 
rose from fewer than one hundred to about 20,000. It was not all smooth sailing 
as delays in licensing coupled with the fragmentation of licence allocations to 
assist Vietnamese importers prompted widespread criticism, alleging that the 
complicated management of the controls was hampering the military effort. 
Voices which claimed that the favoured Vietnamese were not doing the 
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importing themselves, but were selling their licences to foreign importers were 
raised. The government subsequently took steps to rationalize the policy by 
limiting the number of categories of goods a firm might import. The importers 
were also required to make substantial piastre deposits for each import category. 
As the result of these government screening measures, the number of licensed 
importers rapidly declined to only 1,400 by October 1956. Another 1961 
regulation stipulated that an importer had to possess a legitimate place of 
business, furnish proof of access to adequate warehousing facilities. He also 
was supposed to have been engaged in importing on a substantial level during 
the twenty-seven months after September 1957.164 At the end of 1961, when it 
was announced that no further increase in the number of the registered 
importers would be allowed, there were 777 registered importers, 584 of whom 
were Vietnamese nationals. The foreign importers included thirty-six Chinese, 
seventy-four French, sixty-four Indians, six American and thirteen other foreign 
nationals.165 
Inevitably Di'm’s efforts to achieve a form of economic nationalism 
conflicted with the aid policy of the United State, whose goal was to promote 
private entrepreneurial development.166 Because he was convinced that there 
was a dearth of acceptable private initiative, Di'm concentrated his limited 
financial resources accrued from foreign aid and foreign exchange earnings 
from the export of agricultural products, on developing state enterprises and the 
purchase of existing foreign companies. The pressure American could bring to 
bear on the situation proved to be insufficient to bring about a radical change in 
the economic policies of the Di'm government. In the early 1960s, the 
government-owned companies controlled most of important businesses in South 
Vietnam. Whenever he sought to seize control of foreign firms, Di'm remained 
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extremely flexible in his definition of what were ‘vital enterprises’. In early 
1963, his government even acquired the majority ownership in a paper-mill, 
owned jointly with an American firm.167 Besides its substantial reduction in 
economic aid to the Di'm government, the US government found it necessary to 
intervene more directly in South Vietnamese politics. The increasing military 
pressures from North Vietnam which threatened the viability of an anti-
Communist state in Vietnam prompted the US government to send armed troops 
to South Vietnam. As he was thoroughly committed to maintaining 
independence Di'm was opposed to the presence of American troops in South 
Vietnam.168 The anticipated consequence was a coup d’état led by the army 
under American auspice in November 1963, which ended the Ngô family’s rule 




Vietnamese historiography always treats the year 1954 as a watershed which 
separated the country into two antagonist regimes, Communist North Vietnam 
and the anti-Communist Republic in the South. However, from the perspective 
of economic decolonization, the distinction becomes rather blurred. The French 
began transferring their businesses away from Vietnam in the late 1940s and the 
early 1950s. The Geneva Agreement in 1954 brought the French presence to an 
end and caused the considerable reduction in the number of the Chinese 
residents in North Vietnam. The business activities of their compatriots in the 
southern part of the country were also radically eliminated in the next few years, 
with the exception of a small number of French-owned rubber plantations. This 
study argues that there was a continuity in the process of decolonization of 
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economic interests of both the French and the Chinese in Vietnam which ended 
in the late 1950s.   
The principal drive behind the liquidation of the French businesses was 
generated by the policy of economic resistance organized by the Vi't Minh 
Government during the Vietnamese war of resistance. The scorched-earth 
tactics of the Vi't Minh, deliberately planned to destroy French economic 
installations and public facilities, coupled with the non-co-operation of the 
population caused severe damage to and heaped difficulties  on the economic 
activities of the French and the Chinese. The failures of the French army against 
the Vi't Minh and its eventual withdrawal from North Vietnam undermined the 
French hopes of the revival of their economic hegemony in Vietnam. In South 
Vietnam the picture was not much rosier for non-Vietnamese. The eagerness of 
Ngô 1ình Di'm curb foreign economic influence set in motion the rapid 
liquidation of any French and Chinese business assets which still remained. As 
a result of its unwavering nationalism, it was the Di'm Government, which 
rounded off the protracted Vietnamese struggles for economic independence 
from the French, although eventually it was to fail to protect the Republic from 
falling into American hands.  
 Di'm’s economic philosophy which was heavily biased towards state 
ownership but without the elimination of private participation did not diverge 
greatly from the economic policies pursued in the initial years after 
independence and the three years of economic reconstruction after the ceasefire 
in 1954. Where the difference lay was in the historical conditions in which these 
relatively moderate economic approaches were implemented, Di'm was eager 
to consolidate political and economic power in his own hands, but American 
pressures forced him to liberalize the economy. In the North, the necessity of 
forging broad national unity in war of resistance against the French prompted 
the DRV Government advisedly to arouse and play on nationalist sentiments, 
rather than to harping socialist dogma. Progressive and anti-French forces, 
regardless of their political affiliation and social status, were encouraged to 
participate in both government and business. Likewise, the economic 
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difficulties which set in after 1954 as the result of the protracted warfare 
required a substantial contribution from the private and capitalist sectors to 
rehabilitate the dislocated economy.  
 The economic transformation in the direction of the socialist model in 
the North began in the early 1950s. Once it was in motion, it was characterized 
by growing intervention by the Communist Party in both the system of 
economic management and the economic life of the DRV. The agrarian reforms 
of 1953-1956 achieved collectivization in agriculture whereas the socialist 
transformation in industry, handicrafts and trade was achieved by converting 
private and individual sectors into state-owned enterprises or joint ventures with 
the government. By the end of 1960, the socialist transformation in North 
Vietnam had by and large succeeded and the Communist Party-state had taken 






THE INDONESIAN STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL, 1945-1949 
 
‘Since most of the world is capitalist and Indonesia 
lacks the means of engineering the collapse of 
capitalism, the country is forced to avoid alienating 




Soon after the installation of the Tr/n Tr*ng Kim government in Vietnam on 29 
April 1945, the Japanese set up an Investigatory Committee for the Preparation 
of Independence of Indonesia (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia-BPUPKI). On 7 August 1945, the Japanese replaced BPUPKI by a 
Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan 
Kemerdekaan Indonesia, PPKI). Two days later, the leaders of the PPKI, 
Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, and Radjiman were summoned to Dalat in 
Southern Vietnam, where Field Marshal Terauchi Hisaichi, the Commander of 
the Japanese Southern Army, told them that Indonesian independence was now 
in their hands. While preparations for the transfer of sovereignty were still being 
made, Japan surrendered to the Allies. After some hesitation, on 17 August 
1945 Soekarno and Hatta proclaimed the independence of the Republic of 
Indonesia. A central Republican Government was established in Jakarta with 
Soekarno as President and Hatta as Vice-President. However, this government 
was recognized neither by the Netherlands nor by Allied countries, preparing to 
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enter Indonesia. The Japanese were supposed to maintain the status quo in the 
Indonesian Archipelago until the arrival of Allied troops.1 
The landing of Allied troops in Indonesia in which combined forces of 
Australian, British and Indian troops, followed later by the Dutch, took place at 
the end of September 1945. The eastern parts, including Kalimantan, Sulawesi 
and the Lesser Sunda Islands were occupied by the Australian Army. In July 
1946, the Australians handed over the control of these islands to Dutch 
personnel of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA).2 British-
Indian troops landed in Java and Sumatra, but their lack of fighting men and the 
fierce resistance they met from the Republicans confined their occupation to the 
coastal areas of Surabaya, Semarang and Jakarta (now again known as Batavia) 
in Java and Padang, Medan and Palembang in Sumatra.3 In December 1946, the 
British withdrew from Indonesia leaving the jurisdiction over the Archipelago 
to the returning Dutch colonial authorities.4 Indonesia thenceforth entered a 
period of alternating military confrontation and diplomatic negotiations with the 
Dutch, both highly susceptible to the machinations of international politics. The 
conflicts only ceased in November 1949 with the conclusion of the Round 
Table Conference Agreement, by which the Netherlands finally acknowledged 
the sovereignty of Indonesia.  
Inevitably, the political economy of Indonesia between 1945 and 1949 
developed in the framework of a national struggle to secure the newly 
proclaimed independence. This chapter examines the initial attempts of the 
Indonesians to steer the former system of a colonial economy towards that of a 
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national one. It commences by looking at the transformation in the apparatus of 
economic management laying with special emphasis on the organization of 
personnel. Particular attention is paid to the ambivalence shown towards the 
economic thinking and policy of the Indonesian leadership, caught in a cleft 
stick between the aspirations of economic nationalism and the demands for 
independence of the nation. The transfer of economic power from Japanese to 
Indonesian hands and the gradual restoration of Dutch businesses in the 
Archipelago will be analysed in some detail. The substantial concessions made 
at the Round Table Conference by the Indonesian delegation to the Netherlands 
are a good reflection of the prevailing tendency towards pragmatism in 
Indonesian politics in the late 1940s, a trend which continued to develop in the 
early 1950s.  
1. Economic Institutions  
Unlike Vietnam, where independence was proclaimed after most of the 
administrative apparatus had been transferred to the Provisional Government, 
Java and the greater part of the Outer Islands of the Indonesian Archipelago 
remained under Japanese military administration after 17 August 1945. 
Therefore most urgent task facing the Indonesian Nationalist leaders 
immediately after independence was to secure the administrative power from 
the Japanese by setting up their own administrative system of government.5 On 
18 August, the Republican Government was established according to the 
provisions of the new Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (Oendang-
Oendang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia). The next day, PPKI changed its 
name to the Indonesian National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia-KNI), 
which obliquely implied that PPKI was no longer a Japanese product.6 Finally, 
                    
5 The following discussion about the economic institutions of the Republic is largely taken from 
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on 29 August, President Soekarno dissolved KNI and established the Central 
Indonesian National Committee (Komité Nasional Indonesia Poesat-KNIP) in 
its place. Primarily acting as no more than an advisory organ to the President, 
on 16 October 1946, KNIP was granted legislative power. This meant that 
henceforward all legislation had to be approved by KNIP and by the President. 
KNIP was authorized to establish a Working Committee (Badan Pekerja) to do 
the day-to-day work.7 The territory of the former Netherlands Indies was 
divided into eight provinces, each headed by a governor appointed by the 
central government and assisted by a regional Komité Nasional.8 In Java, the 
Republican Government communicated its directives to the regions by radio and 
telegraph. In other parts of the Archipelago, in which the Nationalists had seized 
power, the local leaders took the initiative and gave substance to the general 
guidelines emanating from Jakarta.9 
The first cabinet of independent Indonesia was established on 31 
August 1945 under President Soekarno’s leadership. This cabinet was dissolved 
on 11 November 1945 in response to the demand from the junior members of 
KNIP that legislative power should be transferred from the President to KNIP. 
On 14 November, Sutan Sjahrir, chairman of the KNIP Working Committee, 
was asked by the President to form a new cabinet. The formation of the Sjahrir 
Cabinet marked a fundamental change in the constitutional system of the 
Republic, a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary system. Although the 
form of a presidential cabinet was resurrected in January 1948 under Vice-
President Hatta’s leadership, the new cabinet held itself accountable to KNIP.10 
Besides the three Presidential Cabinets (one led by President Soekarno and two 
others by Vice-President Hatta), between 1945 and 1950 there were other five 
ministerial cabinets (three under the leadership of Sutan Sjahrir and two under 
Amir Sjarifoedin). That was not to mention the emergency government formed 
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by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara between December 1948 and July 1949, after most 
members of the Republican Government had been arrested by the Dutch.  
Despite the frequent change-over of cabinets, the basic structure of the 
Republican Government remained unaltered since it had first been shaped by 
President Soekarno on 31 August 1945. The Presidential Cabinet consisted of 
twelve ministries, four of whose primary task were concerned with the economy 
of the country. The Ministry of Finance was in charge of the national budget, 
taxation, customs and the circulation of money.The Ministry of Welfare was to 
supervise agriculture, industry and handicrafts, animal husbandry and fishing, 
commerce, mining, co-operatives, foodstuffs and essential consumer goods. The 
Ministry of Communications was responsible for transport, the postal, telephone 
and telegraph services. The Ministry of Public Works administered irrigation 
and public construction. One section of the Ministry of Social Affairs was also 
concerned with the economy as it had jurisdiction over labour affairs. The 
Ministry of Welfare was the largest ministry in the economic sphere as it 
exercised control over all Indonesian business activities and the resumption of 
Japanese assets.11 
Ministries were assisted by various government departments which 
followed the pattern set by previous administrations, but now bore the 
Indonesian names and operated under Indonesian management. At the 
provincial level, the ministers delegated power to the Residents, who also set up 
various departments to assist them in carrying out their responsibilities. In 
January 1947, the Indonesian Government set up an Economic Planning Board 
consisting of representatives from Ministries of Finance, Social Affairs and 
Public Works. The purpose of the Planning Board was to draft either a three-or 
five-year economic plan for the reconstruction and development of the economy 
of the country.12 In April 1947, the Planning Board was expanded into a 
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12 Indonesische pers, 9 January 1947; Berita Repoeklik Indonesia, 17 November 1945; Mestika 
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fund the revolution, 1945-1950’; in: Abdulla (ed.) The heartbeat of Indonesian revolution, 182. 
Beyond Political Skin 
 
126 
Committee of Planners for Economic Strategy (Panitia Pemikir Siasat Ekonomi) 
headed by Vice-President Hatta. The Committee consisted of eighty specialists 
and was divided into eight sections devoted to general economic problems, 
estate affairs, industry, mining and oil, foreign property, financial matters, 
electricity, railways and trams, labour affairs and problems in the Dutch 
occupied areas. Instead of coming up with a three- or five-year economic plan, 
in April 1947 the Planning Board proposed a ten-year reconstruction plan.13 In 
June 1948, it introduced yet another programme. This was designed a ‘national 
programme’ and contained twelve points stressing the emancipation of the 
national economy from the colonial order and underlining government control 
of the economy.14 
On account of the hasty transfer of authority from the Japanese and the 
acute shortage of alternative trained personnel, most of the members of these 
early Indonesian governments were former civil servants, who had worked for 
the Dutch colonial authorities and the Japanese military administration. Many of 
them had been trained in economics and subsequently served in the sections 
related to economy. The chairman of KNIP, Kasman Singodimedjo, had 
obtained a law degree at the Djakarta Law School (Djakarta Rechtshogeschool) 
where he had majored in a major in socio-economic studies. He had served as 
chief of the Agricultural Information and Inland Fisheries Section in the Bureau 
of the Agriculture Department of the Netherlands Indies Government. During 
the Japanese occupation, he had joined the Homeland Defence Force (Pembela 
Tanah Air-Peta) and had risen to become a senior officer in the Jakarta area.15 
The Secretary of KNIP was the Deputy-Mayor of Jakarta, R. Soewirjo, whose 
background included a variety of economic experience. Before the Second 
                    
13 Panitia Pemikir Siasat Ekonomi, ‘Rantjangan Sementara’, Mimbar Indonesia; Madjallah 
merdeka diselenggarakan untuk pembangunan, politik, ekonomi, social dan kebudjaan 1 
(November 1947) 40; Merdeka, 23 April 1947; Mestika Zed, ‘Indonesian economy in the 
revolutionary era; The struggle to find financial resources to fund the revolution, 1945-1950’, 
in: Abdullah (ed.) The heartbeat of Indonesian revolution, 182. 
14 Merdeka, 17 May 1948. 
15 T.B. Simatupang, Report from Banaran; Experiences during the People's War (Jakarta: 
Equinox, 2010) 104. 
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World War, he had worked in the Central Office of Statistics and was 
afterwards employed in a building and loan association.16 
Of the seventeen members of the Working Committee, Sjafroedin 
Prawiranegara, R.M. Sunaria Kalapaking, Jusuf Wibisono and Pardi had 
extensive economic experience. Sjafroedin Prawiranegara had worked as an 
assistant-inspector in the Department of Finance of the Dutch colonial 
government. He was promoted to chief of the Tax Office, first in Kediri, then 
Bandung, after the Japanese occupation.17 Sunaria Kalapaking had studied law 
in Leiden and, when he returned to the Netherlands Indies in 1933, he had 
worked as an official in the General Municipal Credit Bank (Algemene 
Volkscredietbank) in Batavia. During the Japanese occupation, he was 
manager-in-charge of the Mangkunegaran enterprises and went on to become 
head of the Office of the National Economy in Jakarta.18 Wibisono had worked 
in the Industrial Division and Central Office of Statistics in the Dutch period. 
During the occupation, he had served as an economic prosecutor.19 
Significantly, most of the members of the KNIP Working Committee would 
thereafter hold portfolio positions in successive cabinets. Many of them played 
a key role in the economic policy making of the Republic.  
The leaders of the first Presidential Cabinet were two principal 
Nationalist foremen of Indonesia, President Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta. 
Whereas Soekarno was an architect by training, Hatta had obtained a doctoral 
degree in economics at the Rotterdam School of Commerce (Rotterdam 
Handelshogeschool). During his time in the Netherlands (1921-1932), he served 
as chairman of the Indonesian Union (Perhimpunan Indonesia), a Nationalist 
association set up by the young Indonesian students attending universities in the 
Netherlands. Hatta had published several articles in the Union magazine, 
Indonesia Merdeka, in which he discussed the economic relations between 
Indonesia and the Netherlands. During the Japanese occupation, Hatta was 
                    
16 Asia Raya, 24,25, 30 August 1945. 
17 Thee, Recollections, 75. 
18Merdeka; Soeara Rakjat Repeblik Indonesia, 17 November 1945. 
19 Indonesian review 1 (1951) 171. 
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Soekarno’s deputy in the Java Service Association (HBkBkai).20 With his 
profound knowledge of economics and political influence, it is understandable 
that Hatta would later become one of the architects of the Indonesian economy. 
His economic ideas were influential among Indonesian intellectuals.   
The Minister of Finance in the first Presidential Cabinet was Samsi 
Sastrawidagda, who had been appointed an advisor in the Department of 
Finance under the Japanese administration. When Samsi resigned on the health 
grounds in September 1945, A. Maramis took over his position. Maramis was in 
turn replaced in the first Sjahrir cabinet (November 1945-February 1946) by 
Sunaria Kalapaking. Shortly after his appointment, Sunaria fell ill and his 
position was transferred to Soerachman Tjokroadisoerjo, a teacher in economics 
at the Djakarta Islamic College. Soerachman had served as director of 
Department of the National Economy during the Japanese occupation and as 
Minister of Welfare in the Soekarno Cabinet.21 He continued to hold his post in 
the second Sjahrir Cabinet (March-June 1946), but in the third Sjahrir Cabinet 
(October 1946-June 1947), he lost his portfolio to Sjafroedin Prawiranegara. In 
the Amir Sjarifuddin Cabinet (July1947-January 1948), Maramis was again 
appointed Minister of Finance and retained his position during the first Hatta 
Cabinet (January 1948-August 1949). When he departed on a mission to India 
in July 1948 Hatta took over his portfolio.  In the second Hatta Cabinet 
(August-December 1949), Hatta handed over the Finance Portfolio to Lukman 
Hakim, a lawyer, who had worked in the government tax office in Jakarta 
during the Japanese occupation.22 
As mentioned above, the Minister of Welfare in the first Presidential 
cabinet was Soerachmam. When he was appointed Minister of Finance in the 
first Sjahrir Cabinet, his portfolio was transferred to Darmawan 
Mangoenkoesoemo who had worked in the Department of Economic Affairs in 
the Dutch period and had been an economic advisor under the Japanese 
                    
20 Mavis Rose, Indonesia Free; A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta (Singapore: Equinox, 
1987) 13, 92, 172. 
21 OrangIndonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa (Jakarta: Gunseikanboe, 1944) 208; Anderson, Java 
in the time of Revolution, 450. 
22 Anderson, Java in the time of Revolution,426. 
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administration.23 In March 1946, the Ministry of Welfare was split into a 
Ministry of Trade and Industry and a Ministry of Agriculture and Supplies. 
Darmawan continued to hold the post of Minister of Industry and Trade, and 
Baginda Zainuddin Rasad, a graduate in agricultural science, was appointed 
head of the Ministry of Agriculture and Supplies.24 In June 1946, the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture and Supplies were 
remerged to become the Ministry of Welfare; Darmawan returned head it as 
minister. In the third Sjahrir Cabinet, Adnan Kapau Gani was appointed the new 
Minister of Welfare. Gani was a businessman from South Sumatra and one of 
the founders of the largest pre-war Indonesian party, the Indonesian National 
Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI).25 Gani was also the first chairman of the 
Economic Planning Board before being replaced by Hatta in April 1947.26 
Sjafroedin was reinstalled to be Minister of Welfare in the Hatta Cabinets.  
In the President Soekarno Cabinet, R. Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso, who 
had been an advisor in the Bureau of Public Works during the occupation, held 
the portfolios of both the Ministry of Communications and the Ministry of 
Public Works.27 In the first Sjahrir Cabinet, the Minister of Communications 
was Abdul Karim, who was an engineering graduate and had worked as chief of 
the Jakarta Municipal Public Works during the occupation. Both the Minister 
and the Deputy-Minister of Public Works were engineers. Martinus Putuhena 
had experience in the administration of private estates and Herling Laoh in 
irrigation.28 In October 1946, Abdul Karim was replaced by his deputy, 
Djuanda. Djuanda had graduated from the Technical College at Bandung in 
1933 and had afterwards been employed as an engineer at the West Java 
Provincial Waterworks. He continued his work in the Department of 
Communications and Waterworks during the Japanese occupation.29 In the 
                    
23 Ensiklopedia Indonesia (Bandung: Van Hoeve, 1954-1955) 372. 
24 P.N.H.Simanjuntak, Kabinet-Kabinet Republik Indonesia; Dari awal kemerdekaan sampai 
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26 Vice chairman of the Economic Planning Board was Soerachman.  
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Hatta Cabinets, H. Laoh was also entrusted with the Ministry of Public Works. 
A new ministry to deal with a vital part of the economy was established in the 
Hatta Cabinet; the Ministry of National Food Supply. Joeseph Kasimo, a 
Deputy-Minister in the Sjarifuddin Cabinet was promoted to head this ministry 
until the Transfer of Sovereignty, which took place on 27 December 1949. 
In brief, within half a month of the day Indonesian Independence had 
been proclaimed, the new Republic had established a system of government 
which had all basic institutions required to plan and operate the economy. In 
contrast to the revolutionary leaders and intellectuals in the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, the majority of the leaders of the Republican Government 
were senior Indonesian officials who had had experience of economic affairs in 
the Dutch colonial Government and the Japanese administration. In view of this 
fact, it might be inferred that in comparison with Vietnam, post-war Indonesia 
was far more richly endowed with experts experienced in economics. Perhaps 
this was so but for a country the size of Indonesia, such persons were in very 
short supply, especially among the lower ranks. Furthermore, under the constant 
military threats against the Republican territories in Java and Sumatra posed by 
returning Dutch forces, the Indonesian economic leaders had had little chance to 
demonstrate or put their skills to good use.  
2. The Preferred Economic System 
The primary concepts of Indonesian Nationalist leaders in which they envisaged 
the future system of the economy were first set down in the Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia. The Constitution was drafted by PPKI before the 
Japanese capitulation and was officially ratified on 18 August 1945. The most 
important sections in the Constitution which relate to the economy are 
contained in Article 27 and Article 33. Article 33 states that, ‘the economy shall 
be organized co-operatively; branches of production, which are important to the 
State and which affect the life of most people, shall be controlled by the State; 
and land and water and the natural riches therein shall be controlled by the State 
and shall be exploited for the greatest welfare of the people.’ Section 2 of 
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Article 27 lays down that ‘every citizen has the right to work and to a livelihood 
befitting a human being.’30 
Although Article 33 contains the most important passages in the 
Constitution regarding the economy, its text was open to a wide variation of 
interpretations. The original Indonesian term for ‘co-operative’ was 
kekeloeargaan, which literally means ‘family principle’. As explained by one of 
the key drafters of the Constitution, Vice-President Hatta, the basis of 
kekeloeargaan was kooperasi. The relationship among the members in a co-
operative or with the members of other co-operatives should be a reflection of 
the relationship in brotherhoods and between family members.31 Another central 
term which was widely used by the political parties in their social and economic 
programmes was gotong-rojong (mutual assistance). The spirit of gotong-
rojong was said to express the essence of Soekarno’s Pantja Sila (Five 
Principles).32 Soekarno saw a future Indonesia as a gotong-rojong state. 
Gotong-rojong, said Soekarno, meant toiling hard together, sweating hard 
profusely together in a mutual struggle to help one another.33 Although 
kekeloeargaan was the term ratified in the Constitution, Indonesian politicians 
later interpreted it as part of the concepts of kooperasi and gotong-rojong. A 
separate issue concerned the way the term mengoeasai (control) should be 
understood; should significant enterprises be owned by the state or controlled 
by other means, including co-operatives and joint ventures? 
In post-independence discourse in Indonesia, Articles 27 and 33 have 
often been referred to as the foundations of the national economy. If the spirit of 
Article 33 were to be adhered to the economy would be organized on a co-
                    
30 Translation from The Voice of Free Indonesia, October 1945. See the original text in Berita 
Repoeblik Indonesia, 15 February 1946. 
31 Mohammad Hatta, Penjabaran pasal 33 Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (Jakarta: Mutiara, 1947) 
27. 
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33 Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds), Indonesian political thinking, 1945-1965 (Ithaca: 
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operative basis. The most important enterprises should be under state control. 
Although the right to work of every citizen was recognized, the drafters of the 
Constitution openly opposed the individual economic sectors. In the Elucidation 
to the Constitution, it was laid down that only insignificant enterprises might be 
in the hands of private individuals. As it had been drafted at a time when 
Indonesians were assured of independence by the Japanese, the Constitution 
represented the primary aspirations of the most senior Indonesian leaders for 
their independent country.  
After the Proclamation of Independence, the Republic had only one 
nation-wide party, the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia-
PNI). In conjunction with KNIP, PNI was designed to assist the President and 
his Cabinet. Nevertheless, in November 1945, Vice-President Hatta issued a 
Government degree which officially permitted the formation of political parties. 
Within months, the political parties in Indonesia had ‘sprouted out like 
mushrooms after rain’, in the words of Sutter.34 The political parties whose 
economic views had a strong influence on the public and the government were 
PNI, the Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis-PS), the Council of Indonesian Muslim 
Association (Madjelis Sjoero Moeslimin Indonesia-Masjoemi), the Indonesian 
Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia-PKI) and the Indonesian Workers’ 
Party (Partai Boeroeh Indonesia-PBI). In the first two cabinets under Sjahrir’s 
leadership, the Indonesian government was largely dominated by the PS. From 
the third Sjahrir Cabinet and thereafter, more and more members of the PNI, the 
Masjoemi, the PBI and non-party members joined the government. In contrast 
to the Communist Party in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which was the 
leading political force in the government, PKI held no important positions in the 
Republican Government.35 The Communist influence was only strong in the 
mass organizations and in Parliament. Of the 222 seats in the KNIP designated 
for the political parties by January 1947, sixty were allotted to the Masjoemi, 
                    
34 Sutter, Indonesianisasi, 341. 
35 There were a few pro-Communist politicians in the cabinets, as among them Minister of 
Defence Amir Sjarifoeddin, Tan Ling Djie, a member of the Working Committee and State 
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forty-five to the PNI, eight to the Indonesian Christen Party (Partai Kristen 
Indonesia, Parkindo) and four to the Indonesian Catholic Party (Partai Katholic 
Republik Indonesia, PKKI), whereas the PKI, the PS and the PBI each had 
thirty-five seats.36 An examination of the economic programmes of the major 
political parties give some more insights into the principal ideas among 
Indonesians about the future economy, as well as their attitude towards foreign 
capital. 
PNI, the Indonesian state party, was established on 22 August 1945 on 
the instructions of President Soekarno. After absorbing a number of smaller 
Nationalist parties and organizations, it was reorganized in January 1946. 
Within five months of its formation, PNI had 40,000 members, spread 
throughout most segments of the Indonesian society, attracting both civil 
servants and businessmen.37 The PNI ideology was based on the principles of 
nationalism, democracy and socialism. By and large, the economic objectives of 
the Party stuck fairly closely to the spirit of Article 33 of the Constitution. In its 
Urgency Programme, PNI called for the socialization of all branches of 
production important for sustaining the people and for provisioning the state. 
The state should take responsibility for the supervision of the distribution of 
those commodities important to sustaining the people. Labour and farmers 
organizations would become an important force in the building of a socialist 
community. This socialist economy was the primary goal of the PNI, although 
in its later policies the party tended to shift its emphasis to nationalism and 
democracy.38 
Those not as great as that of PNI, PS also exerted a marked influence on 
the Indonesian government in the early years of independence. This party was 
established in December 1945 by the merging of two political parties, Amir 
Sjarifuddin’s Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Parsi) and 
Sutan Sjahrir’s Socialist People’s Party (Partai Rakjat Sosialis, Paras). PS 
                    
36 Indonesische pers, 2 January 1947. 
37 Indonesische pers, 29 July 1946. 
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adopted many of the Parsi views on anti-capitalism and anti-feudalism. In its 
economic programme, PS called for a collectivist economy based on co-
operatives, with all basic industries, banks and public utilities securely in state 
hands. The government should also have control of natural resources and use 
these as far as possible to promote the people’s well-being. PS stressed the 
urgent need for transmigration, industrialization and the rationalization of 
agricultural production.39 On account of its socialist views and radical anti-
imperialism, PS retained a dominant position among the left-wing parties, but 
this is not to say that all leaders of the PS acquiesced in the party programme. 
Divisions within PS led to Sjahrir’s withdrawal of his Paras faction from the 
party and his subsequent formation of the Socialist Party of Indonesia (Partai 
Sosialis Indonesia-PSI) in February 1948. In September, Amir Sjarifuddin led 
the remainder of PS in joining PKI in organizing the Madiun Uprising against 
the Republican Government. In the aftermath of its suppression by the 
Republican Army, several leaders of the revolt were executed, including Amir 
Sjarifuddin. This blow caused the collapse of PS and heralded the serious 
decline of PKI.40 
As elsewhere, the Communists in Indonesia held the most radical views 
on anti-foreign influence and support of state control. In its Fighting 
Programme announced at its foundation on 21 October 1945, PKI urged the 
government to immediately nationalize all important enterprises in the fields of 
production, distribution and finance immediately. It also demanded the 
nationalization of all land and the confiscation of all private estates and large-
scale landholdings. Such landholding and estates should be transferred to the 
peasantry who would have been organized into soviets composed of people’s 
representatives.41 Similarly, PBI, which was founded in November 1945 and 
later merged with PKI in 1948, also called for the nationalization of foreign 
enterprises and it that such enterprises should be declared state property. It 
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insisted that distribution of food and clothing should be in the hands of PBI and 
run on socialist lines. A Labour Bank was to be established in which the capital 
of all enterprises could be deposited. This move would ensure that the 
distribution of capital could be effected as widely and fairly as possible.42 
Unlike other Indonesian left-wing parties, PKI and PBI considered themselves 
genuine adherents of Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
In November 1946, PKI and PBI announced the formation of the 
Central Organization of all Indonesia Trade Unions (Sentral Organisasi Boeroeh 
Seloeroeh Indonesia-SOBSI). SOBSI included nearly all the labour unions in 
Java and Sumatra and had a membership of 1,500,000 Indonesian workers, 
covering both labour unions of the government-controlled factories and estates 
and of private enterprises.43 At its first congress held at Malang in May 1947, 
SOBSI voted to join the World Federation of Trade Unions.44 The political and 
economic views of SOBSI were very much in line with those of PKI and PBI. It 
urged for the nationalization of banks, mines, transport, electricity and the other 
public utilities. The state should mobilize all its economic strength to set itself 
on the path of industrialization, so that in the future it would be able to fulfill its 
own requirements and raise the standard of living of the people. SOBSI 
proposed the establishment of a central planning board, composing of 
representatives of workers and farmers to run the economy of the country, it 
would taken an especial interest in industry and agriculture. Foreign investment, 
SOBSI asserted, should be accepted only if sufficient safeguards were set up to 
prevent capitalist exploitation.45 
In the multi-party system of immediate post-war Indonesia, only one 
major party, the Masjoemi, took a relatively liberal, democratic position on 
economic matters. The party was established in November 1945 as a new 
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organization separated from the Masjoemi party formed in the Japanese period. 
In its Struggle Program, the Masjoemi made no reference to socialism or state 
control of the economy. It was in favour of an economy for the people 
established on a gotong-rojong basis. The primary responsibility of the 
Indonesian government was to create opportunities for its citizens to work. 
Although it opposed the capitalist system on the grounds it contained elements 
of pure selfishness, the Masjoemi did acknowledge the right to own private 
property, curtailed only by the religious stipulations of Islam.46 In this respect, 
the Masjoemi differed from the other major parties which saw only one 
alternative to the colonial and capitalist system, namely ownership and 
operation by the state. The Masjoemi recognized the virtue of individual 
initiative and therefore sought to protect private ownership. 
Although PNI, PS, PKI, PBI, and the Masjoemi were the major political 
forces in Indonesia in the early stages of the Revolution, their views did not 
necessarily reflect the entire spectrum of the political thought of the Indonesian 
leadership. A number of Indonesian leaders and influential politicians did not 
actually belong to any political party. Furthermore, within the same party a 
diversity of opinions on the economy was still rife. In order to comprehend the 
Indonesian views about the most desirable economic system, this examination 
should not be limited to the programmes of the parties, as Sutter has notably 
done.47 To paint a proper picture, it is absolutely essential to survey the 
economic views of prominent leaders and politicians. At this point it is worth 
recalling the inherent ambiguity in Article 33 of the Constitution, which helped 
to perpetuate the controversies in economic ideology.   
Heavily influenced by Communist ideology, but choosing not to belong 
to any major political party, was Tan Malaka. His views on anti-imperialism 
and anti-capitalism were more drastic and more radical than those of any other 
Indonesian Nationalists. In December 1945, Tan Malaka organized a Popular 
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Front (Volksfront), calling for the solidarity of all socialists, religious people 
and Nationalists to join the political groups to form a Fighting Union 
(Persetoean Perdjoeangan). His appeal was warmly received. At the second 
meeting of the Volksfront at Surakarta on 15 and 16 January 1946, it was 
reported that the Persetoean Perdjoeangan had managed to gather members 
from 141 organizations, including all the important political parties and military 
organizations.48 The strategic objective of the Fighting Union was Tan Malaka’s 
seven-point Minimum Program, which centered on ‘100 percent Independence’ 
(Merdeka 100%).49 Points Six and Seven of the programme called for the 
seizure and confiscation of estates and industrial installations of enemies, 
namely the Dutch and the Japanese.50 
To secure the future Indonesia economy, Tan Malaka demanded that 
foreign capital be barred from Indonesia. Never again were foreigners to be 
allowed to rent land and control Indonesian raw materials. The economy should 
be organized efficiently by the state. Tan Malaka saw a need for 
industrialization and urged the people to work hard to achieve the setting-up of 
heavy industries in Indonesia, which would then be  in a position to produce 
machinery and war materials. To achieve this goal, Tan Malaka suggested 
drawing on experiences from countries, which harboured no imperialist designs 
against Indonesia, such as Germany, the United States, Sweden and 
Switzerland. Tan Malaka remained emphatic on the point of one-hundred per 
cent independence, alleging that, because the Dutch domestic economy was 
weak it stood to reason that the Dutch would ‘suck the blood of Indonesia even 
more than before the war’ in order to rehabilitate their country. Tan Malaka 
proposed to the formation of a Federation of Aslia, encompassing Southeast 
Asia and Australia. Its leading ‘centre of heavy industry’ would lie along the 
Bondjol (a town in West Sumatra)-Malacca axis. Indonesia would become a 
socialist state, from which all private ownership and individualism were to be 
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Indonesianisasi, 332. 
Beyond Political Skin 
 
138 
eliminated.51 Later, in October 1948, when he founded the small Proletariat 
Party (Murba party)52, Tan Malaka insisted on ‘real independence’, as well as 
on a socialist society for the Indonesian people. In its programme, the Murba 
Party stressed on the nationalization and collectivization of all vital enterprises, 
and urged for the development of heavy industries in Indonesia.53 
The demands for immediate confiscation of foreign assets insisted on 
by Tan Malaka and the Communist-inspired organizations were challenged by 
Sjahrir, who was then in charge of the government. Sjahrir was also the leader 
of the moderate group in the PS. In his famous pamphlet, Perdjoeangan Kita 
(Our Struggle) published in November 1945, Sjahrir himself urged labour to 
unite on an international scale in order to strive to build a socialist world. 
Nevertheless, Sjahrir cautioned that since most of the world was capitalist and 
Indonesia lacked the means of engineering the collapse of capitalism, the 
country would be forced to avoid alienating itself from the capitalist world. For 
the time being, Sjahrir stated, Indonesia had to remain open as far as this was 
possible to foreign investment. Foreigners were free to enter as long as they did 
nothing to undermine the welfare of the people.54 In February 1947, Sjahrir 
further explained the reason Indonesia should allow foreign investment in more 
detail: ‘We shall be doing this not to please foreign capitalists, but because we 
need them for our own economic development […]. We need foreign capital to 
make the speedy development of our country possible.’55 Although socialism 
was Sjahrir’s ultimate goal, for pragmatic reasons and by way of a short-term 
strategy he found it was necessary to retain the continuing operation of foreign 
companies, including Dutch firms, in the country.  
The economic views of Vice-President Hatta probably offer a better 
illustration of the original ideas of Indonesian Nationalist leaders about the sort 
of economic system desired and their changing attitude towards foreign capital. 
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Hatta was the key drafter of the Constitution and it was said that Article 33 was 
his own clause.56 Indeed, it was Hatta, who often explained and conveyed the 
spirit of Article 33 to the attention of the public. At the first economic 
conference of the Republic held at Yogyakarta on 3 February 1946, Hatta 
presented article paper entitled Ekonomi Indonesia di masa datang (Indonesia’s 
Economy in the Future).57 The paper begins with an elucidation of Article 33 of 
the Constitution, which, as he emphasized, formed the foundation of the 
Indonesian Government’s economic policy. Hatta believed that in the future the 
Indonesian economy should abandon the principles of individualism in favour 
of collectivism and public welfare in which case the structure of the economy 
must be based on co-operatives or the tolong-menolong principle.58 Each 
Indonesian village (desa) was to be organized as a co-operative. Large 
enterprises, especially industrial undertakings and estates, should also be 
transformed into co-operatives. These co-operatives should operate under the 
supervision and regulation of the government. The larger the enterprise, the 
larger the government participation had to be; they were to become public 
corporations.  
Above all, those enterprises which were in a position to exert a palpable 
effect on other enterprises or the welfare of the society should be operated 
directly by the state. Mining enterprises should be state enterprises. Other vital 
enterprises, including public utilities, railways, electric power companies and 
industries producing essential materials would also be managed by the state. If 
the state were unable to undertake this challenge, Hatta stated, it might transfer 
the existing operation to organizations directly answerable to the government. 
The government would ensure these organizations and the co-operatives had the 
financial aid and training they needed to function optimally. Workers could also 
buy shares in their co-operatives through a system of wage deductions. In as far 
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as he touched on private sector, Hatta referred only to the rights of the tukang 
(tradesmen), vendors and shopkeepers, because, as he observed, their work did 
not control the lives of others.  
Following the example of Prime Minister Sjahrir, Vice-President Hatta 
rejected the idea of the confiscation of Dutch and other foreign property. He 
stated that were nationalization to be introduced, this would be done according 
to the law and the rights of the state, but that the owner would be compensated. 
Foreign capital would have the chance to co-operate with the government in the 
establishment of joint ventures or co-operatives under government supervision. 
He gave the assurance that the management of such enterprises should be in 
expert hands, regardless of the nationality of the expert. While acknowledging 
that the development of the Indonesian economy should be in step with that of 
the world, Hatta asserted it should avoid becoming an export economy as it had 
been in colonial times. The objective of the national economy was to provide 
the basis needs to the people. Only products which the country was not able to 
produce could be imported. Exports were to be seen as a means for paying for 
imports.59 
Largely inspired by Hatta’s speech at the Yogyakarta economic 
conference, in June 1949, Soejono Hadinoto wrote a booklet, Dari ekonomi 
colonial ke ekonomi nasional (From a Colonial to National Economy), which 
conveyed his views as of one of the most liberal economic thinkers in post-
independent Indonesia. Soejono Hadinoto had studied law and graduated from 
the Law College in Batavia. Under the Dutch colonial administration, he had 
been superintendent of the state enterprises of the Mangkunegaran in Solo. 
After independence, Soejono Hadinoto was appointed Chief of the Regional 
Department of Economic Affairs in Yogyakarta, where he was the founding 
father of the Sovereignty of the People Party (Partai Kedaulatan Rakjat).60 The 
party later merged with the PNI, of which he was subsequently elected 
chairman. As he acknowledged himself, in the completion of his book Soejono 
Hadinoto owned much to S. Mangunsarkor, Minister of Education and Culture, 
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and H. Lao. The work itself was dedicated to Hatta, ‘the economic warrior of 
Indonesia’. In his introduction to the book, Djuanda supported Soejono 
Hadinoto’s ideas and hoped that the book would provide readers with a broader 
view of and a greater depth in some of the basic problems of the orientation of 
the Indonesian economy.61 Indeed, the phrase dari ekonomi colonial ke ekonomi 
nasional drawn from the book became a catchphrase in Indonesian political 
discourse on the economy in the early 1950s.  
The book begins with a survey of the economy before independence, in 
which the author does not spare his criticism of the system of modern economic 
exploitation adopted by the Dutch colonial authorities. On many points this 
system tallied with those in operation under modern imperialism and capitalism, 
which, he stated, would be unacceptable in the Indonesia of the future. His 
preferred system for running the economy was that elucidated in 1945 
Constitution, which favoured a democratic economic system, and eschewed 
capitalist, fascist, Communist, or Marxist-socialist variations. The spirit of 
Article 33 allowed for three economic sectors: government or state, collective 
and individual. The state sector was the most important and the state could 
exercise its control over the economy by three means, by operating enterprises 
directly, participating in joint enterprises and supervising enterprises. 
Enterprises which controlled the basic necessities of the common people and 
might exert a major influence on the welfare of the people, which included 
public utilities and the bank of circulation, should most certainly be operated 
directly by the state. In joint enterprises, the state should participate alongside 
private Indonesian and foreign capital. Co-operatives, which Soejono Hadinoto 
believed to be the economic form most suitable to the Indonesian economy, 
were proposed for the collective sector in agriculture, trade, handicrafts and 
industry. Private enterprises could be developed but without any great fuss 
being made about them.62 
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Soejono Hadinoto believed that the continued operation of foreign 
enterprises in the country was still vital to the health of the economy. He stated 
that, although large foreign enterprises might have an injurious effect on the 
welfare of the people, at that point in time it would be politically and 
economically unwise to confiscate them. Given that even the ‘New Economic 
Policy’ of Socialist Russia contained capitalist features and Mao Tse Tung’s 
China had not turned its back investment from abroad, even from the capitalist 
United State of America, Indonesia should follow their example and not put 
restrictions on foreign investment. The economic development of the country 
would require a huge amount of capital. The most efficacious way foreign 
capital could be invested in Indonesia would be by opening new factories, 
providing loans to the government or participating in the joint enterprises. 
Soejono Hadinoto says, as far as he was concerned, joint enterprises were the 
most suitable way in which foreign capital could be invested in Indonesia. 
Workers in joint enterprises would participate as shareholders. The top 
executive management of any company had to include Indonesians.63 
At variance with Hatta’s reluctance to co-operate with the Dutch,64 
Soejono Hadinoto’s work reveals that he realized how important it was to take 
initiatives to restore the damaged relationship with the Netherlands. He suggests 
that the shortage of technicians, teachers and administrators in Indonesia could 
be largely overcome by offering these sorts of jobs to the Dutch. Capital goods, 
Soejono Hadinoto argues, could be also ordered from the Netherlands, as well 
as from other countries. In his eyes, independence and sovereignty were only 
one set of the goals Indonesia would strive to achieve; another, more intangible 
goal was to create a satisfied society, which would provide the people with 
prosperity and social welfare.65 
In short, apart from the moderate stance on the economy adopted by the 
religious Masjoemi, the other major political parties in immediate post-war 
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Indonesia were bent on creating an economic system in which the state would 
hold a controlling interest in the important sectors. Natural resources, finance, 
public utilities and other vital enterprises were to be under state control in order 
to allow the state to attain the welfare of the people. The debate revolved around 
what form this state control should take, the position of the private sector in the 
economy and above all, the government attitude towards foreign investment. 
The Communists and radical Nationalists insisted on the immediate 
nationalization of foreign estates and enterprises and the introduction of 
restrictions on any new foreign investment. Foreign enterprises would be 
declared state property or be managed by socialist unions. This proved a 
stumbling block as members of the pragmatic group disagreed on the issue of 
the confiscation of foreign property. Although the ultimate goal of some of 
them was indeed socialism, for the time being, from a practical point of view, 
they considered it essential to retain the operation of foreign enterprises in the 
country. As Indonesia was acutely short of capital for economic development, 
investment from abroad, including the Netherlands, should be welcomed. 
Nevertheless, they cautioned that foreign investment in Indonesian private 
businesses must be placed under the supervision of the Indonesian government. 
Co-operatives and joint enterprises were the types of business most favoured by 
the pragmatic group during the period of transition. It is important to note that it 
was these pragmatic Nationalist politicians who dominated the Indonesian 
Government in the late 1940s and in the years immediately after the Transfer of 
Sovereignty.  
3. Economic Concessions 
In their explanations of their decision not to confiscate the Dutch and other 
foreign-owned property in the country, pragmatic Indonesian Nationalist leaders 
emphasized how essential foreign capital was to any future economic 
development. One important, if not indeed the most crucial factor, was still 
largely missing in the economic discourses: the military situation. The 
increasing military pressures exerted by returning Dutch forces were threatening 
the sustainability of the newly independent state. Choosing the same path as the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and displaying the moderate nature of its 
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economic policy, the strategy of the Republican Government was to win the 
recognition of the Netherlands and other foreign powers. Whereas the 
Vietnamese attempts to achieve the same goals were doomed from the outset, 
the Indonesian Nationalist leaders did eventually obtain their objective of 
defending the independence of their country by diplomatic negotiations.  
One week after the Proclamation of Independence, on 24 August 1945, 
the Dutch and the British concluded a Civil Affairs Agreement in which they 
divided the scope of their responsibility over the post-war Indonesian 
Archipelago. As a contingent of Allied forces, British troops would enter 
Indonesia to disarm the Japanese and repatriate Allied internees. The Dutch 
personnel of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) would follow 
hard on their heels to fill the vacuum created by the Japanese withdrawal. The 
de facto authority in the former Netherlands Indies would be temporarily taken 
over by the British. As soon as the military situation was considered sufficiently 
secure, the British would transfer administrative powers to the Netherlands 
Indies Government.66 No part of the Allied plan paid any attention to the 
Indonesian Nationalist movements or the Republican Government which had 
already taken office. In fact, it was not until the initial arrival of a British cruiser 
in Jakarta on 15 September 1945 that it dawned on the British that various parts 
of the Archipelago were actually under the administration of the newly 
established Republican Government.67 
Disappointed by the tardiness of foreign countries to recognize it, the 
top priority in the diplomatic policy of the Republic was to ensure that it 
obtained international recognition, particularly from the Allies and the 
Netherlands. This was not an easy task, as said by President Soekarno on 23 
August, ‘especially under conditions like the present, where the Japanese 
Government is still obliged by the international status quo to remain in this 
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country to run the administration and maintain public order’.68 Doing everything 
within their power to avoid armed confrontations with Allied troops, the 
Republican leaders assiduously sought to win international recognition through 
diplomatic negotiations. Their efforts were constantly thwarted by a growing 
Dutch military presence. 
Historically speaking, the Dutch had enormous economic interests in 
the Indonesian Archipelago. One important objective behind their decision to 
redeploy their troops in Indonesia was to restore and protect their economic 
interests, which had been devastated during the Japanese occupation. The goal 
the British se themselves was to revitalize the entrepôt trade between Singapore 
and Indonesia, especially the rubber trade from Sumatra and Kalimantan.69 
Unquestionably, the chief motivation of the Dutch was economic. In the words 
of wartime Prime Mister of the Netherlands P.S. Gerbrandy, ‘if the bonds which 
attach the Netherlands to the Indies are severed there will be a permanent 
reduction in the national income of the Netherlands, which will lead to the 
country’s pauperization’.70 The Dutch fears of losing their economic interests in 
Indonesia are best illustrated by the slogan widely current in the Netherlands in 
the late 1940s ‘Indië verloren, rampspoed geboren’ (the loss of the Indies spells 
disaster).71 In the context of the serious concerns of the British and the Dutch 
raised by the uncertainty of the future of their economic interests in the 
Indonesian Archipelago, a liberal policy on foreign investment guaranteed by 
the newly installed local government would certainly have eased diplomatic 
negotiations.   
In an interview with Australian war correspondents on 20 September 
1945, President Soekarno expressed the views of the Indonesian government 
about foreign investment in the Indonesia of the future as follows: ‘We shall not 
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repudiate the entry of foreign capital if it is really needed and can help tap the 
wealth of our soil and assist our manpower in ensuring the welfare of our 
country and people, thereby contributing towards meeting the world’s needs.’72 
The President also solicited foreign understanding for the Indonesian situation 
and asked for aid for the Republic. Just three weeks later, on 12 October, 
Minister of Welfare Soerachman issued a government decree regulating the 
position of foreign property still in Indonesia in which it was stated that the 
Republican Government would respect the property of foreigners. To deal with 
the problem of property, which had been held by the Japanese and was now in 
Indonesian hands, a commission, in which for the Allies were to be joint 
participants, would be formed by the government to administer its restitution.73 
Neither the British nor the Dutch responded to the Republican 
declaration on foreign property of 12 October, because a week earlier they had 
already established an Allied Commission for Investigating Foreign Property in 
Semarang to oversee matters relating to the property of Allied nationals.74 In 
October and November 1945, the Allies stepped up the dispatch of troops to 
Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya and other cities in Java and this military influx 
immediately led to battles between the Pemuda and the Allied troops. On 28 
October, the first shots were fired in a bloody battle in Surabaya, which raged 
for more than three weeks. It cost the lives of at least 6,000 Indonesians, and 
also claimed about 600 British and Indian casualties.75 Although Allied troops 
were thereafter in control of the situation, the Battle of Surabaya was enough to 
convince the British of the unique role of Soekarno in being able to quell the 
military skirmishes in Indonesia. This epiphany led the Allies to exert pressure 
on the Dutch to negotiate with the Republic. 
In order to prevent the Dutch propaganda claiming that the Indonesians 
were opposed to the Allied powers spreading to the world, it was vital that a 
more positive policy on the matter of foreign property be formulated. On 1 
November 1945, Vice-President Hatta issued a foreign policy manifesto which 
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emphasized that, ‘all foreign property other than that which the state needs to 
run itself will be returned to its rightful owners, and that what has been seized 
by the government will be compensated as fairly as possible’. Turning to the 
matter of foreign investment, it was stated that foreigners willing to obey the 
laws of the Republic and whose governments had recognized it, not excepting 
the Dutch, would be invited to run their businesses in Indonesia. The Dutch 
were warned to steer clear of beginning a senseless war, which would only 
prejudice their commercial interest in the country. The Republic also declared 
that it was prepared to take over the debts of the pre-war Netherlands Indies.76 
The primary objective of the political manifesto was to obtain 
recognition from the world at large and the Netherlands in particular. 
Henceforth, the Republican leaders used the manifesto in their negotiations with 
the Dutch, which ultimately culminated in the ‘Transfer of Sovereignty’. At a 
meting with Prime Minister and also Minister of Foreign Affairs Sjahrir in 
November 1945, when H.J. van Mook, the Lieutenant-Governor-General of the 
post-war Netherlands Indies, proposed the creation of a Dutch Commonwealth 
in which Indonesia would become a partner, Sjahrir made no bones in declaring 
that he was not prepared to accept any proposals which ignored the existence of 
the Republic.77 He reiterated the wording of the manifesto, but stressed that the 
Republic would not take steps to settle the matter of Dutch property as long as 
the Dutch refused to recognize the Indonesian independence.78 One month later 
Minister of Defence, Amir Sjarifuddin resumed efforts to persuade the Dutch to 
recognize the Republic. He said that the Republic was ready to assume 
responsibility for all former Dutch financial matters in Indonesia and that it 
would gladly permit foreign investment.79 Despite these concessions, Van 
Mook steadfastly refused to recognize the Republic. He adhered to the idea of a 
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Commonwealth of Indonesian constituting a part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands.80 
The deadlock in the negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic 
was only broken when Van Mook decided to adopt the 6 March Accord of 
1946, concluded between the French and Vietnamese, as a model for the Dutch 
and the Republic. On the basis of the fact that out of the whole of former 
Indochina, France only recognized the independent status of Vietnam, the 
Netherlands would follow suit by acknowledging Republican control of a 
certain part of the Netherlands Indies, namely Java. In return, the Republic 
would agree to become a member of a federal state in Indonesia, which would 
join the Netherlands in a union. The Indonesians accepted Van Mook’s idea of a 
federal state, but disputes rapidly arose about the extent of the authority of the 
Republic. Further trouble lay ahead as they made economic concessions to the 
Dutch, while the Indonesian Nationalist leaders began to put forward their 
claims to the economy. At the Malino Conference in Sulawesi in May 1946, the 
Indonesian delegates demanded the abolition of trade monopolies granted Dutch 
companies. There was also a call for the nationalization of the Java Bank, the 
central bank in the Netherlands Indies. The Dutch responses to these matters 
were only proffered in oblique terms.81 They were not prepared to make any 
unequivocal commitment.  
On 15 March 1947, an agreement between the Dutch and the Republic 
was officially signed by Van Mook and Sjahrir at a mountain resort in West 
Java called Linggadjati. Under the terms of the Linggadjati agreement, the 
Netherlands recognized that the Republic of Indonesia held de facto authority 
over Java, Madura and Sumatra. The Republic, together with Borneo 
(Kalimantan) and the Great East (Sulawesi, the Lesser Sundas, Maluku and 
West New Guinea), would constitute the United States of Indonesia (Republik 
Indonesia Serikat-RIS) within the Netherlands-Indonesia Union. In an attempt 
to sort out the economic issues, Article 14 of the Agreement provided for the 
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Republican Government to recognize the claims by foreign nationals for 
restitution of their rights and property within the areas controlled by the 
Republic. Joint commissions, in which both Dutch and Indonesian 
representatives would participate, would be set up to supervise this restitution 
and to keep an eye on economic co-operation between the member states within 
the Netherlands-Indonesia Union.82 
Although the Linggadjati Agreement was inspired by the 6 March 
Accord, it would be a mistake to think that by signing these agreements, 
Indonesian and Vietnam obtained the same degree of sovereignty. In the views 
of Indonesian Nationalist leaders, the Linggarjati granted the Republic greater 
sovereignty than the 6 March Accord did Vietnam. Indonesia was to become an 
independent state on an equal footing with the Netherlands, and the other 
member states within the Netherlands-Indonesia Union. In contrast, the 
sovereignty of Vietnam was contained within the Indochinese Federation and 
the French Union, in which France obviously enjoyed a superior position. In 
other words, the integration between the member states in the Netherlands-
Indonesia Union was much weaker than in the French Union. The United States 
of Indonesia did not have anything to do with the Netherlands, Surinam and 
Curaçao.83 
Nevertheless, the Indonesian comparison between the 6 March Accord 
and the Linggadjati Agreement was misleading. Vietnam had had a legal status 
long before the arrival of the French and H! Chí Minh did not demand 
sovereignty over the whole of former Indochina. Under the 6 March Accord, the 
French promised that they would not intervene in the eventual unification of the 
three parts of Vietnam, namely: Tonkin, Annam and Cochin China. Meanwhile, 
the Indonesians demanded sovereignty over the entire former Netherlands 
Indies, but the Linggadjati Agreement restricted Republican authority to only 
Java and Sumatra. Moreover, the Linggadjati Agreement made extensive 
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economic concessions to the Dutch, whereas the French economic interests in 
Vietnam were only recognized later in the Modus Vivendi. Yet, as had 
happened to the 6 March Accord, the Linggadjati Agreement was soon broken 
because of the military actions launched by the Dutch forces. The motivation 
for these was different from the reasons which had inspired that of the French. 
Van Mook was looking for ways to enforce the Linggadjati Agreement, while 
the French wanted to break the 6 March Accord.84 
Soon after the conclusion of the Linggadjati Agreement, discussions 
about the economic problems arising from the implementation of Article 14 
were resumed. On 10 April, Minister of Welfare Gani forwarded the Republican 
proposals for the restoration of foreign property to the Dutch Government. The 
stipulations set down in these proposals were that all public utilities, such as 
railways, tram, gas and electricity companies in the Republican territory, would 
become state property, and their former Dutch owners would be compensated. 
Foreign private property would be returned to its owners after agreements had 
been reached with the parties concerned wages, safeguards for labour, the 
inclusion of Indonesians in the managerial staff, land rentals and other matters. 
A joint commission would be set up to supervise the restoration of foreign 
businesses. Venturing into the sensitive area of the control of foreign exchange 
revenues, Gani proposed the establishment of an organization to be called the 
Joint Fund for Imports, Exports and Foreign Exchange Control for Indonesia 
(Gemeenschappelijk Fonds voor Import-, Export- en Deviezenbeheer voor 
Indonesia-Gafiedi). Gafiedi would be in charge of all matters related to imports 
and exports. It would be composed of nine members, five from the Republic 
and four from the Netherlands, the Netherlands Indies Government, Eastern 
Indonesia and Borneo. All decisions would be made by majority vote.85 In their 
counter proposals submitted on 15 April, the Dutch agreed to the Gafiedi in 
                    
84 Pham, ‘The Political Framework of Economic Decision-making’, 40-42. 
85 Cheong, H.J.van Mook and Indonesian independence, 121. 
The Indonesian Struggle for Survival  
 
151 
principle, but demanded the immediate restoration of foreign property and 
estates to its rightful owners.86 
On 27 May 1947, the Netherlands Commission General presented a 
memorandum to the Indonesian delegation. This memo again stressed the 
urgency of returning estates and industrial enterprises and the restitution of 
other property to non-Indonesian owners. No conditions whatsoever would be 
imposed. Eager to put their oar in the Gafiedi, the Dutch proposed the 
establishment of an administrative council to govern the fund. Instead of the 
nine members preferred by the Indonesians, they suggested Gafiedi be 
composed of ten representatives: four from the Republic, three from the 
Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies Government, one from Eastern 
Indonesia and one from Borneo. The President of the Java Bank would also be a 
member. This administrative council would be expected to issue regulations 
covering imports and exports, which would be binding in all parts of Indonesia. 
It would be up to organizations within the territory of the Republic or in other 
parts of Indonesia to see that the decisions taken by the administration were 
effectuated. Other similar organizations would also be established in order to 
achieve a uniform regulations and customs legislation for the whole of the 
Indonesian Archipelago. These would include a joint food supply fund, a joint 
customs administration and a joint customs personnel. The memorandum also 
required the immediate export of all estate production available in the 
Republican territory. The sales of these estate products would be handled by a 
central organization with a board of directors consisting of seven members: four 
from estate owners, two from the Republic and one from the Netherlands Indies 
Government. The Republican delegation was given a fortnight to respond to the 
Dutch proposals.87 
On 8 June 1947, the Republic replied in a memorandum whose wording 
was quite conciliatory. It agreed to the composition of members of Gafiedi and 
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the Board of Directors, as well as to the setting-up of a joint food supply 
commission. It also agreed that it was important that foreign property be 
speedily restored, but argued that the restoration needed more time as it was 
imperative that an accurate inventory be compiled and good relations between 
employers and labour established. All state enterprises and the enterprises 
owned by the Japanese had to remain under the control of the Republican 
Government.88 The Dutch flatly rejected this proposal and threatened military 
action.89 On 8 July, the newly appointed Prime Minister, Amir Sjarifuddin, 
finally announced that the Republican Government did recognize foreign 
property rights and its unconditional restoration.90 Despite this conciliatory 
statement, the Dutch went ahead and launched a military attack, named 
Operatie Product, against the Republican territories on 20 July 1947. 
Negotiations resulting in the Renville Agreement of 19 January 1948, were 
resumed after the cessation of hostilities. This agreement confirmed Dutch 
control of West Java, Madura and the Malang region in East Java comforming 
to what was known as the ‘Van Mook line’. A second military action (Operatie 
Kraai) was waged in December 1948 and January 1949, in the course of which 
all key leaders of the Republic, including President Soekarno and Vice 
President Hatta, were captured.91 
Bowing to pressure from the United States which threatened to 
withhold the Marshall Aid to the Netherlands, the Dutch reluctantly reinstated 
the Republican Government in January 1949 and agreed to re-open 
negotiations.92 In May 1949, negotiations were resumed. The Netherlands 
agreed to discontinue military operations and return the capital Yogyakarta to 
                    
88 Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta, 212-219.  
89 The voice of free Indonesia,14 June 1947 
90 However, Sjarifuddin suggested that the transfer of property should be organized after the 
compilation of an inventory and reasserted the Republican claim to the former state enterprises 
within the territory of the Republic. Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta, 227. 
91 Kahin, Nationalism and revolution in Indonesia, 228-229. For more information about the 
Dutch two military operations, see: R. Krimp, J.J. de Ruyter, Operatie Product, de eerste 
politionele actie in Indonesië (Breda: S.L, 1980) and Louis Zweers, Agressi II; Operatie Kraai, 
de vergeten beelden van de tweede politionele actie (Den Haag: SDU,1995). 
92 Alastair M.Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1960) 189. 
The Indonesian Struggle for Survival  
 
153 
the Republican Government. Agreement about the terms of the Transfer of 
Sovereignty was concluded at the Round Table Conference in The Hague in 
November 1949. Under these terms, the Netherlands recognized the sovereignty 
of the United States of Indonesia over the former Dutch colonies in the 
Netherlands East Indies, excluding the territory of West Irian (West New 
Guinea). The question of the political status of New Guinea was to be 
determined by negotiations within a year of the date of Transfer of 
Sovereignty.93 In fact, Irian Barat remained in a dispute between the 
Netherlands and Indonesia for over a decade and became one of the main 
reasons for Indonesian campaigns against Dutch business throughout the 1950s. 
It was not until October 1962 that the territory was finally surrendered to the 
Republic of Indonesia.  
In return, the Indonesian delegation agreed that the Dutch could 
continue to do business in Indonesia, including the remittance of their profits, as 
usual. There was also an obligation placed on the new Indonesian Government 
to consult with the Netherlands on any monetary and financial measures likely 
to have an impact on Dutch interests. The nationalization of Dutch enterprises 
would only be permitted if it were deemed essential to the national interest of 
Indonesia and if both parties agreed. The amount of compensation would be 
determined by a judge on the basis of actual value of the nationalized 
enterprises.94 The new nation was forced to take over the 4.5 billion guilder (or 
$1.13 billion) of the public debt incurred by the Netherlands Indies Government 
to the Netherlands. This amount was made up of the entire internal debt of the 
colonial government, amounting to 3 billion guilders, and another 1.5 billion 
guilders of external floating debts.95 The debt was running at an interest rate of 
3 per cent per year and, as long as this debt was not fully paid off, the Dutch 
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Government retained the right to intervene in the Indonesian economic policy.96 
Furthermore, the Indonesian Government was obliged to maintain the position 
of 17,000 Dutch officials on European pay scales for two years.97It is widely 
acknowledged that Indonesia had to pay a high price for independence. No 
other former colony had to shoulder as heavier a heavy burden from its former 
colonial ruler as Indonesia was expected to do.98 
With the conclusion of the Round Table Conference Agreement, 
Indonesia at long last obtained political independence from the Netherlands. 
Alongside the vigorous revolutionary armed struggles, the diplomatic efforts 
made by Indonesian Nationalist leaders undoubtedly played a central role in the 
process which led to the conclusion of agreement of Transfer of Sovereignty. 
Confronted by the disadvantages in the escalating war against returning Dutch 
forces, the Indonesian leaders continued to strive to gain independence through 
diplomatic negotiations. Economic concessions to the Dutch and the promise of 
a liberal economic policy towards foreign investment in Indonesia were 
repeatedly used during the negotiations. The Indonesian leaders subordinated 
the economic sovereignty of the country to the ultimate aim of gaining political 
independence. H! Chí Minh made similar attempts in the early stages of the 
Vietnamese revolution. The crucial differences in the war policies of the 
governments of France, the Netherlands and the United States were the 
determining factor in any explanation of why the nationalist struggles for 
independence fought so hard for by the Indonesian and Vietnamese people 
ended up at the different ends of the spectrum. 
4. Early Economic Transformation  
In comparison with the situation in Vietnam, the government of newly 
independent Indonesian was in a more advantageous position when it took over 
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the economy. After independence, most of important companies in Vietnam 
were still under the control of the French managers, who went out of their way 
not to co-operate with the newly established Vietnamese Government. The 
Indonesian Government took over the economy from the departing Japanese 
army. The transfer of management was carried out speedily during the months 
prior to the landing and occupation of the Allied troops and NICA. Enterprises 
formerly in Japanese hands were taken over by Indonesian employees and 
subsequently fell under the control of the Republican Government. Indonesian 
private entrepreneurs were urged to join in co-operative federations or 
associations run by high-ranking government personnel.  
The first major sectors liberated from the Japanese control were the 
enterprises which had been operated as government services during the 
occupation. During the first week of September 1945, the media agencies, radio 
stations, post, telephone and telegraph offices were all put under Indonesian 
management. On 7 September, Indonesian publishers and editors established the 
National Publishing Agency (Badan Penerbitan Nasional), which made 
responsible for the supervision of all kinds of publishing in a manner true to the 
spirit of gotong-rojong. A wide range of Indonesian newspapers and magazines 
was founded during this one month, including notably Berita Indonesia 
(Indonesian News) Merdeka (Independence), Indonesia Raya (Greater 
Indonesia), Ma’moer (Prosperity) and Berita Perekonomian (Economic News). 
Through these media channels, subtly playing on nationalist sentiments the 
Indonesian government was able to encourage the ordinary people to get behind 
and support the newly established Republic and its leaders. Important 
government policies and legislation, not to mention the political situation of the 
country, were all major themes of these writings.99 
As well as the take-over of the media enterprises at this crucial period, 
the transportation system was also gradually passing into Indonesian hands. On 
1 September 1945, Indonesian employees of the Kaizi Sookyoku declared 
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themselves to be the personnel of the Republican Government and renamed the 
office to the Department of Maritime Affairs (Djwatan Oeroesan Laoet). Two 
days later, at the Manggarai Railway Station in Jakarta workers passed a 
resolution in the name of all railway employees in Indonesia, declaring the 
railway networks were the property of the Republic of Indonesia (milik negara 
Republik Indonesia).100 The Department of Railways (Djawatan Kereta Api) 
was established to manage the operations of both the railway and tram networks 
in Indonesia. During the same month, branches of the Japanese trucking 
corporation, for instance, Djawa Unyu Zigyosha, were gradually taken over and 
in some places converted into new Indonesian companies.101 On 3 October, 
Minister of Communications Abikoesno gave a speech calling on the employees 
of the railways, the post, telephone and telegraph systems and the radio stations 
to maintain their operations.102 Plans were made to organize Indonesian 
shipping companies and maritime trade into federations under the control of the 
Ministry of Welfare.  
The Indonesian take-over of the water, gas, electricity and mining 
companies was initiated somewhat later. On 29 September 1945, the power 
installation in Bandung was taken over by the trade union of workers in gas and 
electricity companies.103 The example of this seizure was gradually extended to 
other provinces in Java and, by the end of October 1945, the distribution of gas 
and power was being fully managed by the Department of Electricity and Gas 
(Djawatan Listrik dan Gas). On 5 October, the most active mining enterprise in 
Java, the coal-mine at Bajah in southwest Java, was declared the property of the 
Republic. On 15 October, Indonesian personnel took over the largest coal-mine 
in the country, Boekit Asam, in the region of South Sumatra, and proclaimed it 
state property.104 The take-over of the principal mineral industry, oil, also made 
rapid strides in the regions controlled by the Republic. The oilfields and 
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refineries in South and North Sumatra were gradually taken over in October and 
November 1945.105 
Unlike the withdrawal of the Japanese armed forces, which sometimes 
involved violent skirmishes with Indonesian revolutionary units,106 the transfer 
of economic power from the Japanese to Indonesian hands went relatively 
smoothly. The managers of Japanese enterprises initially complied with the 
orders to stay on their jobs as caretakers, but after the repatriation of Japanese 
army, they relinquished their positions to their Indonesian deputies. Some 
Japanese managers even seized the initiative and sold their businesses to 
interested Indonesian individuals.107 By the time of Allied forces arrived, most 
important production facilities in Java and South and North Sumatra had passed 
into Indonesian hands. In Yogyakarta, for instance, by 26 September 1945 all 
offices, factories and enterprises had been transferred to the control of the 
regional KNI.108 Outside Java and Sumatra, where Republican authority was 
still weak, the Japanese were able to maintain their businesses somewhat longer, 
pending instructions for evacuation.109 Appealing to employees to continue 
operations, the Republican Government began introducing measures to establish 
proper control of economic activities.  
On 4 October 1945, the Republican Government issued a series of 
measures to guide the reorientation of the economy. On 4 October, Minister of 
Welfare Soerachman announced a government policy on co-operatives. His 
announcement emphasized the fact that the Indonesian economy was to be 
nurtured in the spirit of gotong-rojong, its ultimate goal being the attainment of 
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a prosperous society. Co-operatives which had been established during the 
Dutch period and were still functioning were to continue operating. The 
Japanese co-operatives (kumiai) were to be abolished as they had been neither 
democratic nor had served the community. All co-operatives were bound to 
comply with the new regulations issued by the Ministry of Welfare. In an 
attempt to define the position of the private sector, Soerachman declared that 
the Republican Government would recognize the proprietary rights of private 
individuals so long as they did not impinge upon the interests of the community. 
Government supervision of foreign property was declared to be only of a 
temporary nature, intended to protect such property from the depredations of 
any public disorder.110 On 12 October, the government affirmed that the 
Republic of Indonesia would respect the property of foreigners. The 
administration of the property formerly held by the Japanese and now in 
Indonesian hands was to be entrusted to a commission which would include 
representatives of the Allies.111 
Control of finances was absolutely crucial, not only because the 
government was in desperate need of money to set up the state apparatus 
properly and to wage the guerrilla war against the Dutch, but also because, if it 
were in control of the banking system, it would be able to control production as 
well as exports and imports. While the major foreign banks which had been 
seized by the Japanese were returned to their rightful owners,112 it was vital to 
the Republican government to establish its own financial institutions. On 22 
August 1945, the Indonesian Independence Fund (Fonds Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia, FKI) was set up to collect and handle the funds and goods 
contributed by residents and organizations to finance the Indonesian 
independence struggle. Just less than a month later, on 19 September, the 
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Republican Government founded the Indonesian Central Bank (Poesat Bank 
Indonesia, PBI). The tasks of this bank were to manage the circulation of money 
and pave the way for the establishment of an Indonesian State Bank (Bank 
Negara Indonesia, BNI). After more than nine months of preparation, on 5 July 
1946 the Bank Negara Indonesia was officially established. Its tasks were the 
issue and circulation of banknotes, the extension of credit to government bodies, 
Indonesian banks and economic organizations and the expediting of foreign 
exchange transactions, all geared towards guaranteeing price stability. Although 
the bank was open to managing the business of all residents, but only 
Indonesian citizens qualified for a seat on the management board. Margono 
Djojohadikusumo, the father of the most distinguished economic expert of post-
war Indonesia, Sumitro Djojohadikusoemo, was appointed the first President of 
BNI. On 30 October 1946, BNI was authorized to issue the new currency of 
Republic of Indonesia (Oeang Republik Indonesia, ORI) which was to replace 
the existing Japanese money still in circulation.113 Indonesian private 
entrepreneurs were encouraged to throw their weight behind the government 
and establish new companies and banks. In January 1947, for instance, the 
government called for private investment efforts to set up a Banking and 
Trading Corporation capitalized with Rp. 20 million. The government held 60 
per cent of the capital, leaving 40 per cent open to private investors. The 
directors of the corporation were Soemitro Djojohadikoesoemo, Ong Eng Die 
and Pri Sastroatmodjo.114 
Most of the large agricultural estates were situated on the territories 
controlled by the Republic. One investigation ordered by the Indonesian 
Government in May 1946 revealed that more than 55,000 hectares of rubber and 
coffee plantations, plus about 18,000 hectares of sugar estates, six sugar-mills 
and 10,000 hectares of cotton plantations had been effectively placed under 
control of the Republic.115 The Indonesian Government set up two new agencies 
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to manage the agricultural estates in its territories. The Agency for Management 
of State Sugar Companies (Badan Penjelenggaraan Peroesahaan Goela Negara, 
BPPGN) was entrusted with running of the sugar industry and the Central 
Organization for State Estates (Poesat Perkeboenan Negara, PPN) was to be 
responsible for supervising all other state plantations.116 In total, these two 
organizations were entrusted with the supervision of approximately 900 
enterprises in Java and 300 in Sumatra.117 Special training courses offering 
instruction in the techniques of sugar processing and textile manufacturing and 
estate cultivation in general were organized in major companies. The candidates 
recruited from the local community and were not supposed to be older than 
thirty-five. By September 1946, in Surabaya and Klaten alone, some 500 
training courses had been organized, covering a wide range of skills including 
general techniques, machinery, electric, chemicals and microbiology.118 Despite 
these efforts, the shortage of labour and the unrelenting guerilla war meant that 
agricultural exports continued to decline rather drastically. Rubber production in 
Java, for instance, had fallen 82 per cent compared to the 1942 level.119 A 
number of sugar-and rubber-mills had been able to resume operations, but ran 
into difficulties when the export of their outputs was thwarted by the Dutch 
naval blockade of the Republican territories. Until the Dutch ended the blockade 
in 1948, most Indonesian trade was carried out by smuggling the products to 
Singapore and the Malay Peninsula.   
The Republican Government had also established two other bodies to 
supervise industries, namely the Bureau for Estates and Industrial Affairs 
(Kantoor Oeroesan Perkeboenan dan Perindoestrian (KOPP) and the Agency for 
the State Textile Industry (Badan Textiel Negara, BTN). Factories processing 
timber and those manufacturing textiles and cigarettes quickly resumed 
production. In January 1946, a cigarette factory in Central Java was employing 
2,000 workers in comparison to only 300 personnel before the war and 18,000 
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during the occupation.120 The timber industries throve healthily throughout the 
whole of Java and by January 1947 there were no fewer than 3,000 companies 
in operation.121 Cigarette manufacturing, which was stopped during the 
occupation, now resumed production, turning out 16 million cigarettes per 
month. Textile manufacturing was also stimulated. In January 1947, twenty-one 
privately-owned textile factories with a capital of Rp. 200,000 were opened in 
Yogyakarta producing 42,000 meters monthly. In Madiun, a state textile 
enterprise planted 2,300 hectares of cotton and made plans to increase the 
acreage to 3,000 hectares. In total, by the end of January 1947 there had been 
about 500 domestic textile companies under the supervision by BTN.122 As a 
general rule, 15 per cent of the annual net profits of state-owned factories were 
earmarked for benefits for their employees and 85 per cent was assigned by the 
government.123 The government implemented a policy of tax reduction for 
privately-owned enterprises. Those producing cigarettes had to hand over only 
30 and 40 per cent of net profits. In the colonial era this had been as high as 50 
per cent and 75 per cent, respectively.124 The major problems facing 
manufacturing were the shortage of labour, raw materials and machinery.125 
One of the distinctive features of the Indonesian economy during the 
revolutionary period was the marked involvement of the military in economic 
management. Military involvement in economic life had begun in the early 
months after the Proclamation of Independence, when various defence 
organizations reportedly participated in the take-over of foreign businesses, 
previously managed by the Japanese army. These estates included power 
installations, transport companies, mines, factories, and even agricultural 
estates. In Wonosobo, Central Java, for example, the military took charge of 
Dutch-owned tea estates and factories. In Yogyakarta, the military gained 
control of the tool factories and metal workshops owned by the Dutch and even 
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seized various Chinese-owned companies, factories and warehouses. Similar 
take-overs were reported from other cities, including Surabaya, Semarang, 
Surakarta, Cirebon, Jakarta, Palembang, Padang, Medan and Makassar.126 Later, 
when the Republican Government was moved to Yogyakarta in January 1946 
and, of the necessity, a defence force occupied an important place on its agenda, 
economic institutions increasingly passed into the hands of the armed forces, 
the local authorities and the trade unions. 
The management of the oil installations was exclusively in the hands of 
the military organizations. The oil refineries in Palembang, South Sumatra, 
were managed by the military-controlled Petroleum Company of the Republic 
of Indonesia (Peroesahaan Tambang Minjak Republik Indonesia). In Pangkalan 
Brandan in the Aceh region of North Sumatra, the BPM oil installation  
(Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij, Batavian Petroleum Company), a Dutch-
owned company run by the Japanese during the occupation, was renamed the 
Oilfield of the Republic of Indonesia (Tambang Minjak Republik Indonesia 
Daerah Atjeh). In early 1947, a State Petroleum Exploration Company of the 
Republic of Indonesia (Peroesahaan Tambang Minjak Negara Republik 
Indonesia) was established and it took control of oil production and distribution 
in the Aceh and North Sumatra regions. The company was reported to be under 
the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Abdul Rachman of the National Armed 
Forces of Indonesia (Tentara Nasional Indonesia-TNI).127 Outside the major oil-
producing areas in Palembang and Aceh, between October 1946 and mid-1947 
the oil installations in other parts of Sumatra were gradually handed over to the 
Allied forces.128 
The administration of shipping and trading had been thrown into great 
confusion in which several institutions, including the armed forces, were 
involved. Initially Indonesian shipping companies declared that they were under 
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the authority of the Ministry of Welfare. However, the management of sea 
transport and shipping industries was gradually transferred to the Ministry of 
Defence and the Ministry of Communications. Although the Ministry of 
Welfare officially exercised jurisdiction over the sales and shipment of 
commodities, the control of the foreign trade was largely in the hands of the 
armed forces. The military played a particularly prominent role in the barter 
trading with British Malaya and Singapore.  Audrey Kahin has written that the 
barter trade between West Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula shortly after the 
Proclamation of Independence was effectively dominated by the Ninth Army 
Division in Bukittingi.129 Apart from trafficking daily provisions, Indonesian 
soldiers also traded firearms which were distributed to Republican resistance 
groups. In Palembang, these trader-soldiers succeeded in turning rubber, coffee 
and quinine into lucrative economic resources which could take their place 
alongside the traditional oil and coal of the region. At a meeting in Bukittinggi 
in August 1946, the deputy-governor of South Sumatra, A.K. Gani, stated that 
each month Palembang exported no less than 90 million guilders worth of 
goods to Singapore. Rubber and coal which were exchanged for foodstuffs and 
clothes, loomed large in this trade.130 By September 1946, the volume of rubber 
exported to Singapore had topped more than 400,000 tons, and other 500,000 
tons was still in store in Sumatra. Sugar, rubber and rice were also carried from 
Java to Sumatra from where they were traded on to Singapore and India.131 
Opium was another important commodity. It was reported that many of both the 
regular and the militia army units in Java regularly traded opium from 
Yogyakarta to the occupied territories and Singapore.132 The Dutch colonial 
government estimated that the value of exports from the Netherlands Indies to 
Singapore and the Malay Peninsula from January to October 1946 amounted to 
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over 178 million Straits Dollar. Of this amount, the value of the ‘illegal exports’ 
had been no less than 150 million in the same currency.133 Indonesia accounted 
for one-third of the total import trade of Singapore, whereas the exports to 
Indonesia amounted one-seventh of the total exports of Singapore.134 
The trading partners of the Republican authorities were the Chinese, the 
British and the Americans. The opium trade pursued by the Indonesian army 
was run in close co-operation with the Chinese. The Chinese was also active in 
trading sugar, rubber, tobacco and pepper from Java in exchange for dried fish, 
gambir and cloves. The British and American traders were interested in sugar, 
rubber, coal, textiles, machines and luxury cars. It was reported that the British 
authorities in Singapore were receiving 1,000 tons of coal per day from 
Palembang.135 Dutch reactions to this ‘smuggling’ were both indecisive and 
discriminatory. Their discrimination was blatant in the fact that, whereas the 
Chinese ships were captured and confiscated, British and American ships were 
only stopped by the Dutch forces and forced to leave Indonesian waters. In early 
August 1946, the Dutch authorities seized eighteen Chinese ships sailing under 
the British flag loaded with sugar and rubber. Their cargo was worth 16 million 
Straits Dollars. In the following month, twenty-two Chinese-owned ships were 
seized.136 Notwithstanding the lurking danger of Dutch seizure, it was reported 
that there were some 150 Chinese-owned ships were lingering in the proximity 
of Singapore ready to engage in trade with Indonesians.137 It is interesting to 
note that whereas the Dutch authorities branded the Chinese and Indonesians 
engaged in trading between the Republic, the Dutch-occupied areas and the 
British Straits Settlement smugglers, the Dutch naval personnel were 
stigmatized as pirates in the Indonesian and Chinese newspapers.  
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The treatment meted out to British and American traders was rather 
different. In early 1946, at least three British-owned ships, named the Empire 
Mayoven, the East Corzor and the Fortune, arrived in Ceribon, the main port 
under the de factor control of the Republic. These ships had all been captured 
by the Dutch and their captains were asked to sail to Batavia where they could 
apply for the licence from the Dutch authorities. The British captains ignored 
the warnings and travelled to Yogyakarta instead. These ships were returned to 
British owners, minus their cargoes which had been confiscated by the Dutch.138 
The Dutch were more ambivalent in their dealings with the Americans. In 
February 1947, an American vessel named the Martin Behrman, carrying 9,000 
tons of cargo, arrived in Cirebon. The ship was stopped by the Dutch destroyer, 
the Kortenaer, but not prevented from unloading her cargo. Within a short time, 
the Martin Behrman had been loaded with 5,000 tons rubber and 1,300 tons 
sugar.139 However, when the American vessel was preparing to leave Cirebon, 
the commander of the Kortenaer ordered her to proceed to Batavia. Although 
the Martin Behrman was later released, her cargo was seized by Dutch 
authorities.140 As had the ‘Gibson affair’ which attracted far more attention to 
the Archipelago from of the American Government in the mid-nineteenth 
century,141 the prolonged dispute over the Martin Behrman incident paved the 
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way for the strengthening of the American relations with the Republic of 
Indonesia.142 
In January 1948, the Republican Government made a tactical move, 
when Sumitro Djojohadikusomo, the General Representative of Finance and 
Trade Affairs of the Republic in New York, signed a contract with an American 
businessman, M. Fox, to establish an Indonesia-American Corporation. The 
corporation was recognized as the ‘sole and exclusive’ agent for the sale of all 
products of the Republican Government in the United States and the purchase 
of goods in the United States on behalf of the Republic for a period of ten 
years.143 In mid-1948, the Republican government signed what were known as 
‘Let Alone’ agreements with three large foreign oil producers, Anglo-Dutch 
BPM, American Stanvac and Caltex. These three giant oil firms pledged to 
repair damaged installations and resume production as soon as possible on 
condition that they would be exempt from government restrictions on access to 
foreign exchange and remittances of profits. By its policy of extending 
economic relationships with foreign partners and respecting the rights of non-
Dutch foreign ownership of vital economic assets, the Republican government 
hoped to drive a wedge between the Netherlands and other Western countries.144 
American disapproval of Dutch military actions against the Republic 
government and the pressures it exerted on the Dutch to acquiesce in the Round 
Table Conference Agreements can be seen as a reflection of the Indonesian 
success in mobilizing support from Western countries in its independence 
struggle. 
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5. The Return of the Dutch 
In October 1945, the Netherlands Indies Government was once again able to 
establish its seat in Batavia. Following the return of Dutch colonial forces and 
the gradual enlargement of the territories they occupied, growing numbers of 
enterprises slipped from under the control of the Republican Government. 
During the final months of 1945 and again during 1946, the occupation of the 
Allied-NICA forces continued to be restricted to the major port cities in Java 
and Sumatra. However, in 1947 after the British had withdrawn from Indonesia 
and handed over control of the areas they occupied to the Netherlands Indies 
Government, Dutch troops began to expand their perimeter of their area of 
occupation. After the First Military Intervention, the Dutch succeeded in 
reducing the Republican territory to smaller areas in Java and Sumatra, 
separated from each other by Dutch zones. In early 1949, after farther successes 
the Dutch even claimed authority over the entire Republican territory.145 
As a matter of course, transport facilities, factories, mines and 
plantations in the areas under Dutch occupation were placed under the 
jurisdiction of the Dutch colonial government. Priority in economic 
reconstruction was allocated to the most critical industries, such as bakeries, 
refrigeration installations, saw-mills and car repair workshops. As early as 
March 1946, approximately one hundred large and medium-sized industrial 
concerns had already resumed production. By February 1947, the average 
industrial capacity, measured in terms of equipment, was estimated to amount to 
50 per cent of the pre-war capacity. Economic recovery in Surabaya, Bandung 
and Semarang continued to be limited as it was hampered by destruction and 
shortage of skilled labour, not to mention a dicey electricity supply. Only 
industries producing the most vital necessities were re-opened. Among them 
were bakeries, building businesses, rice-mills, factories producing machinery, 
printing establishments and metal foundries. In the Outer Islands, although the 
Japanese lost no time in surrendering enterprises to Dutch owners, progress 
proceeded at a snail’s pace, hampered at every turn by the inadequate transport, 
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lack of materials and spare parts and power supplies. The sectors which were 
the quickest to resume production were copra oil, textile manufacturing and 
cement in Celebes, and rice-processing, salt-panning, coconut oil and shoe 
manufacturing in Borneo.146 Despite the numerous stumbling-blocks, the efforts 
the Dutch colonial government made to promote industrial recovery did 
eventually pay off. By 1949, the number of important industries, including rice-
mills, ice factories, rubber-milling plants and metal foundries was back to where 
it had been in early 1942.147 
Initially, the Dutch controlled the major industrial centres and ports in 
Java and Sumatra but, in the aftermath of First Military Action, economic 
establishments in West Java, East Java and some parts of Central Java fell under 
Dutch control. The estate areas of East Sumatra and the coal-mines and oilfields 
in Palembang were also seized by the Dutch. As the result of their tactic of 
deploying lightening attacks, most infrastructures, mining installations and 
plantations were captured by Dutch troops without damage.148 After the Second 
Military Action, most of the remaining estates and industries were also 
occupied by the Dutch. As the Vi't Minh had done, the Indonesian 
revolutionary forces also resorted to scorched-earth tactics, but in their case the 
targets were buildings, public facilities and equipment. The long and the short 
of it was that the Dutch had been able to achieve their economic aims. They 
resumed control of large quantities of export products which had been 
stockpiling at habours because of the Dutch blockade.149 
In the wake of the occupation forces, Dutch managers gradually 
returned to their former estates but a number of small-and medium-sized Dutch 
entrepreneurs, who had faced an uphill battle in re-establishing their business 
after their release from internment camps, sold their properties to local Chinese 
businessmen.150 In late July 1947, the Chinese also paid one million guilders by 
the Dutch Government in compensation for the damage they had suffered from 
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Dutch military actions.151 The Dutch colonial government had the policies also 
tabled policies to stimulate the position of Indonesians in the economy. These 
covered a wide range of initiatives, including granting smallholders credit and 
granting Indonesian importers certain privileges. Despite these efforts, only a 
small number of Indonesian-owned enterprises were actually established in the 
second half of the 1940s. Among them were a number of trading corporations in 
Makassar and Medan, and a few textile-mills in West Java. It should be noted 
that the Indonesian factories tended to be small as compared to the enterprises 
of their Dutch and Chinese counterparts.152 
Control of imports and exports in the Netherlands Indies was 
monopolized by the Netherlands Indies Government Import and Export 
Organization (Nederlands-Indische Goevernments Import en Export 
Organisatie, NIGIEO). NIGIEO was established in March 1946 for the specific 
purpose of controlling the stockpiles of supplies abandoned by the Japanese. It 
also exercised jurisdiction over the distribution of goods and decided on the 
prices of such important goods as provisions, beverages and textiles. On 1 
October 1947, NIGIEO was closed down. In its place was established the 
General Import Organization (Algemene Import Organisatie, AIO). The 
responsibility of the AIO was to allocate import licences to importers, but it also 
held a monopoly on the import of the commodities required by the armed forces 
and government services. In June 1948, AIO ceased its operations and trading 
companies were given a free rein in their import of commodities.153 By that 
time, 75 per cent of imports to Indonesia were controlled by five Dutch trading 
companies, known as the Big Five, namely Borsumij, Geo. Wehry, Internatio, 
Jacobson van den Berg and Lindeteves.154 Although trade between the 
Netherlands and Indonesia had been restored earlier, it only regained a 
significant level in 1948. The balance of trade in the table 7 shows a huge 
surplus on the part of Indonesia, with 134 million guilders or 35 per cent. The 
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balance was positive at the time of Transfer of Sovereignty, but the surplus 
immediately jumped in the early 1950s (Table 7). This speculation will be 
discussed in the following chapter.  
Table 7: Indonesian trade with the Netherlands, 1948-1957 
 Imports from the 
Netherlands 












1948 145,651 200 265,516 334 
1949 249,792 392 345,200 406 
1950 198,012 300 391,419 510 
1951 198,618 402 529,744 755 
1952 253,090 439 370,928 543 
1953 206,548 291 451,420 493 
1954 191,644 233 512,503 528 
1955 201,893 258 315,701 369 
1956 256,662 315 329,013 440 
1957 286,842 274 220,044 454 
Source: Data from 1948 to 1953 from NA, EZ, inventory number 123; data 
from 1954 to 1957 is compiled from NA, EZ, inventory number 127. 
 
Conclusion 
Unlike the abortive government of Tr/n Tr*ng Kim in Vietnam, the Indonesian 
government created by Soekarno and Hatta did manage to survive the turmoil of 
political upheavals which came in the wake of the Japanese surrender. Led by 
strong, charismatic personalities gifted with commonsense and an astute 
awareness of the significance of pragmatism and diplomacy, its survival was 
certainly a tribute to the resource and good management of these leaders. Quite 
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a part from the external threat posed by the Dutch military attempts to regain 
their former colony by force of arms, internally the government had to deal with 
the Communists and the young revolutionary fighters (pemuda) who also made 
attempts to seize power in Indonesia, but time and again they failed.155 Control 
of the Republican Government remained largely in the hands of the Nationalists 
who were affiliated with PS, Masjoemi, PNI and non-party members. Most of 
them had once been employed in either the colonial apparatus or the Japanese 
administration, or even both. This is one obvious stark contrast to the situation 
in immediate post-war Vietnam, where the principal leaders of the Vi't Minh 
government were revolutionaries and senior members of the Communist Party. 
 Despite the differences in the political composition of their leaderships, 
the Republic of Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam pursued 
similar strategies in their struggle to obtain independence. Both groups made 
serious diplomatic attempts to solve the imminent conflict with the returning 
colonial forces by entering into negotiations, in which of necessity economic 
compromises loomed large. Their aspirations to achieve economic nationalism 
were subordinated to the demands political independence for the nation. The 
Indonesian Nationalist leaders eventually succeeded in their strategy, their 
efforts crowned by the conclusion of the Round Table Conference Agreement in 
November 1949. At the time at which the war in Vietnam was escalating into a 
full-scale conflict, Indonesia was granted the Transfer of Sovereignty by the 
Netherlands. This disparate outcome of the course of the revolutionary wars in 
Indonesia and Vietnam can be largely attributed to the attitude of the Western 
powers, especially the United States. Whereas pressure was put on the Dutch to 
discontinue the armed conflict in Indonesia, the American Government threw its 
weight behind France in the continuation of the war in Vietnam. Eventually, the 
French eventually were forced to recognize independence in Vietnam under 
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kidnapping of Soekarno and Hatta on in August 1945 in an attempt to force them proclaim 
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which power was transferred to the Nationalist forces, not the Communist-led 
Vi't Minh. 
The economic transformation in immediate post-war Indonesia also 
followed a different course to that in Vietnam. The Republican Government 
inherited a large number of estates and factories formerly operated by the 
Japanese army. Measures were taken to strengthen government control of these 
potentially profitable economic enterprises. However, as the armed conflict 
escalated, many estates and enterprises slipped out of the hands of the central 
government and into those of the armed forces, trade unions and the local 
authorities, before finally being handed back to their Dutch owners. Weighing 
up which of the decisions they made would be best of the future of the country, 
those in charge of the economic reconstruction in Indonesia consciously paved 
the way for the restitution of Dutch businesses and foreign investment, even 
though this deflected from the declared goal of the government, namely: 
improving the economic position of the indigenous Indonesians and the 
Chinese. The picture in Vietnam was very different. As the landings of the 
French armed forces, French entrepreneurs began to pull out of Vietnam in the 
late 1940s and seek fresh pastures. It is at this point that the political and 






THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT, 1950-1957 
 
‘The economic side of the Indonesian revolution has yet 




With the agreement reached at the Round Table Conference in November 1949, 
Indonesian independence was at long last acknowledged by the Netherlands. 
Hence, at a time at which their Vietnamese ‘comrades-in-arms’ were seeing no 
let-up in their war of resistance against the French forces, the Indonesian 
Nationalists were embarking on the next stage of their struggle which would 
allow them to obtain economic sovereignty. In the words of HajiAgus Salim, 
‘The economic side of the Indonesian revolution has yet to begin.’1 The 
discussion in this chapter investigates the unstinting efforts made by the 
Indonesians once their political independence in the bag to liberate their country 
from the economic domination of Dutch and other foreign firms. The period 
covered ranges from the Dutch Transfer of Sovereignty on 27 December 1949 
to the eclipse of the so-called Parliamentary Democracy in 1957. This period 
was characterized by the active participation by various political parties in the 
decision making of the government. Although the system of party government 
reflected the extremely democratic nature of the Indonesian state immediately 
after independence, the other side of the coin was that rivalry between and 
within the political parties undermined the instability of the political system. 
One of the most palpable consequences of this instability was the short life of 
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the successive cabinets during most of the 1950s. No few than seven cabinets in 
all succeeded one another in seven years. This change in the political leadership 
aggravated by the weakness of the administrative apparatus and the upshot was 
discontinuity in economic policy making and planning. The widely felt 
dissatisfaction with the economy was another important feature of this period. 
The crux of the matter was failure of the government to reduce the economic 
power of Dutch corporations. In the resultant economic limbo, by the mid-
1950s attempts to build up an Indonesian entrepreneurial class were proving 
fruitless. 
The chapter begins with an examination of the economic institutions 
and pays particular attention to the technical experience and political affiliation 
of their leaders. Such an examination helps to gain a better understanding of the 
political and intellectual origins of the economic decisions taken by various 
cabinets. I shall also survey the economic views of the major political parties, as 
these evolved in post-independent Indonesia. The views of the political parties 
served as the most important set of instruments for the articulation of the 
political and economic aspirations of the Indonesians. Government policies and 
plans for economic nationalism will be discussed in some detail in order to 
highlight the unbridgeable gap between the insistence on economic nationalism 
by the Nationalist parties and the pragmatic solutions the government was 
forced to look for.  
1. The Indonesian Cabinets  
The structure of the new state at the time of the Transfer of Sovereignty was 
federal. The Republic of the United States of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia 
Serikat-RIS) was an aggregation of sixteen states, including the Republic of 
Indonesia plus fifteen other states established by the Dutch. Soekarno, former 
President of the Republic of Indonesia, became president of the federation. 
Former Vice-President Mohammad Hatta was appointed prime minister, to head 
a federal cabinet formed on 20 December 1949. Multiple forms of authority and 
legislation were installed in the member states but the ultimate authority was 
vested in the RIS government and the Republic of Indonesia. By that time, most 
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parts of Java and Sumatra had effectively come under the authority of the 
already existing Republican government.  
 Federalism survived the Transfer of Sovereignty by eight months. Most 
Indonesian Nationalists dismissed the new federal member states as mere Dutch 
creations, devoid of any real independence.2 Soon after the Transfer of 
Sovereignty in December 1949, these states began to dissolve of their own 
accord and subsequently join the prime member state, the Republic of 
Indonesia. In May 1950, the leaders of the Republic of Indonesia and RIS 
signed a charter of agreement, under whose terms the two governments agreed 
to work in co-operation towards the goal of a unitary state. Finally, on 17 
August 1950, on the fifth anniversary of his Proclamation of Independence, 
Soekarno officially announced the birth of the unitary Republic of Indonesia. 
Mohammad Natsir, the chairman of the executive council of the Masjoemi, was 
asked to form a new cabinet, and this was inaugurated on 6 September 1950. 
Soekarno retained his position as President, and Hatta returned to his previous 
post in the old Republic as Vice-President.  
Formerly speaking, the unitary Republic of Indonesia was the successor 
to RIS but this is a misconception as the new state was the materialization of the 
concept of the Republic of Indonesia as this was proclaimed in August 1945.3 
With the exception of a few amendments, most of the Provisional Constitution 
adopted in July 1950 was based on the 1945 Constitution.  The parliamentary 
system based on the multiplicity of parties was revitalized and extended to 
ensure the representation of most of the parties in Parliament. The composition 
of the unicameral Parliament announced in March 1951 included 232 members. 
The two largest parties, Masjoemi and PNI, won forty-nine and thirty-six seats, 
respectively. Other prominent parties, such as PSI, PKI, and the Catholic Party 
held between ten and seventeen seats. The remaining seats were divided among 
some fifteen small parties and organizations, many of which were just emerging 
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at the time of the Transfer of Sovereignty.4 Post-revolutionary Indonesia was 
divided into ten provinces; each headed by a governor appointed by the central 
government.5 In each province and at lower levels, legislative councils were 
elected from representatives of local social organizations, political parties, and 
individuals. The governor and the other heads of the region were responsible to 
these legislative councils as well as to the central government in Jakarta.  
Both the composition and organization of this refashioned state 
apparatus were considered provisional pending elections for the Constituent 
Assembly, which were scheduled to be held in August 1951. However, the first 
general elections in Indonesia did not take place until September 1955. Even 
when they were finally held, they ushered in no significant changes in the 
political constellation. The interim parliamentary structure and political 
processes remained by and large intact. The unresolved political oppositions 
between and within the political parties in government and Parliament produced 
a chronic instability in the cabinet system. From the Transfer of Sovereignty 
until the abolition of parliamentary democracy in 1957, there were no fewer 
than seven cabinets in office, only two of which lasted more than one year. In 
order of precedence they were the Hatta Cabinet (December 1949-August 
1950), the Natsir Cabinet (September 1950-March 1951), the Sukiman Cabinet 
(April 1951-February 1952), the Wilopo Cabinet (April 1952-June 1953), the 
first Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet (July 1953-July 1955), the Burhanuddin 
Harahap Cabinet (August 1955-March 1956) and the second Ali Sastroamidjojo 
Cabinet (March 1956-March 1957). Only the first federal cabinet, led by 
Mohammad Hatta, did not suffer unduly from parliament opposition and 
political strife.  
The Hatta Cabinet was termed a Zaken Kabinet (Business Cabinet), 
which implied that cabinet ministers had been specifically chosen for their 
                    
4 Ge.orge McT Kahin, ‘The new Indonesian government’, Far Eastern Survey 20 (1950) 212; 
Feith, The decline of constitutional democracy, 128, 434-435. 
5 The ten provinces were West Java, Central Java, East Java (including Madura), North Sumatra, 
Central Sumatra, South Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Lesser Sunda Islands, and the 
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technical competence rather than on the basis of party affiliation.6 This principle 
is seen most clearly in the leadership which had to deal with the management of 
the economy. All the ministers responsible for economic affairs were capable 
persons who had held similar positions in previous cabinets during the 
revolution. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, former Minister of Finance, then Minister 
of Welfare under the old Republic, became Minister of Finance. Djuanda 
Kartawidjaja, who had previously served as Minister of Communications, was 
now appointed the new Minister of Welfare. Head of the Ministry of 
Communications and Public Works was H. Laoh, who had served in the same 
department in the old Republic. His colleague in the Sjarifuddin Cabinet (July 
1947-January 1948), Deputy-Minister of Labour Wilopo, was now elevated to 
hold a portfolio. 
By appointing Nationalist intellectuals with ability and experience to 
the very heart of the central government apparatus under the leadership of a 
professional economist, the Hatta Cabinet would appear to be able to claim to 
be the most competent cabinet in terms of the economic management of 
Indonesia since 1945. Unfortunately, the cabinet remained in office only briefly, 
during a period in which huge quantities of energy and attention were being 
swallowed up by political matters, chief among them national unification. When 
the unitary state was created in August 1950, two-thirds of members of the 
Hatta Cabinet were replaced by younger politicians, mostly of them the 
members of Masjoemi.7 Among the ministers responsible for the economy, only 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and the non-affiliated Djuanda remained in office. 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara continued to be Minister of Finance, while Djuanda 
moved to become head of the Ministry of Communications, which was now 
made into a separate department. Another part of this huge ministry was 
reorganized into a Ministry of Public Works and Energy under Herman 
Johannes, a Professor and Dean of the Technical Faculty of Gadjah Mada 
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University (UGM) in Yogyakarta. He was renowned for his research and 
inventions to do with the utilization of energy derived from coal and waste.8 
The Ministry of Welfare was also divided into two; the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry under Tandiono Manu 
and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo respectively. Both were affiliated with Sutan 
Sjahrir’s PSI. Tandiono Manu was a lawyer who had graduated from the 
Batavia Law School in 1941. During the Revolution, he had served as a judge in 
Yogyakarta before being appointed Resident of Bodjonegoro in East Java. He 
was an active leader in the principal Republican peasant organization, the 
Barisan Tani. Following the Transfer of Sovereignty, Tandiono was appointed 
Minister of Commerce in the Halim Cabinet of the member-state Republic of 
Indonesia. Sumitro had received his doctoral degree at the Rotterdam Business 
School (Rotterdam Handelshogeschool) in 1943 with a dissertation on the 
popular credit system. He returned to Indonesia in 1946 and shortly afterwards 
became a permanent financial and trade representative of the Republic in the 
United States. In 1949, Sumitro was a delegate to the Round Table Conference 
in The Hague, at which he played an important role in defending the economic 
interests of the Republic against the exigencies of Dutch demands. With 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, who became governor of the Central Bank of 
Indonesia in 1951, Sumitro was a key figure in the post-war economic planning 
of Indonesia.9 Other members of the Natsir Cabinet involved in economic 
policy-making were Minister of Labour R.P. Suroso and Minister of Social 
Affairs F.S. Harjadi. AS Prime Minister Natsir had been, they were appointed in 
response to the political influence they could command rather than any 
pronounced technical competence. Suroso was founder of the Greater Indonesia 
Party (Partai Indonesia Raja-Parindra) and Harjadi was an active member of the 
Catholic Party. Natsir himself graduated from the General Secondary School 
(Algemeene Middelbare School-AMS) in Bandung in 1930. From 1932 to 
                    
8 For more information on the scientific career and personal life of Herman Johannes, see: Julius 
Pour, Herman Johannes; Tokoh yang Konsisten dalam Sikap dan Perhuatan (Jakarta: Gramedia 
Pustaka Utama, 1993) 
9 For more information about Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, see: Thee 
Recollections, 49-65, 75-86. 
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1942, he served as chairman of the private Islamic school organization, 
Pendidikan Islam.10 In the old Republic of Indonesia, Natsir held the portfolio 
of Minister of Information in Sjahrir’s second and third cabinets and also in the 
Hatta Cabinet. Natsir was chairman of the executive body of Masjoemi; and 
following the Transfer of Sovereignty he acted as head of the Masjoemi faction 
in Parliament.  
Initially, Natsir was invited to form a coalition cabinet of in which 
several political parties would be represented. Nevertheless, the eventual 
composition of the cabinet reveals that the majority of its membership was 
drawn from Masjoemi, supplemented by two representatives from PSI and a 
few non-party members. This preponderance inevitably provoked protests both 
in Parliament and from the general public. The protestors came not only from 
the parties left out, including PNI, PKI and Murba. Rival groups within 
Masjoemi also did not hesistate to voice their dissatisfaction. Tensions mounted 
in the early months of 1951, after Natsir failed to bring negotiations with the 
Dutch over the West Irian issue to a satisfactory conclusion. Never very stable, 
the Natsir Cabinet eventually had to resign on 20 March 1951. Sukiman 
Wirjosandjojo, the chairman of Masjoemi and also Natsir’s leading rival was 
authorized to form a cabinet based on a Masjoemi-PNI coalition, from which 
members of the Natsir group would be excluded. The list of the Sukiman 
Cabinet, announced on 26 April 1951, included only six members of the former 
Natsir Cabinet. Djuanda continued to hold the portfolio of Ministry of 
Communications. The new Minister of Finance was a Masjoemi member, Jusuf 
Wibisono, who had been a principal participant in the Working Committee of 
the old Republic and Deputy-Minister of Welfare in the Sjahrir Cabinet. Sujono 
Hadinoto, the author of Dari ekonomi colonial ke ekonomi nasional, was given 
the portfolio of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, shortly afterwards 
renamed the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Hadinoto had played an important 
role in the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee at the Round Table 
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Conference as vice-chairman of the Republican delegation. Another member of 
the delegation, Suwarto, an agricultural graduate, was appointed Minister of 
Agriculture. The Minister of Public Works and Power was Ukar Bratakusumah, 
the former mayor of Bandung and later governor of West Java. Iskandar 
Tedjasukmana, a lawyer and member of the Labour Party, was appointed 
Minister of Labour.11 At this juncture a new ministry in the sphere of economy 
was created, the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs, under Gondokusumo, a member 
of the Greater Indonesia Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Indonesia Raja-PIR).12 
All in all, the composition of the Sukiman Cabinet reflected the re-
emergence of an older generation of leaders, whose skills lay in the fields of 
politics and administration rather than in the possession of technical 
qualifications. Sukiman himself was a medical doctor by training, who had 
obtained his degree from the University of Amsterdam in 1925. He had founded 
the Indonesian Islamic Party (Partai Islam Indonesia-PII) in 1932, but when the 
Revolution broke out, he joined Masjoemi and was elected chairman of the 
party. In the Hatta Cabinets of the old Republic, Sukiman had served as 
Minister of Home Affairs and he ahd also attended the Round Table Conference 
as a member of the Indonesian delegation.13 The Sukiman Cabinet fell in 
February 1952, succumbing to fierce leftist criticism of the pro-American 
foreign policy pursued.14 
On 19 March 1952, President Soekarno appointed the PNI leader 
Wilopo to form a new coalition cabinet. Wilopo had only just taken up the 
                    
11 Indonesian review 3 (April-June, 1951) 165-173. 
12 PIR was founded in December 1948 by a combination of non-party persons and PNI leaders, 
who decried their party’s criticisms of Hatta’s policies in his  negotiations with the Dutch. Led 
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Report from Banaran, 73. 
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agreements, Indonesia would receive economic and military aid from the United States and 
Japan, but committed itself to align with the US-led bloc of states. See: Feith, The decline of 
constitutional democracy, 192-204. 
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position as Minister of Economic Affairs nine months earlier in July 1951, 
replacing Sujono Hadinoto. The Wilopo Cabinet was principally based on a 
coalition formed by Masjoemi and PNI. In fact the reality was more nuanced. It 
represented different factional groups of these two main parties. Only two of the 
five PNI leaders and none of the five Masjoemi leaders who had sat in the 
Sukiman Cabinet were included. Strikingly, three ministers in the economic 
sphere, assigned neither to Masjoemi nor PNI, remained in office, Minister of 
Communications Djuanda (non-party), Minister of Public Works Suwarto 
(Catholic Party), and Minister of Labour Tedjasukmana (Labour Party). 
Sumitro, at that time Dean of the Faculty of Economics at the University of 
Indonesia, returned to the cabinet, as Minister of Finance. Mohammad Sardjan, 
secretary-general of the Islamic Farmers Union (Serikat Tani Islam Indonesia, 
STII) became Minister of Agriculture, and Sumanang was appointed Minister of 
Economic Affairs. In comparison with the two previous cabinets, once again 
this was a cabinet in which a younger Western educated generation 
predominated. Although the abilities and technical qualifications of the 
individual ministers were widely recognized, the political hostilities between 
and within the parties represented in it, particularly Masjoemi and PNI, made it 
impossible for them to carry out their ideas and plans. The Wilopo Cabinet 
resigned in June 1953 in the wake of leftist criticism on its intention to return 
the oil installations in North Sumatra to Royal Dutch Shell.15 
The resignation of the Wilopo Cabinet marked the end of PNI-Majsumi 
co-operation and signified a new alignment in the political forces between PNI 
and the other nationalist parties, such as PKI, Murba and Labour Party. This 
break-down in co-operation in the power situation is revealed in the 
composition of the first Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, formed on 31 July 1953. 
PNI obtained the prime minister-ship and three other major portfolios, two 
directly connected with the management of the economy, the Ministry of 
Finance under Ong Eng Die and the Ministry of Economic Affairs under Iskaq 
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Tjokroadisurjo. Ong was a Chinese Indonesian who had obtained a doctoral 
degree in economics at the University of Amsterdam in 1943. He returned to 
Indonesia in 1945 and worked for the Bank Pusat Indonesia in Yogyakarta. 
Between 1947 and 1948, he served as Deputy-Minister of Finance in the Amir 
Sjarifoeddin Cabinet.16 Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo was a Leiden-trained lawyer, who 
had served as secretary of several Residents of Banjumas and Solo. He was one 
of the founders of PNI and an active member of Partindo and Parindra. He had 
been appointed Minister of Internal Affairs or of the Interior in the Sukiman 
Cabinet.17 When the first Ali Cabinet was reorganized in November 1954, Iskaq 
Tjokroadisurjo was forced to resign following corruption charges. He was 
replaced by Rooseno Soerjohadikoesoemo, also a member of Parindra. Rooseno 
had graduated from the Bandung Technische Hogeschool in 1932. He became a 
professor in 1943 and after independence served as Dean of the Faculty of 
Technology at the UGM. In 1950, he returned to teach at his alma mater. In 
fact, Rooseno’s first appointment was Minister of Public Works and Power but 
in September 1953 he was lifted to the post of Minister of Communications.18 
After he resigned from the ministry, the portfolio was given to A.K. Gani, the 
former Minister of Welfare in the first Amir Sjarifuddin Cabinet under the old 
Republic. Another professor at the Bandung Technical Institute, Sutan Muchtar 
Abidin, was appointed Minister of Labour. He had obtained a degree in 
engineering in 1939 and, during the Japanese occupation, he had worked as an 
inspector of finances. He was also a former member of the Republic’s KNIP 
during the federal period.19 
Despite inherent political instability within the cabinet, resulting in 
several reshuffles in late 1953 and early 1954, the first Ali Cabinet eventually 
succeeded in remaining in office for more than two years, a longer period than 
                    
16 Leo Suryadinata, Prominent Indonesian Chinese; biographical sketches (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1995) 124; Ensiklopedi Nasional Indonesia, Vol.XI (Jakarta: Cipta 
Adi Pustaka,1991) 279. 
17 Indonesian Review 1 (1951) 171. 
18 Rooseno’s reputation is closely associated with such major construction projects as the head 
office of Bank Indonesia, the Pola building, Cupola Istiqlal, National Monument, Hotel Bali 
Beach, and Asian Game Complex. Ensiklopedi Nasional Indonesia, Vol.XV, 167. 
19Ensiklopedi Nasional Indonesia, Vol. I, 15. 
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any of its predecessors. The mechanism by which cabinets usually fell was 
sustained political opposition from the political parties and in Parliament, but 
the first Ali Cabinet was toppled by the military when it attempted to curb the 
rising political power of this body. On 24 July 1955, Ali Sastroamidjojo 
returned his mandate to Vice-President Hatta, who was serving as acting 
president because President Soekarno was on pilgrimage to Mecca. Having 
accepted it, Hatta invited the parliamentary leader of Masjoemi, Burhanuddin 
Harahap, to form a new cabinet, which took office on 14 August 1955. 
Burhanuddin Harahap replaced all the PNI members in the first Ali Cabinet by 
members of Masjoemi, adding members from PSI and the small nationalist 
parties. Sumitro and Mohammad Sardjan were again raised to cabinet rank as 
Minister of Finance and Minister of Agriculture, respectively. The Minister of 
Economic Affairs was a Catholic I.J. Kasimo and the Minister of 
Communications was H. Laoh, now a member of the newly founded National 
People’s Party (Partai Rakjat Nasional-PRN).20 The post at the Ministry of 
Public Works and Power was given to Sunarjo, who also served as interim 
Minister of Interior. With the exception of Sumitro and Mohammad Sardjan, the 
other members of the cabinet, including Prime Minister Burhanuddin Harahap 
himself, had had no previous cabinet experience. In fact, the cabinet was 
generally recognized as an interim cabinet, simply a stop-gap put there in office 
to maintain the government until the general elections, scheduled for September 
1955. Given its temporary status, after the elections, repeated demands were put 
forward for the resignation of the cabinet. The most vociferous of these 
demands were from PNI and the other Nationalist parties, which were feeling 
more securely in the saddle riding on the political strength gained from their 
success in the elections. In the new distribution of seats in Parliament, PNI had 
gained the same number of seats as Masjoemi (57 seats) and PKI raised its 
representation to thirty-nine. The new Islamic party, Nahdlatuh Ulama (NU), 
which split from Masjoemi in April 1952, gained forty-five seats. The liberal 
PSI lost nine seats, dropping from fourteen to five. Parkindo and the Indonesian 
                    
20 The National People’s Party was formed in July 1950 after a split from PNI. It was initially 
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Islamic Union Party (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, PSII), each had eight  
seats.21 Six months later, the Harahap Cabinet resigned in March 1956. 
After the fall of the Harahap Cabinet it became impossible for the 
Indonesian Nationalists not to acknowledge that the underlying cause of the 
political instability besting the system of Parliamentary Democracy was the 
rivalry between the political parties, particularly between the two largest parties, 
Masjoemi and PNI. In an attempt to reduce this tension, when he returned to 
cabinet leadership on 20 March 1956, Ali Sastroamidjojo strategically included 
NU in the traditional Masjoemi-PNI coalition. Nevertheless, Ali Sastroamidjojo 
was not prepared to go to the lengths of accepting President Soekarno’s request 
that PKI be included in the cabinet. His principal argument was that this would 
be irreconcilable with Masjoemi. By way of compromise, he did appoint 
Djuanda, who had also been recommended by the President, State Minister for 
Planning Affairs. Jusuf Wibisono, Minister of Finance in the Natsir Cabinet, 
was invited to fill this post again. Other key members of the government 
directly involved with economic policy-making included the Minister of 
Economic Affairs, Burhanuddin, the Minister of Communications, Suchjar 
Tedjasukman, the Minister of Public Works and Manpower, Pangeran Noor and 
the Minister of Agriculture, Eni Karim. With the exception of Prime Minister 
Ali Sastroamidjojo, Minister of the Interior Sunarjo, Djuanda and Jusuf 
Wibisono, the overwhelming majority of the ministers lacked cabinet 
experience. Despite the representations of Masjoemi, the composition of the 
second Ali Cabinet reaffirmed the ascendancy of the leftist and extreme 
Nationalist groups in the government as it took shape in the aftermath of the 
general elections in 1955. 
 Soon after the formation of the second Ali Cabinet, at the opening 
ceremony of newly elected Parliament on 26 March 1956, President Soekarno 
gave a speech in which he emphasized that the new Parliament would work on 
the basis of mutual co-operation, as the members of a family would, rather than 
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Feith, The Indonesian elections of 1955 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1957) and A. van Marie, ‘The 
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on competition between the political parties vying for power on the number of 
votes they had received. Although his concrete conception (konsepsi) for a new 
system of government, namely Guided Democracy (Demokrasi Terpimpin), was 
not effectively introduced until February 1957, at this point the President had no 
compunction about making clear his dissatisfaction with the existing system of 
Parliamentary Democracy. Instead of maintaining a Parliament composed of the 
elected representatives of parties, Soekarno proposed the establishment of a 
National Council (Dewan Nasional), its membership principally made up of the 
functional groups in society. The Council would assist the cabinet and offer it 
advice. Decisions would be reached by consensus rather than by voting.22 The 
establishment of the National Council by President Soekarno in July 1957 in 
conjunction with the formation of a ‘Working Cabinet’ (Karya Cabinet) led by 
Djuanda one month earlier officially marked the end of the era of parliamentary 
democracy, ushering in a new era in Indonesian history, Guided Democracy, 
which was to last until 1966.  
The brunt of Soekarno’s attack on the system of Parliamentary 
Democracy was directed towards the lack of consensus between the political 
parties represented in Parliament. It has to be said that the continuous bickering 
did undoubtedly weaken Indonesian unity and undermine national strength. 
Indeed, the seven-year period from the Transfer of Sovereignty to the beginning 
of Guided Democracy was one characterised by high and rising political 
dissatisfaction and unrest, of which the most outward and visible sign was the 
succession of seven cabinets in less than eight years. With the exception of the 
second Ali Cabinet, which extended its coalition to the Islamic NU, post-
revolutionary Indonesian cabinets were led by either Masjoemi or PNI, in co-
operation with other smaller parties. In comparison with its status in the 
previous period under the Republic of Indonesia, the position of PKI had 
weakened and it was excluded from all succeeding cabinets in the early 1950s. 
Despite its failure to make the cabinet, its influence in Parliament actually grew, 
indeed markedly so after the general elections of 1955. The disintegration of 
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government by political parties was blamed for the difficulty encountered in 
producing a strong national leadership so necessary if long-term policies were 
to be successfully formulated and pushed through. Examining the personal 
qualities of their leadership, there is no question that quite a few of Indonesian 
leaders were highly educated and had built up considerable professional 
experience in either economics or engineering. Mohammad Hatta, Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Ong Eng Die, Jusuf Wibisono, 
Djuanda and Rooseno Soerjohadikoesoemo were all among the best 
professionally trained people in the Indonesian intellectual elite. The 
Achilles’heel in the system was that they had to co-operate with other cabinet 
members, only half of whom were qualified graduates, and they were constantly 
challenged in a Parliament, in which two-thirds of the members had no more 
than a certificate of secondary education. Notwithstanding the relatively high 
number of trained civil servants (Table 8) on which it could rely, the restrictive 
political environment of the early 1950s prevented the Indonesian government 
from bringing its economic policies and plans to fruition.   
Table 8: Educational level of Indonesian political decision 









University 68 27 87 
    Fully trained 58 19 67 
   Partially trained 10 8 20 
Secondary 32 64 13 
  Senior certificate 15 32 13 
 Junior certificate 17 32 0 
Primary certificate 0 9 0 
Total 100 (n=146) 100 (n=234) 100 (n=160) 
Source: Soelaeman Soemardi, Some Aspects of the Social origin of 
Indonesian Political Decision Makers (London: International 
Sociological Association, 1956) p. 342. 




2. Re-formulating the National Economy  
Despite the rampant disagreement about balancing the roles of the state, co-
operatives, and private firms in the economy, all Indonesian politicians and 
intellectuals were adamant that independent Indonesia must never again fall into 
the pitfalls of the colonial economy. Nobody disputed that Indonesia had to 
develop its own national economy, controlled, led, and organized by 
Indonesians. The constant goal before all their eyes had to be the welfare of the 
Indonesian people.23 Unquestionably, the Transfer of Sovereignty in December 
1949 aroused high expectations among Indonesians who were waiting on 
tenterhooks for the rapid realization of such an ideal economy, while 
controversies continued to be waged over the ways and means to foster the 
economic transformation. Debates about the most appropriate systems for the 
national economy continued into the early 1950s, alongside questions about the 
role and potential contribution of national capital. The most controversial issue 
was related to the policies towards the Dutch companies which were still in 
control of important segments of the Indonesian economy. The ideological 
splits within the political parties, the direct effect of the formation of so many 
new political parties in the late 1940s and immediately after Transfer of 
Sovereignty, appeared to have little effect in reducing the diversity of opinion 
existing within each party. 
As they had tended to dominate the economic discussions in the late 
1940s, the articles in the Constitution touching on the economy continued to be 
the point of departure from which arguments about the desired systems of 
economy were launched. After the Transfer of Sovereignty, although RIS 
adopted a federal Constitution, the member-state of the Republic of Indonesia 
continued to implement its former 1945 Constitution. The federal Constitution 
was subsequently abrogated in July 1950 and replaced by a new Constitution 
amended from the Constitution of the Republic. Under the new unitary state in 
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August 1950 the Constitution was renamed the Provisional Constitution, 
although it remained in force until July 1959 when President Soekarno restored 
the 1945 Constitution.24 Significantly, despite various changes made between 
the successive constitutions, Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, with its 
important passages regarding the economy, remained intact. It simply 
renumbered as Article 38 in the Constitution of 1950. At this point, in order to 
avoid confusion, an elucidation was added, to define the term ‘controlled’ 
(dikoeasai) in the sense of direction and/or management. This was a deliberate 
choice for the purpose of encouraging production at a time at which co-
operative bodies were growing in importance. The term ‘branch of production’ 
was defined as all kinds of production of goods, transportation, distribution, 
circulation and trade. Once again this wording failed to identify which branches 
were considered important enough to be kept under state control. The upshot of 
this vagueness was that the political discourse of economy in the 1950s laid less 
stress on state ownership. Needless to say, in such a hotbed of political 
opinions, plenty of ideas circulated about which enterprises should be 
nationalized. The other two articles in the Provisional Constitution relating to 
economy were Article 26 and Article 28, which defined the right to work and to 
the ownership of property of Indonesian citizens, respectively.25 
The most active groups in steering the public and parliamentary 
discussions in the direction of the solution to economic issues were the 
Nationalist and Marxist-oriented parties. Several of the latter were newly 
formed as a result of their dissociation with PKI after the Madiun Rebellion. 
They included Murba, PIR, and the Labour Party.26 The leaders of these parties, 
were often quick to vent extreme anti-Dutch and anti-imperialist views and, by 
definition they were utterly opposed to the economic concessions made to the 
                    
24 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 304. 
25 ‘The Provisional Constitution of the Republik Indonesia (1950)’, Indonesian Review 2 (Feb.-
March 1951) 140-157; Rentjana Undang-undang Dasar Sementara Republik Indonesia 
(Jakarta: Pertjetkan Negara, 1950) 49. 
26 This Labour Party (often called Party Buruh) was a split-off from the post-war Labour Party 
(BPI). It was formed by a group of members of BPI and PS who were opposed to the merger of 
BPI into PKI in September 1948. After the Madiun Affair, BPI reappeared, but rejoined PKI in 
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Netherlands at the Round Table Conference by the Indonesian delegation. With 
new life breathed into Parliamentary Democracy under a new set of rules 
following the Transfer of Sovereignty, these leaders did their level best to 
attract support from other political parties and put pressure on the government 
to take immediate action to seize economic power out of Dutch hands. There 
were also demands for a unilateral abrogation of agreement made at the Round 
Table Conference, on the grounds that these would obstruct Indonesia in 
operating its economy in the spirit of the Indonesian Constitution.27 
Murba adopted an Urgency programme in early January 1950. Its 
ultimate aim was to strive for 100 per cent independence, adhering to the letter 
of the 1945 Proclamation of Independence and to strengthen the goal of 
establishing socialism. Demanding a reassessment of economic objectives, the 
party urged the government to organize the economy in accordance with the 
spirit of Article 27 and Article 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia. Its ultimate goal was realization of a truly national economy which it 
thought could be achieved by ridding the country from foreign capital and 
eradicating the capitalist economic structure inherited from colonial times. The 
Murba platform was that the national economy should be based on the concept 
of the people’s welfare, and this could be achieved by giving state-owned 
enterprises and co-operatives a leading role in the process. The party identified 
those vital enterprises which it was convinced should be nationalized, including 
transport, communications, gas, electricity, and water enterprises, mining, 
manufacturing and agricultural estates. The Murba Urgency Programme also 
demanded that banks be nationalized and that the entry of foreign capital should 
be stopped forthwith. It expected the government to implement a progressive 
system of taxation, from which wage and land taxes should be eliminated to be 
replaced by income tax. Its plan was that imports should be placed under 
government regulation and their quotas should be based on the daily needs of 
the population. In its separate programme for labour, the party requested the 
government introduce a regulation on minimum wage and a forty-hour working 
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week. In its agricultural workers’ programme, the party promised to protect 
peasants and small-scale farmers working in businesses or leasing land to 
others.28 
Although the Labour Party also insisted on the nationalization of Dutch 
enterprises, it did not neglect the macro-economic management of the state and 
the interests of labour. In its Emergency Programme, announced on 8 February 
1950, the Labour Party urged the government to set up a scheme to organize the 
distribution of basic consumer goods and tools. It stated in no uncertain terms 
that the government should also supervise and co-ordinate the entire production 
process. In order to implement Article 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia, the government had no option but to nationalize important 
enterprises and expand the state-controlled sectors. Turning to the interests of 
the labour, the party stuck to its guns and insisted that the government to draw 
up regulations which would govern collective work contracts (Collectieve 
Arbeidsovereenkomst) and labour participation in decision making 
(medezeggingschap) in all enterprises. Since it had been set up by former 
members of PSI and PBI, naturally the Labour Party shared some ideological 
affinity with these two political parties. As time went by and PSI became 
increasingly liberal in its economic outlook, whereas PBI leaned more heavily 
towards radicalism, the Labour Party took the middle ground somewhere 
between the two. It acquiesced in the restoration of foreign property on the 
condition that the government ensured the implementation of the above-
mentioned principles.29 
On 13 March 1950, twenty-four PNI members of Parliament held a 
conference in Jakarta. At this meeting, the chairman, Sujono Hadinoto, asserted 
that the faction would continue to act according to the Charter and Principles of 
the party, which had been agreed at its third congress in June 1948. The ultimate 
goal of PNI was to create a sosio-nasional-demokrasi in Indonesia. The PNI 
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leaders were convinced that the future economy of the country should be a 
democratic economy, based on gotong-rojong principles. With this conception 
of the economic system, clearly before their eyes, the party left no doubt it was 
opposed to individualism and capitalism, and therefore rejected the concept of 
liberalism.30 In May 1950, PNI organized its fourth congress in Yogyakarta, and 
at it a new Political Struggle Programme was adopted. The first point in the 
Social-Economic Section of the programme read ‘[to] lay the foundation of a 
socialist economy’, or in other words ‘the nationalization of vital enterprises’. 
Other points noted in the section included demands for the implementation of 
Article 27 and Article 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the 
strengthening of democratic and anti-imperialist movements of industrial labour 
and farmers, the reform of labour and agrarian laws and the stimulation of the 
establishment of co-operatives and transmigration.31 
The PNI programme paid special attention to labour in a separate 
Labour Urgency Programme. It demanded the government to be the pioneer in 
democratizing the life of labourers and that it recognized labour as the principal 
factor in the production process. Therefore labour should be entitled to 
participate in determining the process of production though Management 
Boards (Dewan Pimpinan), which would be established in state-owned 
enterprises and Enterprise Councils (Dewan-Dewan Perusahaan) in privately-
owned or mixed firms. The task of these boards would be to supervise 
production and initiate collective and co-operative projects with labour. In its 
Farmers’ Programme, PNI promised to insist that the government implement a 
national economic plan based on collectivism. By ensuring that its 
representatives would be placed in collective projects, the party promised it 
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would fight to attain the rights of farmers.32 This Political Struggle Programme 
continued to be the fundamental guideline of PNI in the following years, 
although a few changes in orientation were made at subsequent congresses. In 
the Fighting Programme adopted at the sixth congress in December 1952, PNI 
put more stress on government assistance to national businessmen and put 
forward cogent arguments for the imposition of restrictions on foreign capital. 
Its nationalist standpoint, both anti-Dutch and anti-imperialist, was never 
compromised.33 
Within a few months of the Transfer of Sovereignty, most major 
political parties in Indonesia had reorganized themselves and were ready to 
introduce their new political and economic programmes. The exception was 
PKI which was still in an organizational chaos in the aftermath of the Madiun 
Affair. Shaken by their defeat, the remaining leaders of the party devoted more 
attention to seeking co-operation with other nationalist parties, than to 
strengthening the ideology and organization in the party itself.34 Only after the 
return of D.A. Aidit and M.H. Lukman, the leading Leninists who had fled to 
China and Vietnam after the Madiun Uprising, in mid-1950 and their 
subsequent appointment to the new leadership of PKI in January 1951, did the 
party begin to regain its political influence. Aidit and Lukman became editors of 
Bintang Merah (Red Star) and Harian Rakjat (People’s Daily), the foremost 
PKI publications. After the affiliation of BPI to PKI in February 1951, the 
influence of the latter grew as BPI had several representatives in Parliament.  
In March 1951, Aidit announced a ‘New Road’ resolution, whose 
principal rallying call was the creation of a united national front. To elaborate 
this ‘New Road’ resolution, the party adopted a new party programme 
consisting of twelve articles. Point 6 of the programme was a call for the 
nationalization of important enterprises, which in PKI terms encompassed large 
factories, mining and transport enterprises, major agricultural estates and large 
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banks. PKI also demanded that an industrialization plan to be drawn up which 
would cover all of Indonesia. It was the duty of the state to help and support all 
small-and medium- scale enterprises which would benefit the people. All 
agreements with foreign capital which might in any way threaten or hamper the 
development of the national economy should be discontinued forthwith. Point 7 
demanded the confiscation of large landed properties and private estates as well 
as the implementation of a policy of ‘land for the farmers’. Large foreign 
enterprises should pay very heavy taxes but the masses should be advantaged by 
reduced taxes.35 This twelve-point programme served as the principal 
documentary basis of the party until its fifth national congress in March 1954. 
At this juncture, a new modified twelve-point programme was adopted, which 
put more emphasis on the development of national industrial enterprises and the 
protection of the national middle class from foreign competition.36 
In preparation for the formation of the united front, PKI called on 
leaders of several political parties to form a confederative association. On 30 
March 1951, a Political Parties’ Consultative Council (Badan Permusjawaratan 
Partai-Partai-BPP) was founded, in which PKI, the Sumatran Islamic Party 
Perti, Murba, the Labour Party, Parindra, the National People Party (Partai 
Rakjat Nasional-PRN) and the Indonesian People’s Party (Partai Rakjat 
Indonesi-PRI) all participated. These eight parties signed a charter of co-
operation, a joint programme, and a constitution for the council.37 To this 
extent, the BPP programme can be considered as a shared aspiration of the 
participating parties, although by no means all of them agreed with Communist 
and Marxist doctrines. The Welfare Section of the programme was designed to 
mobilize domestic manpower and resources in an attempt to improve the 
physical and spiritual welfare of the people, guaranteeing a fair distribution of 
products to the state, labour and capital. It called for the nationalization of vital 
enterprises and for the support of those national businessmen, who made it their 
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duty to promote the interests of the people. The government should ensure that 
an industrialization programme was put into force and see to the mechanization 
of agriculture throughout Indonesia. An upswing in production would certainly 
assist domestic consumption and would be vent more important to exports. 
National export organizations should be given a helping hand and the 
government had to take serious measures to combat smuggling and corruption. 
BPP also promised to improve the condition of land, sea and air transport 
throughout the Archipelago, tackling the handicaps caused by the inefficient 
transport system on a national basis. Such an undertaking would guarantee the 
interests of the people. Above all, the BPP programme insisted on the 
abrogation of the Round Table Conference agreement.38 
Initially, PKI tried to attract PNI into BPP, planning to form a national 
coalition government with members from PNI and other Nationalist parties. 
This attempts was doomed to failure as, after some preliminary negotiations, 
PNI withdrew and threw its weight behind Sukiman in his efforts to form a new 
cabinet based on the Masjoemi-PNI coalition. PKI, Murba and the Labour Party 
were again excluded from the government. More critically, in August 1951 the 
Sukiman government announced the mass arrest of Communists for an 
allegedly planning a coup against the state.39 This proved no more than a 
hiccough as this action did not stop PKI from expanding through various trade 
unions, especially SOBSI. The party re-emerged under the PNI-led cabinets of 
Wilopo and Ali Sastroamidjojo. In March 1954, when President Soekarno sent 
his good wishes to the fifth PKI congress, the party was well on its way to being 
accepted as a full-fledged part of the nationalist political framework.40The 
outcome of the 1955 election and the President’s suggestion that PKI should be 
included in the second Ali Cabinet established a firm foundation for the direct 
participation of PKI in Indonesian politics under the Guided Democracy.  
                    
38 Sutter, Indonesianisasi, 1152. 
39 Van der Kroef, The Communist party of Indonesia, 49. 
40 Feith, The decline of constitutional democracy, 408. 
   The Democratic Experiment 
 
195 
As one of the two leading factions in both the cabinet and Parliament 
during the early 1950s, PNI shared various political ideas and sometimes was 
willing to co-operate with PKI and the Murba party. It goes without saying that 
the other major faction, the Islamic Masjoemi, was the most anti-Communist 
party. At this stage, the economic views of Masjoemi were far more liberal and 
moderate than those of other major political parties in post-independence 
Indonesia. In its new programme, adopted at the fourth congress in late 
December 1949, Masjoemi only demanded nationalization of the central bank 
although it did press the government to establish state banks in order to 
facilitate the development of agriculture, commerce, manufacturing and 
shipping. It stressed that the regulations drawn up by the former colonial 
authorities, which had proved injurious to economic development, had to be 
simplified. Other points in the economic section of the programme included 
demands for the stimulation of transmigration from Java to other islands, the 
improvement of the welfare of village people, and the termination of 
monopolies such as that on copra in Sulawesi and other territories.41 
At its sixth congress in August 1952, Masjoemi adopted a new 
programme which demanded a state-directed economy, in which production and 
distribution would be run ‘to benefit the largest possible number of people’. 
Private monopolies detrimental to society should be prohibited. To strengthen 
the Indonesian national economy, the party called for the establishment of co-
operatives supported by the government. The party demanded industrialization 
in the near future and asserted that opportunities must be opened up for foreign 
capital to set up new industries on the basis of mutual gain. In its plans for 
nationalization, four categories were identified in order of priority: the central 
bank, basic transport enterprises, public utilities, and mining. Although there 
were now three more categories for any prospective nationalization than there 
had been after the fourth congress, the new three categories did not have the 
immediacy of the demand for the central bank.42 
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As was Masjoemi, PSI was also often charged by PKI and other 
nationalist parties of ‘being too much concerned with looking after foreign 
interests’.43 This was the reason that, in its plan to form a popular-front 
government, BPP flatly rejected co-operation with Masjoemi and PSI. Because 
the ideological base of PSI was socialism, it did not count as a Nationalist party. 
In terms of economic orientation, it did indeed differ markedly from the 
Nationalist parties. It had set its sights on modernization and economic 
development, rather than on economic nationalism. During the first two years 
after the Transfer of Sovereignty, PSI was still preoccupied with its internal 
reorganization after its split from PS in early 1948. The first congress of PSI, at 
which the economic programme of the party was officially adopted, was held in 
February 1952. The ideology of PSI was that a socialist economy was the only 
guarantee of the people’s livelihood, no unemployment, an increase in 
production and the equality of property. Designing a socialist economy went far 
beyond matters of nationalization or socialization. Rather, it meant the 
mobilization of all the means of production, natural resources and state and 
private property to achieve the goals of socialism. The party pointed out the 
need for an improvement of technology of production and an expansion in the 
opportunities for people to participate in planning the economy. Although they 
definitely did not support liberal capitalism, the PSI leaders were opposed to 
extreme nationalism and anti-foreign sentiment. They were convinced that 
foreign capital would be necessary for a considerable time to come.44 
Although the political influence of PSI and Masjoemi in Parliament 
gradually declined, their liberal and rational economic views continued to be 
implemented during most of the 1950s. This palpable influence was felt not 
least because three of the most prominent leaders of the economy, Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, and Jusuf Wibisono, were loyal 
members of these parties. Other leaders who belonged to the Nationalist PNI, 
such as Sujono Hadinoto, Wilopo, and Sumanang, also supported the Masjoemi 
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point of view in economic matters, especially those related to foreign 
investment.45 Masjoemi received enormous support especially from Vice-
President Hatta. It was indeed Hatta in the absence of President Soekarno took 
the chance to revitalize the national leadership of Masjoemi in August 1955. 
The short-lived revival of Masjoemi and PSI was an important episode in the 
Indonesian economic history. Under the Harahap Cabinet, several economic 
measures were carried out to rationalize the economic system, which had been 
thrown into disarray by the preceding first Ali Cabinet. Looking at the re-
emergence of Masjoemi in late 1955 and early 1956, Sutter’s hypothesis of a 
periodization between the Masjoemi era and the PNI era marked by the fall of 
the Wilopo Cabinet in mid-1953 is untenable. The extreme views of PNI, let 
alone the far more drastic proposals of PKI and Murba, were in fact never put 
into effect prior to 1957. Even under the two cabinets led by Ali Sastroamidjojo, 
the matter of the nationalization of Dutch enterprises was not given top priority.  
The differences in economic views between Masjoemi and PSI opposed 
to those of PNI, PKI, Murba and other small Nationalist parties did not preclude 
them having a common economic objective; that is to achieve an independent 
national economy.46 The acceptance of private capital and foreign investment by 
Masjoemi and PSI should be seen in the light of being a pragmatic solution to 
the prevailing situation in which Indonesia found itself in acute need of capital 
and foreign assistance for economic development. What is beyond doubt is that 
none of the Indonesian politicians was in favour of capitalism or liberalism, 
both far too strongly bound up with Dutch colonialism and economic 
imperialism.47 Socialism was an alternative economic system supported by most 
parties, particularly the Nationalist and Marxist-oriented ones. Nevertheless, 
caution is advised in attempting to interpret the Indonesian concept of socialism, 
since its interpretation fluctuated enormously between the political parties and 
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individuals. In the eyes of some Indonesian politicians, socialism meant little 
more than Sutter's concept of Indonesianisasi, which encompassed a conscious 
effort to increase the participation and elevate the role of the Indonesian in the 
large sectors of the economy. Others understood socialism as a collectivist 
economy based on co-operatives or the spirit of gotong-rojong. In the broadest 
sense, anything related to state control, planning, class division, and social 
equality could be considered to espouse socialism and therefore to be 
progressive.48 
3. Indonesianisasi  
In a response to the clamours of the leftist groups in Parliament who were 
demanding the immediate nationalization of Dutch firms, in June 1950 Prime 
Minister Hatta stated that it was impossible to undertake any nationalization at 
that moment since the government did not have any money and was still 
borrowing from abroad. He pointed out that state budgetary deficit was 1,500 
million rupiahs. In answer to their protests he added that on account of a 
shortage of trained Indonesian personnel, for the time being foreign 
management was inevitable. Hatta hastened to give assurances that foreign 
personnel would be obliged to work under government supervision and that the 
government was already busy with plans to nationalize important public 
utilities.49 As supplementary material to back up Hatta’s argument, the 
following month, Minister of Labour Wilopo published an article on Indonesian 
labour issues, in which he stressed the severe shortage of Indonesian experts. 
Wilopo stated that the total number of civil, electrical and other engineers was 
no more than ninety, whereas at least 4,000 were actually needed. The number 
of medical doctors, some 1.5000, was slightly better, but it was still far below 
the minimum of 5,000 needed for a total population of more than 70 million.50 
In a nutshell, lack of capital and trained personnel continued to be major factors 
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thwarting the implementation of economic nationalism in Indonesia in the early 
1950s. Pragmatic leaders in the Indonesian government realized that, rather than 
immediately nationalizing them, they had to accept the necessity of utilizing the 
advantages offered by Dutch firms if they were to build up the national 
economy and sustain economic development.  
Adhering to this pragmatic thinking, in early 1950 the Indonesian 
government issued a series of regulations stipulating that agricultural estates and 
factories should be returned to their former owners, the majority of them Dutch. 
A Committee for the Return of Foreign Estates (Panitia Pengembalian 
Perusahaan Perkebunan Milik Asing) was set up in each of the main estates 
areas to organize the returns.51 The government also encouraged the continuing 
operations of such public services as local transport, gas and electricity, most of 
which were managed by private enterprises with Dutch owners. In early August 
1950, the General Netherlands Indies Electricity Company (Algemeene 
Nederlandsche-Indische Electriciteits-Maatschappij, ANIEM) and the Overseas 
Gas and Electricity Company (Overzeese Gas-en Electriciteits Maatschappij, 
OGEM), the two largest distributors of electricity, accounting for 70 per cent of 
electrical power distribution in Indonesia, were allowed to raise their charges by 
58 and 48 per cent, respectively.52 Several attempts were also made by the Hatta 
Cabinet to seek the co-operation of Dutch firms in establishing new joint 
enterprises. Garuda Indonesian Airways (GIA), founded in March 1950, is a 
typical example of the type of joint venture which was common in the early 
1950s. The Indonesian government and Royal Dutch Airlines (Koninklijk 
Luchtvaart Maatschapij, KLM) shared 51-49 per cent equity in this company. 
KLM agreed to train Indonesian staffs and gradually to transfer ownership into 
Indonesian hands. The contract was drawn up for a period of thirty years, 
allowing for the possibility of nationalization within ten years. This space of 
time would be used to Indonesianize GIA. It was the Indonesian government 
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which would decide which routes would be flown.53 On slightly lesser scale, 
during his trip to the Netherlands and other European countries in mid-1950, the 
then Minister of Trade and Industry Sumitro Djojohadikusumo concluded 
agreements with Dutch firms for the setting up of three enterprises, 
manufacturing wire and cables, bicycles and textiles as well as with a Swedish 
firm to construct a paper-mill. In all these cases, 51 per cent of the share capital 
was officially Indonesian and 49 Dutch or Swedish.54 
The most drastic actions undertaken under the Hatta Cabinet were the 
implementation of a new tariff system and the subsequent monetary reforms. In 
March 1950, the Indonesian government introduced a new foreign exchange 
certificate system, under which an exporter would receive twice the amount 
stated on the invoice of a completed export transaction in Indonesian currency. 
However, an importer would have to pay in rupiahs not only the amount on his 
invoice but twice that amount in order to obtain an import certificate. In effect, 
this system was the equivalent of a devaluation, reducing the official exchange 
rate of the Indonesian rupiah from 1:1 to 1:3 to the Dutch guilder.55In an effort 
to reduce the money supply which expanded rapidly in the wake of the 
devaluation of the rupiah, on 19 March 1950 Minister of Finance Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara implemented a ‘monetary purge’ (pembersihan uang). All bank-
notes with a denomination higher than 2.50 guilders were literally cut in half, 
one half to be exchanged for a new bank-note, the other half for a government 
bond. More radically, all bank deposits in excess of 400 guilders were reduced 
to half with the remaining 50 per cent converted into compulsory government 
loans at 3 per cent interest.56 The result of the monetary purge was surprising. 
President Houwink of the Java Bank claimed that 1.6 billion guilders, 
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equivalent to 41 per cent of the total money supply, had been taken out of 
circulation.57 Although the effectiveness of the new exchange certificate system 
and monetary reform for the long-term economic development of Indonesia 
continued to arouse controversy,58 it cannot be denied that these measures 
assisted the Indonesian government to get a better grip on the currency. At long 
last, Indonesian money now no longer depended on the exchange rate system 
which had been designed by the Netherlands. Another part of the monetary 
reform also meant that all local and the old Republic Indonesia currencies were 
demonetized, signalling the unification of the monetary system in Indonesia. 
From 1 May 1950, the official currency unit in Indonesia was the rupiah, issued 
by the Java Bank.59 
One of Hatta’s primary intentions when the federal cabinet was founded 
in December 1949 was to set up new industries, which made sound economic 
sense.60 Unfortunately, high budgetary deficits and an unfavourable political 
climate thwarted his cabinet in its intention to implement new industrial plans. 
When Natsir took over the cabinet, both the financial and the political situations 
improved significantly. The political unification of the country had at long last 
been materialized and thanks to the Korean War boom, Indonesian exports 
expanded remarkably, reaching a record of 445 per cent in October 1950, 
compared to the monthly average of 1949.61 The government budget rose 
accordingly from Rp. 3,596 million in December 1949 to Rp. 5,222 million in 
January 1951, contributing to a sizable budget surplus of Rp. 1,7 billion in 
1951.62 All seemed set fair, especially as foreign aid to Indonesia rose 
remarkably during the last quarter of 1950. In August 1950, the government 
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received a loan of $ 32 million (Rp. 365 million) from the Export-Import 
Bank.63 Assured of the availability of accumulated funds, the Indonesian 
government could now concentrate its attention on the development of the 
desperately needed new industries.  
At this juncture, it should be said that industrial development in post-
independent Indonesia did not necessarily take place to the detriment of foreign 
estates and future foreign investment. In an article ‘Building up a national 
economy’ published in July 1950, Minister of Welfare Djuanda argued the 
importance of promoting national industries. He stated that ‘There is plenty of 
opportunity for many more branches of industry and for new trading enterprises 
[to be founded], without [these] interfering with established interests.’64 This 
idea was incorporated into an industrial plan, drafted by Minister of Trade and 
Industry in the Natsir cabinet, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. The actual plan was 
announced in April 1951, under the name Rentjana Urgensi Perekonomian 
(Economic Urgency Programme). It is often referred to as the Sumitro Plan 
although by that time Sumitro was no longer in charge. The Economic Urgency 
Programme, as Sumitro himself said, was an integral part of the general policy 
of the government to build up the economic strength of the Indonesian people as 
basis for developing a sound national economy.65 
The specific objective of the Sumitro Plan was to stimulate the 
development of all the layers of the Indonesian industrial sector, to wit: small-, 
medium- and large-scale industries. The major part of the activities it proposed 
were concentrated on extending loans and credit to small-scale industries, 
installing central production and processing units (induks) in industrial centres 
in various rural regions and establishing large industrial plants in vital sectors of 
the economy. In contrast to the induks which functioned as a concentration of 
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management for small enterprises, large-scale industry was meant to support the 
other sectors. Significantly, the Economic Urgency Programme laid down that 
all projects were to be operated under government sponsorship through its 
agencies.66 Foreign capital and Indonesian private citizens were allowed to 
participate, but on condition that the government had dominant control of key 
industries, including defence factories, chemical factories, cement works, power 
plants, waterworks and transport enterprises. This would be assured by a 
government participation of at least 50 per cent of the capital and two-thirds of 
preference shares as well as a controlling majority on the Board of Directors. 
Foreigners would be employed on management contracts to provide technical 
assistance and train Indonesians to assume leading positions in the enterprises.67 
The obligation to train Indonesian employees and promote them to higher 
ranking management positions applied not only to new joint enterprises, it also 
extended to important foreign-owned firms, particularly oil companies, an 
industry in which the Indonesian lack of expertise and technology were 
glaringly apparent.   
 It was understood that, given the circumstances, the Economic Urgency 
Programme was provisional. At the time of its first publication in April 1951, its 
most detailed planning instructions were handed out to large-scale industries. 
There covered short-term projects, expected to be completed by the end of 
1952, and applied to the establishment of a wide range of industries for printing, 
rubber re-milling, cement, tyres and textiles. The estimated cost of these 
projects was Rp. 179 million. Among the long-term projects were those to 
construct eleven factories in different regions of Indonesia, processing caustic 
soda, manure, aluminium, plywood, paper as well as iron smelting and 
manufacturing glass. Other enterprises would be for knitting and spinning as 
well as the production of tannic acid and coconut flour. These projects required 
an investment of Rp.522 million. Turning to the idea of projects for production 
centres, the Programme proposed the installation of eight induks, concentrated 
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in Java. The budget appropriated for the induks projects amounted to Rp. 27 
million. The programme also proposed the establishment of a number of 
research institutes and laboratories in Bandung whose investigations would help 
to produce better materials and improve the efficiency of production. At this 
time, no specific instructions had yet been given for mechanization and loan 
projects.68The estimated cost of the Sumitro Plan was Rp.863.5 million. 
Table 9: Total cost of the ‘Sumitro Plan’ (in million rupiahs) 
 1951 1952 After 1952 Total 
Laboratories and 
institutes 
3.8 4 1.5 7.8 
Central production units 14.5 12.5 p.m. 27 
Small industries 66.5 59.5 p.m. 126 
Large scale industries 
(short- term) 
107 72 p.m. 179 
Large scale industries 
(long-term) 
p.m. p.m. 522 522 
Total 192 148 523.5 863.5 
Source: Indonesian Review 1 (1951) p. 189. 
In order to facilitate the implementation of these plans, the Natsir 
Cabinet paid a great deal of attention to the reorganization of the credit system. 
Attempts were made to increase the number of Indonesian members on the 
board of the central bank and other government credit institutions. Government 
banks, as among them the Java Bank, the Indonesian People’s Bank (Bank 
Rakjat Indonesia) and the Postal Savings Bank (Bank Tabungan Pos), were still 
owned and staffed by Dutch corporations. Fully aware of this, the cabinet also 
stimulated the development of national banks. The Bank Negara Indonesia, 
which had served as the central bank of the Republic during the Revolution, was 
reorganized and provided with Rp. 250 million in outstanding credits at the end 
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of 1951.69 The Bank Negara Indonesia became the first Indonesian-owned 
foreign exchange bank. Its primary task was to assist Indonesians to build up 
their trade and export-import businesses. Credit institutions whose job it was to 
develop industries included the State Industrial Bank (Bank Industri Negara), 
the Credit Foundation (Jajasan Credit) and the Bureau of National 
Reconstruction.70 The former colonial Copra Fund was reorganized into a copra 
foundation in December 1950. Its primary task was to assist the Indonesian 
copra-producers to set up co-operatives.71 Alongside this state activity, 
Indonesian private citizens were encouraged to establish banks in order to 
attract private funds from the population.  
The Sumitro Plan was presented only after the Natsir Cabinet had been 
dissolved. It was taken over by the Sukiman Cabinet under the supervision of 
Minister of Commerce and Industry Sujono Hadinoto and after July 1951 of 
Minister of Economic Affairs Wilopo. The vision was there in plenty but the 
capital needed for the programme turned out to be in extremely short supply. 
The peak of Korean War boom had passed by mid-1951 and Indonesian exports 
had begun to decline. The budget deficit in 1952 was Rp. 4.3 billion, compared 
to the surplus of Rp. 1.7 billion the preceding year.72 In such a difficult 
situation, only those projects to support small-scale industries, which did not 
require either large investment or particularly skilled labour, were fully financed 
during the first year of the plan. In early 1952, the government expanded the 
induk projects, providing Rp. 14 million to establish ten other production 
centres.73 As had been expected under the circumstances, the results of the 
projects for large-scale industries were very disappointing. The most that can be 
said is that a few printing presses were acquired by private Indonesian firms 
using state credit. The government itself financed five rubber re-milling 
factories, all much less than what private investors had accomplished of their 
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own accord in the meantime. No project was completed within the allotted two 
years.74 
The most spectacular action undertaken under the Sukiman Cabinet was 
the nationalization of the Java Bank in 1951. The total capital of the bank 
amounting to Rp. 25 million was paid in full by the Indonesian government. In 
1953, the name of the bank was changed into the Bank Indonesia, but its 
primary function as the central bank continued.75It was decreed by law that, 
from now on, only Indonesian citizens could sit on the management board. 
From the point at which it was nationalized in 1951, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara 
served as its first Indonesian Governor. The nationalization plan was also 
extended to public utilities and a number of mines and estates owned by private 
Dutch corporate firms. A report issued by the Board for Financial Supervision 
(Dewan Pengawas Keuangan) states that, by the end of 1951 the Indonesian 
government had obtained a leading share in the Bandung Public Electric 
Company (73 per cent) and the Surakarta Mineral Water Company (60 per 
cent), as well as a controlling interest in the Billiton Mining Company (62.5 per 
cent) and the Java Private Land Company (75 per cent). A Central Shipping 
Foundation (Penguasaan Pusat Kapal-Kapal, PEPUSKA), formed by the 
government in September 1950, succeeded in buying up six large Dutch ships 
and several smaller ones operating in East Indonesia.76 The activities of 
PEPUSKA anticipated the establishment of the Indonesian National Shipping 
Company (Pelajaran Nasional Indonesia, PELNI) in May 1952. The objective 
of the PELNI was to wrest control of inter-island shipping from the Dutch 
Royal Packet Company (Koninklijk Paketvaart Maatschappij, KPM). 
Unfortunately a lack of expertise in leadership skills meant that the operations 
of PELNI were inefficient and it never achieved a position from which it could 
seriously challenge KPM.77 
                    
74 Lindblad, Bridges to new business, 81. 
75 BI, Nationalization of the Javasche Bank, inventory number. 3233; For more information about 
the nationalization of the Java bank, see: Budi Nofianto. Nasionalisasi de Javasche Bank, tahun 
1951-1953 (PhD dissertation, University of Diponegoro, Semarang, 2001). 
76 Dewan Pengawas Keuangan, Pemberitaan Tahun 1951. 
77 ANRI, Report of the Indonesian Sailor Union, 9 May 1953, KP, inventory number 9h. 
   The Democratic Experiment 
 
207 
The foreign exchange certificate system, which was put into place in 
March 1950, was devised to stimulate exports. The stumbling block on which it 
floundered was that the fluctuating prices on the home markets, as these were 
constantly being adjusted to the rampant inflation, made the system fiendishly 
complicated, not to mention that it was open to manipulation and hence invited 
corruption. On the advice of Hjalmar Schacht, in February 1952 the Sukiman 
Cabinet abolished the exchange certificate system replacing it with fixed export 
duties set at 331/3 per cent of the proceeds.78 The cabinet simultaneously 
introduced the Export Dollar Certificate (Bukti Export Dollar, BED) which 
encouraged exports to the countries in the dollar zone, particularly the United 
States, Canada and Japan. Exporters with their sights set on dollar areas 
received a premium in BEDs worth up to 70 per cent of the amount of dollars 
submitted to the Foreign Exchange Institute. Conversely, traders needing dollars 
to import goods from dollar areas were obliged to buy BEDs to the full amount 
of the foreign exchange required.79 The immediate effect of the new trade policy 
was a decline of exports from Indonesia to the Netherlands (Table 7, Chapter 3). 
 At this point, the Indonesian government imposed a specific policy 
which discriminated in favour of national importers, namely the Benteng Policy. 
Benteng (literally ‘fortress’) referred to those categories of goods which the 
government reserved for Indonesian importers.80 Generally speaking, the 
government controlled 60 per cent of total exports. Part of this sum was 
reserved for highly privileged consumers, among them government’s 
institutions, health centres and anyone trying to get industrialization off the 
ground; the rest was reserved for the benteng importers.81 It is important to note 
that only ethnic Indonesians were eligible to participate in the benteng groups. 
The Indonesian leaders, referred to them as ‘an economically weak groups’ who 
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were entitled the government protection.82 These protective measures began to 
bear fruit, beginning in March 1951 when the Sukiman Cabinet used foreign 
exchange certificates as import licences to monitor imports. A substantial 
number of the import licences were reserved for indigenous Indonesian 
importers. In 1952, 43 per cent of all foreign exchange was allocated to 
indigenous Indonesian importers, giving them a marked advantage over 
European firms (31 per cent) and Chinese traders (26 per cent).83 The number of 
benteng importers rose from 250 by the end of 1950 to 741 in April 1952.84 
As must already be obvious from what has been said previously, 
economic nationalism proceeded at a relatively slow pace between 1949 and 
1953 but nevertheless it did progress. It was the Wilopo Cabinet which threw a 
spanner in the works and caused a slow-down leading to stagnation in the 
process. Confronted with serious, almost insurmountable financial problems, 
this cabinet concentrated its efforts on curbing inflation and reducing routine 
government expenditure. The first to feel the pinch were importers of luxury 
and semi-luxury articles on which stringent restrictions were placed and a 
number of ministries had no option but to accept severe budget cuts. In April 
1952, the National Planning Bureau, in which foreign specialists also 
participated, was set up. Its task was to make adjustment to economic projects 
to bring them into line with the critical situation. While a long-term economic 
plan was being drawn up, in June 1952 Prime Minister Wilopo announced that 
the period for implementing the short-term projects proposed under the Sumitro 
Plan would be extended to three years.85 The new policies laid down that only 
industries which seemed capable of producing goods at a better price than 
continuing to import them would be given the go-ahead to develop. A Supply 
Council (Dewan Perlengkapan) was established to compile lists of what 
supplies were really required by ministries and government departments. The 
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government could refer to this in its efforts to find a balance between imports 
and manufacturing.86 The combination of competition from cheap import 
products and a lack of government support meant that a large number of 
Indonesian smaller entrepreneurs, especially textile producers, who still had to 
use traditional obsolete technologies, went bankrupt.87 
In January 1953, the government issued a decree to regulate the 
establishment of new enterprises. In it four categories of enterprise were 
distinguished. Enterprises important to the security of the country, public 
utilities, non-profit enterprises and enterprises traditionally undertaken by the 
state were operated only by the state. Indonesian citizens (warge-negara 
Indonesia) operated enterprises which had traditionally been the prerogative of 
Indonesian nationals (bangsa Indonesia). Such enterprises did not require 
foreign capital and/or foreign experts. In any joint enterprises, Indonesian 
citizens had to have a major participation in the stock capital, which would 
automatically give them more votes in such companies. Enterprises which did 
not fit into the categories above were opened up for foreign capital. This did not 
offer an open playing field as the decree stressed the Indonesian government 
reserved the right to restrict the co-operation when it considered it was 
necessary to intervene to give Indonesian nationals the opportunity also to 
participate. The use of Indonesian labour was clearly detailed in Article 20 of 
the decree which stipulated that work usually done by Indonesians must be 
reserved for the Indonesian people. Indonesian members must be in the majority 
on the board of directors and each foreign director had to be assisted by one 
deputy-director who was an Indonesian national. At least 70 per cent of the 
staffs of the company and 90 per cent of the lower positions had to be composed 
of Indonesian citizens.88 
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Obviously, these new regulations were drawn up to protect the interests 
of the Indonesian people but this did not mean that they did not provided 
foreign capital with wider opportunities to invest in Indonesia. In July 1952, 
Minister of Economic Affairs Sumarang suggested the return of the oil 
installations in Bangkalan Brandan, North Sumatra, to Royal Dutch Shell. In 
early 1953, Prime Minister Wilopo also announced that the government was 
preparing new statements on foreign investment policy.89 These statements 
turned out to be rather premature as neither the bill on the Statement on Foreign 
Investment Policy nor the restoration of Dutch-owned oilfields was approved by 
Parliament. In fact, criticisms of the foreign economic outlook of the cabinet 
eventually forced Wilopo to resign. Despite this upset, when the first Ali 
Cabinet took office in July 1953, the matter of foreign investment policy was 
still occasionally being brought up for the discussion, albeit sporadically as the 
attitude of the government at the time towards foreign enterprises was anything 
but congenial.90 The protracted nature of negotiations is shown by the fact that it 
was not until the Harahap Cabinet took office in August 1955 that an agreement 
between BPM and Masjoemi was reached. Masjoemi promised to return the 
oilfields on condition that the current supervisor, Djohan, be allowed to retain in 
office.91 
Under the first Ali Cabinet, economic nationalism was again taken up at 
a new accelerated pace. In contrast to the policies of restricting imports pursued 
by the Wilopo Cabinet, the first Ali Cabinet accorded the development of trade, 
particularly imports, a high priority. The moving force behind this, Minister of 
Economic Affairs Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo, considered an equitable settlement of 
the issue of import licences and credits an effective means to raise government 
revenue and improve the position of Indonesian trading enterprises. 
Consequently, it was during Iskaq’s incumbency as Minister of Economic 
Affairs, that the Benteng Policy was pursued most aggressively. The number of 
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recognized national trading firms rose to at least 2,111, possibly even as high as 
4,000 by March 1955.92 The percentage of total exchange allocations for 
imports to national importers increased from 37.9 per cent in 1953 to 80 and 90 
per cent in late 1954.93 The government agency in charge of granting the credits 
was PNI, which co-operated with Indonesian importer associations to channel 
the flow of credits to their members.94Private Indonesian banks was one sorts of 
institutions for which the first Ali Cabinet provided credits to encourage their 
establishment. It was expected that they would serve national enterprises better. 
In effect, the number of private national banks rose from twenty in mid-1953 to 
seventy-five at the end of 1955.95 
In February 1953, the Indonesian government took over the exploitation 
of the Batavian Transport Company (Bataviasche Verkeers Maatschappij, 
BVM). The company was subsequently transformed into a state-owned Jakarta 
Transport Company (Perusahaan Pengangkutan Djakarta). The Indonesian 
government paid the Dutch owners Rp. 4.3 million.96A plan for nationalization 
of gas and electrical companies was also drawn up by the government in early 
1953. Several branches of OGEM and ANIEM were also brought under the 
control of the Indonesian government in 1954. The Dutch owners received 
Rp.15 million, far less from their original demand of Rp.52 million.97 In 1954, 
the government bought up the Dutch share in GIA, transforming it into a fully 
state-owned enterprise in which the role of KLM was henceforth limited to 
providing technical assistance.98 The government had also a plan to buy Fuchs 
& Rens, the main Dutch manufacturer of rolling stock and motor cars, which 
owned four assembling plants in various locations in Indonesia. The estimated 
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cost was 1.5 billion guilders, payable within five years up to 1959.99 A shortage 
of funds derailed this project and no further nationalization of Dutch enterprises, 
including Fuchs & Rens, was effected during 1956 and 1957. 
As it had sounded the death knell of the efforts to industrialize, the 
shortage of capable trained Indonesian entrepreneurs likewise frustrated the 
Benteng Programme. A large number of the people involved in the business of 
importing had had no previous commercial experience. The new national 
companies were frequently importir aktentas (brief-case firms), which kept 
themselves afloat by reselling licences to foreign and Chinese enterprises. They 
were also frequently called ‘Al-Baba’ firms, straw-man Indonesian-Chinese 
establishments in which ‘Ali’, the Indonesian titular head, secured the licences 
and ‘Baba’, his Chinese associate, ran the business.100 In early 1955, the Central 
Import Office estimated that only fifty of the many national importing firms 
were bona fide establishments, and another 200 concerns hovered on the 
borderline. Deputy Prime Minister Wongsonegoro added that as many as 80 per 
cent of licences allocated to national importers were in fact being sold on to 
non-indigenous traders.101 The perversion of the Benteng Programme and the 
arbitrary allocations of government credit, if not sheer unadulterated corruption, 
eventually forced Iskaq to resign in November 1954. When Roosseno 
succeeded Iskaq, his first task was to rationalize the Benteng Policy, a task 
which he commenced by ordering a rescreening of the 4,300 persons already 
accredited as national importers. He worked from a premise that sixty to 
seventy importers would be really sufficient to cover the import needs of 
Indonesia. By coincidence, shortly after the rescreening had begun, Roosseno 
stated that only 10 per cent of the 600 importers already screened could be 
considered bona fide.102 
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With the return of the more moderately-minded Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo to the Ministry of Finance, the economic policies of the 
Indonesian government tended to focus on solving the most immediate 
economic problems, rather than the rather more distant issues of nationalism 
and ideology. The cabinet decided that getting inflation under control was the 
most pressing necessity as it was convinced that economic stabilization was the 
most urgent step. The best way to achieve this goal was by expanding 
production and this would have to take precedence over the ideal of the 
indigenization of ownership. The ailing Benteng Programme was finally 
abolished under the Harahap Cabintet. All businessmen who were citizens of 
Indonesia, regardless of ethnic origin, were accorded the same priority.103 
Importers were now required to advance the full value of the goods they 
intended to purchase abroad at the time they applied an import licence. The 
results of this action were not long in making themselves felt. By November 
1955, the supply of money had been reduced by nearly Rp. 600 million (5 per 
cent), and the indices of imported goods fell by 15 per cent to 27 per cent in 
December 1955.104 Furthermore, imports of raw materials for industrial 
production in 1955 increased considerably, for instance caustic soda (doubled), 
dye materials (2.5 times) and cotton (1.5 times) compared to 1954.105 
The most major drastic action of the Harahap Cabinet was the unilateral 
abrogation of the Round Table Conference agreements. It did this in March 
1956, only one month before the cabinet returned its mandate. When Ali 
Sastroamidjojo resumed cabinet leadership, he upheld the decision and finally, 
on 4 August 1956, the cabinet officially announced that it repudiated the 3,241 
million guilders of the remaining debt to the Netherlands. This amount 
corresponded to only 18 per cent of the total debts which the Indonesians had 
agreed to pay to Netherlands at the Round Table Conference in November 
1949. In principal, the Indonesian government recognized the 871 million 
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guilders which composed the pre-war debts of the Netherlands Indies 
government, of which 210 million had already been paid off. It refused to pay 
the 3 billion guilders of internal debts and the 420 million guilders to third 
parties (mainly the United States, Canada and Australia), arguing that these 
debts were contracted by the Netherlands Indies government to buy arms for the 
purpose of attacking the Republic of Indonesia. In the final balance, since the 
Indonesian government had already paid 120 million guilders and would 
continue to pay the remaining debts to third parties, the balance of pre-war debts 
to the Netherlands was reduced to 241 million guilders. Given that the total 
budget deficit of the Netherlands Indies Government between 1946 and 1949 
amounted to almost 5 billion guilders, and the sole source for meeting the 
deficit was to print paper money through the Java Bank, the Netherlands Indies 
Government in fact owed Indonesian society, not the Java Bank. Although the 
Dutch government agreed to wipe out 2 million guilders, it was still indebted to 
Indonesian society to the tune of 3 billion guilders. The Indonesian authorities 
thought that this indebtedness of the Dutch was large enough to warrant the 
offset of the responsibility of the Indonesian government to pay the sum of 241 
million guilders to the Dutch. Indonesia no further had a debt to the 
Netherlands.106 
The second Ali Cabinet also revitalized many of the policies of 
discrimination against foreigners devised by the previous cabinets. In May 
1956, the cabinet decided not to return the oil installations in Sumatra to the 
Royal Dutch Shell. Instead, an army-controlled company, called North Sumatra 
Oil Extraction Company (Eksploitasi Tambang Minjak Sumatera Utara, 
ETMSU), was established to take control of the oilfields in that region.107 The 
following month, the cabinet submitted a draft for a Foreign Investment Bill to 
Parliament. Under its term, foreign capital would be banned from investing in 
social enterprises and public utilities. Owing to the prevailing economic climate, 
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no Foreign Investment Law was promulgated until 1958, ironically right around 
the time that the Indonesian government decided to nationalize Dutch 
enterprises and seize Chinese businesses.108 In October 1956, the cabinet 
launched the long-awaited Five-Year Development Plan (1956-1960) which had 
been being prepared by previous cabinets.109 Two months before the second Ali 
Cabinet returned its mandate, in February 1957, the Indonesian government 
announced its plan to nationalize various branches of OGEM in Makassar and 
Medan in 1958 and ANIEM in 1959-1960. The seemingly ineradicable labour 
problem meant that the nationalization of the electricity and gas companies in 
South Sumatra had to be postponed.110 Following the advent of the Guided 
Democracy, all the economic efforts made by Indonesian cabinets since 
independence, including those of the second Ali Cabinet, were reformulated and 
incorporated into the new scheme for the Guided Economy. 
In short, with the exception of the nationalization of the Java Bank, GIA 
and a number of public utilities, no other significant transfer of economic 
ownership from the Dutch to Indonesian hands occurred during the period 
between the Transfer of Sovereignty and December 1957. Realizing that an 
immediate dismantling of the former colonial economic system while the 
country was still facing an acute shortage of capital and skilled employees 
would spell economic dislocation and hardship, Nationalist leaders in 
successive Indonesian cabinets in the early 1950s adopted pragmatic measures. 
While foreign firms were encouraged to continue their operations, vigorous 
efforts were made to develop new state-owned enterprises and build up a 
national business class. Dutch firms were requested to provide financial and 
technical assistance for government projects and to train Indonesian employees, 
                    
108 Hal Hill, Foreign investment and industrialization in Indonesia (Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1988) 5; Dick, Houben, Lindblad, and Thee, The emergence of a national economy, 187; 
Lindblad, Bridges to new business, 204. For an English translation of the Indonesian foreign 
investment law of 1958 in: Paauw, Financing economic development, Appendix H. 
109 See summary of the Five-Year Development Plan in: Paauw, Financing economic 
development, 363-392. 
110 ANRI, Resolution of the Indonesian Labour Union of Electricity and Gas (Seriat Buruh 
Listerik & Gas Indonesia, SBLGI), branch of Palembang, 1 March 1957, KP, inventory number 
1528. 
Beyond Political Skin 
 
216 
who could gradually be promoted to management positions in the companies. 
The overriding desire of the government to promote the economic strength of 
Indonesians to counter the domination of Dutch and Chinese firms was 
eventually frustrated by the unstable political system and particularly the 
weakness of the administrative apparatus.  
4. Entrenched Dutch Position 
The disappointing performance of the Indonesianisasi process in the early 
1950s can also be laid at the door of the Dutch hesitance to co-operate with the 
Indonesian government. In its policies, the Indonesian government failed to 
make the most of the advantages which it might have received from Dutch 
firms, which would have supported the policy of economic nationalism. Under 
the first four cabinets in what Sutter has labelled ‘the Masjoemi period’, foreign 
firms seized by the Indonesian authorities during the revolution were speedily 
returned to their former owners. By 1952, about 98 per cent of the rubber 
estates, 88 per cent of the palm oil estates and 80 per cent of the fibre estates in 
the Medan region had been returned to their owners. Likewise, most estates in 
West Java and about 60 per cent of the estates in East Java had also been 
returned by the end of 1952. In total, by the end of 1952, about 70 per cent of 
the foreign estates in both Java and Sumatra had been returned to their original 
owners. In absolute terms, the number was 1,140 estates, covering 2 million 
hectares. Another 466 estates, totalling 480,000 hectares, accounting for 20 per 
cent of the total area were also returned in the new few years. Only some 
smaller estates were not returned, in part because the owners no longer wanted 
them and local conditions made it too difficult for them to have resumed their 
property. The big three foreign oil companies, namely Shell, Stanvac and 
Caltex, also returned, as did most of the foreign companies in the manufacturing 
sector.111 
In principal, 40 per cent of the profits made by foreign capital must be 
paid into the public treasury in the form of company taxes. For the remittance of 
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money to foreign countries, foreign exchange certificates had to be bought for 
up to 200 per cent of the value of the money remitted. Any overseas transfers of 
foreign currency must have the permission of the Foreign Exchange Control 
Institute (Lembaga Alat-alat Pembayaran Luar Negeri, LAAPLN).112 Over and 
above these demands, export duties (about eight per cent of the value of the 
goods) and other levies were imposed. The oil imports and exports were 
exempted from the foreign exchange regulations. ‘Let Alone Agreements’ 
signed in 1948 between the Republican government and foreign oil companies 
were still in force. More than 50 per cent of the profits of foreign oil companies 
had to be paid to the Indonesian government.113 Initially, foreign companies 
were allowed to transfer 100 per cent of after-tax profits gained overseas, but in 
July 1953, the Ali Cabinet introduced new regulations, which allowed foreign 
companies to transfer only 40 per cent of their net profits. In March 1954, these 
regulations were reformulated and a 66 per cent levy was imposed on all 
overseas transfers. In May 1954, new more severe restrictions were placed on 
imports, and the corporate tax rate rose to as high as 52 per cent.114 Foreign 
manufacturing firms were prohibited from distributing their own goods in 
Indonesia; they had to hand this over to distribution firms owned by 
Indonesians.115 
At this distance in time, it is difficult to examine just how far the 
Indonesian government was in control of the overseas transfer of profits by 
foreign companies. It was certainly not as much as it had hoped, as will be 
revealed in the next chapter. Only later did the Indonesian authorities discover 
the full extent of unauthorized oversee transactions by Dutch and Chinese firms, 
when these were used as evidences against Dutch claims for compensation after 
nationalization or as a justification for the confiscation of the Chinese 
businesses. Clear cut evidences of Dutch and Chinese attempts to counteract the 
discriminatory policies of the Indonesian government are certainly evident in 
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their reactions to the Benteng Programme. Besides fostering their association 
with the Indonesian brief-case firms, Dutch and Chinese corporate firms 
established their own Indonesian branches as a legitimate route to obtain import 
licences from the Indonesian authorities. The Indoprom Company, for instance, 
was a benteng importer recognized by the Indonesian authorities in November 
1950. It co-operated closely with the Indoprom Company in Japan and the 
Indoprom Company in Hong Kong, as well as having various agencies in 
Singapore, Rotterdam, New York and Sydney. Although two-thirds of the 
shareholders of the company were Indonesian citizens, the director and his 
deputy, Tan Thong Yam and Tan Thong Kie, were Chinese descent.116 A 
similar example is the Libra Company which was listed as a benteng firm. 
Nevertheless, 90 per cent of its employees, including its directors, were former 
employees of the Dutch trading firm Lindeteves. Libra received its capital and 
took instructions from Lindeteves, de factor serving as a branch of this Dutch 
company.117 
Indonesian efforts to co-operate with Dutch firms in setting-up of joint 
ventures were only successful in the case of aviation and a small number of 
industrial enterprises. KPM consistently refused to co-operate with the 
Indonesian government so that it still remained the central transport apparatus 
under the Dutch flag.118 Indonesian efforts to elevate the position of the 
Indonesians in the Dutch companies were also often unsatisfactory. Dutch 
companies were reluctant to promote Indonesian employees to higher-ranking 
management positions. They routinely stated that there were not enough 
qualified Indonesians to replace European expatriates.119 It was not until 1952, 
when the Indonesian government introduced immigration quotas restricting the 
entry of expatriates from the Netherlands, that Dutch companies began to put 
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Indonesians into the positions in the lower and middle management ranks 
vacated by Dutch people. In large firms, new positions for relatively high 
functionaries were created, such as the Staf Indonesia (Indonesian Staff) in the 
trading firm Internatio and the mandur (foremen) in the estate company Oud 
Djember (Landbouw-Maatschappij Oud-Djember, LMOD).120 Needless to say, 
these efforts to pay lip service to the Indonesian government regulations did not 
meet Indonesian Nationalist aspirations. The positions vacated by Dutch were 
often taken by Chinese Indonesians rather than by indigenous Indonesian 
employees. The top management remained exclusively in Dutch hands.121 
The result of the failure of the Indonesianisasi was that the Indonesian 
economy in the early 1950s retained many colonial characteristics, especially its 
dualistic nature, represented most unequivocally in the sharp cleavage between 
the modern sector and the traditional rural, subsistence agricultural sector. By 
1952, the modern sector still constituted 24 per cent of Indonesian GDP 
compared to the 32 per cent it had been in 1939.122 No less than 35 per cent or 
more than one-third of total revenue were derived from foreign trade.123 The 
economy was still largely geared towards the production and export of a limited 
number of agricultural products and the extraction of raw materials by mining, 
the most important of all these being oil. In 1955, for instance, almost 80 per 
cent of export revenue was derived from four export products: rubber, tin, 
copra, and oil. Rubber alone accounted for about 50 per cent of the total export 
value (Appendix, Table 12). The rural economy was so under-commercialized 
that in 1955 only 9.4 per cent and in 1956 6.7 per cent of rice production in Java 
and Madura was being milled commercially.124 Dutch firms and some British 
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and American multinationals dominated the modern sector. Most indigenous 
Indonesians were still engaged in agriculture and making handicrafts. The 
Chinese middlemen formed the nexus between the two sectors.  
Despite Indonesian control of a number of oil installations in North 
Sumatra, the oil sector was predominantly managed by three big foreign 
companies (Royal Dutch Shell, Stanvac and Caltex) and four marginal (the 
Amsterdam Algemeen Petroleum Corporation, the Surabaya Oriental Petroleum 
Corporation, the Borneo Oil Company and the Sekoerau Petroleum Company). 
The insurance sector was likewise completely dominated by 110 foreign 
insurance companies. It was not until June 1950 that the first Indonesian 
insurance company (Maskapai Assuransi Indonesia) was opened its door for 
business.125 In the commercial sector, in 1952 four leading Dutch trading firms 
handled 50 per cent of all consumer imports, and eight firms controlled 60 per 
cent of all exports, excluding copra, tin, and cinchona.126 Private banking was 
largely in the hands of seven foreign banks, of which three were Dutch-, three 
Chinese-, and one British-owned.127 The Dutch businesses in post-colonial 
Indonesia continued to be very profitable. Between 1954 and 1957, annual 
remittances of profits to the Netherlands amounted to 900 million to 1 billion 
guilders, contributing to 2.9 to 4.5 per cent to the national income of the 
Netherlands (Appendix, Table 14). The lure of such profits encouraged Dutch 
firms to continue to invest around 1.5 billion guilders in Indonesia between 
1950 and 1958.128 By the time of the take-over in December 1957, Dutch firms 
controlled about 50 per cent of all estate acreage and about 60 per cent of 
Indonesian foreign trade.129 
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Table 10: The importance of the Netherlands in Indonesian 
trade, 1950-1957 (in percentages) 
















1950 - - 17.2 25.3 
1951 - - 12 20.6 
1952 6.4 5.6 13 21.4 
1953 5.5 3.6 11.8 23 
1954 4.8 2.6 10.5 19.5 
1955 3.0 2.5 11.7 15.8 
1956 3.1 2.9 10.7 19.5 
1957 2.9 2.3 9.8 - 
Source: NA, Het economisch belang van Indonesië voor Nederland in 
1957, EZ, inventory number 127, in adjustment with Statistical pocket 
book of Indonesia (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1957) pp. 100-101. 
Post-colonial Indonesia still continued to experience a considerable 
trade surplus with the Netherlands. For the period from 1948 to 1957, the trade 
surplus of Indonesia with the Netherlands was 58 per cent. In the peak year of 
1954, the surplus mounted to 127 per cent (Table 7, Chapter 3). Ironically, more 
than in the first two decades of the twentieth century, when the trade surplus of 
the Netherlands Indies with the Netherlands amounted to 25-40 per cent 
(Chapter One). Although the Indonesian government tried to guide trade 
relations in the direction of countries in the dollar zone, the Netherlands still 
remained an important trading partner of Indonesia until 1957. A comparison 
with the late colonial period shows that the share of Indonesia in Dutch imports 
in the early 1950s remained the same, but its share in Dutch exports was 
reduced to half. Clearly the importance of the Netherlands in Indonesian 
imports declined in the 1950s, but, conversely, the share of the Netherlands in 
Dutch exports remained large. Exports to the Netherlands accounted for 20-25 
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per cent of all Indonesian exports between 1950 and 1957, with the exception of 
a remarkable decline in 1955 when it was only 16 per cent, probably the result 
of the intensified screening of trading firms by the Indonesian government 
(Table 10). Importantly, this share was not significantly different from the 16.5-
32 per cent of the late colonial period. In a nutshell, post-colonial Indonesia 
continued to remain highly dependent on the Dutch market.  
Understandably the continuing domination of the Indonesian economy 
by Dutch firms after independence stirred negative public sentiment. One of the 
best illustrations of the reactions by the local population to the restoration of 
Dutch firms is the upset known as the Tanjung Morawa Incident, which flared 
up in early 1953. Tanjung Morawa had originally been a Dutch tobacco estate, 
which had been occupied by Chinese families since the late 1940s. In 1951, the 
Indonesian government decided to return part of the property to its Dutch 
owners. The Chinese families, who were supported by the local peasant unions, 
refused to leave. Finally, in March 1953, the Indonesian government sent police 
to clear the land. At this point the conflict escalated into a confrontation 
between the police officers and 1,500 demonstrators supporting the Chinese 
families. The conflict resulted in the death of five demonstrators and several 
more people were injured. Although the government eventually did clear the 
land, it was not long before the Tanjung Morawa Incident escalated into a 
serious political issue, which contributed to the downfall of the Wilopo Cabinet 
in June 1953.130 
Trade unions were the most vigorous activists in protests against Dutch 
business. In July 1953, the trade union of the Padalarang Paper Factory passed a 
resolution demanding that the government nationalize the company and made it 
state property.131 Likewise, in March 1954, a branch of the Indonesian Trade 
Union of Electricity and Gas Workers (Seriat Buruh Listerik & Gas Indonesia, 
SBLGI) in South Sumatra issued a resolution, urging the government to 
nationalize all gas and electrical companies in Indonesia and make these 100 per 
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cent state property.132In the wake of this action, shortly afterwards branches of 
SBLGI in other provinces issued similar resolutions. Workers in ANIEM quit 
their jobs and moved to the newly established electricity companies, many of 
which had actually formerly been branches of ANIEM.133 In a resolution 
presented to the Indonesian government in June 1956, SOBSI estimated that the 
Dutch still controlled 669 plantations, covering more than 1 million hectares. 
Many of the plantations had been sold to the Chinese and other foreign 
nationals, instead of Indonesians. Incensed, SOBSI strongly urged the 
government to confiscated Dutch estates, whose land leases had expired.134 In 
the midst of this unrest, attitudes towards Dutch business hardened after the 
Independence Day speech of President Soekarno on 17 August 1956. The 
President warned that Dutch colonialism in the Indonesian economy had not yet 
been overthrown. He supported the action by the Harahap Cabinet when it 
unilaterally abrogated the Round Table Conference agreements and called for 
further actions to expel the residue of foreign domination of the Indonesian 
economy.135 In the three months between September 1956 and December 1957, 
numerous requests from various trade unions and occupational associations 
were submitted to the Indonesian government, demanding that Dutch 
enterprises be nationalized and that control of these enterprises be handed over 
to their organizations. The hotbed of political tensions in late 1957 created 
conditions under which trade unions could undertake spontaneous actions 
against Dutch business interests. 
 
Conclusion 
As Bruce Glassburner has said, the years from 1950 to 1957 in Indonesia are 
best understood as years of a hopeless losing battle on the part of a very small 
group of pragmatically conservative political leaders, whose ideas were on a 
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collision course with an increasingly powerful political opposition whose 
orientation was generally radical.136 The pragmatic conservative group had 
largely dominated the government during the first three years after the Transfer 
of Sovereignty. It consisted of members affiliated to Masjoemi, PSI and the 
moderate faction of PNI, or else of non-party members. Most of them had 
enjoyed a Western education and some had participated in the negotiations at 
the Round Table Conference. Their chief concern was the economic 
development and the concomitant stability of the country, which they believed 
should take precedence over matters of ideology. The political opposition group 
which opposed this cautious approach had begun to exert an increasing 
influence since the time of the first Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, although the 
pragmatic conservatives once again managed to revitalize their power in the 
Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet. Members of the radical oriented and extreme 
Nationalist groups were loyal followers of PNI, Murba, the Labour Party and 
some smaller Nationalist parties. Despite its strong presence in Parliament, 
particularly after the general elections of 1955, PKI was not invited to take any 
cabinet position. The ultimate goal of the radically minded, extreme Nationalist 
politicians was an independent national economy based on the Indonesian 
concept of socialism. They demanded the immediate nationalization of all vital 
enterprises at that moment still owned by the Dutch and the introduction of a 
co-operative economic system, in which state enterprises would play the pivotal 
role. The resultant political splits inside the government were the main reason 
for the frequent succession of cabinets, a situation which made it difficult to 
produce strong national leadership and formulate long-term policies for 
Indonesia in immediate post-independence period. 
With the predomination of the pragmatic group in the government, the 
Indonesian economy in the early 1950s was operated on the basis of a mixed 
pattern, exhibiting both capitalist and ‘socialist’ characters. The pragmatic 
Nationalist leaders realized that they could not dismantle the colonial and 
capitalist structure of the economy overnight since the country was suffering 
from an extreme shortage of both capital and skilled labour. Moderate measures 
                    
136 Glassburner, ‘Economic policy-making in Indonesia’, 71. 
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were therefore adopted and efforts were thrown into utilizing the advantages of 
foreign companies to support economic nationalism. Nationalisation affected 
only the central bank, the national carrier and a small number of public 
enterprises. Meanwhile, discriminatory policies were also taken to promote 
state-owned industries and indigenous entrepreneurship. The apparent failure of 
the Indonesianisasi campaign was most clearly demonstrated by the continuing 
domination of Dutch and other foreign firms in the important sectors of the 
Indonesian economy throughout most of the 1950s. Public sentiment of the 
economic domination of the Dutch escalated in the mid-1950s and culminated 
in the take-over of Dutch-owned firms in December 1957. Ironically, the 
subsequent advent of the policy of Guided Economy coincided with the period 
of intensified collectivization movement in North Vietnam. The upshot was that 
after a period of diverging developments, the economic struggle in Indonesia 
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The introduction of Soekarno’s Konsepsi in February 1957 led directly to the 
formation of the Cabinet Karya and the National Council and signified a really 
major change in the political system of post-colonial Indonesia. The message it 
gave was that Parliamentary Democracy on the basis of a multi-party system 
was no longer considered appropriate to the nation. It had not lasted for very 
long, just over a decade in fact, and was replaced in July 1959 by a far more 
authoritarian system, labelled Guided Democracy, akin to the first Presidential 
Cabinet established in the early months after the Proclamation of Independence 
in 1945. Guided Democracy effectively restored and expanded the executive 
powers of the President, and it opened the door for the military to participate 
actively in state affairs. In the unpromising climate it created, most political 
parties suffered a catastrophic decline. The exception was the Communist party, 
which experienced an unprecedented rise and was also warmly supported by 
President Soekarno who saw it as a political counterpoise to the armed forces.1 
An essential and integral part of Guided Democracy was the Guided Economy, 
                    
1 Herbert Feith, ‘President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists; The triangle changes shape’, 
Asian Survey, 8 (1964) 977-978; Herbert Feith, ‘Dynamics of Guided Democracy’, in Ruth T. 
McVey (ed.), Indonesia (New Haven: HRAF, 1963) 338; Rex Mortimer, Indonesian 
Communism under Soekarno; ideology and politics, 1959-1965 (Singapore: Equinox 
Publishing, 2006) 79. 
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which in effect established direct state control and management of the important 
segments of the national economy.   
The institutionalization of Guided Democracy and its component 
Guided Economy, which coincided with the take-over and subsequent 
nationalization of private Dutch companies in the late 1950s, at long last 
signalled the realization of the primary objectives of economic nationalism as 
these had been formulated by the Indonesian leaders, albeit cautiously, and 
enshrined in the 1945 Constitution which was restored in July 1959. This 
chapter is a discussion of the final phase of the transformation into an 
independent national economy in Indonesia, arguing that in ideological terms 
the Guided Economy represented the highest expectations of what the 
Indonesian leadership thought an ideal economic system should be. It examines 
the transformation in the economic management apparatus, from a liberal-
democratic system to a guided counterpart, characterized by strong military 
intervention. The domination of Communist views as an integral part of state 
ideology under the Guided Economy as this was formulated by President 
Soekarno will be analysed in some details. Particular attention will be paid to 
the forcible eradication of foreign economic factors and the efforts undertaken 
to convert foreign assets into the state-controlled sectors. It will also examine 
government control of other sectors, including private enterprises and co-
operatives, in order to paint a more comprehensive picture of the Guided 
Economy. Although the system of the Guided Economy in Indonesia bore some 
resemblance to the centrally planned economy in North Vietnam as this existed 
from the late 1950s, this study certainly does not argue that these two models 
were identical. 
1. The Military-Civil Administration 
Military involvement in economic affairs in Indonesia had commenced 
immediately after Independence. Various defence organizations participated 
actively in the take-over of enterprises previously controlled by the Japanese 
(Chapter Three). Under the system of Parliamentary Democracy, the prime 
concern of Indonesian military officers was their conventional task as guardians 
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of the state, rather than any special intervention in politics and business. The 
attempted coup by the army on 17 October 1952, in which President Soekarno 
was asked to resume control of the government, was the single most resounding 
action in reaction to the weakness of the civilian government undertaken by the 
deeply divided army in the early 1950s. In this period, army commanders in 
North Sumatra and North Sulawesi were engaged in illegal business with local 
traders in their attempts to raise essential funds for their troops. These actions 
were necessitated by an inadequate financial supply from the cash-strapped 
central government.2 All in all, the army played a passive role in the political 
and economical life of the country until at least the end of 1956.3 
Military involvement in political and economic affairs changed all of a 
sudden after President Soekarno declared nationwide martial law in March 
1957.4 This measure was primarily based on the colonial Regulation on the 
State of War and Siege (Regeling op den Staat van Oorlog en van Beleg, SOB) 
of September 1939. It had remained in force under the Republic of Indonesia as 
the proposed Law on National Emergencies stipulated in the Provisional 
Constitution of 1950 had never been drafted.5 The terms of SOB decreed the 
subordination of civilian authority to military command.6 Inevitably, it affected 
                    
2 Ruth McVey, ‘The Post-revolutionary transformation of the Indonesian army’, Indonesia 11 
(1971) 152-153; Harold Crouch, The army and politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1978) 38. 
3 Daniel S. Lev, ‘The political role of the army in Indonesia’, Pacific Affairs 36 (1963-1964) 350; 
Crouch, The army and politics, 38. 
4 In fact, ever since the Transfer of Sovereignty various parts of Indonesia had been under the 
State of War, in Java because of the activities of the Darul Islam and other armed bands, in the 
Molucas as the result of the continuing resistance encountered from Soumokil’s separatist 
Republik Maluku Selatan forces, in South Sulawesi on the account of the rebellion of Kahar 
Muzakar and his followers. In December 1956, dissident officers in Sumatra declared a state of 
siege in the areas under their command. Soekarno’s declaration of martial law in March 1957 
virtually extended the state of war and siege to the entire country. 
5 Heeding criticism that the government was working under a colonial law, in December 1957 the 
Indonesian Parliament passed a new martial law. In actual fact, this new law did not ring many 
changes as it was still principally based on SOB. A few articles, whose purpose was to rein in 
the power of the army, were added, but these did little to reduce the waxing influence of the 
armed forces.  
6 SOB distinguished two levels of emergency. In a State of War situation, the military had the 
authority to issue orders and regulations governing public affairs and internal security. Under 
the terms of the State of Siege, the military authorities were exempted from public law and were 
abled to take any measures they considered necessary to deal with the immediate emergency. 
Under both sets of circumstances, civilian authorities were obliged to obey military orders. 
The Guided Economy 
 
229 
economic affairs since, under its terms, all imports and exports, as well as all 
traffic whether by land, sea or air now fell under military regulations. Such 
public services as publishing, posts, telegraph and telephone, theatre and other 
facilities whose function was to supply entertainment and leisure were also 
supervised by the armed forces. Generally speaking, army leaders were in 
charge of safeguarding the conditions required for the pursuit of economic 
activities in the areas under their command.7 As martial law had been declared 
nationwide, army officers were quick to assert their authority throughout the 
entire country. 
 Martial law had immediate effects at the regional level, where civilian 
officials were subordinated to the local army headquarters. Army officers 
intruded into parts of regional administration; some became governors or 
district commissioners. They were particularly interested in the administration 
of such economic matters as tax collection, the issue of licences and the 
granting of other facilities.8 At the national level, in Jakarta, where the influence 
of the central government was still relatively strong, the army could obtain 
power by infiltrating into government departments and state bodies. Especially 
so because the highest martial law authority was not in hands of the Head of the 
Martial Law Administration, General Nasution, but rested with President 
Soekarno, whose roles included Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.9 
Soekarno was also chairman of the National Council, which took over the task 
of being an executive policy making body, which wielded an influence far 
greater than that allowed Parliament.10 Members of the National Council were 
selected on the basis of Soekarno’s idea of functional groups, and among them 
were representatives from trade unions, the peasantry, young people, 
                    
7 For comprehensive provisions and analysis of SOB, see: Basarudin Nasution, S.O.B. pedoman 
pelaksanaan peraturan tentang keadaan perang dan keadaan darurat perang, Jakarta:  
Penerbit, 1957. 
8 Crouch, the army and politics, 38; Lev, The transition to Guided Democracy, 78. 
9 Ulf Sundhaussen, The road to power; Indonesian military politics 1945-1967 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1982) 129-130; Lev, The transition to Guided Democracy, 28. 
10 E. Utrecht, Pengantar dalam Hukum Indonesia (Jakarta: Ichtiar, 1959) 442. The vice-chairman 
was Soeslan Abdulgani, a member of the PNI and trusted associate of the President, who had 
formerly been Minister of Information and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
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intellectuals and veterans, supplemented by delegates from various islands and 
religious leaders.11 The armed forces held only four of the forty-two seats on the 
Council, and these were taken by the Chiefs of the Army, the Navy, the Air 
Force and the State Police.12 Key ministries were also represented on the 
Council. The idea behind their inclusion was that they could facilitate the co-
ordination between the Council and the cabinet.13 
The primary task of the National Council was to give advice to the 
Cabinet Karya, installed under Prime Minister Djuanda on 9 April 1957. As the 
Hatta Business Cabinet of 1950 had been, the Djuanda Cabinet Karya was a 
non-party cabinet whose ministers were appointed for their technical 
competence and experience, not their political affiliation. The armed forces had 
two representatives, Colonel Nazir as Minister of Marine Transport and Colonel 
Aziz Saleh as Minister of Health. Notably, all posts related to the economic 
management, with the exception of marine transport, fell outside the sphere of 
military influence. The Ministry of Finance was led by Sutikno Slamet, who 
had served as Indonesian representative to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in Washington. The Minister of Trade was Sunarjo Kolopaking, the very 
first Dean of the Economics Faculty of the University of Indonesia.14In June 
1958, he was replaced by his party colleague (NU) Rachmat Muljomiseno, his 
Achilles heel being that he had failed to deal with widespread smuggling in the 
Outer Islands.15 A former member of the Communist peasant organization, the 
Barisan Tani, Sadjarwo, became Minister of Agriculture. Minister for Industries 
was an electronic engineer, F.J. Inkiriwang, who had obtained a degree at Delft 
University in the Netherlands. Two graduates from the Bandung Technische 
Hoogeschoool, Pangeran Mohammad Noor and Sukardan, were appointed 
                    
11 David Reeve, ‘Soekarnoism and Indonesia’s functional group state’, Review of Indonesian and 
Malayan Affairs 13 (1979) 53-116. 
12 In 1957, the military was not yet considered a functional group. It was assumed that the army 
would keep its expanded authority only as long as martial law was in force. Nasution’s demand 
for functional group status for the military was only acceded to by the National Council and 
Parliament in November 1958. 
13 Dewam Nasional (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1957) 15. 
14 However, Sunarjo Kolopaking soon transferred the position of Dean of the Economics Faculty, 
the University of Indonesia, to Sumitro Djojohadikusumo.  
15Berita Negara Republik Indonesia, 1 July 1958 
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Minister of Public Works and Minister of Communications, respectively, and 
non-party Samjono was made Minister of Labour. When Sjaffruddin was 
reappointed Governor of the Central Bank, the Djuanda government was 
considered strong on economics.16 
Another efficient channel through which it was possible to expand army 
influence in the political economy was that of the civil-military agencies for co-
operation (Badan Kerjasama, BKS). Initially, BKSs were created for the 
purpose of niggling away at the influence of the political parties, especially 
PKI. What the move actually boilded down to was that army officers were 
appointed to head the mass organizations attached to the political parties. In the 
course of their activities, however, BKSs participated in a variety of economic 
activities, particularly at provincial and village levels. The first BKS was the 
Youth-Military Co-operative Body (Badan Kerdjasama Pemuda Militer, BKS-
PM), established in June 1957 under the leadership of Colonel Pamurahardjo, 
who was later to play a leading role in the take-over of Dutch firms. In 
December 1957, the Labour-Military Co-operative Body (BKS Buruh-Militer) 
was founded by incorporating fourteen labour organizations. Other notable 
BKSs included the Farmers-Military Co-operative Body (BKS Tani-Militer), 
the Women-Military Co-operative Body (BKS-Wanita Militer) and the 
Intellectual-Military Co-operative Body (BKS-Sardjana Militer). In 1958, all 
BKSs were merged into the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian 
(Front Nasional Pembebasan Irian Barat, FNPIB). Besides its ultimate political 
task of mobilizing the masses in the struggle to liberate West Irian, FNPIB also 
played an important role in stimulating production and public construction in 
various regions. The activities of BKSs and FNPIB were carried out under the 
supervision of the State Ministry for Civilian-Military Relations headed by 
Wahid Wahab, a loyal associate of President Soekarno.17 
                    
16 Higgins, Indonesia’s stabilization and development, xxii. 
17 For the activities of the BKSs and FNPIB, see: Iskandar Sulayman, Karya Kerdja Sama Sipil-
Militer, 25 Djuni 1958-6 Djuli 1959 (Jakarta: Menteri Negara, 1959) 
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While martial law was still in force, the official proclamation of Guided 
Democracy in July 1959 reinforced the entrenched position of the armed forces 
in the state apparatus. Guided Democracy was proclaimed by Presidential 
Decree of 5 July 1959, which also promulgated the restoration of the 1945 
Constitution. Four days later, a Presidential Cabinet was established, in which 
Soekarno served as both President and Prime Minister. Djuanda was appointed 
First Minister (Menteri Pertama) and his actual job was to take charge of the 
day-to-day running of the government. The cabinet was re-organized into nine 
core ministers, each responsible for co-ordinating several junior ministers. In 
the process, the elements of the armed forces, now a functional group, were 
steadily increasing in absolute terms. In comparison with their rather scarce 
presence in the preceding Djuanda Cabinet, their representation rose from three 
ministers to eleven. They controlled five important ministries in economic 
management, including the Core Ministry of Production and four junior 
ministries responsible for Agriculture, Land and Air Communications, 
Transmigration and Co-operatives and Community Development. The civilian 
bureaucrats were left with the Core Ministry of Finance under Djuanda, assisted 
by his Junior Minister Notohamiprodjo, a fund-raise for PNI. The Core Ministry 
of Distribution was in the prestigious hands of Johannes Leimena, who 
entertained close relations with the Hatta group of liberal politicians. A 
Sumatran ideological radical, Chairul Saleh, the former Minister of State for 
Veterans’ Affairs in the Djuanda Cabinet, was elevated to the position of Core 
Minister for Reconstruction and Development, which included a Junior 
Ministry of Basic Industries and Mining.18 Dr Suharto, financial secretary of 
                    
18 Chairul Saleh was a strong revolutionary figure who had joined Soekarno in many Nationalist 
movements during the Dutch colonial period and under the Japanese occupation. He was one of 
the group of Pemuda, who kidnapped Soekarno and Hatta on 16 August 1945. He also joined 
the Persatuan Perdjuangan movement held by Tan Malaka, which was opposed to Sjarih’s 
concessions to the Dutch. After the Transfer of Sovereignty, the armed band led by Saleh 
refused to mobilize and co-operate with the National Army. In 1951, Saleh was detained by the 
army but, owing to interventions by Soekarno, Hatta and Moh. Yamin, he was released shortly 
afterwards and sent off to Europe. On account of his hostility to the army coupled with his 
Communist sympathies, not to mention he was without party affiliation, Saleh became an ideal 
recruiting figure when Soekarno initiated his plan to replace the liberal constitutional system. In 
April 1957, he returned to Indonesia at Soekarno’s invitation and shortly thereafter was 
appointed State Minister for Veterans’ Affairs. In fact, ever since his appointment as Junior 
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PNI, was appointed Junior Minister for People’s Industries, while the Junior 
Minister for Trade was Arifin Harahap, a close associate of President Soekarno 
and had previously served in the Department of Information. Two junior 
ministers, Public Works and Manpower, Sardjono Dipokusumo, and Labour, 
Ahem Erningpradja, held their portfolios under the co-ordinating Core Minister 
of Production, Colonel Suprajogi.  
The name of the cabinet was changed from Kabinet Karya to Kabinet 
Kerdja, although both appellations obviously had the same meaning, namely, a 
working cabinet. It still remained a non-party cabinet, and unlike its 
predecessor, all members of Soekarno’s cabinet were compelled by law to drop 
their party affiliations.19 In the wake of the formation of the Presidential 
Cabinet, a sequence of changes in high government bodies was also pushed 
through to meet the requirements of the re-implementation of the 1945 
Constitution. The National Council was replaced by the Supreme Advisory 
Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, DPA) chaired personally by President 
Soekarno, assisted by his close associate Roeslan Abdulgani and later also by 
Sujono Hadinoto. In March 1960, President Soekarno prorogued the Parliament 
elected in 1955 and replaced it with a Gotong-Royong Parliament (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat-Gotong Royong, DPR-GR), also headed by the President.20 
In August 1960, President Soekarno appointed members of the Provisional 
People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, 
MPRS), the highest policy-making body under the 1945 Constitution. 
Alongside DPR-GR, a mass organization called the National Front (Front 
Nasional, FN) was established to replace the army-led FNPIB. FN consisted of 
representatives from the political parties, functional groups, the government and 
                                       
Minister of Basic Industries and Mining, Saleh had unrelentingly fought for government control 
of the oil sector, which was then under the control of army and foreign oil companies. 
19 Lev, The transition to Guided Democracy, 300. 
20 The Parliament was dissolved as a result of its opposition to the government 1960 budget bill. 
Representatives of all major parties, which together held 198 out of the total 270 seats in 
Parliament, not only were specifically apposed to the size of the anticipated budget deficit, they 
also objected to the entire fiscal policy of the government. This parliamentary disagreement was 
glaringly out of tune with the gotong-royongethos which Soekarno was trying to build as the 
legal basis of Indonesian politics. 
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DPA. Soekarno again took charge of FN at the national level, but at the regional 
levels the army was undeniably strong.21 The principal opponents of Soekarno’s 
policy, namely, the Masjoemi, PSI and other liberal parties were excluded from 
the new Parliament, before eventually being banded altogether in 1961.22 
Now turning in completely the oppositie direction, President Soekarno 
appointed two principal leaders of PKI, Aidit and Lukman, to the posts of 
Deputy-Chairman of MPRS and DPR-GR, respectively. Aidit and Lukman also 
simultaneously served as state ministers. Despite the new system, cabinet 
changes were not past history and there were various cabinet reorganizations 
between 1960 and 1965. The title of junior minister was abolished in February 
1960, in favour of minister. In March 1962, core minister was replaced by the 
tile deputy first minister, each of whom was given co-ordinating responsibility 
over the departments and the ministers in his own section. After the death of 
Djuanda in November 1963, the post of first minister was abolished. The title 
deputy first minister was changed into deputy prime minister. His job was to 
assume responsibility for co-ordinating ministers in each compartment. In 
September 1964, the cabinet changed its name to Kabinet Dwikora (Dwi 
Komando Rakyator the People’s Dual Command).23 All the deputy prime 
ministers were grouped into a Praesidium. In July 1966, its name was changed 
yet again to Kabinet Ampera (Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat or Message of the 
People’s Suffering). By that time, most of the control of the government had 
been transferred to General Soeharto, who was serving as acting-President.  
                    
21 Of the 17 provincial FN branches established by April 1961, 9 were chaired by the local army 
commander and another one by an army officer in his capacity as provincial governor, 
Sundhaussen, The road to power, 152. 
22 The banning of Masjoemi, PSI and other liberally-oriented parties was one part of government 
efforts to retool the political party system. However, the direct cause of their demise was that 
their leaders had participated in the Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic 
(Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, PRRI) in North Sumatra in 1958. By the end of 
1960, there were only 10 political parties still legally in existence, including three nationalist 
parties (PNI, Partindo, IPKI), three Muslim parties (NU, PSII and Perti), two Christian parties 
(Parkindo and Partai Katholik) and two Marxist parties (PKI and Murba). Roeslan Abdulgani, 
Nationalism Revolution and Guided Democracy in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash University 
Press, 1973) 50. 
23 The first command referred to the intensification of the Indonesian Revolution and the second 
one to assistance to the peoples of Malaya, Singapore and North Borneo in achieving their 
independence.  
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Soekarno’s government in the early 1960s was characterized by various 
complicated personnel re-arrangements made to fit in with the structural 
changes in the state organs. In March 1962, Major-General Suprajogi, while 
changing from Core Minister to Deputy First Minister for Production, held the 
post of Minister of Public Works and Power. Minister of Agriculture, Major 
General Azis Saleh, moved to head the Ministry of People’s Industries. The 
former head of this ministry, Dr Suharto, took over the post of Minister of 
Trade after Arifin Harahap moved to head the new Ministry of the State Budget. 
In October 1962, Leimena, now Deputy First Minister for Distribution, and 
Subandrio, Deputy First Minister with Jurisdiction over Foreign Affairs and 
Foreign Economic Relations, assumed Djuanda’s duties when he fell ill. Deputy 
First Minister for Finance was Achmadi M. Notohamiprodjo. He shred his 
responsibility of co-ordinating with Minister Arifin Harahap and Minister for 
the Central Bank Sumarno (Governor of the Bank Indonesia). Notohamiprodjo 
himself was Minister in Charge of Revenues, Expenditures and Supervision. He 
was also served as Deputy First Minister for Public Welfare. In the third 
reshuffle on 13 November 1963, Sumarno, while being appointed Co-ordinating 
Minister of the Department of Finance, became Minister of State Revenue, 
Finance and Audits. Suharto moved to head the Ministry of Bank Affairs and 
Private Banks. The department of the Deputy First Minister for Production was 
renamed Department of Development under leadership of Chairul Saleh, who 
also held the post as Minister of Basic Industries and Mining. The Ministry of 
Land Communications, Post, Telegraphs and Telephone was led by General 
Hidajat, who replaced General Djatikusumo.  
Under the Kabinet Dwikora, Sumarno remained Co-ordinating Minister 
of Compartment of Finance, but the post of Minister of State Revenues, Finance 
and Audits was handed over to Mohammad Hassan. Arifin Harahap transferred 
his post as Minister for State Budget to Suryadarma Surjadi, a former leader of 
the Indonesian Democratic Party. The Minister for Private Banks and Capital 
was J.D. Massie. Several new ministries were formed. The Ministry of State 
Plantations was headed by the anti-Communist Roman Catholic Dr Frans Seda. 
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On 31 March 1965, the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining was divided into 
three separate ministries. Chairul Saleh became Minister for Oil and Natural 
Gas. Armunanto, former leader of Partindo and Hadi Thajeb, an Acehnese 
medical graduate, were appointed as Minister of Mining and Minister of Basic 
Industry respectively. Adam Malik, a journalist, was appointed Minister for the 
Implementation of the Guided Economy. He was succeeded by Brigade-General 
Achmad Jusuf, who had previously served as Acting Minister of Foreign Trade 
Relations. On 1 April 1965, Major-General Ibnu Sutowo was appointed 
supernumerary minister attached to the Praesidium with responsibility for oil 
and natural gas affairs. In May 1965, several more new ministries were 
installed, including those for Road Development, Trans-Sumatra Highway, 
People’s Irrigation, Town Planning, Electricity and Power and Village 
Development. On 4 June 1965, the Ministry of Marine Communications was 
removed from the Compartment of Distribution. A new Department of 
Maritime Affairs was established, coordinating with the Minister of Marine 
Communication, Minister of Fisheries and Marine Exploitation and Minister of 
Maritime Industries. All but the Ministry of Maritime Industries was under 
military control.24 
Since 1947, the Indonesian government had a specific advisory body 
for long-term economic plans, whose membership was composed of leaders of 
various ministries or government departments and the Governor of the Central 
Bank. Prior to the Karya Cabinet, the advisory body had been the State 
Planning Bureau (Badan Perantjang Negara, BPN), which had devised the Five-
Year Development Plan (1956-1960). In mid-1957, on Soekarno’s advice 
Djuanda dissolved BPN in the wake of PKI accusations that it was too 
‘capitalist’, on the basis of its connections with foreign experts working closely 
with Yale University and the Ford Foundation.25 In June 1959, a National 
                    
24 Susan Finch, Daniel S. Lev, Republic of Indonesia cabinets, 1945-1965 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1965) 40-66. 
25 BPN was in fact still functioning under the name of Economic and Finance Bureau during the 
Djuanda Cabinet. Former BPN staff member, Mulyatno Sindhudarmoko, was appointed bureau 
chief. One of the functions of the Bureau was to co-ordinate foreign aid to Indonesia, including 
joint venture investment. Robinson Pangaribuan, The Indonesia state secretariat 1945-1993 
(Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996) 15, 26. 
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Planning Council (Dewan Perantjang Nasional, DEPERNAS) was established 
in the place of BPN. Chairman of DEPERNAS was Professor Mohammad 
Yamin, leading a committee of seventy-seven members.26 The composition of 
DEPERNAS reveals that its members had been chosen by Soekarno for political 
considerations rather than for their technical expertise. Muhammad Yamin 
himself was the former Minister of Justice, best known in Indonesia as a poet 
and a romantic historian. The Secretary-General was a distinguished civil 
servant, M. Hutasoit, who had worked as Secretary-General of the Ministry of 
Education and had been largely responsible for the development of public 
education in Indonesian since independence.27 
The immediate task of DEPERNAS was to devise an overall national 
development plan, to be completed within one year. Exactly one year after it 
had been set up in August 1960, DEPERNAS did finish drafting an Eight-Year 
Development Plan (1961-1968) and shortly thereafter submitted it to the cabinet 
and MPRS. The Plan was a massive opus of 5,000 pages, consisting of eight 
parts, seventeen volumes and 1,945 paragraphs, symbolizing the 17 August 
1945, the date of the Proclamation of Independence. All projects were divided 
into two categories. The A-projects concentrated on increasing the production 
of foodstuffs, textiles and materials which could be used in industry, laying the 
foundation for the building up of such heavy industry as steel, aluminium and 
the manufacture of metal products. It also included what were known as ‘mental 
construction’ projects, which encompassed the press, scientific research and 
tourism. The bulk of the expenditure on the A-projects would be financed by B-
projects, which focused on the exploitation of the rich natural resources of 
Indonesia. Whereas the investment needed for the B-projects was not discussed, 
the total cost of the A-projects was Rp. 240 billion. Half of that sum would have 
to be in foreign currency, equivalent to the sum of US$ 2.5 billion.28 
                    
26 H. Muhammad Yamin, Pemandangan terhadap saran-saran para menteri dalam Sidang 
Kabinet R.I., tanggal 25, 27, dan 29 Oktober 1960 tentang Rantjangan Dasar Undang-Undang 
Pembangunan Nasional Semesta Berentjana 1961-1969. Jakarta: s.n., 1960, pp.1-5. 
27 Guy Pauker, ‘The Indonesian Eight-Year Overall Development Plan’, Pacific Affairs 34 (1961), 
115 
28 Information about the Eight-Year Plan can be found in: The United State Economic Survey 
Team to Indonesia, Perspectives and proposals for United States economic aid; a report to the 
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In December 1963, the Indonesian government established a National 
Development Planning Council (Badan Perentjanaan Pembanguna Nasional, 
BAPPENAS), which integrated into DEPERNAS. BAPPENAS played a role as 
the highest government level in the field of overall national development 
planning. It was personally led by President Soekarno but its daily tasks were 
supervised by Suharto. BAPPENAS consisted of eight Planning Bureaus, 
covering financial planning, welfare planning, defence and security, law and 
home affairs, development, distribution, planning of the building up the spirit of 
the Revolution and international relations. BAPPENAS was also responsible for 
making recommendation and giving advice and guidance to private enterprises, 
as well as for making evaluations of development projects carried out by the 
private sector.29 In March 1965, another Consultative Body for National 
Development Planning (Musjawarah Perantjang Pembangunan Nasional, 
MUPPENAS) was established. It was composed of seventy members and work 
in tandem with four government advisory committees. Its primary task was to 
draft a Three-Year Plan (1966-1968) to finish these projects which had been 
devised by DEPERNAS in the Eight-Year Development Plan. The plan was 
approved by MPRS in July 1965, although, as were the previous Five-Year Plan 
(1956-1960) and Eight-Year Development Plan (1961-1968), larger parts of the 
Three-Year Plan were never been fully realized. MUPPENAS was dissolved 
early in 1966.30 
The transformation of economic institutions in Indonesia in the late 
1950s and the early 1960s was part of a wider trend towards the full 
achievement of Guided Democracy and the Guided Economy. The essence of 
this process was a high degree of concentration of state power in the hands of 
President Soekarno. Governing and executive responsibilities were granted to 
the military and the complex administrative apparatus. Soekarno was 
                                       
President (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1963); Guy Pauker, ‘The Indonesian 
Eight-Year Overall Development Plan’, Pacific Affairs, 1961, 115-130; and Humphrey, 
‘Indonesia’s National Plan for economic development’, Asian Survey, II (1962) 12-21.  
29 For the organization of BAPPENAS and its task see: Suharto, Badan Perentjanaan 
Pembangunan Nasional (BAPPENAS) (Jakarta: Sekretariat, 1964).  
30 For the organization of the MUPPENAS and its Three -Year Plan, see: Suharto, Kesimpulan-
kesimpulan dan kertas-kerdja- kertas-kerdja, rapat paripurna ke III MUPPENAS (Jakarta: 
Sekretariat MUPEENAS, 1965). 
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simultaneously President, Premier, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces 
and Chairman of the National Front, of the National Advisory Council GPRS 
and of the National Planning Board. The constant structural changes made in 
the economic institutions in the early 1960s were evidence of the constant 
efforts by President Soekarno to retool the whole system of the politics and 
economy to fit his concept of Guided Democracy and Guided Economy. 
Predictably, the unremitting changes had negative consequences on the 
effectiveness of the administrative system, particularly that branch involved in 
economic management. The co-ordination between government departments 
was extremely weak and many of them had to cede the power they had 
previously wielded, a sort of ritual self-immolation. Even more detrimental 
were the problems arising from personal frictions and profound disagreements. 
Because of the President’s personal antipathy to Professor Sumitro, who had 
participated in PRRI, many of the latter’s excellent students, economists trained 
at Western universities, were deliberately overlooked by the government. This 
repudiation of Western economic knowledge is also seen in the fact that no 
foreign experts were invited to consult with DEPERNAS in the creation of the 
Eight-Year Development Plan. This change of tacks took in stark contrast to the 
earlier situation, when Sumitro had made the most of contributions by Western 
economic experts in the formulation of his Economic Urgency Programme and 
the Five-Year Development Plan. Admittedly, despite these xenophobic 
feelings, in April 1960 the Indonesian government did ask the US International 
Co-operation Administration (ICA) to provide economic and financial 
consultants and two economic experts, Bernard R. Bell and Oscar A. Ornati, 
were introduced but their appointment was apparently not a success. They were 
not integrated efficiently and were only consulted on specific technical 
matters.31 
While these changes were taking place, the armed forces were gaining 
extensive access to all economic departments, especially at the regional level. 
                    
31 Guy Pauker, ‘The Indonesian Eight-Year Overall Development Plan’, Pacific Affairs 34 (1961) 
116. 
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After the take-over of the Dutch-owned enterprises in late 1957, followed by 
that of British and American firms in early 1960s, the influence of the army 
spilled over from administrative sphere into direct participation in business. A 
considerable number of profitable foreign firms were placed under the direct 
management of the military. In some aspects the intrusion of the armed forces 
into the apparatus of economic management in Indonesia in the late 1950s and 
the early 1960s was can be compared to the ‘partification’ of the state apparatus 
by the Communist Party in Vietnam which emerged in the early 1950s. The 
major difference is that, whereas the Vietnamese Communist Party ultimately 
attained the outright power in North Vietnam, the Indonesian army had to share 
its power with emerging Communist rivals and was always subordinated to 
President Soekarno. Both the Communists and the army officers were highly 
disciplined and committed to the meaningful independence of their country. 
Their weak point was not their lack of patriotism, which cannot be faulted, but 
their failure to realize that managing an economy always requires both 
extensive economic knowledge and concomitant experience, requirements 
which the Communist leaders and army commanders of Indonesia and Vietnam 
could not immediately provide.  
2. Ideological basis of Guided Economy 
As stated earlier, the idea of an economy operated under direct guidance by the 
state in Indonesia was not an innovation but had been laid down in the 
Constitution of 1945. During the revolutionary period, and especially in the 
initial years after the Transfer of Sovereignty, Article 33 of the 1945 
Constitution (which became Article 38 in the Provisional Constitution of 1950) 
was often referred to in discussions both in Parliament and in public discourse. 
Calls were made on the government demanding the immediate implementation 
of state control of the economy. A number of Nationalist as well as the 
Socialist-inclined parties also accorded Article 33 top priority in their 
programmes for the economy. The stumbling block was that the economic and 
social conditions which would have enabled the state to take full responsibility 
for running the economy were still acutely lacking, hence the leaders of the 
The Guided Economy 
 
241 
successive Indonesian governments in the late 1940s and the early 1950s were 
forced to interpret the economic objectives of the Constitution in terms of a 
gradual process and a long-term plan. Demands for economic development 
which was coupled with political and economic stability had the highest priority 
and, as Indonesia was still struggling to get on its feet, this meant a continued 
foreign presence. As a result, private enterprises, especially those owned by 
foreign corporations, continued to dominate the modern sector of the Indonesian 
economy until the late 1950s.  
The blatant failure of the attempts to achieve Indonesianisasi in the 
early 1950s engendered a nationwide frustration with the advisedly moderate 
measures taken to achieve economic nationalism. In these fraught 
circumstances, the radical Nationalist views espoused by such political parties 
as PNI, Murba, PRN, and especially PKI won a ready audience and increasingly 
gained support from the public, as well as from the President. In fact, President 
Soekarno had betrayed his sympathy for the Communists as early as April 1954, 
when he sent his good wishes to the fifth congress of PKI. However, it was not 
until February 1957 that his support of the PKI was publicly expressed. When 
explaining his konsepsi of the new system of government, President Soekarno 
suggested the unprecedented inclusion of PKI in the formation of a new cabinet. 
He unequivocally asked, ‘Can we continue to ignore a group which has received 
the votes of six million human beings in the elections?’.32 Despite the massive 
numbers quoted, the proposal was not accepted and throughout the whole 
period of Guided Democracy, only two PKI leaders, its chairman Aidit and 
vice-chairman Lukman, were ever appointed to posts in Soekarno’s cabinets. 
Nevertheless, in view of their high positions, it would be sage to assume that 
they exerted some influence on government decision making. Perhaps the 
Communist influence at lower levels, where such PKI-affiliated organizations 
as SOBSI and BTI successfully rallied a large number of worker and peasant 
associations struggling to defend their interests, was more effective.33 
                    
32 Quoted from Feith, The decline of constitutional democracy, 542. 
33 In July 1962, BTI claimed 5.7 million members, one-quarter of all Indonesian adult peasants. 
Later in the same year, SOBSI claimed nearly 3.3 million members. PKI itself had over 2 
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Unquestionably there is evidence that PKI-led movements made some political 
capital out of the anti-corruption campaigns. Yet policy recommendations were 
vague and did little to reduce the chaos.34 
In its turn, PKI was the strongest supporter of President Soekarno and 
his scheme of Guided Democracy. Its most prominent slogan during the 
transition to Guided Democracy between 1957-1959 was ‘a realization of the 
konsepsi 100 per cent’. At the sixth congress of the party in September 1959, 
after President Soekarno gave a speech addressing his approval of PKI attitudes, 
Chairman Aidit affirmed that PKI supported the resurrection of the 1945 
Constitution. He went on to stress that one of the indispensable conditions for 
the establishment of the Guided Democracy system was Soekarno’s leadership 
of the state.35 At the same congress, PKI adopted a new programme which 
contained several points similar to its 1954 programme, especially those 
touching on anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism and the form the government 
should take. One striking feature of the new programme was that it paid a great 
deal of attention to detail and widened the scope of the interests and activities of 
the party. Although, on the occasion of its seventh congress in April 1962, PKI 
again adopted a new programme, its contents were based mainly on its 1959 
programme. In fact, the 1959 programme continued to serve as the official 
guidelines of PKI until the party was banned in March 1966.  
By the time the new PKI programme was adopted in September 1959, 
most Dutch enterprises had been formally nationalized. The stress in the 
programme was therefore not on nationalization as it had been in the 1954 
programme, but on the next step in formation of a people’s democratic state. 
The new state was to be based on the masses and on a national united front of 
peasants and workers, led by the working class. In this people’s democratic 
state, PKI assumed that the people’s government would have to carry out 
                                       
million members by the end of 1962, making it the largest Communist party in any non-
Communist nation. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia,327. 
34J. M. van der Kroef, ‘Indonesian Communism and the changing balance of power’, Pacific 
Affairs, 57 (4) (1964-1965) 369-370. 
35Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Soekarno; Ideology and politics, 1959-1965 
(Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2006) 80; Sundhaussen, The road to power,427. 
The Guided Economy 
 
243 
democratic reforms, including such measures as the abolition of feudalism, the 
distribution of land to the peasants free of charge, the defence of national 
industries and the improvement of the living conditions of the workers. The 
Indonesian economy should be developed in such a way that top priority be 
given to the state sector, particularly stressing the area of state-owned 
enterprises. Nevertheless, it stated that the government should not do anything 
to stand in the way of participation of national capitalists in business, especially 
in industry and trade. When it came to land reform, its tune was rather different. 
The programme demanded that all land owned by foreigners and Indonesian 
landlords be confiscated without compensation and distributed to the peasantry 
on an individual basis. This ukase did not apply to modern and large-scale 
estates, which it thought should not be distributed among the peasantry, but 
placed under state control.   
Besides such general objectives, the new programme contained a 
specific request about the economy, based on ‘a Marxist analysis of the concrete 
situation and the balance of forces’. Under the slogan ‘For economic 
improvement’, owners of foreign estates would be required to cultivate rice on 
estate lands in order to increase the output of this staple. The owners should also 
help the peasants with seeds, fertilizer and implements. Protective tariffs which 
would benefit national enterprises and give them protection against foreign 
competition were also demanded, as was price control. Changes in foreign 
investment legislation were also insisted on to make sure that the foreign 
exchange earnings of the foreign oil companies were retained in the country and 
that the people and the armed services would be guaranteed adequate supplies 
of oil. All mining concessions which had not yet been taken up should be 
withdrawn and exploited by the government itself. Imports and exports and all 
important enterprises should be under full government control. 
Communications, especially outside Java, should be improved. The section on 
‘for better living conditions’ asked for a general improvement in the working 
conditions and living standards of workers and peasants. This could be realized 
by taking such measures as raising wages, eliminating crop mortgages, reducing 
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interest rates on loans, as well as by legalizing ownership of land taken by 
peasants from foreign estates. Small enterprises should be given special 
protection by the government in the form of credit and tax cuts.36 
The high priority in the 1959 PKI programme on state control and 
ownership of businesses, finance, land and mining reflected the recent 
institutional changes in Indonesia. It is noteworthy that the programme was 
drafted after President Soekarno had officially implemented Guided Democracy 
and the Guided Economy. At this state, although Soekarno’s theories of Guided 
Economy did not emerge full-grown in 1959 and were by no means identical to 
those of PKI, the resemblance between the two is unmistakable. During the 
discussions about the introduction of Guided Democracy and the return to the 
1945 Constitution, President Soekarno had often emphasized the importance of 
state leadership in the economy. The cautious PKI application of Marxist 
theories to Indonesia can be seen as a reconciliation with the President’s 
concept of socialism, based on his own ideology of the Pantjasila. As from 
1960, after Communism had become part of NASAKOM, PKI views were 
officially integrated into the state ideology as formulated by Soekarno. 
NASAKOM was the ideological basis of Soekarno’s new national front and 
signaled the co-operation between the three principal political currents in the 
country, Nationalism (Nasionalism), Religion (Agama) and Communism  
(Komunisme).Occasionally this concept was broadened to NASAKOMIL, the 
last three letters referring to the military and their participation in the 
government. In the early 1960s, the PKI leaders tended to speak more often 
under the aegis of Soekarno’s ideologies and doctrine than those of their own 
party programme.  
When President Soekarno inaugurated the Guided Economy, he was 
somewhat vague about its main aim: the general drift was an Indonesian sort of 
socialism, a just and prosperous society (masjarakat adil dan makmur).37 As did 
                    
36 Van der Kroef, The Communist party of Indonesia, 185-198. 
37 ‘Djawaban Presiden Soekarno atas pertanjaan2 para anggota tentang ‘Demokrasi Terpimpin’ 
pada sidang Dewan nasional ke-VI, tanggal 5 Djuni 1958’.in Soekarno, Roeslan Abdulgani, 
Djuanda, Demokrasi Terpimpin (Jakarta: Dewan Nasional RI, 1958). 
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other Indonesian intellectuals, he identified the Guided Economy with a planned 
economy and thought the new system as a viable alternative to economic 
liberalism, which he was convinced ought to be abandoned.38 A planned 
economy, in the view of President Soekarno, was an integral element in 
Indonesian Socialism. In a speech in front of the National Council in July 1958, 
he stated that Indonesian Socialism had to exhibit a planned and orderly 
character. All fields, including economy, finance, culture, defence and others, 
had to be planned. There ere no two ways about it; the Indonesian economy was 
to be a planned economy.39 The objectives of the Guided Economy became 
more specific in July 1959, following the official re-enactment of Article 33 of 
the 1945 Constitution and the Pantjasila. In the programme of the 
KabinetKerdja, the first of its three short-terms goals was ‘[…] to obtain an 
adequate supply of food and clothing for the people’.40 This part of the 
programme was known as the Sandang-pangan (clothing-food) Programme. 
The Sandang-pangan Programme was intended to be completed within two 
years, by the end of 1961, but, in effect, providing people with an adequate 
supply of clothing and food remained the primary task of Soekarno’s 
government throughout the entire period of Guided Democracy.  
On Independence Day of 17 August 1959, President Soekarno delivered 
a speech entitled ‘The Rediscovery of Our Revolution’, which was soon 
adopted by MPRS as a basic guideline of state policy in Indonesia. In the 
speech, now labelled Manipol (Manifesto Politik), President Soekarno set out 
the principles, tasks, social powers, character and enemies of the Indonesian 
Revolution. The principal tasks were to free Indonesia from all kinds and every 
vestige of imperialism and to achieve three aims: a Unitary State of the 
                    
38 See Indonesian intellectual discussion on Guided Economy in H.Moh. Djambek, Doktrin 
Ekonomi Terpimpin dan Pembangunan; kuliah ilmiah pendidikan kader revolusi angkatan 
Dwikora (Jakarta: Jajasan Serbaguna, 1965); Mohammad Hatta, Ekonomi terpimpin (Jakarta: 
Fasco, 1960); ‘Demokrasi Terpimpin’, Jakarta, 15 August 1958. 
39 ‘Pidato Presiden Soekarno tentang ‘Demokrasi terpimpin’ dalam sidang Dewan Nasional ke-
VIII tanggal 23 Djuli 1958’.in Soekarno, Roeslan Abdulgani, Djuanda, Demokrasi Terpimpin 
(Jakarta: Dewan Nasional RI, 1958) 
40 T.K.Tan, ‘Soekarnian Economics’, in T.K. Tan (ed.), Soekarno’s Guided Indonesia 
(Melbourne: Jacaranda Press, 1976) 34. 
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Republic of Indonesia with a territory stretching from Sabang to Merauke, good 
friendship between the Republic of Indonesia and all the states of Asia-Africa in 
the creation of a New World, free from imperialism and colonialism and a just 
and prosperous society. This ideal society would be called ‘Socialism à la 
Indonesia’, a distinct form of Socialism in tune with the conditions, nature, 
customs, culture and psychology of the Indonesian nation.41 Soekarno’s 
Socialism was therefore not identical to the orthodox international Marxist 
theories of Socialism which were being implemented in North Vietnam. 
No one doubted that it was to be an uphill struggle and that if these 
socialist goals were to be attained, plenty of groundwork had to be undertaken 
and efforts made to retool the whole system of politics, economy and society. 
New instruments, tools and apparatus would replace those which did not match 
the ideology of Guided Democracy. In the field of economics, retooling was 
carried out in all branches of production and distribution so as to ensure that (in 
a rather mixed metaphor): ‘The steering-wheel turning towards the realization 
of Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, using the rails of Guided Economy’. All 
instruments vital to production and distribution should be under the control of 
the state or at the very least under the state supervision. Manipol also stressed 
the efforts which had to be made to mobilize and organize all funds and forces, 
including foreign funds, if progressive countries were willing to help realize the 
programme of the Indonesian government. Any foreign funds and forces 
contributed could be channelled towards industrial development, for instance, in 
medium-size industry which was open to private initiative. To deal with the 
land problem, Manipol continued, the government should abolish the 
proprietary right (hak-eigendom) to land inherited from Dutch colonialism and 
the right to own landed property would be exclusively for Indonesians. It was 
unacceptable in independent Indonesia to have land owned by foreigners, 
especially the Dutch.42 President Soekarno’s command immediately resulted in 
                    
41 Roeslan Abdulgani, Pantjawarsa Manipol (Jakarta: Panitia Pembina Djiwa Revolusi, 1964) 22. 
42 In colonial times, foreigners were not legally allowed to own land. All land without certified 
ownership (eigendom) remained ‘free domain of the state’ or state land. The colonial 
government granted a title of long-lease (eftpacht) of up to 75 years to foreign planters. 
Nevertheless, an Indonesian national with dual nationality could acquire a right of ownership. 
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the promulgation of a Basic Agrarian Law in September 1960, which effectively 
replaced the Dutch system of land rights then still in operation. The right of 
ownership (eigendom) previously acquired by a foreigner or an Indonesian 
national with dual nationality was converted into the right of use (hak pakai). 
Only Indonesian nationals holding single nationality could apply for ownership 
(hak milik) of land.43 
In Manipol it was stated that Indonesia opposed Dutch imperialism, 
considering that the Dutch still possessed West Irian. It was also stated that the 
take-over of Dutch enterprises marked an important step in the context of 
struggle for the liberation of West Irian. However, as Manipol emphasized, not 
all Dutch capital had been taken over and not all Dutch enterprises had been 
nationalized. If the Dutch remained ‘stubborn’ in the matter of West Irian, ‘all 
the Dutch capital, including that in mixed enterprises, would bring its story to a 
close on Indonesian soil!’. The enemies of the Indonesian revolution, said the 
President, were not only the Dutch imperialists, other imperialists were also 
lurking around and they were trying to deceive the Republic of Indonesia by 
tacitly offering support to counter-revolutionaries and by perpetrating economic 
sabotage. In this respect, the Manipol affirmed that the owners of foreign non-
Dutch capital present in Indonesia had to obey requirements set by the 
government. If such capitalists did not use it according to Indonesian 
regulations or illegally gave assistance to counter revolutionaries or those 
committing economic sabotage, the Indonesian people would one day treat them 
as they had dealt with Dutch companies.44 
The retooling and re-ordering of the economic system were said by 
President Soekarno to be essential to providing supplementary contents to his 
                                       
Like many other colonial laws, this land law, promulgated in 1870, continued to be in force in 
post-independent Indonesia, until September 1960. 
43 For more information about the Basic Agrarian Law of September 1960 and its implementation 
in Daryono, ‘Transformation of land rights in Indonesia; A mixed private and public law 
model’, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal (July 2010) 418-457; Jude Wallace, ‘Indonesian 
land law and administration’, in: Tim Lindsey (ed.), Indonesia; Law and society (Singapore: 
The Federation Press, 1999) 191-223. 
44Political Manifesto Republic of Indonesia of 17th August 1959 (Jakarta: Department of 
Information RI, 1959). 
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cabinet programme, which was devoted to only the most urgent needs of the 
Indonesian people, namely: clothing and food. In these efforts, the domestic 
struggle against Dutch economic interests loomed very large, since for the time 
being the government had decided not to bring the West Irian issue up before 
the United Nations. In this respect, President Soekarno asserted, the shifting of 
the tobacco market from Amsterdam to Bremen, the abolition of property rights 
of the Dutch in Indonesia and the take-over of Dutch enterprises were all linked 
up with the government struggle to liberate West Irian. It is therefore important 
to keep in mind when studying the Indonesian economy in the years after 1959 
that the government was ready to sacrifice the immediate economic well-being 
of the country in order to uphold political ideals and national pride. On 18 
August 1962, three days after the Dutch agreement to withdraw from West 
Irian,45 President Soekarno made a pledge that now the West Irian issue was 
resolved, he would devote special attention to the economic front.46 After a few 
months of preparation, on 28 March 1963, President Soekarno made public his 
further thinking about the Guided Economy, known as the Economic 
Declaration (Deklarasi Ekonomi) or Dekon.  
Inside Indonesia itself, Dekon was considered to be the economic 
counterpart of the Political Manifesto and was often called the ‘Economic 
Manifesto’. It assumed that the growth of the Indonesian economy would take 
place in two stages. The first stage would be a period in which an economic 
structure would be created that was ‘national and democratic in character, 
unsullied by vestiges of imperialism and feudalism’. In the second stage, the 
chief task would be to establish a socialist economy, an economy free of the 
exploitation of man by man (exploitation de l’homme par l’homme). In socialist 
                    
45 Under pressure from the United States, on 15 August 1962 the Netherlands and Indonesia 
signed the New York Agreement on West Irian which was put under a temporary trusteeship of 
the United States before being transferred to Indonesia in May 1963. Under the Act of Free 
Choice, in 1969, the leaders of West Irian, now New Guinea, decided to join the Republic of 
Indonesia. For more information about the negotiations over the West Irian, see: P.J. 
Drooglever, An act of free choice; Decolonization and the right to self-determination in West 
Papua (Oxford: Oneworld Publictions, 2009). 
46 ‘The year of triumph’, Review of Indonesia 7 (1963) 28. For Indonesian version see: Roeslan 
Abdulgani, Pantjawarsa Manipol, 305-350. 
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Indonesia, it was asserted, each person would be ensured ‘work, food, clothing 
and housing as well as a proper cultural and spiritual life’. Dekon also clearly 
underscored that Indonesia was still in the first stage of its revolution and that 
the second stage could not begin until the first one has been completed. For the 
strategic direction of economic development, Dekon stressed, all efforts had to 
be devoted to expanding production by exploiting the abundant natural 
resources of the country to the full. This meant that agriculture, estates and 
mining had to be prioritized, while a firm foundation was being laid for 
industrialization.  
In the struggle to complete the national democratic stage, the three basic 
potentials of the economy, the state, co-operatives and private business, had to 
be fully mobilized. While the state continued to hold the leading position in the 
economy and co-operatives were being encouraged to unite and assist the 
working masses in all their livelihoods, more possibilities for economic 
participation needed to be opened up to national entrepreneurs, who could play 
an important role in developing industries. The private sector could serve as an 
auxiliary factor to the state sector. Operating in wider parts of the economy, 
state-owned enterprises should become the main source of capital for further 
development. Should insufficient capital be raised from domestic sources, 
Dekon stated, credit could be sought from abroad. Foreign investors would be 
repaid on the basis of production-sharing, obtaining a proportion of the output 
produced by the projects they participated in. It was clearly hammered home 
that ownership and management of the joint enterprises must remain in the 
Indonesian hands.  
Aware of the inefficiency and mismanagement of state-owned 
enterprises, partly attributable to the geographical distance between the 
centralized administration in Jakarta and the regions, Dekon urged for 
deconcentration (dekonsentrasi). Accordingly, the region or branch of the state 
enterprises would be granted a degree autonomy and, importantly, sufficient 
individual responsibility. This deconcentration was intended to operate only in 
matters concerning the region or branch itself. It had to be carried out ‘without 
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sacrificing centralization in planning and final control, which resides in the 
hands of the center.’ Dekon also unequivocally delineated that deconcentration 
in management did not fall under local autonomy and that Indonesia must 
remain a unified economic and political entity. 
Besides its basic economic strategy, Dekon outlined a short-term 
programme for the next two years. The major tasks to be achieved by the 
programme were to resolve the question of sandang-pangan goods, which was 
becoming a serious problem. To accomplish this, Dekon specified that ‘the 
government must possess and control an “iron stock” of rice.’ Inn essence this 
meant that the government must be able to control the supply and distribution of 
rice. The aim was to establish a basic stockpile of rice in order to control the 
rice price in the market, and it was also acknowledged that measures were 
needed to increase production. Dekon stressed the task of also increasing 
productive capacity in other fields in order to meet the basic needs of the 
people. Imports were acknowledged to be necessary, but only for essential 
consumer goods and for the raw materials needed for investment. The import of 
luxury goods should be reduced as much as possible. Another measure to 
increase production was through taxation, and Dekon promised that the 
government would conduct a radical overhaul of taxes and budget policies so as 
to improve benefits to producers.47 
By introducing Manipol and Dekon, President Soekarno had so far 
thrown the emphasis on the struggle against the economic exploitation of 
(Dutch) imperialism and on state control of the economy. In passing, he 
indicated the objective of economic self-sufficiency when he stressed the 
importance of ‘national funds and forces’ in the realization of his cabinet’s 
programme. To achieve this they would be aided by abetted import restrictions. 
In his Independence Day speech of 17 August 1963, he expressed his great 
pleasure in witnessing the growing desire of the Indonesian people to build the 
national economy by their own effort, which he chose to refer to as economic 
                    
47 Soekarno, Deklarasi Ekonomi; Diutjapkan oleh Presiden Soekarno di Istana Negara, Djakarta, 
tanggal 28 Maret 1963, (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan R.I., 1963). 
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patriotism.48 Then, on 17 August 1964, in his famous Independence Day speech 
‘Tahun “Vivere Pericoloso”’ (Year of Living Dangerously), President Soekarno 
officially introduced a new principle of the Guided Economy, namely berdiri 
diatas kaki sendiri (standing on one’s own [two] feet). Initially, this slogan 
referred to self-reliance in rice.49 But in another speech entitled Berdiri Diatas 
Kaki Sendiri before MPRS in April 1965, he extended the scope of self-reliance 
to all fields of the Revolution. MPRS lost no time in adopting Soekarno’s 
concept, now termed Berdikari, as the new foundation for national economic 
policy.  
Berdikari grew out of the President’s conviction that the Eight-Year 
Development Plan was not working because the B-projects, designed to provide 
finance for the A-projects, were so heavily dependent on the co-operation with 
foreign firms. He now changed tack, averring that the revolutionary 
development of Indonesia should be based instead on its abundance of natural 
resources and ‘the extensive use of funds and forces’ present in the country. 
President Soekarno now called for a banting stir (turn of the wheel) to achieve 
Berdikari. Taking North Korea as his model of a successful self-sufficient 
economy, which had already solved the problem of sandang-pandang and had 
become ‘an industrial country’, Soekarno was anxious that Indonesia would not 
be left behind. If it was to achieve similar economic self-reliance, Indonesia had 
to accomplish five urgent economic tasks, namely, completing projects on 
nation and character building, solving the sandang-pangan problem as soon as 
possible, continuing projects which were already under construction or deemed 
economically very important to the strategy of the country, overcoming 
obstacles to development by exploring and encouraging the strength of the 
Indonesian people and exploiting natural resources to produce more goods and 
solving the problem of the foreign capital already invested in Indonesia, so that 
Indonesia could achieve full independence in the field of economy. 
                    
48 His speech was titled ‘Genta suara revolusi Indonesia’ (The resounding voice of the Indonesian 
revolution). See: Roeslan Abdulgani, Pantjawarsa Manipol, 353-398. 
49 Roeslan Abdulgani, Pantjawarsa Manipol, 443. 
Beyond Political Skin 
 
252 
With these new thoughts in mind, President Soekarno requested that the 
people embrace a new Programme of Economic Struggle (Kebidjaksanaan 
Ekonomi Perdjuangan), which had to be based on the Berdikari principle. 
Berdikari in fact became the ideological foundation for the later Three-Year 
Plan (1966-1968). Soekarno ordered various changes which he deemed 
necessary in government economic policies. In the field of international trade, 
exports were to be encouraged and imports restricted to goods, which could not 
be procured in Indonesia. The President decided that importing would be carried 
out only by the government. Private entrepreneurs were prohibited take part in 
any importing unless in the name of the government. Among these private 
entrepreneurs, licences would only be granted to producer-exporter candidates 
who were willing to export under government guidance. The task of the 
Revolution imposed on private entrepreneurs was just one element of the 
socialist economy of Indonesia. In the new economic climate, it was decreed 
that co-operatives would be reorganized into two types, production co-
operatives and distribution co-operatives. Turning to the financial sector, 
Soekarno stated that Indonesia had to utilize ‘all funds and forces’ existing in 
the country, from co-operatives and private enterprises to farmers, workers and 
the armed forces efficiently. State-owned enterprises would be the major motor 
to generate development. Measures had to be taken to fight mismanagement and 
abuse of authority. Managerial expertise, managerial skills, leadership and co-
operation between managers and workers all had to be honed and improved. 
The regions should have more autonomy and authority to create their own 
financial resources. In order to reduce inflation and keep it under control, 
President Soekarno declared that the government budget should be directly 
under his control.50 
In an undelivered message appended to this speech, Soekarno stated 
that the principle of berdiri diatas kaki sendiri had been an idea he had nurtured 
since 1932, when he used the slogan ‘self-help’ in an attempt to inspire the 
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Nationalist movement against Dutch colonialism.51 Regardless of the conceptual 
difference between ‘self-help’ and ‘self-reliance’, if this statement was true, it is 
difficult to understand why Soekarno had made such strenuous efforts in earlier 
years to lure investment and capital from Western countries, particularly the 
United States. Almost half of the Rp. 240 billion of the A-projects was expected 
to be provided by the B-projects, which in turn could only be financed by an 
influx of foreign capital, either to be used to develop untapped natural resources 
or in the form of loan. Immediately after the Eight-Year Development Plan was 
launched, President Soekarno went to meet President Kennedy, who offered to 
assist Indonesia to finance the Plan. In 1962-1963, rumours were spreading in 
Indonesia, based on a report by the US economic mission for Indonesia led by 
D.D. Humphrey, that the US government would provide Indonesia with some $ 
400 million in aid.52 The production-sharing possibility offered by Dekon, 
followed by the issuing of a series of regulations on foreign investment in May 
1963, was intended to give the signal that the economy of Indonesia had been 
liberalized.   
Disappointment was rife in Indonesia when realization dawned that the 
Humphrey mission’s report was no more than a recommendation and not an 
official commitment. President Kennedy’s aid policy came under considerable 
attack in Congress. Therefore, in 1963 the American government could offer 
only very little credit, about $ 17 million in March and $ 50 million in August, 
channelled through IMF.53 Meanwhile, help was coming from the other side in 
the Cold War. The Soviet Union was trying to increase its influence in 
Indonesia. Its first loan to Indonesia was $100 in 1956 but this was increased to 
$ 250 million in January 1960, the bulk of it intended for the purchase of Soviet 
military weapons.54 By 1962, Soviet loans had expanded to $ 700-800 million.55 
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Chinese-Indonesian relations were also improved. In 1960, China granted 
Indonesia $ 46 million and another $ 30 million in October 1961.56 By April 
1960, the total loans from the Communist countries to Indonesia amounted to $ 
563 million, almost equivalent to the accumulated loans of $ 607 million from 
the US. To cap it all, the loans from the Communist countries were offered at a 
low interest rate of 2.5 per cent against the 5 per cent asked by the US.57 Even 
though strongly opposing government policies on foreign investment, by late 
1963 PKI decided to follow the Peking line.58 Relations between the US and 
Indonesia hardened after the death of President Kennedy. President Johnson 
supported Great Britain in the formation of Malaysia, to which Soekarno was 
adamantly opposed. In early 1964, the US government decided to abandon a 
proposal to lend $ 250 million to Indonesia. Humiliated by the American 
attitude, in a public speech attended by US Ambassador Jones in March 1964, 
Soekarno openly stated ‘Go to hell with your aid’.59 Hence, Berdikari was 
officially born in the tensions of the Cold War. Its main target was against the 
US, not the Soviet or the People’s Republic of China. In fact a strong case can 
be made to argue that it was born of failure to implement Dekon which was 
used to attract investment and financial aid from Western countries.  
The adoption of Berdikari imbued Guided Democracy and the Guided 
Economy with important additional substance. The ultimate goal of the 
Indonesian Revolution had been expanded and was now more than establishing 
a just and prosperous society, it was also expected to forge a ‘self-reliant’ 
economy. Forming a trio with Manipol and Dekon, Berdikari established the 
basic guideline on which the national economic policy could be based. These 
three documents complemented each other and fused to create the main 
philosophy and aim of the Guided Economy. Although they are often associated 
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with the person of President Soekarno, they were not based on concepts thought 
up by the President alone nor were they entirely new concepts in Indonesian 
political thought. When it was all said and done, Manipol did not introduce 
many new elements at all. The essence of Manipol was USDEK, an acronym, 
whose letters referred to the five essential elements of the Indonesian state 
philosophy: the Constitution of 1945 (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945), Indonesian 
Socialism (Sosialisme à la Indonesia), Guided Democracy (Demokrasi 
Terpimpin), Guided Economy (Ekonomi Terpimpin) and Indonesian identity 
(Kepribadian Indonesia). Needless to say, these terms had all been favoured 
topics of discussion in Indonesian political discourse since Independence. When 
Soekarno ‘rediscovered the Revolution’, he simply restructured and 
systematized themes, which turning them into a weapon to attack the previous 
political and economic system.60 
Dekon was drafted by the Cabinet and the Supreme Advisory Council 
after many marathon meetings chaired by Soekarno with the active participation 
of Djuanda and other experts, technocrats in finance, trade and agriculture, and 
not forgetting the army leadership.61 It was often criticized by moderate groups, 
which argued ‘there is nothing new in it’ and ‘all of this had been said 
repeatedly and yet the situation has not gotten better but the contrary’.62 Nor 
was Berdikari Soekarno’s own idea. He himself stated that had had been given 
this idea by the leader of North Korea, Kim II Sung, ‘[…] in order to build a 
democratic state, the foundation of an independent economy of the nation must 
be established. Without the foundation of an independent economy, we can 
neither attain independence, nor found the state, nor subsist’.63 The general 
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sentiment applauding anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism in favour of a gotong-
rojong economy emphasized in Manipol, Dekon and Berdikari had been an 
almost universal element in Indonesian political ideology since Independence. 
Looking at the views of the political parties, it is not difficult to recognize that 
there was plenty of common ground between Soekarno’s ideologies and those 
of PNI, PKI, Murba, NU, PRN as well as various other nationalist parties. 
Demands that power be balanced against the increasing influence of the army 
drove Soekarno closer to the Nationalist and Communist-influenced parties, 
which were drumming up considerable support among the population. 
President Soekarno indubitably bore the ultimate responsibility for the 
system. Nevertheless, as T.K. Tan puts it, under the system of highly centralized 
control, the whole success or failure Guided Democracy fell into the hands of 
those who directed it.64This fact was also perceived by leaders of the Indonesian 
government. In his explanation of Manipol in 1963, Roeslan Abdulgani, 
Deputy-Chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council, emphasized the 
importance of ‘the role of the executors’. He quoted a statement issued by the 
Supreme Advisory Council that, ‘although the political manifesto is very 
important because it has given the answer to the basic problems of the 
Revolution and has also put forward the basic efforts for the completion of the 
Indonesian Revolution, nevertheless, its realization depends very much on the 
persons, who will be given the task of executing it’. The people charged with 
the execution of Manipol, Roeslan Abdulgani explained, were those who had 
been given a share in the authority of the state.65 Military officers were 
explicitly part of the executors of the state ideology and policy, if not the most 
powerful ones. 
3. Take-over and Nationalization 
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In Manipol, it was stated that the cause of and context for the take-over of 
Dutch firms was the Indonesian struggle for the liberalization of West Irian. 
This struggle had been being waged since the mid-1950s, after negotiations by 
successive Indonesian cabinets with the Netherlands had collapsed. In an 
attempt to maintain its laatste parel in de Gordel van Smaragd (Last Pearl in 
the Emerald Girdle), the Netherlands refused to countenance the transfer of 
sovereignty of West Irian to Indonesia.66 The failure of the Indonesian 
government to involve the United Nations in the dispute signalled a further 
deterioration in Dutch-Indonesian relations, of which the final result was a 
unilateral abrogation of the Round Table Conference Agreement in February 
1956. Nevertheless, with the exception of a number of electricity and gas 
companies, the subsequent second Ali and Djuanda Cabinets did not express 
any desire to confiscate or nationalize Dutch companies. One of the reasons for 
their reticence was that that they knew the government could not afford to pay 
for this nationalization. 
In August 1957, a group of Asian and African nations once again 
attempted to put the conflict over West Irian back on the agenda of the United 
Nations General Assembly. From that time, the West Irian issue appeared 
almost daily in Indonesian media. On 28 October, President Soekarno launched 
the ‘Campaign to Liberate West Irian’, followed by a four-day boycott of Dutch 
firms throughout Indonesia. A few weeks later, at another mass rally in Jakarta, 
President Soekarno announced that, if the resolution of the United Nations 
about West Irian issue failed again, the Indonesian government would take 
measures to ‘startle the world’, including nationalizing vital Dutch businesses. 
As expected, the General Assembly meeting of 29 November did not obtain the 
required two-thirds vote on the resolution.67 
The next day as the news spread in Jakarta, an attempt was made to 
assassinate Soekarno. Although the President escaped unharmed, two people 
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were killed and at least thirty were wounded.68 This attempt certainly added fuel 
to the tensions. On 1 December 1957, the Djuanda Cabinet met and agreed on a 
set of reprisals. A nationwide strike against Dutch enterprises was announced 
on the radio by Minister of Information Soedibjo. On the morning of 3 
December, the KLM representative in Indonesia, A.H. Duyf, was informed that 
the KLM landing rights in Jakarta had been rescinded. The nationwide 24-hour 
strike took place as planned on 2 December and on 3 December, the Secretary-
General of Justice announced that no more visas would be issued to Dutch 
nationals. All financial transfers to the Netherlands were blocked. The next day, 
a prohibition was announced on Dutch newspapers and films.69 
The seizure of Dutch enterprises began on 3 December 1957, when a 
delegation of trade unions affiliated with PNI and PKI entered the head office of 
the KPM shipping company in Jakarta. There, they read out a proclamation 
declaring that the workers were taking over the company. When the KPM 
directors refused to sign the proclamation, they were forced to leave their 
offices. All employees were then ordered to gather in front of the KPM building 
where the union leader again read out the proclamation. The KPM flag was 
lowered and replaced by the Indonesian national flag and the plain red union 
flag.  The KPM facilities on shore and about forty ships (out of total of ninety-
six) were taken over. Most of the other ships had already been moved to 
Singapore and other foreign ports before the seizure.70 
The seizure of KPM set the pattern for a series of similar take-over of 
Dutch companies throughout the country over the next few days. The 
management of three Dutch banks, namely the Escomptobank, the Nationale 
Handelsbank and the Cultuurbank passed into the hands of a trade union 
committee, All-Indonesian Union of Bank Employees (Serikat Buruh Bank 
Seluruh Indonesia, SBBSI). On 4 December 1957, the assets of the ‘Big Five’ 
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(Borsumij, Geo. Wehry, Internatio, Jacobson van den Berg and Lindeteves) and 
of the NHM (Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij) were also seized.71 BPM 
and Unilever escaped the take-over in view of their joint Anglo-Dutch 
ownership.72 On 5 December, the Indonesian Minister of Justice ordered all 
Dutch nationals who were not employed to leave Indonesia within the next few 
months.73 On 13 December 1957 Nasution as Martial Law administrator, 
tightened the prohibition on any further take-over and put the enterprises 
already seized under military command, presumably to circumvent Communists 
gaining control of these assets through the local trade unions which had carried 
out actual take-over. Finally, on 19 December 1957, Prime Minister Djuanda 
issued an announcement officially placing Dutch-owned enterprises under 
control of the Indonesian government. By that time, the total number of 
companies seized had reached 700, 500 of them estate enterprises.74 
For one year after the take-over in December 1957, the Indonesian 
government hesistated about the future legal status of the Dutch companies. 
Only in December 1958 was it decided that the companies should be 
nationalized and permanently placed under government. A law on the 
nationalization of Dutch enterprises was finally promulgated on 31 December 
1958. It laid down that Dutch-owned enterprises within the territory of the 
Republic of Indonesia were nationalized and were declared the full and free 
property of the State of the Republic of Indonesia. The amount of compensation 
‘will be determined by a committee whose members are appointed by the 
government’. In its preamble, the law specified three factors which were 
directly connected with nationalization: the framework of the liberation of Irian 
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Barat, the abrogation of the Round Table Conference agreements and the 
intention to derive the greatest possible benefit for all Indonesians and to 
improve the security and defence of the state.75 
The promulgation of the law on the nationalization of Dutch-owned 
enterprises, laid the foundation for the final expulsion of Dutch businesses from 
Indonesia. The number of Dutch enterprises affected by this law was very large. 
On 21 November 1958, Colonel Suprajogi had already submitted of list of 
enterprises to Parliament, which the Central Military Authority handed over to 
the relevant government ministries in preparation for the actual nationalization. 
The list included seventy-seven agricultural enterprises, ninety-two industrial 
and mining enterprises, thirty-one banks and insurance concerns, thirty-two 
trading enterprises and some other businesses.76 In comparison to the total 
number of Dutch enterprises seized in December 1957, the military certainly 
retained more than half of enterprises for itself. In February 1959, the Djuanda 
Cabinet issued an ordinance on the determination of Dutch-owned tobacco 
agrarian enterprises to be nationalized. A list of thirty-eight tobacco enterprises 
was provided, of which twenty-two were located in North Sumatra, fourteen in 
East Java and two in Central Java. The principal proprietors were the Deli 
Company, the Oud-Djember Company and the Senembah Company.77 
The ordinance on the nationalization of tobacco enterprises became the 
prototype for a series of similar ordinances relating to the nationalization of 
estate enterprises. By May 1959, some 277 plantations of various types and 
sizes had been nationalized.78 Dutch trading and manufacturing firms, about 
forty, including the ‘Big Five’, were nationalized in June 1959. A report issued 
by the Association of Employers in Indonesia (Ondernemersbond voor 
Indonesia) in July 1959 indicated that 248 Dutch companies had so far been 
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nationalized, of which ninety-two were engaged in mining, seventy-seven in 
estate agriculture and thirty-two in trading, just to mention the largest 
categories. These 248 companies were said to represent a value of $ 1.5 
billion.79 Nationalization was continued in 1960 and neared its conclusion by 
the end of the same year. So far such Anglo-Dutch ventures as BPM and 
Unilever had escaped unscathed. On 28 July 1960, Colonel Suprajogi, now 
Core Minister for Production, reported to the cabinet that 489 Dutch companies 
had been nationalized to date, including forty trading firms, 161 industrial and 
mining companies, 216 in the estate sector, nine in electricity and gas concerns, 
eleven livestock breeding companies, ten in charter firms, two printers, twelve 
involved in railways, two in banking, fourteen in assurance and twelve in 
maritime services. Approximately another 100 enterprises were awaiting 
nationalization.80 
The principal motivation behind the rapid nationalization of Dutch 
enterprises was the interventions by PKI and SOBSI. Between February and 
December 1959, SOBSI and its various affiliated trade unions repeatedly sent 
appeals to the government urging that the law on the nationalization of Dutch-
owned enterprises be passed. In August 1959, for instance, SOBSI sent a 
resolution to the government calling for an immediate nationalization of all 
Dutch enterprises, noting that the government had so far only focused on the 
nationalization of tobacco companies, corporate farms, gas and electricity 
companies, estates and railway companies in Java and Madura. Dutch capital in 
the oil sector remained free ‘to play its role in raking the riches of the 
Indonesian soil.’ SOBSI urged the government to nationalize all Dutch 
companies, including oil companies, making them state property under 
government supervision. The resolution named various important enterprises 
which still had not yet been nationalized or transferred to state ownership. 
These included printing (Kolff and Van Dorp), manufacturing (Nimef and 
Molenvliet), shipbuilding (VPV), pharmaceutical companies (Rathkamp and 
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Van Gorkom), trading (Borsumy, Lindeteves and Internatio),81 banking (NHM) 
and the railway company DSM in North Sumatra.82 One month later, on 30 
September 1959, SOBSI was again urging the nationalization of all Dutch 
companies, including the joint ventures with non-Dutch foreign capital, such as 
BPM. The government had no choice but to put all vital enterprises, such as 
transport, mining, electricity and estates, under its control and ownership.83 
Similarly, on 4 December 1959, at a congress in Solo in the presence of 
President Soekarno, PKI passed a resolution calling for the nationalization of all 
the remaining Dutch enterprises and the expulsion of the Dutch from 
Indonesia.84 
Various occupational associations also exerted pressure on the 
government to pursue the nationalization of Dutch enterprises as vigorously as 
possible. For instance, in April 1959, when news spread that the government 
would not nationalize oil companies because of the dearth of experts 
compounded by financial difficulties, the Technicians’ Association of 
Yogyakarta sent a detailed proposal to the Indonesian government insisting on a 
reorganization of oil companies after nationalization. It emphasized the 
importance of the oil sector to the economic growth and national security of 
Indonesia. Since a large number of experts and employees working for Dutch 
Shell companies were non-Dutch, it argued, the Indonesian government could 
also employ foreign experts after nationalization. The Technicians’ Association 
also asserted that the Indonesian technical experts in their organization could 
also handle the job.85 A similar proposal was put forward by the Indonesia 
Pharmaceutical Importers’ Association in February 1959, urging the 
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government to allow its members to participate in the nationalization of Dutch 
pharmaceutical companies.86 
The Dutch attitude towards the take-over and nationalization by the 
Indonesian government was predictably fierce. The Dutch government protested 
and stated that no transfer of ownership had been acknowledged and that this 
non-recognition also applied to what was produced by these firms.87 
Nevertheless, since the Indonesians promised to pay damages, with its hand 
tied, all the Dutch government could do was to provide mediation in order to 
reach some sort of satisfactory outcome. The issue of compensation was 
primarily a matter between the Indonesian government and Dutch individuals. 
One of the first to protest was KPM, demanding 120 million guilders in 
compensation for ships seized. Prime Minister Djuanda retorted by claiming 
that for some time KPM had already been busy liquidating its operations in 
Indonesian waters.88 Some estate companies fought against the seizure by 
bringing a lawsuit against those foreign companies which were marketing 
produce from their former plantations in Indonesia. In early 1959, two Dutch 
tobacco companies, the Deli Tobacco Company and the Senembah Company, 
appealed to a German court for property rights to the tobacco harvest of 1958, 
which had been shipped to Bremen by a Germany company.89 They asked the 
German court for an injunction which would oblige the German company to 
deliver the tobacco to them. The German court refused to hand down the 
injunction on the grounds that the Dutch tobacco companies had forfeited their 
property rights at the time of the take-over.90 The Handelsvereeniging 
“Amsterdam”, although it did adopt the same stance as the Dutch government 
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on the seizure, warned that it would take legal action if the Indonesian 
authorities traded in products originating from its estates.91 
The official Dutch claim for compensation amounted to 1,260 million 
guilders. This estimate was based on the total of the material and capital 
investment by the Dutch companies in Indonesia between 1950 and 1957. It 
consisted of privately owned real estate (140 million guilders), small enterprises 
(120 million guilders), pensions (capitalized 112 million guilders), loans since 
1950 (218 million guilders), lend-lease silver (20 million guilders), taxes (650 
million guilders), plus interest of 5 per cent per month for the eight-year period 
(1950-1958).92 In some circumstances, the Dutch also claimed an additional 
payment of 887 million guilders, which was broken up into various parts. The 
main components were interest accumulated up to 1962 and the repayment of 
Indonesian bonds (237 million guilders), payment of pensions (290 million 
guilders), loss of redemption and interest on two state loans (220 million 
guilders) and an outstanding debt on interstate loans (110 million guilders).93 
The Indonesian government again rejected the claim, arguing that the Dutch 
firms had long ago repatriated their capital to the Netherlands.94 As a result of 
the diplomatic crisis, trade relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands 
ground to a halt in the late 1950s and early 1960s. When relations were restored 
in 1963, Dutch exports to Indonesia amounted to only 27 million, rising to 43 
million guilders in 1964. The imports from Indonesia to the Netherlands were 
55 million in 1963 and 344 million in 1964, of which tin ore (170 million 
guilders) and petroleum (88 million guilders) were the major players.95 By 
comparison, Dutch exports to Indonesia in 1956 were 315 million, whereas the 
reverse trade was 454 million guilders in 1957 (Table 7, Chapter 3).  
                    
91 NA, Report of the N.V. Handelsvereeniging “Amsterdam”, November 1958, EZ, inventory 
number 123. 
92 NA, Netherlands delegation in the joint Netherlands Indonesian committee on outstanding 
financial problems, EZ, inventory number 128. 
93 NA. Economisch-financiele betrekking met Indonesie, EZ, inventory number 127. 
94 Lindblad, Bridges to new business, 185. 
95 NA, Trade relation with Indonesia, 8 April 1965, EZ, inventory number 128. 
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Although the prime target of the take-over and subsequent 
nationalization were Dutch property, a number of non-Dutch enterprises were 
also seized under various circumstances. In May 1959, the Norwegian owner of 
the A/S Norsk-Sumatra Plantage Kompagni in Kota Pinang, Deli, reported to 
the General Association of Rubber Planters in East Sumatra (Algemeene 
Vereeniging van Rubber Planters ter Oostkust van Sumatra, AVROS) that, 
between June and August 1958, his estate had ben raided several times and then 
finally taken over by ‘rebel forces’. The majority of the buildings, among them 
the factory, smokehouses, office and practically all accommodation, had been 
destroyed, incurring an estimated loss to the estate of nearly Rp. 8 million. 
Several attempts were made by the government forces to clear the area of rebel 
occupation, but the estate was still in the hands of the rebels and was now being 
tapped under their direction.96 Another case was that of the Belgian-and French-
controlled Netherlands N.V., which was also brought under the targets of the 
nationalization law. The company was owned by a Belgian national, I.E. 
Schurmans, but it had originally been registered in the Netherlands. In 
desperation, Schurmans applied to the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
Jakarta for recognition as a non-Dutch enterprise and appealed to the Belgian 
authorities to intervene in the dispute. Nevertheless, according to the Dutch 
ambassador in Belgium, J. M. Devers, all companies in Indonesia registered in 
the Netherlands were likely to be treated as Dutch companies.97 
A similarly gloomy situation outlook faced the Chinese businesses in 
Indonesia. After the Kuo Ming Tang government in Formosa had supported the 
PRRI uprising in Sumatra, the Indonesian government began to pay more 
attention to the situation of the Chinese in the country. In the early months of 
1958, Communist and Nationalist groups were constantly urging the 
government to take radical action against the Kuo Ming Tang adherents in 
                    
96 ANRI, Sumatra Norsk-Sumatra Plantage Kompagni, Medan, 11 May 1959, KP, inventory 
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97 NA. Letter of J.M. Deversto to the Minister of Foreign Economic Affairs, Brussels, 19 January 
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Indonesia, accusing them of siding with PRRI.98 The first retaliation was in the 
form of a government prohibition of the publication of Chinese-language 
newspapers and magazines in April 1958. On 18 September, the government 
banned fifty-two Chinese organizations in the Jakarta area considered to have 
links with the Taiwanese government, among them trade associations, sports 
groups, women‘s and youth organizations, cinemas and schools as well as the 
Great Eastern Bank in Jakarta. Finally, in October 1958, decrees were issued 
placing all schools, business enterprises, estates, industries, insurance 
companies, banks, shops and mining companies owned by Chinese, who were 
not citizens of countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Indonesia under 
government control. It is noteworthy that the measures taken against the 
Nationalist Chinese were virtually the same as those taken against the Dutch. 
On 22 September 1958, a high military authority in Jakarta openly declared that, 
‘the action against Chinese enterprises will be the same as that against the 
Dutch’.99 
Table 11: Number of trading firms considered to be foreign 
owned in Indonesia until February 1959 
 Big Average Small Total 
 
Chinese 177 14,654 44,956 59,787 
Dutch 139 65 10 214 
Indian/Pakistan 73 461 424 958 
British/American 58 19 19 96 
German/Swiss 14 3 2 19 
Other Europeans 13 15 6 34 
Other Asian 5 279 736 1.020 
Indonesian Chinese 42 222 56 320 
Indonesian others 46 25 8 79 
Other 23 23 27 73 
Total 590 15,766 46,244 62,600 
Source: Dua Tahun Kabinet Karya, April 1957-April 1959 (Jakarta: 
Kementerian Penerangan R.I, 1959) p. 245. 
                    
98 B.H.M. Vlekke (ed.), Indonesia’s struggle 1957-1958 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of 
International Affairs, 1959) 56. 
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The anti-Kuo Ming Tang Chinese actions taken by the Indonesian 
government in 1958 extended into general anti-Chinese resentment in Indonesia 
in the next few years. This time, the government complaints were based on the 
fact that Chinese traders in various rural areas were controlling the market in 
important products. An investigation conducted by the Ministry of Trade in 
early 1959 allegedly showed that 94 per cent of the total 62,600 trading firms, 
especially medium and small businesses throughout Indonesia were owned by 
Chinese. Only few of their owners had Indonesian citizenship (Table 11).  
Another investigation provided even more impressive figures. By 
November 1959, there were 167,000 foreign enterprises in Indonesia, and this 
was excepting enterprises in the service sector, such as hotels, the media and 
cinema. Of these, about 125,000 were trading firms, the majority owned by 
Chinese.100 They completely controlled the gold trade and monopolized the salt 
fish market, which was an important source of protein for the Indonesian 
people. Government policies on price control and distribution were being 
disrupted by monopolistic manipulations and speculation.101 The inevitable 
upshot was that in July 1959, Minister of Trade, Rachmat Muljomiseno, 
announced a regulation banning foreign nationals engaging in rural trade, 
requiring them to have transferred their businesses to Indonesian citizens by 30 
September 1959. In November 1959, President Soekarno issued a similar decree 
which stated that, as of 1 January 1960, foreign nationals engaging in retailing, 
distribution and brokerage would be banned from rural areas in Indonesia. They 
could close their shops altogether, sell them to Indonesian citizens or move their 
businesses to the cities and towns. Although this measure unquestionably also 
affected the Arab and Indian traders, its principal target was the Chinese. The 
Indonesian government hoped that the Chinese-run businesses in the rural areas 
would be taken over by co-operatives or transferred to private Indonesian 
individuals.102 
                    
100 Berita Negara Republik Indonesia, 15 November 1959. 
101 Berita Negara Republik Indonesia, 15 January 1960. 
102 Berita Negara Republik Indonesia, 15 August 1959; Thee, ‘Indonesianization’, 35. 
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Despite heated interventions by the Chinese government which created 
serious diplomatic tension between Peking and Jakarta,103 thousands of Chinese 
left Indonesia for the Chinese People’s Republic throughout 1960. By early 
1961, the total number who had ultimately left Indonesia swelled to 119,000.104 
Their departure seriously dislocated the distribution trade in a number of areas, 
not only in Java but also in Kalimantan.105 Some traders encouraged by Chinese 
diplomatic officials in Jakarta refused to abandon their rural businesses. As the 
ethnic Chinese in South Vietnam had done, the most common way for ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia to escape the seizure of their assets by the local authorities 
was to transfer ownership of their property to Chinese relatives who were 
Indonesian citizens. This became a very common practice when it came to large 
companies, as soon as it became apparent that the Indonesian authorities were 
not going to restrict their discriminatory actions to small traders. One of the best 
examples which illustrates this prevailing tendency can be seen in the desperate 
efforts made by the managers of the Oei Tiong Ham Concern, which was 
eventually confiscated by the Indonesian government in July 1961, but not 
without a fight after a period of resistance.  
In 1924, when Oei Tiong Ham died his concern was inherited by nine 
of his thirteen sons.106 A lack of strong leadership, the world economic 
depression of the 1930s and the increasing intervention in the economy of the 
colonial government all conspired to harm the growth of the company. 
However, the decisive blow which hastened the steady decline of OTHC was 
the hostile attitude towards capitalism adopted by the Indonesian government 
after Independence. Viewed as the symbol of the success of the Chinese, 
                    
103 See the Chinese reactions against the Indonesian measure to expel the Chinese from the rural 
areas in Mozingo, Chinese policy toward Indonesia, 164-171; Indonesian Observer, 1 April 
1961. But Chinese relations with Indonesia soon recovered because the Chinese government 
was keen to increase its influence in Indonesia for fear that Indonesia would incline towards the 
US or the Soviet Union. 
104 Mozingo, Chinese policy toward Indonesia, 175; Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 
324. 
105 Berita Negara Republik Indonesia, 15 January 1960. 
106 Nevertheless, one of the nine sons, Oei Tjong Swan, sold his share to other brothers and left 
for Europe. Since 1930, there had been only 8 shareholders. Oei Tjong Hauw, Oei Tjong Tjiat, 
Oei Tjong Yan, Oei Tjong Ik, Oei Tjong Ie, Oei Tjong Bo, Oei Tjong Hiong, Oei Tjong Tjay. 
In 1950, Oei Tjong Hauw died and his share was transferred to his son, Oei Ing Swie.  
The Guided Economy 
 
269 
nefariously acquired through their collaboration with Dutch colonialism, the 
businesses of OTHC met with serious obstacles thrown up by the Indonesian 
government. The Benteng Programme with its discriminatory measures in 
favour of indigenous groups certainly speeded up the decline of the Kian Gwan 
trading company, which also had its work cut out competing with Dutch firms, 
especially the Lindeteves.107 Although the owners of OTHC tried to cultivate 
contacts with Indonesian political leaders, as among them Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo, and helped finance both PSI and PNI, the hardening political 
situation in post-Independent Indonesia frustrated their efforts. Besides the four 
brothers who had studied abroad and did not return to Indonesia and the three 
appointed to the head offices in New York, Singapore and Amsterdam, other 
members of the Oei family left Indonesia one after the other in the course of the 
1950s. By the time of the take-over, none of the Oei brothers was in Indonesia 
and the management had been entrusted to Tjoe Soe Tjong, who was not a 
member of the family. Nevertheless, in order to deal with the Indonesian 
authorities, who were seriously concerned about the nationality and property, in 
late 1959 the shares in OTHC were transferred to three brothers, Oei Tjong Yan 
(50 per cent), Oei Tjong Ik (37 M per cent), Oei Ing Swie (12 M per cent), of 
whom two, Tjong Yan and Tjong Ik, were Indonesian citizens.108 
On 10 July 1961, an economic court in Semarang decided to confiscate 
all the OTHC property which had an estimated value of Rp. 4 billion. The 
confiscation order was based on a court examination of OTHC by the public 
prosecutor Daan Soelaiman on 26 June 1961. The Indonesian authorities 
discovered that the owners of OTHC had violated Article 16 of the Economic 
Penal Code, requiring foreign nationals in Indonesia to register their property 
with the LAAPLN, which controlled foreign exchange. It transpired that the Oei 
brothers had not report their property, which they had inherited from their 
father, Oei Tiong Ham. In separate charges, as a foreign resident, Oei Ing Swie, 
the director of OTHC in 1952 had sold Kian Gwan shares to a value of 
                    
107 KKA, New Nation, 24-25 August 1971, OTHC, inventory number 10. 
108 KKA, Letter of Oei Tjong Tjay to Oei Tjong Ie, Oei Tjong Bo and Oei Tjong Hiong, 
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16,210,000 guilders without the authorization of LAAPLN. In February 1958, 
he again booked his stocks from the Bank Indonesia to Amsterdam on behalf of 
OTHC in the name of Oei Tjong Yan, who was also a foreign resident. This 
involved a nominal amount of 6,812,574 guilders and it was not reported to 
LAAPLN.109 Although the Oei family contested the charge of the Semarang 
court, which involved them in a legal dispute with the Indonesian government 
until very recently, the history of OTCH officially ended in July 1961.110 
While not letting up on the anti-Chinese business during the next few 
years, the Indonesian government now embarked on other campaigns against 
British and American companies. The West Irian dispute, the vehicle which 
rallied Indonesian masses to demand the closure of Dutch business in Indonesia, 
had been resolved by the end of 1962. To keep alive the spirit of ‘continuing 
Revolution’ against imperialism and colonialism, which had escalated into a 
conflict between the NEFO and OLDEFO,111 President Soekarno thrust his 
country into a Confrontation (Konfrontasi) with the neigbouring country 
Malaysia. Whatever ulterior motives he might have had, it seems that Soekarno 
viewed the formation of the Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963 as a 
British neo-colonialist project and a threat to the security of his country. The 
Ganjang Malaysia (Crush Malaysia) campaign included attacks on British and 
American property, because Great Britain was considered the intellectual author 
behind the Malaysia scheme, and the United States was its accomplice. As had 
                    
109 KKA, Suara Merdeka, 27 June 1961, Sinar Indonesia, 27 June 1961, OTHC, inventory 
number 12. 
110 In their defence, the Oei family argued that there was ‘no obligation existed at all, requiring 
non-residents to report their assets located in Indonesia to LAAPLN’. Furthermore, in 1952, Oei 
Ing Swie and Oei Tjong Yan still had Indonesian citizenship. Therefore, they were not obliged 
to report their transactions to LAAPLN. Letter from Oei Tjong Tjay to the Ambassador of the 
United Kingdom to the Republic of Indonesia, dated 14 October 1961, and Letter from Tan 
Swan Bing to Oei Tjong Tjay, dated 29 October 1996, OTHC, inventory number 3. 
111 NEFO-OLDEFO was Soekarno’s simplified concept of world order, first introduced by him in 
1961 at a conference of non-aligned states held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Soekarno argued that 
the world was divided into two conflicting and irreconcilable camps, the New Emerging Forces 
(NEFO) consisting of the Socialist countries, the newly independent countries and the 
progressive peoples in the capitalist countries against the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO), 
consisting of the imperialists, the capitalists and the colonially minded people. Soekarno aligned 
Indonesia with the NEFO by organizing the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) in 
Jakarta in November 1963. 
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happed to the Dutch businesses during the West Irian Campaign, the economic 
interests of the British and Americans in Indonesia became a principal target for 
attack. The Indonesian government also broke off trade relations with Malaysia 
and Singapore, its two foremost commercial partners in Southeast Asia.112 
On the day of the formation of the Malaysia Federation, there were 
mass demonstrations in Jakarta and Medan, which led to serious fighting and 
the destruction of the British embassy, consulates and houses.113 The seizure of 
British firms commenced one day later, on 17 September 1963. The Jakarta 
office of four British companies, Harrisons & Crosfield, J.A. Wattie, Dunlop 
Rubber and Commercial Union Assurance Company, were taken over by the 
trade unions of their employees associated with SOBSI. Likewise, workers at 
the Shell Oil Company at Plaju in South Sumatra seized the refinery but the 
Shell refinery at Balikpapan was taken over by the military commander of East 
Kalimantan, Colonel Soehardjo.114 On 18 September 1963, the Governor of 
West Java, Mashudi, issued a decree, providing a list of British firms in East 
Java which were to be placed under the supervision of his provincial 
government. The list included estates of the P&T Lands, J.A. Wattie, Harrisons 
& Crosfield and Ross Taylor, as well as the facilities of Dunlop Tyre enterprise, 
BAT (British and American Tobacco) and the Shell Oil offices in Bandung and 
Cirebon.115 
Most of the take-overs were non-violent. Foreign managers were forced 
to leave their offices and their work was transferred to Indonesian staff. On 19 
September, President Soekarno issued decrees forbidding any further take-overs 
and demanding the enterprises seized be transferred to the appropriate 
ministries. Supervisory teams were appointed and given the task of 
safeguarding security and ensuring the smooth operation of these firms. All 
                    
112 A.C. Mackie, Confrontasi; The Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, 1963-1966 (Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1974) 182. 
113 Mackie, Confrontasi, 182-187. 
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arrangements were declared to be temporary as the government was planning to 
return the firms to the foreign owners. Well-aware of the economic importance 
of oil companies, President Soekarno demanded the immediate return of the 
Plaju refinery to the Shell Oil Company, and he took the opportunity to instruct 
the regional authorities firmly that they were to prevent any further take-over of 
Shell facilities. His instructions were certainly listened as the oil fields and 
refineries at Plaju were handed back to their Shell managers the next day, 20 
September 1963. More remote and with the army behind him, Colonel 
Soehardjo delayed the return of the Balikpapan refinery until late December 
1963. With the exception of these sensitive Shell properties, no other firms were 
immediately returned to British owners.  
In January 1964, a new wave of take-overs of British firms began. This 
time it was initiated by workers and trade unions, their greatest stimulation 
being PKI influence. Konfrontasi, Manipol/USDEK and Dekon continued to 
serve as basic sources of inspiration for the take-overs, the immediate flash-
point was the behaviour of the British colonial authorities in Hong Kong who 
refused point blank to the issue licences for the export of military equipment to 
Indonesia and, adding insult to injure, detained two Indonesian pilgrim ships in 
December 1963.116 On 20 January 1964, SOBSI members hoisted the red flag at 
Shell Oil company headquarters in Jakarta. The walls of the Shell office 
building were plastered with signs reading ‘Indonesian property’. Unilever 
workers in Jakarta seized the switchboard and bolted the main doors of the 
factories, after first warming British staff to stay away from the building. On 22 
January, workers took over the Jakarta office of BTA. On the same day, the 
offices of the Maclaine Watson trading firm in Jakarta and Makassar were also 
taken over by the unions to which its employees belonged. In North Sumatra, on 
22 January, various trade unions leaders entered the main office of Harrisons & 
Crosfield in Medan, and the office and estates of the Anglo-Sumatra Estate 
Agency and Guthries were also simultaneously seized. In Surabaya, on 24 
January, SOBSI-affiliated unions attempted take-overs of three British-owned 
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firms in Surabaya, Unilever, BAT and Fraser & Neave. On 31 January, Third 
Deputy Prime Minister, Chaerul Saleh, issued a circular placing the British 
companies seized under the control and supervision of the relevant ministers.117 
The total number of British enterprises taken over in January 1964 was seventy-
eight.118 The Indonesian authorities ignored all claims to property rights to the 
British companies as well as by the British government.  
The government supervision was declared to be a temporary measure 
and was claimed to be necessary for the purpose of safeguarding the continued 
operation of British companies. Despite this reassurance, on 26 November 
1964, President Soekarno issued a decreed placing all British firms under 
government control. The decree was supplemented by a list of enterprises to be 
controlled by relevant ministries. The Ministry of Estates took over Harrisons & 
Crofssfield, Guthries, P&T Lands, J.A. Wattie, Anglo Sumatra, C.V. Perindo, 
Groemit/Reids, P.T. Indreswari and Ross Taylor. Dunlop Rubber was 
transferred to the Ministry of Basic Industries. The Ministry of People’s 
Industries took over the management of Unilever, the mining company Archa, 
BAT, Limun F&N and a textile factory called Nebritex. Maclaine Watson was 
placed under the Ministry of Trade. The Ministry of State Revenues, Finance 
and Audits controlled the companies OCEAN, Semarang Sea and Fire and 
Union of Canton. The Chartered Bank was transferred to the Ministry of the 
Central Bank.119 The list did not include the Shell, since this oil company was 
still under the British management. 
Once the take-over of British companies had been completed at the end 
of 1964, American companies, led by the oil companies Stanvac and Caltex, 
were the most important foreign companies remaining in Indonesia. By 1965, 
the Konfrontasi against Malaysia and the British had escalated into a 
confrontation against all ‘imperialist’ and colonial powers of the world. This 
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escalation was marked by the withdrawal of Indonesia from the United Nations 
in January 1965, as well as its exodus from IMF, Interpol and the World Bank 
in August 1965. The anti-imperialist alliance with the People’s Republic of 
China culminated in President Soekarno‘s famous proclamation in August 1965 
of the Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang axis. Diplomatic relations 
with the US had been steadily deteriorating since early 1964, when the US 
government had cut off financial aid to Indonesia, which was greeted by the 
President’s response: ‘Go to hell with your aid’ on 25 March 1964. US support 
for Malaysia during Konfrontasi, as well as increasing US involvement in 
Vietnam symbolized plain unvarnished imperialism and added fuel to the anti-
US rhetoric in Indonesia. Between February and mid-April 1964, the 
government of Indonesia took over thirteen foreign companies, eleven of them 
American-owned, including the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company and the 
United State Rubber Corporation (USR). Next to fall victim were the big three 
foreign oil companies, Caltex, Stanvac and Royal Dutch Shell, which were 
taken over on 19 March 1965. In April, the remaining American companies, 
including the Union Carbide Battery Plant, American and Foreign Insurance 
Association (AIFA), National Cash Register and some American film 
companies were all taken over. Finally, on 24 April 1965, appealing to the 
rationale of Berdikari, President Soekarno issued a decree stating that all 
foreign enterprises would be put under the government control, regardless of 
nationality.120 
Although most British and American companies were eventually 
returned to their former owners in the early years of the New Order, the 
Presidential decree of 24 April 1965 can be considered the culmination of the 
efforts by the ‘1945 Generation in Indonesia to liberate their country from 
economic control by foreigners. These efforts had begun just after 
Independence, but reached a climax in the late 1950s with the take-over and 
eventual nationalization of Dutch enterprises and in the early 1960s with the 
seizure of British and American companies, which happened alongside the 
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extended expropriation of Chinese businesses. Various explanations can be 
offered for these extraordinarily radical actions by the Indonesian government. 
Tensions in diplomatic relations, in which foreign companies were used as 
pawns, were certainly an important factor, especially in the case of Dutch, 
British and American firms. However, the confiscation of the Chinese 
businesses and their infrastructures had nothing to do with foreign relations, 
except for the charge of alleged Taiwanese government support of the PRRI 
rebellion. They were taken over directly by the government. In contrast, the 
seizures of the Dutch, British and American companies were all initiated by the 
military and trade unions affiliated with PKI. The Indonesian government 
claimed to be passive observe in these events, unable to take any action, except 
to follow up the seizure in order to ‘supervise’ and ‘safeguard’ the continued 
operations of the companies. Passive though it probably was, why was 
Soekarno’s government so loath to return the seized enterprises to their foreign 
owners?   
4. Business Engagement 
Whether or not the take-overs had been clandestinely planned by the Indonesian 
government, it would seem that these attempts to attain the final elimination of 
foreign control of the economy were inevitable, an essential part of the 
transition of Indonesia into an independent national economy. The other side of 
the coin was the elevation of Indonesians to the commanding role in the 
economy. The rhythm of this intertwined process depended largely on the 
political developments. When the country decided to adopt the policies of 
Guided Democracy and the Guided Economy followed by martial law, sooner 
or later it was on the cards that foreign control of the economy would have to be 
eliminated, by hook or by crook. In a speech one day after the take-over had 
begun, on 4 December 1957, the Governor of the Bank of Indonesia, Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara, criticized the seizure, stating that, ‘I completely agree with the 
liquidation of all Dutch property in Indonesia, but everything should be carried 
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out according to a systematic plan and not just prompted by burning passions 
which might [eventually] only rebound on the people themselves’.121 
In fact, soon after the imposition of martial law, it is clear that the 
military had already been making some preparations for a take-over of the 
economy. On 24 August 1957, the Ministry of Defence issued an instruction, 
identifying companies, departments and agencies considered vital to the 
military, which SOB asserted should be under military jurisdiction. In fact, all 
companies, departments and facilities relating to transportation, posts, the 
media, hospitals, oil, gas, electricity and printing were vital to the military, or so 
the military thought. Four major Indonesian banks, Bank Indonesia, Bank 
Negara Indonesia, Bank Industri Negara, and Bank Rakjat Indonesia, together 
with mining enterprises, some manufacturing enterprises and estates were all 
scheduled to be put under military authority. At that point, the instruction did 
not yet go so far as to indicate any measures to bring foreign enterprises under 
military control.122 The sudden take-over of Dutch enterprises by local trade 
unions in December 1957 certainly had an impact on the military thinking about 
what its primary intentions were. Probably driven by fears that PKI might 
attempt to bring these enterprises under its own control, thereby strengthening 
its economic resources and political position, the army quickly stepped in and 
assumed control of the enterprises seized.123 The Indonesian government 
definitely did not wish these enterprises to fall into the hands of either PKI or 
the army. On 19 December 1957, Djuanda, in the name of both Prime Minister 
and Minister of Defence, announced government control of all Dutch 
enterprises.  
As a conciliatory measure, various government bodies were installed to 
control the seized Dutch enterprises. Members of these bodies consisted of 
judicious mixture of relevant ministers, army officers and representatives of 
trade unions. Dutch banks were managed by the Central Supervisory Council 
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for Dutch Banks (Badan Pengawas Bank-Bank Belanda Pusat, BP Bank2 
Belanda Pusat), the estates by the Centre for New State Plantations (Pusat 
Perkebunan Negara Baru, PPN-Baru), trading firms by the Government Agency 
for Commercial Enterprises (Badan Urusan Dagang, BUD), while the 
supervision of manufacturing and mining firms and pharmaceutical enterprises 
was placed under respectively the Government Agency for Manufacturing and 
Mining Enterprises (Badan Penyelenggara Perusahaan Industri dan Tambang, 
BAPPIT) and the Central Body for Administration of Dutch Pharmaceutical 
Companies (Badan Pusat Penguasa Perusahaan2 Pharmasi Belanda, 
BARPHAR). There were three more supervisory agencies established during 
the course of 1957-1958, two for the insurance companies, namely, the 
Supervisory Board for Life Insurance (Badan Pengawas Assuransi Djiwa) and 
the Supervisory Board for Dutch Insurance Companies (Badan Pengawas 
Perusahaan2 Assuransi Kerugian Belanda) and the Central Supervisory Board 
for Dutch Contracting Companies (Badan Pusat Pengawas Perusahaan2 
Pemborongan Belanda, BP5B) for contracting services.124 All former Dutch 
companies adopted Indonesian names and most of them became state-owned 
enterprises.  
In February 1959, by the time the nationalization law had been 
effectively executed, all these agencies were placed under one umbrella body, 
called the Board for the Nationalization of Dutch Enterprises (Badan 
Nasionalisasi Perusahaan Belanda, BANAS). Members of BANAS consisted of 
all ministers responsible for economic affairs, the Governor of Bank Indonesia 
and the Minister of Health, whose function was probably to supervise the 
pharmaceutical enterprises. It was chaired by Prime Minister Djuanda, assisted 
by two deputies, Soetiko Slamet from Bank Indonesia and Minister of 
Economic Stabilization, Colonel Soeprajogi.BANAS had the authority to decide 
which Dutch companies would be transferred to the government supervisory 
agencies and which were to be managed by provincial governments, or left to 
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the private sector.125 BANAS also extended its coordination to existing state 
corporations, such as PELNI, Bank Indonesia and GIA. In total, BANAS 
supervised about twenty groups of state-owned enterprises and banks.126 In 
December 1960, BANAS was dissolved and replaced by a Central Co-
ordination Board (Badan Pusat Cordinasi), which functioned as a co-ordinating, 
planning and supervisory staff for the First Minister Djuanda. From a historical 
distance, it seems that the running of the Central Co-ordination Board left a 
great deal to be desired, especially after the death of Djuanda. In the meantime, 
the government supervisory agencies for state-owned enterprises expanded 
apace, absorbing a considerable number of Chinese, British and American 
enterprises. By examining some particular supervisory agencies, it is possible to 
see how the foreign companies were integrated into the existing Indonesian 
sectors, if not vice-versa. The consequences of this forced marriage will be 
discussed below. 
Banking was perhaps the sector most urgently in need of control if a 
tremendous outflow of money from Dutch banks to other foreign banks was to 
be prevented and if credit was to be made available to state enterprises. As said, 
all Dutch banks in Jakarta were placed under the control of BP Bank2 Bank 
Belanda Pusat. This body was composed of representatives of high-raking 
military staff, as well as bureaucrats from financial and economic departments, 
the ministry of finance and the Bank Indonesia. Their branches in the regions 
were controlled by the Regional Supervisory Council, which was composed 
along the same lines as the Central Board. A supervisory team, Team 
Pengawas, was stationed in each bank. Henceforward, all the transactions of 
Dutch banks had to be handled through Indonesian banks with the prior consent 
of the Indonesian authorities. Dutch nationals also needed a permit from the 
local authorities to withdraw their money.127 
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The nationalization of Dutch banks eventually took place in 1960. The 
Handelsbank was converted into State General Bank (Bank Umum Negara). 
The Escompto Bank was liquidated and its activities were immediately taken 
over by the State Commercial Bank (Bank Dagang Negara). The assets and 
liabilities of the NHM were transferred to the Bank for Co-operatives, 
Smallholders and Fishermen (Bank Koperasi, Tani den Nelayan).128 Several 
rearrangements were simultaneously introduced in the state banks. The Post 
Office Savings Bank was renamed the State Savings Bank. The State Industrial 
Bank (Bank Industri Negara) was merged with the Development Bank of 
Indonesia (Bank Pembangunan Indonesia), which was established in May 1960 
with a special task of helping the government finance its Eight-Year 
Development Plan. The working licences of all foreign banks, including the 
Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC), Bank of China, Hong Kong 
and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the British-owned Chartered Bank were 
gradually withdrawn throughout 1963 and 1964. In March 1964, the Chinese 
government volunteered to turn over the assets of Bank of China to the 
Indonesian government as a gift to strengthen its relations with Indonesia.129 
The assets of the Chartered Bank were taken over by the Bank Negara 
Indonesia and the Bank Umum Negara in February 1965. The two other banks 
withdrew their businesses from Indonesia. To consolidate the centralized 
control of the banking system, in preparation for financing the Three-Year Plan 
(1966-1968), in August 1965 all seven state banks were integrated into one 
body, called the Bank Tunggal (Sole Bank).130 In 1960 and 1965, besides the 
state banks, there were twenty-two regional development banks, nineteen small 
local banks (both as joint enterprises between the government and private 
parties) and twenty-two private national banks.131 
On 10 December 1957, the Minister of Agriculture, Sadjarwo, 
announced the formation of the Centre for New State Plantations (Pusat 
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Perkebunan Negara Baru, PPN-Baru), which was then merged with the existing 
PPN, established under the old Republic of Indonesia.132 PPN-Baru was 
immediately entrusted with the management of 542 Dutch estates, three-
quarters of all Indonesian plantations.133A rapid indigenizationof the 
administration of Dutch estates immediately followed, although a number of 
Dutch managers were allowed to stay on after signing documents limiting their 
rights to the estates.134 In most cases, senior Indonesian employees of former 
Dutch enterprises were promoted to key jobs as managers or overseers, and 
army officers served as supervisors. The new managers were selected from 
influential groups in the daerahs (regions), particularly those who had close ties 
of interests and affinity with the existing regional authorities, the pamong 
pradja, and army officers.135A six-month course was organized to train senior 
middle school graduates to take over supervisory positions.136 As the result of 
all these efforts, 90-95 per cent of the personnel on the rubber estates in North 
Sumatra had been Indonesianized by 1960.137 
The nationalization after 1959 brought other significant changes. 
Individual estates were grouped into ‘Units’, which formed legally distinct state 
enterprises. The Unit served as the provincial branch of PPN-Baru (now again 
named PPN), whose head office and general managerial board were stationed in 
Jakarta. All major decisions were taken by the Jakarta office after it had 
received recommendations from the provincial branches. The Units carried out 
general supervision, provided technical advice, determined the annual budgets 
as well as the planting and production schedules for each estate.138 The offices 
of units could be concentrated in one centre, for instance, Surabaya where the 
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office of all sugar units in East Java was located, or situated in the region of 
estates concerned.139 In both cases, this brought about a major structural change 
in the administration of the former Dutch estates. The Dutch estate companies 
were now broken up and fused into regional units under the centralized 
administration of the PPN head office in Jakarta. In total, PPN managed ninety-
two units, including fifty-two rather small ones for sugar, sixteen huge ones for 
rubber and seven for tobacco.140 In May 1962, the sugar factories and rubber 
estates belonging to OTHC were transferred to the management of PPN, while 
its other businesses were handled by a joint committee composed of members 
from the Department of Attorney General and the Department of Trade.141 
The administration of the estates taken over between 1963 and 1965 
generally followed the pattern explained above of grouping them either by 
geography or previous ownership. At first, overall charge of British estates was 
entrusted to a supervisory team in the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian 
Affairs. In March 1964, the team developed into the Central Control Board of 
British Estates (Badan Pusat Penguasaan Perusahaan Perkebunan Milik 
Inggris), chaired by the Co-ordinating Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian 
affairs, Sadjarwo. In September 1964, all the seized British estates were 
grouped into five units, known as Dwikora. Each Dwikora unit was led by 
managers appointed by Sadjarwo and these managers were responsible for 
supervising, controlling and managing the estates in its group. These five 
Dwikora units were either geographically and/or company-based. Dwikora I 
was compoased of all the Harrisons and Crosfield estates in North Sumatra, 
Dwikora II was a mixture of other estates in Sumatra, Dwikora III was a 
mixture of estates primarily in Java, Dwikora IV made up almost exclusively of 
the P&T Lands estates and Dwikora V was a cluster of estates in East Java. In 
November 1964, a Central Board of Directors of Dwikora (Badan Pimpinan 
Umum Dwikora, BPU-Dwikora) was established, which took over the 
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management of the estates in the Dwikora structure. The BPU-Dwikora was 
made up of four directors. The first director was in overall charge of the 
Dwikora, while the other three directors were responsible for production, 
marketing and finance, respectively. Each Dwikora unit also had a board of 
directors, and one senior director was in overall charge of all the component 
units. This board of director was advised by a supervisory board, whose 
members included the governor and representatives of the army, trade unions 
and the National Front.142 
Most estates belonging to Goodyear and USR were turned over to the 
government state-owned rubber plantation unit, known as the State Rubber 
Plantations (Pusat Perkebunan Karet Negara, PPN Karet) in the Ministry of 
Agriculture. But the Wingfoot South Estate was sold to two private firms, 
namely Hapinis and Oriental Tyre. In March 1965, the government changed the 
name Goodyear to the Estate Company Ampera I (Perusahaan Perkebunan 
Ampera I) and the name USR to the Estate Company Ampera II (Perusahaan 
Perkebunan Ampera II). Following the Presidential decree of April 1965, the 
estates owned by the Belgium firm SOCFIN in North Sumatra were organized 
into two units, one in Aceh administering eighteen estates and another called 
PPN No.5 in charge of ten estates. These estates were later grouped with other 
Belgium-owned estates into four units called PPN-Expera. There were two 
Expera units in Sumatra and two in Java. The Expera units appeared to have 
been administered separately from the other government estates although, as on 
other estates, the top layer of management was appointed by the central 
government.143 
The administration of the Dutch trading firms seized was placed under 
BUD. Reorganization took place after the promulgation of the nationalization 
law, with immediate effect for more than forty Dutch trading firms. The ‘Big 
Five’ were reorganized into state enterprises under new names. Borsumij, Geo. 
Wehry, Internatio, Jacobson van den Berg and Lindeteves became respectively 
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the Indonesian Development Industrial and Trading Corporation (Indevitra), 
Satja Negara Trading Corporation (Satja Negara), Judha Bhakti Corporation, 
Indonesian Estates and Industrial Supply Corporation (Indestins) and the 
Triangle Corporation. Another Dutch-owned trading enterprise, Mirandolle and 
Voute, was transformed into the Estate and Plantation Company Mira Sari 
(Perusahaan Dagang dan Perkebunan Mira Sari, Mira Sari). These six leading 
Dutch companies, with two Indonesian state trading enterprises, the Central 
Trading Company (CTC) and the Indonesian Industrial Enterprise (Usaha 
Industri Indonesia, Usindo,) formed the ‘Big Eight’. A military officer, usually 
with the rank of major or colonel, headed the management in each of these 
trading companies.144 
In 1960, the Law on State Enterprises opened the way for a further 
reorganization and regrouping of all these enterprises. Seven of the Big Eight, 
the exception being Mira Sari, were incorporated into other small Dutch firms 
and a government agency, named the Foundation for the Import of Essential 
Raw Materials (Jajasan Bahan Penting, JBP), to form nine state trading 
corporations, called Bhakti (loyal service). Indevitra became Budi Bhakti, Satja 
Negara turned into Aneka Bhakti, Judha Bhakti into Fadjar Bhakti, Indestins 
into Tulus Bhakti, the Triangle Corporation into Marga Bhakti, the CTC into Tri 
Bhakti, Usindo into Djaja Bhakti, the JBP into Sedjati Bhakti, while a company 
called Java-Staal Stokvis plus a number of other small Dutch firms formed 
Sinar Bhakti.145 Although the government did make attempts to specialize these 
state trading corporations, their activities overlapped and sometimes were even 
in competition with each other. Seven of the nine Bhakti, Budi Bhakti, Aneka 
Bhakti, Marga Bhakti, Djaja Bhakti, Fadjar Bhakti, Tulus Bhakti and Tri 
Bhakti, were primarily concerned with inter-island trade and the import and 
export of consumer goods and the distribution of domestic manufactured 
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products. Sedjati Bhakti handled the import of essential goods, while Tulus 
Bhakti operated exclusively in the import of technical articles.146 In 1965, the 
nine Bhakti were again dissolved and regrouped into six Niagas (trading 
companies), namely Aduma Niaga, Aneka Niaga, Pantja Niaga, Satya Niaga, 
Dharma Niaga and Pembangunan Niaga.147 
Although the formal organizational structures of the state enterprises 
varied widely, that did share some general lines. All the corporations were 
placed under the supervision of a General Management Board for State Trading 
Corporations (Badan Pimpinan Umum-Perusahaan Dagan Negara, BPU-PDN) 
in the Ministry of Trade. Each trading corporation had a board of managing 
directors, which often consisted of three or four directors, each assigned to a 
particular field of business, for instance finance, marketing, exports or imports. 
The directors were assisted by several general managers, who were assumed to 
have a specialist knowledge of a particular aspect of the company. Under the 
general managers came the heads of various departments, the names and 
number of which varied among the specialized corporations. Below the 
departments, there might be sub-departments, divisions or sections in some 
cases. For instance, Budi Bhakti and Marga Bhakti, which operated primarily in 
agricultural and consumer goods, both had a department for the export of 
agricultural products. This department was not broken up into divisions in the 
former company, but was in the latter. Budhi Bhakti had a department of 
internal supervision and statistics and a division of public relations and law, 
which Marga Bhakti did not have. The departmentalization of Tulus Bhakti was 
primarily organized on the basis of main trade categories, such as machinery, 
electrical equipment and other technical equipment.148The regional and overseas 
branches of the corporations were headed by their own managers. The 
management of the state trading corporations was largely centralized when they 
were dealing with essential imports. There were some ‘free list’ articles which 
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the regional branches were allowed to import directly. These articles could also 
be imported by private importers.149 
Just as with government attempts to achieve a functional specialization 
of state trading corporations, the integrated units of former Dutch trading 
companies engaged in production were transferred separately to other 
government bodies. The estate units were incorporated into the above-
mentioned PPN-Baru, while textile mills and mines were transferred to the 
respective bodies of the Ministry of Industry and Mining. The Bureau of State 
Industrial Enterprises (Biro Urusan Perusahaan-Perusahaan Industri Negara, 
BUPIN) was in charge of industrial enterprises and the Bureau of State Mining 
Companies (Biro Urusan Perusahaan-perusahaan Tambang Negara, BUPTAN) 
ran the field of mining. In April 1958, BAPPIT was established to take over the 
management of state enterprises in manufacturing and mining. BAPPIT had its 
central office in Jakarta and branches in Bandung, Surabaya and Medan. By 
1960, BAPPIT controlled 240 companies, of which forty-eight were in 
machinery and the electrical industry, twenty-one in the chemical industry, 
twenty-one in the printing and publishing industry, eighty-nine in general 
industry and sixty-one in mining.150 
Under BAPPIT, the companies were classified into groups; important 
companies were managed by the central government, while less important ones 
were controlled by the regional governments. Small industries, such as bread 
factories, cinemas, tile works, were left to private sectors. All former Dutch 
companies were transformed into limited liability companies or PT (Perseroan 
Terbatas) with new Indonesian names. For instance, the joint mining enterprise 
Gemeenschappelijke Mijnbouw Maatschappij Billiton was changed into 
Belitung Tin-Mining Corporation (Pertambangan Timah Belitung). BUPTAN 
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then appointed an Indonesian engineer, M.E.A. Apitule, to head the firm.151 The 
Pertambangan Timah Belitung and two other government tin enterprises, 
Tambang Timah Bangka and Tambang Timah Singkep, constituted almost the 
entire tin production in Indonesia, although their production declined 
dramatically in the late 1950s and early 1960s.152 Likewise, by 1958 more than 
90 per cent of the coal output in Indonesia was being produced by two 
government coal-mines, the Bukit Asam and Umbilin, both in Sumatra. When 
the Oost-Borneo Maatschappij handed over its coal-mines at Batu Panggal and 
Sigihan in East Kalimantan to the state-owned Sebuku, the Indonesian 
government had gained full control of all coal-mining in the country.153 
In all 179 industrial enterprises were taken over by BAPPIT. In 1964, 
these manufacturing firms were split up into 121 state companies, which were 
then rearranged into units defined by regions. The largest unit was that of East 
Java with forty-two state companies, followed by that of Central Java with 
twenty-six, while the Jakarta and West Java units contained eighteen state 
companies each. The Indonesian government did not interfere much in the 
organization of British and American manufacturing firms, including BAT, 
Unilever, Fraser & Neave, Nebritex, Goodyear Tire and Rubber, Procter and 
Gamble and Colgate-Palmoilve Peet after the take-over. The only step which 
was taken was that a government supervisory body was established in each firm 
but, rather than introducing any radical change, their function was mainly to 
keep the operations of the companies up and running. Most of these companies 
were later returned to their former owners. 
The situation in the oil sector where BPM had successfully escaped the 
take-over of December 1957 by transferring its ownership to the British-owned 
Shell Indonesia was different. On 10 December 1957, the military controlled-
ETMSU was renamed the National Oil Company (Perusahaan Minyak 
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Nasional, Permina). An army official, Colonel Ibnu Sutowo, was appointed 
President-Director of the company, while two other directors were bureaucats 
from the Ministry of Industry and Ministry of Trade. In late 1960, the 
Netherlands Indies Petroleum Company (Nederlandsch Indische Aardolie-
Maatschappij, NIAM), a 50-50 joint venture with BPM, which held the 
concessions at Jambi (South Sumatra) and Bunyu (Kalimantan), adopted an 
Indonesian name, the Indonesian Oil Mining Company (Pertambangan Minyak 
Indonesia, Permindo). Its head office was moved from The Hague to Jakarta. 
Permindo was then taken over by a newly established state oil enterprise, 
Indonesian Oil Mining Enterprise (Pertambangan Minyak Indonesia, Pertamin). 
The third state-owned oil company set up under the Minister of Basic Industries 
and Mining Chairul Saleh was the National Oil and Gas Corporation 
(Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Nasional, Permigan). Permigan was designated 
to manage the Shell oil fields in Cebu, which had been taken over by Colonel 
(later General and President) Soeharto in 1957. These facilities were quite 
small, but were substantially expanded in 1962, when Shell sold all its 
installations in the Cepu area to Permigan. Under the terms of a Work 
Agreement of 1963, the three foreign oil companies, Caltex, Shell and Stanvac, 
continued to operate in Indonesia, but under the provisional supervision of the 
Indonesian government. The Indonesian control over oil sector was intensified 
in early 1965, after these oil companies had been either purchased or taken over 
by the government. The government body responsible for the supervision of the 
oil sector was the Bureau of Oil and Gas (Biro Minyak dan Gas Bumi, Biro 
Migas) established by Saleh in November 1959.154 
The centralized operation of the Indonesian economy in the late 1950s 
and the early 1960s required a good system of transportation and distribution. 
Unfortunately this was in a very precarious state. Transport facilities had 
deteriorated since the liquidation of KPM and the forced departure of Chinese 
traders from rural areas in 1959-1960 pushed the distribution system almost to 
the point of collapse. The take-over of KPM had not provided PELNI with any 
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more facilities and equipment. In fact it was floundering. Although it had to 
take responsibility for 10,000 Indonesian employees of KPM, none of the KPM 
ships was handed over to PELNI. The confiscated ships actually had to be 
returned to KPM as a result of intervention by the insurance company Lloyds of 
London, which had insured the KPM fleet.155 After 1958, inter-island shipping 
was handled primarily by PELNI, with the assistance of several smaller private 
shipping firms. In January 1958, the number of ships owned by PELNI was 
only nineteen, the majority from Hong Kong. Another fifteen vessels of the 
State Salt and Soda Company (PGSN) were also put at the disposal of PELNI. 
A number of vessels belonging to private national shipping companies, a total 
of 104 ships, amounting to 44,000 tons, were mobilized and co-ordinated.156 
Under an agreement signed with Japan on 8 December 1957, a few days after 
the take-over of KPM, the Indonesian authorities hoped to obtain twenty-six 
ships. It was also reported that about twenty Japanese shipping companies were 
willing to donate ships to Indonesia, which would mean in effect that the 
Japanese ships could effectively replace the KPM vessels. Besides helping with 
ships, the Japanese government also offered a loan of $ 225 million, repayable 
within twenty years.157 
All in all, military managers held dominant positions in the 
management of the administrative and co-ordinating bodies of BUD, BAPPIT, 
PPN, Bhakti and the majority of state-owned plantations. Some of the Bhaktis 
were managing reasonably well and even won the confidence of business 
relations abroad, but they were the exceptions to the rule. The volume of 
production of major agricultural crops suffered a serious decline under the 
Guided Economy. They were undermined by a potent cocktail of 
mismanagement, corruption, arbitrary dismissal of well-trained, non-military 
staff already available on the respective enterprises and vehement conflicts 
between military managers and labourers prevailed. In PPN, to name just one 
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instance, the operation of the large and inefficient central office absorbed 25 per 
cent of the profits of the estate members.158 By 1962, conditions had 
deteriorated into such a state of chaos technically and financially, most of the 
former Dutch plantations and industrial enterprises had done bankrupt.159 Some 
of these corporations even became a financial burden on the government. By 
now, understandably, foreign investors were very chary of putting their money 
into Indonesia and the chaos and huge inflation in the financial sector also made 
donors of foreign aid also think twice before committing their funds, the 
government had to find an increasingly share of financial resources from the oil 
sector, especially the two state oil companies, Pertamin and Permina. Another 
distinct feature of the Guided Economy was its permanent hyper-inflation, 
remaining around 100 per cent per annum from late 1960 to 1965.160 The price 
of some public services, for instance, railway, bus and air fares had jumped by 
400 and 500 per cent by the end of 1963. Public utilities such as electricity, tap 
water and post and telegraph tariffs also had to battle with a rate of inflation of 
no less than 400 per cent.161 The impact of these price increases was soon felt in 
the market for most of the staples. By the end of 1965, the price of rice was 
believed to be rising at an annual rate of 900 per cent.162 The forced marriage 
between foreign companies and Indonesian sectors ultimately failed, leading to 
in the collapse of the system of the Guided Economy.  
 
Conclusion 
By mid-1965, almost all foreign enterprises operating in Indonesia had been 
effectively brought under the control of the Indonesian government. The leading 
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forces behind this radical move were trade unions, the military and the 
government itself. Generally speaking, it was the trade unions, which seized the 
advantage offered by the political and diplomatic crisis and initiated the seizure 
of Dutch, British and American enterprises. By virtue of the martial law 
declared shortly thereafter, the military assumed the control of the companies 
seized, although for the time being the management remained in the hands of 
trade unions. Finally, the Indonesian government, which certainly did not wish 
the foreign enterprises to fall in the hands of either the military or the PKI-
affiliated trade unions, claimed its authority over all enterprises seized. 
Nevertheless, it was only in the case of the Chinese businesses that the 
Indonesian government set in train confiscation or forced liquidation, adducing 
as its rationale that it was protecting the interests of the Indonesian people. 
Although, on occasion, it did not shun political and economic allegations to 
bolster its case, most of the take-overs occurred without violence and foreign 
managers had little choice but to surrender their positions to subordinate 
Indonesian staff members or sell their businesses to the Indonesians. 
 With the exception of a number of small estates and shops, which were 
left to private sectors, large foreign firms were reorganized and incorporated 
into new state-owned enterprises. Management was entrusted to a whole string 
of ever-changing government agencies, whose job was to co-ordinate with the 
existing state enterprises. Each co-ordinating agency had a board of directors 
consisting of the relevant ministers, army officers and representatives of trade 
unions. Although most former foreign enterprises continued their operations, 
the high cost incurred by inefficient centralized management, conflicts between 
military managers and labourers and the poor co-ordination between the state 
enterprises were major contributions to the stagnation of the Indonesian 
economy in the early 1960s. The already depleted financial resources of the new 
nation were brought to the point of exhaustion by the military expenditures 
required to maintain the West Irian conflict and Confrontasi campaigns against 
Malaysia. Budget allocations for the armed forces in the early 1960s made up 
about 25 to 35 per cent of the government expenditure and no less than 50 per 
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cent of the state budget (Appendix, Table 13). Had these funds been rallied and 
used in investment projects, the economic picture of Guided Democracy would 
have been a great deal brighter. 
 The expropriation of Dutch and other foreign businesses occurred in 
the framework of the Guided Economy. The foundations of this economic 
model were laid in the 1945 Constitution, which strongly emphasized state 
control of the economy. During the periods of the revolutionary struggle and 
Parliamentary Democracy, state control was exercised only in a fairly limited 
way, restricted to supervision, co-operatives and the formation of a small 
number of state-owned enterprises. The Guided Economy swung the pendulum 
in the opposite direction and stressed state ownership, while the co-operative 
sector also still continued to be encouraged. In 1960, Indonesia had 27,301 co-
operatives involving more than 5 million people. The number of co-operatives 
rose to 50,158 co-operatives in 1962 and 62,376 in 1964 with the corresponding 
increase in membership from 10 million to 12 million, respectively.163 The 
conversion of foreign firms into state-owned enterprises, coupled with the 
abolishment of the colonial agrarian law and a radical retooling of the economic 
management apparatus, signaled the dismantling of what remained of the 
economic structure of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia after Independence. By 
the end of 1965, the transition to an independent national economy in Indonesia 
had been completed. Although the price for this economic transformation was 
high, the efforts made under the Guided Economy paved the way for the 
economic development of Indonesia in the future.   
                    





In November 1945, the President of the Republic of Vietnam, H! Chí Minh, 
sent a letter addressed to ‘the President of the Republic of Indonesia’, proposing 
that a joint declaration of solidarity to be made by Indonesia and Vietnam in the 
form of a ‘Preparatory Commission Struggling for a Federation of the Free 
Peoples of Southern Asia’. The letter, entrusted to an American journalist 
named Harold Isaacs, did not reach President Soekarno.1 It was handed to Vice-
President Mohammad Hatta, who then passed it on to Prime Minister Sutan 
Sjahrir.Sjahrir discussed the offer with Soedjatmoko Koko, the interpreter to 
foreign correspondents of the Republican government, but told him that he 
would not reply and preferred just to ignore the letter. Sjahrir indifference 
sprang from his conviction that the situation in Indonesia and Vietnam were 
very different. The Indonesian Nationalists were up against the Dutch, who 
were ‘a weak colonial power and could be defeated quickly.’ H! Chí Minh had 
to contend with the French, who could and would resist him for a long time. 
Furthermore he looked askance at the fact that the DRV government depended 
on support from the Communists, which was not the case in Indonesia. In 
conclusion, Sjahrir argued, ‘If we ally ourselves with H! Chí Minh, we shall 
weaken ourselves and delay Independence.’2 
The story of the missed opportunity for co-operation between Vietnam 
and Indonesia3 as a result of Sjahrir’s ‘betrayal of the greater Asian Revolution’, 
as Soedjatmoko Koko puts it, is tailor-made for the scope of this study. It 
                    
1 Harold Robert Isaacs is the author of No peace for Asia, which has been cited widely in this 
dissertation. In the book, Isaacs claimed that he was H! Chí Minh’s ‘Shanghai friend of long 
ago’. In mid-November 1945, Isaacs visited Vietnam and met H! Chí Minh. The letter was 
probably given to Isaacs on this occasion. Isaacs claims that H! Chí Minh could not count on 
support from Russia, the French Communists, or the Chinese. Thwarted in this he turned to 
leaders of the new Nationalist revolutions in Southern Asia, including Indonesia. Harold R. 
Isaacs, No peace for Asia (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1967) 173.  
2 Papanek, “Note on Soedjatmoko’s recollections of a historical movement; Sjahrir’s reaction to 
H! Chí Minh 1945 call for a Free People Federation”, Indonesia, 49 (1990) 141-144. 
3It was not until 1955 that Vietnam and Indonesia officially established diplomatic relationship in 
the wake of the Bandung Conference, whose aim was to foster closer relations between the 




discusses the transformation towards a national economy in both Indonesia and 
Vietnam within the wider context of the Nationalist struggles for Independence 
in the two countries. The study focuses on the twin processes of economic 
decolonization and nation-building, paying special attention to political and 
institutional factors involved in the process. It has been demonstrated in this 
study that, despite the differences in the political situations resulting in the 
adoption of divergent strategies, the Vietnamese and Indonesian leadership were 
in fact pursuing similar long-term goals, namely: to carry out economic 
nationalism. Certainly, the Indonesian determination to get rid of economic 
legacy of Dutch colonialism and place the economy under the strong state 
control and ownership, in accordance with the spirit of Guided Democracy and 
the Guided Economy in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, did bear some 
resemblance to the socialist transformation in North Vietnam in the 1950s and 
to the high concentration of economic power in the hands of the Ngô 1ình 
Di'm government in South Vietnam in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. 
Politically speaking, Sjahrir was right in anticipating the outcome of the 
Nationalist struggles in the two countries. In November 1949, the Netherlands 
finally acknowledged the political Independence of Indonesia. In Vietnam the 
story was different. Vietnam had to continue its military struggle against the 
French until 1954 for the Independence of North Vietnam and against the 
Americans until 1975 for the Independence and the unification of the whole 
country. If a battle to attain economic independence should be considering an 
integral part of the Nationalist revolution alongside the achievement of political 
Independence, Sjahrir’s argument is obviously no longer appropriate. It is an 
incontrovertible fact that it was not until December 1957 that the Indonesians 
finally wrested economic power from the Dutch. It took another couple of years, 
in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, before the Indonesian government 
proceeded to confront the economic power of the Chinese, British and 
Americans. In contrast, the Independence of North Vietnam in 1954 went hand-
in-hand with the full economic decolonization of French enterprises. The 
liquidation of most of the remaining French and Chinese enterprises in South 
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Vietnam in the late 1950s and the early 1960s brought of the process of the 
French decolonization in Vietnam to an end. 
Sjahrir was well aware of and actually did point out one major 
difference between the leadership of Indonesia and of Vietnam. In Indonesia, 
the great majority of the leaders of the Republican government were 
Nationalists, whereas most members of the DRV government were 
revolutionary leaders who had espoused a Communist ideology. This seems a 
straightforward statement, but it does not immediately ring true of the 
Vietnamese situation immediately after Independence, at which time the DRV 
government still consisted of a considerable number of non-Communist 
Nationalists. However, from late 1946, and especially after its retreat to the Vi't 
B@c base in February 1947, the DRV government was indeed dominated by its 
Communist members. In 1951, the Communist Party officially declared its 
leadership of the country, leading inexorably to the ‘partification’ of the state. 
The intrusion of the Party members into the state apparatus was accelerated in 
North Vietnam after 1954, and by 1960, Party members had obtained most of 
the important positions in the DRV government.  
Although they were marginalized as a result of the political purge in 
late 1946, the non-Communist Nationalist forces in Vietnam were not totally 
dead. They re-emerged again in South Vietnam after the partition of the country 
as a result of the Geneva Agreement in 1954. The Di'm government consisted 
of Nationalist intellectuals who had served in the colonial administration. As 
North Vietnam was gradually transformed into a Socialist state, South Vietnam 
became an anti-Communist state, supported by the United States and other 
capitalist countries. Nationalism in South Vietnam was not a pure strain but 
admixed with personalism, which allowed Di'm to concentrate the power in the 
hands of his family members and friends. 
Nobody could deny that post-independence Indonesia was led by the 
Nationalists. The Communists did not hold any high-level positions in 
government until the early 1960s, despite their strong support by the population 
and in Parliament. Admittedly, the political influence of the Indonesian 




elections in 1955 and reached its zenith in the early 1960s, when Soekarno 
imposed the Guided Democracy. In contrast to North Vietnam, Indonesian 
Communists had to face enduring hostilities, not only from various other 
political parties, but also from the emerging new force of the army. Eventually, 
in late 1965 and early 1966, the army launched the killing campaigns targeting 
the Communists, bringing the history of PKI to a catastrophic end. After March 
1966, Communism was banned in Indonesia. The collapse of PKI was in a stark 
contrast to the steady expansion of Communism in North Vietnam, where the 
Vietnamese Communist Party had won an unchallengeable position by the late 
1950s.  
The Indonesian Nationalists were not one bloc but were riven by many 
internal divisions and affiliations with various political parties. Three of the 
major political parties, which successively dominated the Indonesian 
government in the immediate post Independence period, were the Socialist 
Party (PS), the religiously (Islam)-oriented Masjoemi and the Nationalist Party 
(PNI). Under Sjahrir’s chairmanship, PS was able to exert the strongest 
influence during the negotiations for Independence with the Dutch in the late 
1940s. Once this had been achieved, the Masjoemi-PNI political coalition 
stepped in to control the Indonesian government in the early 1950s, although in 
different cabinets one party alternated strength with the other. Furthermore, a 
number of Indonesian Nationalist leaders did not even belong to any political 
party. Within the same party, a diversity of opinion could exist. The rivalry 
between and within the political parties was the main reason for the great 
instability in the political system and the upshot was the short time span of the 
successive Indonesian cabinets. The introduction of Guided Democracy in the 
late 1950s was an effort by Soekarno to stabilize the political structure. Aware 
of the precarious situation in which the country found itself, the President hoped 
to create a political consensus and national solidarity. In 1960, only ten political 
parties were legally permitted. Unquestionably, the determined, authoritarian 
nature of Soekarno’s government under Guided Democracy did resemble both 
the Communist government of North Vietnam and Di'm’s despotic government 
of South Vietnam, albeit in various degrees. 
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Another important difference in the leadership composition in Indonesia 
and Vietnam after Independence had to do with professional competence, 
especially in the field of economic management. With the exception of a few 
ministers who had been employed in the French colonial administration, all the 
revolutionary leaders of the DRV government had had no practical experience 
of organizing an economy. Although members of the Di'm government had 
been civil servants in the former colonial state, the majority had been low-and 
middle-ranking officials. Ngô 1ình Di'm himself had been appointed governor 
of Bình ThuDn province, in Central Vietnam.4 French policies of exclusion had 
prevented the Vietnamese from acquiring positions of any real responsibility in 
the colonial administration. By contrast, owing to Japanese policies during their 
occupation of the Netherlands Indies, many Indonesian leaders had had the 
experience of being appointed to top level positions in departmental hierarchies. 
They subsequently became senior leaders of the Indonesian government. 
Therefore, it can be inferred that, in comparison with Vietnam which continued 
to function under its Vichy regime, post-war Indonesia possessed more experts 
with some experience in economics. Nevertheless, for a country the size of 
Indonesia, such persons were in very short supply, especially at the lower 
levels. 
The differences in political and professional backgrounds of the 
leadership of Indonesia and Vietnam had a great impact on the development of 
the Nationalist struggle for Independence in the two countries. As Sjahrir stated 
at a meeting of the Vietnam-United States Friendship Committee in New York 
in September 1947, Indonesia and Vietnam might follow different paths to 
Independence. What was important were their long-term goals for their nations 
and for the region.5 In response to the intrusion of external factor, the leaders of 
Indonesia and Vietnam did indeed adopt different strategies in their struggle. 
Nevertheless, they shared a common goal in pursuing a meaningful 
                    
4Denis A. Warner, The last Confucian; Vietnam, South East Asia, and the West (Sydney: Angus& 
Robertson, 1964) 89. 
5 William H. Frederick, ‘Brothers of a kind; Perspectives on comparing the Indonesian and 
Vietnamese revolutions’, in: Taufik Abdullah (ed.). The heartbeat of Indonesian revolution. 




independence, one embracing both political and economic sovereignty. They 
both favoured a national economic system in which the state played a leading 
role. Consequently, the Nationalist struggles in Indonesia and Vietnam brought 
about radical changes in the economic system of the two countries, at least in 
comparison with what happened in other Southeast Asian countries.  
The Indonesian Nationalist leaders adopted a pragmatic strategy and 
decided to gain Independence by negotiation. This decision was based on the 
belief that the Netherlands was a weak colonial power. Highly aware of Dutch 
concerns about the future of their economic interests in Indonesia, the 
Indonesian leaders sought to play the card of economic concessions as the 
means to achieve Dutch recognition of Indonesian sovereignty. Dutch 
enterprises which had been seized from the Japanese by the Indonesians during 
the early months after Independence were gradually returned to their owners. 
The Indonesian pragmatic policy, indubitably assisted by American pressure 
judiciously exerted on the Netherlands government, resulted in the agreements 
reached at the Round Table Conference in November 1949. Indonesia was at 
long last granted its Transfer of Sovereignty from the Netherlands on 27 
December 1949, excluding the territory of West Irian (West New Guinea). 
In fact, H! Chí Minh had also tried to prevent what he knew would be a 
protracted and bitter war by offering economic concessions to the French. In his 
conversation with Harold Isaacs in mid-November 1945, H! Chí Minh told that 
he was prepared to negotiate the Vi't Minh recognition of the French economic 
position in Vietnam in return for French recognition of Vietnamese 
Independence. He was willing to accept a compromise since, ‘We have been 
paying out our life’s blood for decades. Suppose it costs us a few hundred 
million more piastres to buy our freedom.’6 The majority of the economic 
concessions made by H! Chí Minh to the French in the Modus Vivendi of 14 
September 1946 were similar to those made by Indonesian leaders to the Dutch 
in both the Linggadjati Agreement in 1947 and the Finec Agreement in 1949, 
with the exception of the stipulations about Indonesian debt obligations. In 
                    
6 Harold R. Isaacs, No peace for Asia (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1967) 175. 
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Vietnam, it was the aggression of French officials, who were determined to 
break off relations with the Communist-controlled Vietnamese government, 
which frustrated the efforts to reach a peaceful settlement by President H! Chí 
Minh and the top leaders of the French government in Paris.7 Once the war had 
officially broken out in December 1946, the policies of the DRV government 
pertaining to French businesses underwent a radical change. Besides its military 
operations, the Vi't Minh organized sabotage campaigns targeting the French 
economic installations.  
The French enterprises in Vietnam were badly damaged during these 
economic sabotage campaigns organized by the Vi't Minh. Following the 
pattern of the steady expansion of Vi't Minh-controlled territories in the early 
1950s, French mines and factories in North Vietnam gradually fell into the 
hands the Vi't Minh and industrial installations in the cities as well as the 
rubber plantations in South Vietnam were under constant attack. Under such 
unfavourable, economically ruinous conditions, French companies thought it 
expedient to withdraw their operations from Vietnam, acts which were in 
contradiction to the calls from the French authorities for more private 
investment under the Bourgoin Plan. The withdrawal of the French business 
from Vietnam began in 1948 and became the prevailing tendency in the early 
1950s. Banking corporations and manufacturing firms gradually transferred 
their business to other French colonies or back to France. The remaining French 
firms in North Vietnam moved to the South after the implementation of the 
Geneva Agreement in 1954-1955. The southwards evacuation of the French was 
accompanied by the emigration of Chinese and Vietnamese Roman Catholics. 
However, it was not long before the economic position of the French 
and the Chinese in South Vietnam was being challenged by Di'm’s economic 
nationalist policies. During the land reform promulgated in late 1956, major 
French rice plantations were transferred to Vietnamese ownership. By imposing 
restrictive administrative measures, Di'm’s government forced the French 
                    
7 Stein Tønnesson, Vietnam 1946; How the war began (Berkely: University of California Press, 
2010) 5-6; Laying the blame for the provocation of the war on shoulders of the local French 
officials in Indochina has also been well documented in Philippe Devillers, Paris-Saigon-




companies to liquidate their businesses to Vietnamese. The French were 
allowed to retain the ownership of rubber plantations, because of the rising 
share of rubber in export revenues and a shortage of funds to compensate 
French owners. The expropriation of the Chinese economic interests was 
motivated by forcing all Chinese born in Vietnam to take out Vietnamese 
citizenship. In yet another repressive move, foreign nationals were banned from 
a number of occupations which had been in the hands of the Chinese since the 
colonial times. By the fall of the Di'm regime in late 1963, almost all foreign 
companies associated with French colonialism had been placed under control of 
the Vietnamese authorities. 
Strikingly, at the time the French companies began to move out of 
Vietnam, the Dutch were strengthening their economic position in Indonesia. 
Dutch installations still occupied by the Indonesians were returned to their 
owners shortly after the Transfer of Sovereignty. With the exception of the 
nationalization of the central bank and of a number of public utilities, no other 
significant transfers of ownership from Dutch to Indonesian hands took place in 
the early and mid-1950s. Between 1950 and 1957, Dutch firms continued to 
invest in Indonesia. Therefore, independent Indonesia was again teetering on the 
brink of the pitfall of being a colonial economy. Dutch firms and British and 
American multinationals controlled the modern sector, leaving indigenous 
Indonesians to engage in agriculture and handicrafts. The Chinese dominated 
internal trade and were also engaged in mining and industry. In a nutshell, 
foreign business in post-Independence Indonesia remained profitable. Up to 
1957, profit remittances to the Netherlands from Indonesia were still large, 
enough to make a considerable contribution to the Dutch national income 
(Appendix, Table 14).  
The Dutch predominance in large parts of the Indonesian economy was 
abruptly subject to a radical change in December 1957, when almost all Dutch-
owned companies were taken over by the Indonesian trade unions, subsequently 
to be put under military supervision. They were officially nationalized by the 
Indonesian government in 1959. The oil company BPM and Unilever escaped 
nationalization saved by their dual nationality as Anglo-Dutch firms. 
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Unquestionably, tensions arising from the continued domination of the Dutch in 
the Indonesian economy were an important factor in forcing this catalyst, but 
the immediate reason lay in the protracted dispute between Indonesia and the 
Netherlands over the territory of West Irian. At the Round Table Conference in 
1949, Dutch and Indonesian leaders had agreed that the political status of West 
Irian would be determined within one year from the date of Transfer of 
Sovereignty. But nothing was resolved and the matter just simmered on.  
The next target of Indonesian economic nationalism was the Chinese, 
whose businesses were expropriated in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This 
time, the seizure was directly orchestrated by the Indonesian authorities, 
claiming exigent economic and political grounds or hiding behind the banner of 
protecting the interests of the Indonesian people. The more subtle motivation 
was exposed in the prohibition of the publication of Chinese-language 
newspapers in April 1958, and on various social organizations, charities, trade 
associations, schools, shops, banks, estates, notably mining companies run by 
the Chinese. They were either banned outright or put under control of the 
Indonesian government. In 1960, Chinese and other foreign nationals were 
barred from trading in rural areas. Just as the ethnic Chinese in South Vietnam, 
their compatriots in Indonesia were forced to sell their businesses in the 
countryside to local people.  Large companies, such as the Oei Tiong Ham 
Concern, fell under direct control by the Indonesian government. 
Between 1963 and 1965 the take-over of the British and American 
enterprises was pursued in conjunction with Soekarno’s deflective 
Confrontation policy against imperialist and colonial powers, particularly the 
United States and Great Britain which were heavily involved in the formation of 
the Malaysian Federation and the escalating war in Vietnam. British estates, 
insurance companies, manufacturing enterprises and facilities of Shell were 
seized by trade unions in September 1963 and again January 1964. In 
November 1964, the Indonesian government officially declared that all British 
firms, with the exception of the Shell, would be placed under its control. In a 
similar move, in March 1965, American companies, including Stanvac and 




import companies, were seized by trade unions. The Indonesian government 
officially stepped in on 24 April 1965 when President Soekarno decreed that all 
foreign enterprises were to be placed under government control, regardless of 
nationality. Until the restitution of most of British and American companies in 
the late 1960s, for the first time Indonesia was completely freed of foreign 
economic domination.  
The implementation of the Presidential degree of 24 April 1965 marked 
the accomplishment of the Indonesian Nationalist struggle for economic 
sovereignty. The very radical ends to this struggle resembled the total 
liquidation of French business interests from North Vietnam after 1954. 
Nevertheless, it differed slightly from the situation in South Vietnam where 
rubber plantations and a small number of public enterprises still maintained in 
French hands and the Di'm government permitted a limited amount of new 
foreign investment.  It can with justification be claimed that these rather trifling 
differences do not obscure the fact that the common goal of the Vietnamese and 
Indonesian leaders was to obtain a truly national economy, freed of control by 
foreign capital (on paper at least). 
Another aspect of the economic struggles in Vietnam and Indonesia 
concerned the new national forms of economy established to replace their 
former colonial counterparts. As befitted colonial economies, the structures of 
the economy in French Indochina and colonial Indonesia were geared towards 
primary production rather than manufacturing. The majority of Dutch and 
French private investors were interested in the extraction of agriculture and 
mining products, and the colonies were regarded as a captive market outlets for 
manufactured goods from the metropolis. In both countries, internal trade was 
largely dominated by the Chinese. In the beginning, the Japanese occupation did 
bring some changes in the economic system of the Netherlands Indies and 
Indochina. Not only was there a transfer of economic power from Western 
companies and the Chinese to the Japanese, but the colonial economies were 
also diversified by the introduction of new crops and industries. Both the 
Netherlands Indies and Indochina grew less dependent on the world market.  
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A new national system of economy was introduced in Indonesia and 
Vietnam immediately after their Independence had been proclaimed in August 
and September 1945, respectively. The 1945 Constitution of the DRV favoured 
a moderate system of control, whereas the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia stressed the importance of state control of the economy. It was 
strongly felt that important enterprises should be in the hands of the state. 
Private capital could participate in joint ventures and idealistic co-operatives, 
but would no longer wield the sceptre as it had done in the colonial era. 
Considering the financial and technical bottlenecks in the country compounded 
by the increasing Dutch military threat, this sought-after economic system faded 
into the realm of dreams. Bowing to reality, the pragmatic strategy adopted by 
the government in the late 1940s and the early 1950s was to accept the 
inevitable necessity of foreign control of large segments of the economy while 
the country settled down to pursue and nurture political Independence and 
economic development. Consequently, main features of the Dutch colonial 
economy remained largely intact in Indonesia in the immediate post-
Independence period. State control was exercised only in the fields of 
supervision, co-operatives and the formation of a small number of state 
enterprises. Appeals from the Communist and various Nationalist parties asking 
for the nationalization of vital enterprises, which would make them state 
property, were consistently rejected by the Indonesian government.  
The DRV government also exercised little intervention in the economy 
during the early years after Independence, with the exception of taking direct 
management of the defence industries and a number of enterprises 
manufacturing essential goods. Change began to infiltrate the system in 1951 
when the Communist Party officially took over the policy making of the DRV. 
The principles of a socialist economy, akin to the socialist economic models 
implemented in China and the Soviet Union were gradually brought into effect 
in North Vietnam. Between December 1953 and July 1956 in particular, the 
Party carried out a radical land reform, which erased the former systems of land 
ownership in the Vietnamese countryside. Land reform was followed by 




production co-operatives. The ownership of land was vested in the hands of the 
state, which also took control of the agricultural output of the co-operatives and 
its distribution. The socialist transformation in industry, handicrafts and 
commerce began in late 1957 after short-term plans for economic reconstruction 
to repair the damage resulting from the protracted warfare had been largely 
completed. Former French companies were grouped into state enterprises and 
Vietnamese private firms were encouraged to co-operate with the government in 
the formation of joint enterprises or industrial co-operatives. By 1960, the 
socialist transformation in North Vietnam had by and large been completed and 
the Party-state had taken control of all the important means of production and 
distribution.  
The economic re-organization in South Vietnam also led to a 
concentration of economic power in the hands of the new Vietnamese 
government. Di'm’s personalism required every citizen to contribute part of 
his/her property to the government, although in principle it did recognize private 
property rights. The upshot was that, under land reform a larger part of 
confiscated land remained government owned, while a smaller part was 
allocated to peasants. As did the North, the Di'm government also encouraged 
peasants to participate in co-operates, but it took a slightly different tack.  The 
co-operative campaigns in the South were conducted along more voluntary lines 
and the southern co-operatives enjoyed a greater autonomy from the central 
government. Moreover, the South Vietnam government did not take control of 
large rubber plantations, most of which were owned by the French and 
American firms. In the manufacturing sector, the government established new 
state-owned enterprises to purchase the majority of shares or even take full 
control of existing foreign companies. New foreign investment was only 
accepted in the form of joint ventures, in which the government held at least 51 
per cent of equity. All banking tasks were placed under supervision of the 
government-owned National Bank of Vietnam. Di'm’s economic philosophy, 
with its strong bias towards state ownership but eschewing the elimination of 
private participation, did not diverge greatly from many of the economic 
policies of the DRV in the early years after Independence and those of the 
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Republic of Indonesia in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. As a consequence 
of the excessive dependence of South Vietnam on military and financial aid 
from the United States, Di'm’s economic nationalism was doomed to remain an 
illusion, the price of which was the collapse of the First Republican regime and 
the loss of his own life.  
A radical change in the structure of the Indonesian economy occurred in 
the late 1950s and the early 1960s. It was characterized by the state taking the 
direct control and the management of the national economy under the policy of 
the Guided Economy. Following the reinstitution of the 1945 Constitution of 
the Republic of Indonesia, its economic principles were brought into effect 
without fear or favour. With the exception of a number of small estates and 
shops, which assigned to the private sector, large Dutch, Chinese, British and 
American enterprises were reorganized and incorporated into new state-owned 
enterprises. The management of these enterprises was entrusted to various 
government agencies, which were merged into the existing state enterprises. 
Major co-ordinating bodies included the BP Bank2 Bank Belanda Pusat 
(banking), BUD (trade), BAPPIT (manufacturing and mining), PPN 
(plantations) and BARPHAR (pharmacy). Each co-ordinating agency had a 
board of directors consisting of selected cabinet ministers, army officers and 
representatives of the Communist-led trade unions. Here it deviated from the 
situation in North Vietnam where the Party cadres took on full responsibility for 
the management of state enterprises and co-operatives. Moreover, whereas 
North and South Vietnam received aid from the Socialist bloc and capitalist 
countries, respectively, the Indonesian economy was increasingly geared 
towards self-reliance. The Indonesians did not intend to impose either 
Communism or Capitalism on their country.8They sought to build an Indonesian 
kind of Socialism, an economic model based on Soekarno’s own ideologies. 
Despite their differences, Indonesian Socialism and its counterpart in North 
Vietnam displayed similarities in terms of the centrally planned administration 
of the national economy. After a period of divergent development in their 
                    




Nationalist struggles, in the early 1960s both the Indonesians and the 
Vietnamese obtained their primary goals of economic independence, by 
constructing a truly national economy. The ways in which they realized these 
goals had a tremendous effect on the stability of their regimes as well as the 
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Table 13: Revenue and expenditure of the Indonesian 
government, 1960 - 1965 (Rp. million) 
 
 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Expenditures 
(-) 
62,156 97,798 116,819 334,467 669,995 1,749,812 
Revenues 
(+) 
49,877 66,000 77,205 153,303 199,987 821,250 
Deficit (-) 12,279 31,798 39,614 181,164 470,008 928,562 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Report of Bank Indonesia for the financial 




Table 14: The contribution of Indonesia to the Dutch 









1954 24,310 1093 4.5 
1955 26,850 1088 4.1 
1956 28,560 945 3.3 
1957 30,520 882 2.9 
Source: Het economisch belang van Indonesië voor Nederland 
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This study discusses the transformation from a colonial into a national economy 
in Indonesia and Vietnam. It focuses on two intertwined processes of economic 
decolonization and reconstruction in the two countries after the Second World 
War, paying special attention to political and institutional factors involved in 
these processes. The study demonstrates that, although differences in the political 
situations resulted in the adoption of divergent strategies, the Vietnamese and 
Indonesian leadership were in fact pursuing similar long-term goals, namely: 
achieving economic independence. The Indonesian government was determined 
to get rid of the economic legacy of Dutch colonialism by placing the whole 
economy under the strong state control and ownership, in accordance with the 
spirit of Guided Democracy and Guided Economy in the late 1950s and the early 
1960s. This effort resembled much the socialist transformation of North Vietnam 
in the 1950s and the various means by which the government of South Vietnam 
concentrated economic power in its hands during the late 1950s and the early 
1960s. 
 The study first concentrates on major differences to the political and 
institutional framework of Indonesia and Vietnam immediately after 
Independence. Indonesian leaders were mainly Nationalists who were affiliated 
with various political parties. Many of them had served in the Dutch colonial 
authority and the Japanese administration and therefore had an extensive 
knowledge and experience in the field of economic management. By contrast, the 
majority of members of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(DRV) were revolutionary leaders adhering to Marxist ideology. In 1951, the 
Vietnamese Communist Party officially declared its leadership of the country, 
leading inexorably to a ‘partification’ of the state. The intrusion of the Party 
members into the state apparatus was accelerated in North Vietnam after 1954, 




and by 1960, the Party had gained control of most important positions in the DRV 
government. Even if the Vietnamese Nationalists obtained important positions in 
the DRV government in the early months after Independence, they were soon 
eliminated only to re-emerge again in South Vietnam after the partition of the 
country as a result of the Geneva Agreement in 1954.  
The differences in political and professional backgrounds of the 
leadership of Indonesia and Vietnam had a great impact on the process of 
economic decolonization in the two countries. Highly aware of Dutch concerns 
about the future of their economic interests in Indonesia, the Indonesian leaders 
sought to achieve Dutch recognition of Indonesian sovereignty by economic 
concessions. The Indonesian pragmatic policy resulted in the agreements reached 
at the Round Table Conference in November 1949. Indonesia was at long last 
granted its Transfer of Sovereignty from the Netherlands on 27 December 1949.  
The Vietnamese leaders had also tried to prevent war by diplomatic 
negotiation. Economic concessions made by H3 Chí Minh to the French in the 
Modus Vivendi of 14 September 1946 were similar to those made by the 
Indonesian leaders to the Dutch in the Linggadjati Agreement in 1947 and the 
Finec Agreement in 1949, with the exception of the stipulations about Indonesian 
debt obligations. The aggression of French officials in Vietnam, who were 
determined to break off relations with the Communist-controlled Vietnamese 
government, frustrated the efforts to reach a peaceful settlement by President H3 
Chí Minh and the top leaders of the French government in Paris.  
Following the pattern of the steady expansion of Vi-t Minh-controlled 
territories in the early 1950s, French mines and factories in North Vietnam 
gradually fell into the hands the Vi-t Minh and industrial installations in the cities 
as well as the rubber plantations in South Vietnam were under constant attack. 
Under such unfavourable conditions, French companies thought it expedient to 
withdraw their operations from Vietnam. The withdrawal of the French business 
from Vietnam began in 1948 and became the prevailing tendency in the early 
1950s. Banking corporations and manufacturing firms gradually transferred their 




business to other French colonies or back to France. The remaining French firms 
in North Vietnam moved to the South after the implementation of the Geneva 
Agreement in 1954-1955. The southwards evacuation of the French was 
accompanied by the emigration of Chinese and Vietnamese Roman Catholics. 
The economic position of the French and the Chinese in South Vietnam 
was soon challenged by Di-m’s policies of economic nationalism. During the 
land reform promulgated in late 1956, major French rice plantations were 
transferred to Vietnamese ownership. By imposing restrictive administrative 
measures, Di-m’s government forced the French companies to liquidate their 
businesses to Vietnamese. By the fall of the Di-m regime in November 1963, 
almost all foreign companies associated with French colonialism had been placed 
under control of the Vietnamese authorities. 
Strikingly, at the time the French companies began to move out of 
Vietnam, the Dutch held on to their economic position in Indonesia. The Dutch 
predominance in the Indonesian economy only became subject to a radical 
change in December 1957, when almost all Dutch-owned companies were taken 
over by the Indonesian trade unions and the military. They were officially 
nationalized by the Indonesian government in 1959. The takeover of the British 
and American enterprises took place between 1963 and 1965 in conjunction with 
Soekarno’s defective Confrontation policy. On 24 April 1965, President Soekarno 
officially decreed that all foreign enterprises were to be placed under government 
control. Indonesia was completely freed of control by foreign capital for the first 
time.  
Another aspect of the economic struggles in Vietnam and Indonesia 
concerned the new national forms of economy that were established to replace 
their former colonial counterparts. The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia stressed the importance of state control of the economy, but this desired 
economic system faded into the realm of dreams. The Indonesian pragmatic 
strategy in the late 1940s and the early 1950s was to accept the inevitable 
necessity of foreign control over large segments of the economy in pursue of 




political independence and economic development. Consequently, main features 
of the Dutch colonial economy remained largely intact in Indonesia in the 
immediate post-Independence period. State control was exercised only in the 
fields of supervision, co-operatives and the formation of a small number of state 
enterprises.  
The 1945 Constitution of the DRV favoured a moderate system of state 
control. The DRV government initially exercised little intervention in the 
economy during the early years after Independence. Change began to infiltrate 
the system in 1951 when the Communist Party officially took over the policy 
making of the DRV. The principles of a socialist economy were gradually 
brought into effect in North Vietnam. Between December 1953 and July 1956, 
the Party carried out a radical land reform, which erased the former systems of 
land ownership in the Vietnamese countryside. Land reform was followed by 
collectivization campaigns, under which land was incorporated into agricultural 
production co-operatives. The socialist transformation in industry, handicrafts 
and commerce began in late 1957. By 1960, the socialist transformation in North 
Vietnam had by and large been completed and the Party-state had taken control of 
all the important means of production and distribution. The economic re-
organization in South Vietnam also led to a concentration of economic power in 
the hands of the Di-m government. Under land reform a larger part of confiscated 
land became government owned. The government established new state-owned 
enterprises to purchase the majority of shares or even take full control of existing 
foreign companies. New foreign investment was only accepted in the form of 
joint ventures, in which the government held at least 51 per cent of equity. 
A radical change in the structure of the Indonesian economy occurred in 
the late 1950s and the early 1960s. It was characterized by the state taking the 
direct control and management of the national economy under the policy of the 
Guided Economy. Following the reinstitution of the 1945 Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia in July 1959, its radical economic principles were brought 
into effect. The management of foreign enterprises was entrusted to various 
government agencies, whose board of directors consisted of selected cabinet 




ministers, army officers and representatives of the Communist-led trade unions. 
This was different from the situation in North Vietnam where the Party cadres 
took on full responsibility for the management of state enterprises and co-
operatives. Moreover, whereas North and South Vietnam received aid from the 
Socialist bloc and capitalist countries, respectively, the Indonesian economy was 
increasingly geared towards self-reliance. Soekarno sought to build an Indonesian 
kind of Socialism, or the so-called ‘Socialism à la Indonesia’. Despite their 
differences, Indonesian Socialism and its counterpart in North Vietnam displayed 
similarities in terms of the centrally planned administration of the national 
economy. Here, the Indonesians and the Vietnamese at long last obtained their 
primary goals of economic nationalism. All principles of their former colonial 
economies were abandoned and a truly national economy was constructed in the 
two countries. Although the price for this economic transformation was high, the 
achievement of independence in their economic affairs had laid foundation for the 






















Deze studie betreffende de overgang van de koloniale naar de nationale 
economieën van Indonesië en Vietnam analyseert de processen van economische 
dekolonisatie en wederopbouw die na de Tweede Wereldoorlog in beide landen 
plaatsvonden. Bijzondere aandacht krijgen de politieke en institutionele factoren 
die hierbij een rol speelden. Ondanks grote verschillen in de lokale politieke 
situaties, streefden het Vietnamese en het Indonesische leiderschap in feite het 
zelfde lange termijn doel na: economische onafhankelijkheid. Het Indonesische 
streven om zich van de koloniale economische erfenis te ontdoen en de gehele 
economie onder staatscontrole en –eigendom te plaatsen, leek in menig opzicht 
op de socialistische transformatie die in Noord Vietnam in de 50-er jaren 
plaatsvond, en op de hoge concentratie van economische macht die de regering 
van Zuid Vietnam in dezelfde periode naar zich toe trok. 
Het proefschrift richt zich in eerste instantie op de grote verschillen in de 
politieke en institutionele kaders van Indonesië en Vietnam onmiddellijk na de 
onafhankelijkheid. De Indonesische leiders waren nationalisten die aan 
verscheidene politieke partijen waren verbonden. Velen van hen hadden onder 
Nederlands en Japans bestuur gediend en bezaten een uitgebreide kennis en 
ervaring op het gebied van economisch beheer. Daartegenover bestond de 
meerderheid van de leden van de Democratische Republiek Vietnam (DRV) uit 
revolutionaire leiders die de communistische ideologie aanhingen. Het penetreren 
van deze partijleden in het staatsapparaat versnelde na 1954, en in 1960 had de 
Partij de belangrijkste posities verworven in de DRV-regering. Een deel van de 
Vietnamese nationalisten die snel uit het bestuur waren weggewerkt, dook 




opnieuw op in Zuid Vietnam na de deling van het land als gevolg van het 
Akkoord van Geneve in 1954. 
Het verschil in politieke en professionele achtergronden van de leiders 
van Indonesië en Vietnam had grote gevolgen voor het proces van economische 
dekolonisatie in beide landen. Aanvankelijk probeerden de Indonesische leiders 
erkenning te krijgen van Nederland door economische concessies te doen. Het 
Indonesische pragmatische beleid leidde tot de overeenkomsten die bereikt 
werden bij de Ronde Tafel Conferentie in november 1949. 
In feite waren de economische concessies die H3 Chí Minh deed aan de 
Fransen in de Modus Vivendi van 14 september 1946 vergelijkbaar met die van de 
Indonesische leiders hadden gedaan, met uitzondering van de bepalingen 
aangaande de schuldverplichtingen. Toen de onderhandelingen met de Fransen 
toch mislukten en het in december 1946 op een oorlog uitliep, veranderde het 
beleid van de DRV met betrekking tot de Franse bedrijven radicaal. Naast 
militaire operaties, organiseerde de Vi-t Minh ook sabotage campagnes gericht 
tegen de Franse economische vestigingen. Onder deze ongunstige 
omstandigheden vonden de Franse bedrijven het raadzaam om zich met hun 
activiteiten uit Vietnam terug te trekken. Dit proces begon in 1948 en werd een 
heersende tendens aan het begin van de 50er jaren. Banken en industriële 
ondernemingen werden geleidelijk verplaatst naar andere Franse koloniën of 
terug naar Frankrijk.  
In Zuid Vietnam werd de economische positie van de Fransen en de 
Chinezen al gauw bedreigd door het nationalistische beleid van Ngô "ình Di-m. 
Tijdens de landhervorming uitgevaardigd aan het eind van 1956, gingen de grote 
Franse rijstplantages over naar de Zuid Vietnamezen. Toen de regering van Di-m 
ten val kwam in 1963, waren bijna alle buitenlandse bedrijven die deel hadden 
uitgemaakt van de Franse kolonisatie, al in beheer genomen door de Vietnamese 
autoriteiten.  
Opvallend is dat de Nederlanders nog lang vasthielden aan hun economische 
positie terwijl de Franse bedrijven zich uit Vietnam begonnen te vertrekken. De 




Nederlandse overheersing over de Indonesische economie kwam pas ten einde in 
1957, toen bijna alle Nederlandse bedrijven werden bezet door de vakbonden en 
de militairen. Nationalisering door de Indonesische regering volgde in 1959. De 
etnisch Chinese minderheid werd het volgende doelwit van het Indonesische 
nationalisme. In 1960 werden Chinezen en andere buitenlanders buitengesloten 
van handel op het platteland. De overname van Engelse en Amerikaanse 
bedrijven vond plaats tussen 1963 en 1965 in het kader van Soekarno’s 
Confrontatie politiek. Op 24 april 1964 plaatste President Soekarno alle 
buitenlandse bedrijven onder regeringstoezicht. 
Een ander aspect van de economische strijd in Vietnam en Indonesië 
betreft de nationalisering van de economie. De grondwet van de Indonesische 
republiek van 1945 benadrukte het belang van staatscontrole van de economie, 
maar aanvankelijk werd staatstoezicht slechts uitgevoerd op coöperaties en de 
oprichting van kleine staatsbedrijven. Ook de DRV regering intervenieerde 
weinig in de economie tijdens de beginjaren van de onafhankelijkheid. 
Veranderingen drongen pas door in het systeem in 1951 toen de communistische 
partij officieel de beleidsvorming overnam van de DRV. Tussen december 1953 
en juli 1956 voerde de partij een radicale landhervorming uit, die alle 
voorafgaande systemen van grondbezit wegvaagde op het Vietnamese platteland. 
Landhervorming werd gevolgd door collectiviseringscampagnes, waarmee al het 
land ingelijfd werd in landbouw productie coöperaties. De socialistische 
overgang in de industrie, ambacht en handel begon in laat 1957. Rond 1960 was 
dit proces in Noord Vietnam in grote lijnen volbracht en was het beheer over alle 
belangrijke middelen van productie en distributie in handen van de partijstaat 
terecht gekomen.  
De economische reorganisatie in Zuid Vietnam leidde ook tot een 
concentratie van economische macht in handen van de Di-m regering. Bij de 
landhervorming werd een groot deel van het onteigende land eigendom van de 
staat. De regering richtte nieuwe staatsbedrijven op om de meerderheid van 
aandelen te kopen of zelfs het volledig beheer van bestaande buitenlandse 
bedrijven in handen te krijgen. Nieuwe buitenlandse investeringen werden slechts 




geaccepteerd in de vorm van joint ventures, waarin de regering minstens 51 
procent van het vermogen bezat. 
De radicale verandering in de structuur van de Indonesische economie 
vond pas eind jaren 50 plaats, toen de staat onder het motto van ‘Geleide 
Economie’ rechtstreeks controle ging uitoefenen over de nationale economie. Met 
uitzondering van een aantal kleine landgoederen en winkels in de privé sector 
werden grote Nederlandse, Chinese, Engelse en Amerikaanse bedrijven 
gereorganiseerd en ingelijfd in staatsbedrijven. Het management van deze 
bedrijven werd toevertrouwd aan verschillende regeringsinstanties met een raad 
van beheer bestaande uit geselecteerde kabinetministers, legerofficieren en 
vertegenwoordigers van de Communistische vakbonden. Dit verschilde 
aanmerkelijk met de situatie in Noord Vietnam waar de partijkaders de volle 
verantwoordelijkheid namen voor het management van staatsbedrijven en 
coöperaties. Terwijl Noord en Zuid Vietnam werden gesteund door 
respectievelijk het Socialistische blok en de kapitalistische landen, moest de 
Indonesische economie op eigen benen leren staan. Soekarno probeerde daarbij 
een eigen Indonesische Socialisme op te bouwen, het zogenaamde ‘Socialism à la 
Indonesia’. Ondanks verschillen vertoonden het Indonesische Socialisme en zijn 
tegenhanger in Noord Vietnam overeenkomsten op het vlak van de centraal 
geplande administratie van de nationale economie. Nu afscheid was genomen van 
alle principes van de koloniale economie, kwam in beide landen een ware 

















Studi ini membahas transformasi sebuah ekonomi kolonial menjadi ekonomi 
nasional di Indonesia dan Vietnam. Ia terfokus pada dua proses: dekolonisasi dan 
rekonstruksi ekonomi yang saling terkait satu sama lain di kedua negara tersebut 
sesudah Perang Dunia Kedua, dengan memberikan perhatian khusus pada faktor-
faktor politik dan institusional yang terlibat dalam proses-proses tersebut. Kajian 
ini menunjukan bahwa, meskipun berbagai perbedaan situasi politik yang 
menyebabkan perbedaan strategi yang diambil, para pemimpin Vietnam dan 
Indonesia pada dasarnya berusaha mencapai tujuan jangka panjang yang sama, 
yaitu: tercapainya nasionalisme ekonomi. Keinginan Indonesia untuk 
menyingkirkan warisan ekonomi kolonialisme Belanda dan menempatkan seluruh 
perekonomian di bawah kontrol dan kepemilikan negara yang kuat, sesuai dengan 
semangat Demokrasi Terpimpin dan Ekonomi Terpimpin pada akhir 1950an 
hingga awal 1960an, menyerupai transformasi sosialis di Vietnam Utara pada 
tahun 1950an dan konsentrasi kekuatan ekonomi di tangan pemerintah di 
Vietnam Selatan pada akhir 1950an dan awal 1960an. 
Pertama-tama, studi ini berkonsentrasi pada perbedaan-perbedaan besar 
dalam kerangka politik dan institusional Indonesia dan Vietnam sesaat setelah 
keduanya memperoleh kemerdekaan. Para pemimpin Indonesia utamanya adalah 
kalangan nasionalis yang berafiliasi dengan berbagai partai politik. Banyak 
diantara mereka pernah bekerja di dalam lingkaran pemerintahan kolonial 
Belanda dan Jepang sehingga memiliki pengetahuan dan pengalaman yang luas di 
bidang pengelolaan ekonomi. Sebaliknya, mayoritas anggota pemerintahan 
Republik Demokratik Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam - DRV) adalah 
pemimpin-pemimpin revolusioner yang menganut ideologi komunis. Pada tahun 




1951, Partai Komunis Vietnam mendeklarasikan secara resmi para pemimpin 
negerinya, sehingga kemudian mengakibatkan terjadinya sebuah ‘peleburan’  
(pertification) negara. Penyusupan anggota-anggota partai ke dalam berbagai 
aparat negara terjadi dengan cepat di Vietnam Utara sesudah tahun 1954, dan 
pada tahun 1960, Partai ini berhasil menguasai sebagian besar posisi penting di 
dalam pemerintahan DRV. Kalangan nasionalis Vietnam juga memperolah 
posisi-posisi penting di dalam pemerintahan DRV pada bulan-bulan awal sesudah 
kemerdekaan. Namun demikian, mereka segera tersingkirkan dan baru kemudian 
muncul kembali sebagai kekuatan politik di Vietnam Selatan setelah terjadinya 
pembagian negara sebagai akibat dari Persetujuan Jenewa (Geneva Agreement) 
tahun 1954. 
Perbedaan-perbedaan latar belakang politik dan professional di dalam 
kepemimpinan Indonesia dan Vietnam berdampak besar pada proses dekolonisasi 
ekonomi di kedua negara. Menyadari kekhawatiran Belanda akan masa depan 
kepentingan-kepentingan ekonominya di Indonesia, para pemimpin Indonesia 
berupaya memperoleh pengakuan Belanda terhadap kedaulatan Indonesia melalui 
konsesi-konsesi ekonomi. Perusahaan-perusahaan Belanda yang dirampas dari 
Jepang oleh pemerintah Indonesia selama bulan-bulan awal sesudah kemerdekaan 
dikembalikan kepada para pemiliknya semula secara bertahap. Kebijakan 
pragmatis Indonesia ini, tidak bisa dipungkiri dibantu oleh tekanan Amerika yang 
secara jitu berhasil memaksa pemerintah Belanda, yang dihasilkan melalui 
kesepakatan yang dicapai pada Konferensi Meja Bundar pada bulan November 
1949. Setelah menunggu sekian lama, Indonesia akhirnya memperoleh Transfer 
Kedaulatan dari  Belanda pada tanggal 27 Desember 1949. 
Faktanya, pemimpin-pemimpin Vietnam juga berusaha untuk mencegah 
perang melalui negosiasi diplomatik. Konsesi-konsesi ekonomi yang dibuat oleh 
H3 Chí Minh dengan Prancis dalam Modus Vivendi 14 September 1946 adalah 
mirip dengan apa yang dibuat pemimpin-pemimpin Indonesia dengan Belanda 
dalam Perjanjian Linggadjati pada tahun 1947 dan Perjanjian Finec pada tahun 
1949, kecuali butir-butir ketentuan mengenai kewajiban hutang Indonesia. Agresi 
pejabat-pejabat Prancis di Vietnam, yang menginginkan untuk memutuskan 




hubungan dengan pemerintah Vietnam yang dikuasai kalangan Komunis, 
mementahkan upaya-upaya untuk mencapai sebuah kesepakatan damai dengan 
Presiden H3 Chí Minh dan pemimpin-pemimpin utama pemerintah Prancis di 
Paris. Ketika perang akhirnya meletus pada Desember 1946, kebijakan 
pemerintah DRV berkenaan dengan bisnis-bisnis Prancis mengalami perubahan 
radikal. Selain melancarkan operasi militer, Vi-t Minh juga mengorganisir 
berbagai kampanye sabotase dengan target utama menghancurkan instalasi-
instalasi ekonomis milik Prancis. 
Perusahaan-perusahaan Prancis di Vietnam mengalami kerusakan parah 
selama kampanye sabotase ekonomi yang dilancarkan oleh Vi-t Minh tersebut. 
Seiring perluasan wilayah yang dikontrol oleh Vi-t Minh pada awal 1950an, 
tambang-tambang dan pabrik-pabrik Prancis di Vietnam Utara secara bertahap 
jatuh ke tangan Viet Min dan instalasi-instalasi industri di kota-kota, seperti 
halnya perkebunan-perkebunan karet di Vietnam Selatan, juga terus mengalami 
serangan. Dalam kondisi yang tidak menguntungkan tersebut, perusahaan-
perusahaan Prancis mulai mempertimbangkan pilihan untuk menghentikan 
operasinya dan menarik diri dari Vietnam. Penarikan bisnis Prancis dari Vietnam 
dimulai pada tahun 1948 dan menjadi kecenderungan umum pada awal 1950an. 
Korporasi perbankan dan perusahaan-perusahaan manufaktur secara bertahap 
mulai mentransfer bisnis mereka ke koloni-koloni Pernacis lainnya atau ke 
Prancis. Perusahaan-perusahaan Prancis yang tersisa di Vietnam Utara berpindah 
ke Selatan sesudah ditandatanginya Perjanjian Jenewa tahun 1954-1955. 
Evakuasi orang-orang Prancis ke wilayah selatan disertai oleh emigrasi orang-
orang Cina dan oang-orang Vietnam penganut Katolik Romawi. 
Posisi ekonomis Prancis dan Cina di Vietnam Selatan tergusur oleh 
kebijakan-kebijakan nasionalisme yang dikeluarkan oleh Di-m. Selama 
pelaksanaan reformasi tanah yang dimulai tahun 1956, perkebunan-perkebunan 
beras utama Perancis diambilalih kepemilikannya ke tangan orang Vietnam. 
Dengan menerapkan langkah-langkah administratif, pemerintahan Di-m 
memaksa perusahaan-perusahaan Prancis untuk menutup usahanya bagi orang 
Vietnam. Pengusaha Prancis diijinkan untuk memelihara kepemilikan mereka 




atas perkebunan-perkebunan karet, karena meroketnya saham nilai komoditas 
karet dalam nilai pendapatan ekspor dan karena kurangnya dana untuk 
memberikan kompensasi kepada para pemilik Prancis tersebut. Pengambilalihan 
kepentingan ekonomi Cina dilakukan dengan cara memaksa semua orang Cina 
kelahiran Vietnam untuk mencabut kewarganegaraan Vietnam-nya. Selain itu, 
orang-orang berkebangsaan asing juga dilarang bekerja di sejumlah profesi, yang 
sudah dikuasai oleh orang-orang Cina sejak zaman kolonial. Pada saat rejim 
Di-m jatuh pada November 1963, hampir semua perusahaan yang diasosiasikan 
dengan kolonialisme Prancis telah berada di bawah penguasaan otoritas Vietnam.  
Menariknya, pada saat perusahaan-perusahaan Prancis mulai berpindah 
ke luar Vietnam, Belanda  justru tengah memperkuat posisi ekonominya di 
Indonesia. Instalasi-instalasi Belanda yang diduduki oleh orang Indonesia 
dikembalikan kepada para pemiliknya sesaat setelah dilakukannya Penyerahan 
Kedaulatan. Kecuali nasionalisasi bank sentral dan sejumlah fasilitas publik lain, 
tidak ada transfer kepemilikan yang signifikan dari Belanda ke Indonesia di awal 
tahun 1950an. Dominasi Belanda dalam perekonomian Indonesia mulai 
mengalami perubahan radikal pada bulan Desember 1957, ketika hampir seluruh 
perusahaan milik orang Belanda diambil alih oleh organisasi-organisasi Serikat 
Dagang Indonesia dan militer. Mereka semua dinasionalisasi secara resmi pada 
tahun 1959 oleh pemerintah Indonesia. Perusahaan minyak BPM dan Unilever 
lolos dari nasionalisasi disebabkan oleh status nasionalitasnya yang ganda sebagai 
perusahan Inggris-Belanda (Anglo-Dutch). Cina menjadi target berikutnya dari 
nasionalisme ekonomi Indonesia. Di akhir tahun 1950an, berbagai organisasi 
sosial, asosiasi dagang, sekolah, toko, bank, perusahaan perkebunan dan 
pertambangan milik orang Cina dilarang beroperasi atau berada di bawah kontrol 
pemerintah Indonesia. pada tahun 1960, orang Cina dan bangsa asing lainnya 
dicekal dari perdagangan di wilayah pedesaan. Sebagaimana etnik Cina di 
Vietnam Selatan, saudara-saudara mereka di Indonesia juga dipaksa untuk 
menjual bisnis mereka di pedasaan kepada penduduk setempat. Perusahaan-
perusahaan besar, seperti Oei Tiong Ham Concern, jatuh di bawah penguasaan 
langsung pemerintah Indonesia. 




Penyitaan perusahaan-perusahaan Inggris dan Amerika terjadi antara 
1963 dan 1965 bersamaan dengan kebijakan konfrontatif Soekarno terhadap 
imperialis dan kekuatan-kekuatan kolonial, terutama Amerika Serikat dan 
Inggris, yang terlibat langsung dalam pembentukan Federasi Malaysia dan 
meluasnya perang di Vietnam. Perkebunan-perkebunan Inggris, perusahaan 
asuransi, perusahaan manufaktur, dan fasilitas-fasilitas Shell disita oleh serikat-
serikat dagang di akhir 1963 hingga awal 1964. Pada Maret 1965, perusahaan-
perusahaan Amerika, termasuk dua perusahaan minyak terkemuka, Stanvac dan 
Caltex, perusahaan-perusahaan manufaktur dan asuransi juga disita oleh serikat–
serikat dagang. Pada April 1965, Presiden Soekarno memutuskan secara resmi 
bahwa semua perusahaan asing akan diletakan di bawah pengawasan pemerintah. 
Hingga penyerahan sebagian besar perusahaan Inggris dan Amerika di akhir 
tahun 1960an, untuk pertama kalinya Indonesia terbebas dari kontrol modal 
asing.   
Aspek lain dari perjuangan ekonomi di Vietnam dan Indonesia berkenaan dengan 
pencarian bentuk baru perekonomian nasional yang dibangun untuk 
menggantikan ekonomi kolonial sebelumnya. Undang-undang Dasar Republik 
Indonesia tahun 1945 menekankan pentingnya kontrol negara terhadap ekonomi. 
Namun demikian, hambatan-hambatan finansial dan teknis yang dihadapi negeri 
ini yang muncul akibat meningkatnya ancaman militer Belanda, telah membuat 
sistem ekonomi yang diinginkan tersebut harus berhenti di tingkat impian semata. 
Indonesia harus mengadopsi kebijakan pragmatis di akhir tahun 1940an dan di 
awal tahun 1950an, yaitu dengan mengakui makna penting kontrol kekuasaan 
asing atas sebagian besar perekonomian demi menggapai kemerdekaan politik 
dan pembangunan ekonomi. Akibatnya, ciri-ciri utama dari perekonomian 
kolonial Belanda di Indonesia tetap bertahan kokoh selama periode sesaat 
sesudah kemerdekaan. Kontrol negara hanya bisa dicapai pada tingkat 
pengawasan, kerjasama dan dalam pembentukan sejumlah kecil perusahaan.  
Sebaliknya, Undang-Undang DRV tahun 1945 memungkinkan 
terwujudnya sebuah sistem kontrol negara yang moderat. Pemerintah DRV 
memiliki kewenangan untuk melakukan sedikit intervensi dalam perekonomian 




selama tahun-tahun awal sesudah kemerdekaan. Perubahan mulai menyentuh 
sistem ini pada tahun 1951 ketika Partai Komunis mengambil alih secara resmi 
proses pembuatan kebijakan di DRV. Prinsip-prinsip sebuah perekonomian 
sosialis secara perlahan mulai bekerja di Vietnam Utara. Antara Desember 1953 
dan Juli 1956, Partai Komunis melaksanakan kebijakan reformasi tanah 
(landreform) radikal, yang menghapus sistem kepemilikian tanah yeng berlaku 
sebelumnya di pedesaan Vietnam. Reformasi tanah tersebut segera diikuti oleh 
kampanye-kampanye kolektivisasi, yang menentukan bahwa tanah digabungkan 
ke dalam koperasi produksi pertanian. Hak kepemilikan tanah berada di tangan 
negara, yang juga mengambilalih hasil-hasil pertanian dari koperasi ini beserta 
distribusinya. Transformasi sosialis di bidang industri, kerajinan tangan dan 
perdagangan dimulai pada akhir tahun 1957. Bekas perusahaan-perusahaan 
Prancis digabungkan kedalam perusahaan-perusahaan negara dan perusahaan-
perusahaan swasta Vietnam dianjurkan untuk bekerjasama dengan pemerintah 
untuk membentuk perusahaan bersama atau koperasi industrial. Pada tahun 1960, 
transformasi sosialis di Vietnam Utara sebagian besar telah berakhir dan Partai – 
negara telah mengambilalih kontrol atas semua alat-alat produksi dan distribusi 
yang penting. Reorganisasi ekonomis di Vietnam Selatan juga menghasilkan 
suatu konsentrasi kekuasaan ekonomis di tangan pemerintahan Di-m. Di bawah 
program reformasi tanah sebagian besar tanah yang disita menjadi milik negara. 
Pemerintah mendirikan perusahaan-perusahaan milik negara untuk meraih 
mayoritas saham atau bahkan meraih kontrol penuh atas semua perusahaan asing 
yang ada. Investasi asing yang baru hanya bisa diterima dalam bentuk usaha 
bersama, yang didalamnya pemerintah menguasai setidaknya 51 persen equitas.     
Perubahan radikal dalam struktur perekonomian Indonesia terjadi pada 
akhir 1950an dan awal 1960an. Perubahan itu ditandai dengan Negara mengambil 
alih kontrol langsung dan manajemen perekonomian nasional melalui kebijakan 
Ekonomi Terpimpin. Seiring dengan diberlakukannya kembali Undang-Undang 
Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 pada bulan Juli 1959, maka prinsip-prinsip 
ekonomi radikal pun turut diterapkan. Dengan pengecualian sejumlah kecil 
perkebunan dan toko milik swasta, perusahaan-perusahaan besar milik Belanda, 




Cina, Inggris, dan Amerika direorganisasi dan digabungkan ke dalam perusahaan-
perusahaan baru milik negara. Manajemen perusahaan-perusahaan tersebut 
dipercayakan kepada sejumlah agensi pemerintahan, yang dewan direkturnya 
seringkali terdiri dari menteri-menteri kabinet, pejabat militer, dan perwakilan 
dari serikat dagang pimpinan Partai Komunis. Ini berbeda dengan situasi di 
Vietnam Utara, di mana kader-kader partai bertanggung jawab penuh atas 
manajemen perusahaan-perusahaan dan koperasi-koperasi. Selain itu, sementara 
Vietnam Utara dan Selatan yang masing-masing menerima bantuan dari blok 
Sosialis dan negara-negara kapitalis, ekonomi Indonesia diarahkan menuju 
kemandirian. Soekarno berupaya membangun sejenis sosialisme Indonesia, 
“Sosialisme ala Indonesia”. Meskipun memiliki perbedaan, Sosialisme Indonesia 
dan tetangganya di Vietnam Utara menunjukan sejumlah persamaan dalam hal 
perencanaan administrasi ekonomi nasional yang terpusat atau sentralistik. Pada 
titik inilah, pada akhirnya Indonesia dan Vietnam mampu mencapai tujuan-tujuan 
nasionalisme ekonomi mereka. Semua prinsip dasar perekonomian kolonial yang 
berlaku sebelumnya mereka tinggalkan dan sebuah perekonomian nasiona benar-
benar dibangun di kedua negara. Walaupun harga untuk transformasi ekonomi ini 
sangat tinggi, pencapaian kemerdekaan dalam persoalan-persoalan ekonomis 
telah meletakan fondasi yang kuat bagi perkembangan Indonesia dan Vietnam di 
periode-periode selanjutnya.  
